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- ABSTRACT -
Knowledge is both a phenomenon of the mind and of society. 
Most analyses of knowledge have tended to emphasize either the mental 
or societal attributes of knowledge, and have rarely sought out cross 
linkages between them. It is often argued that the disposition 'to 
know' is a conditional or warranted assertion, and the conditions upon 
which such assertions are based are a matter of consensual agreement 
amongst the members of a knowledge community. To acquire knowledge, 
then, is to be introduced into an arena where assertions about the world 
have been publicly authenticated. That introduction occurs in the 
context of education, and from it stems the slow displacement of a 
private disposition to the world by one that is public and consensual 
amongst members of a particular discipline. It is possible, in fact, 
to construct a model of that displacement and show how it is that 
exposure to knowledge results in the gradual accretion of an epistemo-
logical sensitivity towards the world. But knowledge is corrigible 
and subject to change, so that epistemological sensitivity is itself 
subject to modification. This raises the issue, then, of how it is 
and by whom epistemological modification is executed. In fact, it is 
possible to show that knowledge changes are in the main a matter of 
refining the nexus between knowledge and reality. That refinement is 
largely executed by certain sorts of members in knowledge communities. 
For within knowledge communities - which, it is argued, exist to 
promote refinements to knowledge - a number of roles can be prescribed, 
one of which, that of the researcher, advances the territory of publicly 
certifiable knowledge. But his role is not the only one essential to 
the functioning of knowledge communities. Teachers are also necessary 
to them. If disciplines are, in fact, to survive they must enlist new 
personnel to be researchers and teachers, with the requisite mental 
outlook and dispositions to the world, to continue the advancement of 
certified knowledge. 
The thesis contains no material which has been accepted 
for the award of any other degree or diploma in any 
University, and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, 
this thesis contains no material previously published or 
written by another person, except when due reference is 
made in the text of the thesis. 
Colin Symes. 
CHAPTER ONE 
PURPOSES AND ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
"In my beginning is my end" 
(T.S. Eliot, "East Coker" Four Quartets) 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The focus of this study revolves around delineating the traits 
and features of a discipline. Inevitably, such an investigation 
regresses to questions about the nature of knowledge and the character 
of that substantive content which the discipline serves to embrace. 
For * discipline' is only a rather convenient, but nonetheless, 
appropriate cognomen that has been attached to differentiated and 
autonomous 'species* of knowledge. Etymologically more adequate than 
other cognates that are used to designate the basic units or com-
partments of knowledge, the word 'discipline' evokes the notion of 
order and submission to rules (Hirst and Peters, 1970, p.125). Its 
adequacy stems from the fact that knowledge is indeed a form of rule 
governed behaviout that observes the canons and strictures inherent 
in a discipline. But there is more to a discipline than a collection 
of statutes and ordinances, designed to keep knowledge 'in order'. 
The notion that a discipline restrains untoward cognitive behaviour 
is dominant, but associated with it is an important epistemological 
function: that a discipline supplies methods for segmenting and 
analysing experience. To the extent that a discipline provides a 
set of rules for ordering and understanding aspects of reality, it 
has the character of a 'martinet'. But it is possible to over 
dramatise the metaphorical connotations that flow on from regarding 
a discipline as a martinet, and forget that, as a form of knowledge, 
its rules, unlike those which keep children and soldiers in order, 
supply a set of imperatives whose application results in the 
acquisition of knowledge. To disobey these disciplinary imperatives 
is punishable only to the extent that their flouting does not result 
in an extension of the territory of certified knowledge. Tradition-
ally, submission to discipline is thought to build character; in the 
epistemological sense, submission to its imperatives builds knowledge. 
The pursuit of knowledge, within the canons of a discipline, then, 
is an eminently 'moral* activity. It involves the submission to rules 
and the endorsement of the standards and norms which regulate a 
discipline. Such constraint is necessary to prevent personal 
ascriptions about the nature of reality, which do not follow the 
publicly accredited routes to knowledge (Ayer, 1972, p.33), being 
elevated to the status of legitimate knowledge. The norms, the rules, 
that are indigenous to a discipline, execute a form of * quality 
control* which prevents the standard of knowledge usually associated 
with a discipline being degraded. They adjudicate over what is and 
what is not knowledge. They act as form of behavioral control over 
epistemological activity. 
Knowledge, above all, is a communal affair. It has a civic 
dimension, and it occurs within an intellectual community whose 
members have agreed to constrain their pursuit of knowledge within 
the canons and norms of some disciplinary framework. The existence 
of such a consensual contract enables the fallacies, that might be 
induced by solipsism, to be cured and prevented. It does not 
necessarily mean that the personal component donated by the disciplin-
arian is wholly purged from the pursuit of knowledge. Within the 
parameters of the discipline's normative framework, he is permitted 
a certain amount of licence to impress his own individual standpoint 
upon knowledge. Indeed, it will be argued, that it is the tension 
between the public constraints of the discipline and the private 
desire to violate them that is the ultimate breeding ground of know-
ledge. Constraint, far from inhibiting the advancement of knowledge, 
actually enhances it. 
A disciplinary community, then, like any other community, requires 
that its members observe certain standards of conduct and behaviour. 
These requirements constitute what could be called the *moral code* 
of the discipline. This code legislates to curb defiance and maintain 
epistemological standards. Without it, the discipline would in-
evitably degenerate into anarchy and be prey to the pressures and 
vagaries of solipsism.* In order to discourage this, it is important 
that the admission of members into a disciplinary community be care-
fully controlled. Would-be members must obviously volunteer a sub-
mission to and a commitment towards the moral code of the discipline, 
if that code is to' be upheld. They must be seen to support its norms 
and abide by its rules; and to exhibit a loyalty to all the con-
straints the disciplinary system imposes. 
The sponsorship of admittance into a disciplinary community is 
largely conducted by education. It has evolved as the major insti-
tution in society to concern itself with that process of socializ-
ation or, as it has sometimes been called, "initiation" into the 
public forms of knowledge (Peters, 1970, pp.50-51). This process of 
* This might or might not be ultimately beneficial to the development 
of knowledge. The scope of this study is limited to the discussion 
of what is, not what ought to be. It is, however, worth counten-
ancing the possibility that Feyerabend (1976) has propounded, that 
the acceleration of knowledge acquisition is retarded by the pres-
ence of disciplinary constraints. Better a situation, Feyerabend 
argues, of epistemological anarchy than one where disciplinary con-
trol prohibits the fructification of new ideas, new thoughts, new 
knowledge: even if those ideas and thoughts mean that that knowledge 
ultimately turns out to be implausible. 
initiation or disciplinary apprenticeship can be regarded as enduring 
the whole length of education. Education might achieve many other 
things, but a primary purpose, as far as this study is concerned, is 
with conducting the procedures of admission into various disciplinary 
communities. These procedures, which involve supplying the student 
with the norms and standards, rules and ordinances associated with the 
discipline, take many forms and styles. Divers though they may be, 
their cimiulative impact is much the same; the development of a 
commitment to a disciplinary system. 
Through initiation, the student comes to learn the 'lingua franca' 
of the disciplinary community, its grammar and its vocabulary. He 
eventually comes to understand its values and its concepts in the way 
his fellow 'communards' do. He gradually learns to play and atcept 
the rules of the 'knowledge game' that the discipline serves to encap-
sulate. He comeŝ  to conform to the standards of the discipline, through 
acquiescing to the constraints they impose upon his reasoning. By 
completing a course of disciplinary apprenticeship, the student acquires, 
as it were, a licence to practise the pursuit of knowledge within the 
structure of the discipline's normative framework. He secures a kind 
of 'moral' autonomy within the intellectual community that the discipline 
represents. 
One of the cognitive side-effects of this initiation or apprentice-
ship, it has been argued (Kuhn, 1973), is that the members of a 
disciplinary community possess an outlook on the world which is distinc-
tive and exclusive to themselves. They are bound together by a 
common conceptual framework that orientates their analyses of the 
world in certain preferred directions. The community not only shares 
the same conceptual 'lingua franca' and a common set of disciplinary 
values, it also shares the same basic epistemological sensitivity to 
reality. 
This sensitivity, which, it will be argued, arises during the 
years of disciplinary apprenticeship, accumulates from a continuous 
exposure not only to the knowledge of a discipline, but also to its 
methodological and metaphysical prejudices. The impact of this 
sensitivity is to exaggerate and emphasize aspects of reality that 
would normally be below the threshold of normal perception and 
observation. Thé physicist's vision of the world is thus radically 
different from that of the layman. The latter can only appreciate 
the depth of vision the physicist sees by being trained as a 
physicist (Hanson, 1969a, p.16). 
This phenomenon of heightened sensitivity is not peculiar to 
those trained within the framework of a discipline, rather it is an 
extension of man's normal perceptual behaviour. All that is perceived, 
"seeing as", as Wittgenstein (1972, p.l93e) pointed out, is charged 
with interpretation, otherwise it would not be registered. The 
analysis of the world by the senses,- in conjunction with the mind, 
is accompanied by interpretation. Meaningful perception is born of 
learning about the conduct of the world, of having knowledge about it. 
It is broadly the thesis of this study that the training a discipline 
supplies simply extends this process and leads to the development of 
a set of "seeing as" interpretations not normally acquired in a 
casual acquaintance with reality. Such training exploits the fact 
that man's perceptual outlook is susceptible to transformation and 
change. 
The mental impact of disciplinary training, then, results in the 
amplification of an individual's ordinary sensitivity to the world. 
The discipline acts as a power amplifier. It extends the individual's 
cognitive powers and renders them sensitive to those features of 
reality which are of particular concern to the discipline. Disciplin-
ary training helps draw the attention of the individual to aspects of 
reality he would not normally be conscious of. The disciplined mind, 
then, is one that is regulated according to the norms and ordinances 
of knowledge; and it is one that sees the world in terms which are 
compatible with the implications it inherits from being trained within 
the epistemological framework of a discipline. 
* * * * * * 
The description of a discipline just outlined indicates the close 
proximity that the development of an epistemological sensitivity and 
education have to one another. It suggests that the cumulative impact 
of a formal education results in the slow transformation of the 
individual's mentality and outlook on the world. The disciplined mind, 
it is suggested, possesses a characteristic vision of the world. 
Almost analogous to the 'tropism' that some animals and flowers 
exhibit, such a mind is abnormally sensitive and responsive to 
certain stimuli that inhabit the scenario of its surrounds. This 
epistemological tropism, however, is not innate as it is in animals 
and flowers, it is learnt and acquired through long years of training 
and education in a discipline. This study will be concerned with 
understanding and describing the educational circumstances and the 
cognitive results thereof, which generate this form of mental tropism. 
It will examine the way the mind, as it succumbs to the influence of 
knowledge, comes to an experience of the world with a set of 
disciplinary predispositions or "seeing as" outlooks. This study, in 
short, will look at the way knowledge influences the behaviour of the 
mind. It will explore the relationship between the knower and the 
known; and try to show how it is that the character of the latter 
comes to influence the outlook of the former. 
1.2 PURPOSES AND ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
The theme of this study, it has been suggested, deals with the 
psychic impact of knowledge. That theme, in fact, will be explored 
from two rather different, though not independent, perspectives. The 
first will examine the theme from the way the knowledge an individual 
acquires transforms'his vision of the world. It will, as it were, try 
to encompass what are essentially the cognitive facets of the theme. 
The second perspective will examine the theme in terms of the edu-
cational context in which mental transformation usually occurs. It 
will examine the sort of processes of training which cumulatively 
bring about a progressive metamorphosis of an individual's outlook. 
This, since it largely occurs through the individual interacting with 
other people, particularly teachers,.will represent the theme's 
social perspective. But whilst it is possible to separate both 
these themes, what in fact the study wishes to do overall is develop 
a model of knowledge, and the epistemological enterprises it em-
braces, that will encapsulate both the cognitive and social themes. 
The quest for this model will commence in Chapter Two, where it 
will be initially indicated that knowledge is only one of a whole 
'family' of phenomena that have the potential to influence the way 
the world is regarded. It will be argued, however, that knowledge, of 
all the members of this * family*, has the greatest capacity for in-
fluence. A number of instances of this influence, in a variety of 
knowledge areas, are then cited, which endeavour to show that 
epistemological sensitivity, far from being a hypothesis, is a fact. 
The remainder of Chapter Two is concerned with ascertaining a 
disciplinary approach that might help to explain this apparent power 
of knowledge to influence outlook in very profound and dramatic ways. 
It emerges from the 'literature survey*, that, whilst knowledge 
represents one of the most intensively cultivated fields of philosophy, 
most approaches to it are *reductionist * in tenor, and do not really 
encompass in any substantive way the phenomenon of epistemological 
sensitivity. Contrary to the approach that will be adopted in this 
study, most epistemological analyses of the knowledge process tend 
to concentrate on'understanding its fundamental elements. Rather 
than looking to preserve its *holistic* attributes, most examinations 
of knowledge are prone to reducing it to its discrete and component 
parts. They either examine knowledge as a phenomenon that reflects 
reality in some unexplained way; or treat it as an essentially mental 
phenomenon whose psychic and mental character needs to be more fully 
understood. But although there can be merit in looking at the mental 
* substrata* from which knowledge is fabricated and nothing else, 
such an approach offers explanations, it is argued, at the expense 
of a total understanding of knowledge. They would tend to divorce, 
for instance, those cognitive and social dimensions of the knowledge 
process, which, it has been declared, this study is principally 
interested in. Therefore such approaches to knowledge will tend to 
be looked upon with disfavour for the purposes of this study. 
But not all examinations of knowledge are necessarily so 
reductionist in character. The approach adopted notably by Polanyi 
(1962, 1969) and the "beyond reductionism" school (Koestler and 
Smythies, 1972) has often served to bridge the gap between philosophy 
and the human sciences. In the light of this approach it is con-
cluded in Chapter Two, that it is to the holistic rather than the 
reductionist style of epistemology that this study should show most 
allegiance. 
With the decision made in Chapter Two, to regard knowledge as a 
comprehensive rather than a disjunctive entity. Chapter Three makes 
some attempt to apply the implications of this decision to under-
standing the psychological origins of knowledge. It initially tries 
to show how it is that knowledge arises out of the mind having a 
rapport with reality. It argues that consciousness and experience 
represent the incipient conditions for the creation of knowledge. The 
theme of Chapter Three, then, centres on the notion that knowledge 
represents a kind of cerebral extension of sensory awareness. Know-
ledge is not, as Locke (1971, Book II, Section 23) pointed out, 
"coeval with sensation", but it does have its origins in sensory 
awareness. About that, as Kant (1969) said, there can be no doubt. 
The chapter also indicates that knowledge initially arose as an 
efficient way of coping with contingencies man encounters in coming 
to terms with reality. It ameliorates man's problem solving capacity. 
Knowledge, then, is a product of the colloquy between the individual 
and his environment. This colloquy, it is suggested in Chapter Three, 
begins with sensory awareness and ends with knowledge. 
In further developing this notion of colloquy. Chapter Four 
endeavours to construct a model of how it is the mind has contact with 
reality (Winch, 1958, p.21); and what sort of epistemological results 
accumulate from that contact. It suggests that there is a strong 
'isomorphism' between language and knowledge, and that the models of 
meaning formulated by a number of linguistic theorists offer parallels 
between the structural condition of language and knowledge. That is 
to say, the relationship that exists between a word, its meaning and the 
object to which it refers (its referent), and to which traditional 
models of meaning draw attention, resembles the relationship between the 
three basic radicals of the epistemological enterprise: knowledge, 
reality and mind. Chapter Four argues that a model of verbal meaning 
can act as an analogue for epistemological meaning. On that basis, a 
model of knowledge is constructed which serves to describe the nature 
of the relationship between knowledge, mind and reality. The model is 
sufficiently flexible to incorporate the theme of this study, the psychic 
impact of knowledge on the perception of reality. 
Much of Chapter Four, then, is concerned with the way knowledge 
comes to reflect and modify the mind's interpretation and reading of 
reality. One of the conclusions of looking at knowledge through the 
perspective of the model, is that it indicates that various minds 
regard knowledge and its relationship to reality rather differently. 
Some minds possess a critical attitude to extant knowledge and are 
eager to diagnose doubts in the power of some knowledge to reflect 
reality. Out of such doubts, it is argued in Chapter Four, eventually 
come refinements to knowledge, which improve its compatibility with 
the behaviour of reality. Knowledge advances through "error eradi-
cation" (Popper, 1973a, p.119). 
Other minds, not trained to diagnose doubts, are much more neutral 
in their attitude to knowledge. They are often willing to adhere to 
the authenticity of knowledge and to support the epistemological 
status quo. The latter half of Chapter Four, then, indicates that 
within a disciplinary community there might be different styles of 
cognitive outlook and epistemological sensitivity. This provides a 
basis for analysing the social dimension of knowledge. This 
dimension, which constitutes the second major perspective of this 
study, is dealt with in Chapters Five and Six. 
The analysis of the social dimension of knowledge - in particular 
that associated with disciplines - begins in Chapter Five. It is 
asserted that there are useful analogies to be made between disci-
plinary and so-called 'open' systems. Like an open system, it is 
argued, the disciplinary system requires an input of personnel and 
an output of knowledge, if it is to maintain itself in equilibrium 
and not degenerate into chaos and ' entropy' . Since those personnel, 
if they are to produce new knowledge, must be prepared to submit 
themselves to the constraints of the discipline, there must be some 
institutions dedicated to equipping the personnel with the values and 
ordinances that are indigenous to the discipline. Those institutions, 
which in our culture are associated with education, conduct the 
initiation into the disciplinary systems, and thereby ensure that they 
are supplied with the requisite, qualified personnel. 
Chapter Five suggests, then, that education attends to the needs 
of disciplinary initiation. It conducts the various 'rites' which 
surround that initiation. The whole structure and dynamic of 
education, which Chapter Five attempts to map out in what is called 
the 'disciplinary continuum', reflects the need to create individuals 
who can satisfy the epistemological needs of the disciplinary 
community. As such, the structure of education appears to be 
functionally arrayed, so as to bring about in students a 'mental 
tropism' that is in accordance with the discipline's publicly 
accredited outlook. Education, in essence, serves to bring about a 
degree of conformism within the conceptual frameworks of the various 
disciplines. 
By attempting to assemble a *role typology' of the participant 
members in a disciplinary community. Chapter Six extends the analysis, 
commenced in Chapter Five, of the discipline as a social system. The 
typology represents an attempt to classify those members the 
community demands, if it is to function properly as an open system. 
As has already been indicated, not all members of a disciplinary 
community are necessarily concerned with stripping the veil of 
mystery from reality (Duhem, 1954, p.7); for, as Chapter Five indicated, 
the community, in order to survive as a functioning, corporate unit, 
needs other sorts' of personnel apart from those solely engaged in 
extending the limits of knowledge. The disciplinary community needs, 
for example, personnel to conduct the initiation of students; and still 
others to see that new knowledge is disseminated to the whole community. 
Each responsibility, each type of role, requires a rather specific 
outlook on knowledge and reality. Those gathering knowledge, for 
example, need to possess a more critical outlook on extant knowledge, 
than those concerned with disseminating it. The latter half of 
Chapter Six, then, is concerned with identifying and describing the 
roles in a disciplinary community, and showing how these roles can 
be symbolically represented on the model of knowledge developed in 
Chapter Four. This chapter, then, represents an attempt to bring 
about a synthesis of the cognitive and social dimensions of knowledge 
developed in the earlier chapters of the study. 
The seventh and last chapter offers a summary of conclusions. 
It tries to indicate what sort of contribution to the understanding 
of knowledge the study attempts to make. It also tries to assess 
what sort of use this understanding of knowledge is potentially able 
to offer. It looks, then, at the implications, particularly for 
education, that the study yields. The chapter also notes that the 
models of knowledge developed in the study are attempts to abstract 
from the total spectrum of knowledge some general features and 
traits of knowledge that can be systematized within the framework 
of a model. The study has not concentrated on describing the 
features and characteristics of particular forms of knowledge. In-
stead, Chapter Seven suggests this might be an area of research that 
could be pursued to supplement and corroborate the models of know-
ledge posited in the study. 
CHAPTER TWO 
EPISTEMOLOGY AND ENCULTURATION 
"The eye's plain version is a thing apart. 
The vulgate of experience" 
(Wallace Stevens, 
An ordinary evening in New Haven) 
2.1 EXPERIENTIAL MODIFICATION OF A PRIORISM 
Traditional debate about the foundations of knowledge has tended 
to focus on whether knowledge is ultimately generated from experience 
alone, or from some timeless mental entities that are archetypal to 
all thought and cognitive activity. The debate reduces itself to 
whether knowledge is governed by a priori or a posteriori principles, 
or arises from a concessionary interplay between the two. Virtually 
the whole history of epistemology - from Plato through to Frege - is 
devoted to settling this debate, and there is no sign yet that the 
debate is exhausted. It seems that just as the empiricists were 
about to triumph, in the guise of Behaviourism, thus settling the 
debate, the issue, once again, has been resurrected by those who would 
have epistemology turn to Seventeenth Century rationalism rather 
than empiricism afe a mentor in the matter of cognitive activity. The 
foundations of knowledge are, it seems, as uncertain as ever! 
It has been the problem of explaining "language acquisition" 
which has reawakened interest in the credibility of psychological 
a priorism. The explanation as to why all humans, irrespective of 
their intellectual ability, should be competent language users, or 
why that competence should be apparently so "species specific", it 
has been argued (Chomsky, 1967, 1972), cannot readily be accounted for 
in a posteriori terms: hence the vigorous defection from the tenets 
of Behaviourism. For the tabula rasa thesis of the latter - with its 
insistence that all cognitive behaviour has its incipience in en-
vironmental stimuli of some kind - cannot, so the new a priorism 
argues, accommodate the phenomenon of "language acquisition". An 
inductive awakening of language ability, one that is motivated into 
existence by sensation and that alone, Chomsky feels represents a 
wholly inadequate explanation. The phenomenon of language is founded 
upon something other than the skeleton of a stimulus/response 
mechanism. The advantage of the "innateness hypothesis" - which 
Chomsky proposes as a more plausible alternative to straightforward 
Behaviourism - is that not only does it explain the human specificity 
of language, but also why it is that, beneath their superficial 
diversity, all languages display a homogeneous structure. All 
languages have their provenance in the same "deep grammar"; they share 
a "vast central core of common rules" (Chomsky, 1972, p.79). And it 
is that central core and grammar, which, being somewhere embedded in 
the cortex of human beings, is finally responsible for generating 
linguistic behaviour. 
In effect, Chomsky*s neo-Kantianism, or as he prefers to see it, 
neo-Cartesianism, 'has once again opened the Pandora's Box of whether 
man learns by experience alone, or whether the mind is furbished, to 
begin with, with some basic spatio-temporal concepts, grammars, 
"eternal essences", which help it to initially extrapolate meaning 
from experience. In short, are the origins of language and ideation 
in general ultimately mental or experiential? Interestingly, Chomsky's 
own defence for the existence of "innate" grammars rests on the evi-
dence of language, rather than any observed features in the neuro-
physiology of the brain. He argues retroductively that the task 
of language learning demands "innate assistance". Otherwise, according 
to Putnam (1967, p.94), given the complexities of language, it would 
be miraculous if one tenth of the human race were ever able to master 
it. But as to whether there are any generative grammars embedded 
somewhere in the cortex, at the moment, that remains undemonstrated. 
Their existence, then, is a product of reason rather than observation. 
Not that Chomsky's "innateness hypothesis" looks wholly implaus-
ible. When lower order cognitive capacities than language are con-
sidered, there is a certain amount of empirical evidence to suggest 
a degree of innateness. Research, for instance, into the perceptual 
receptivity of "visually inexperienced" animals, like kittens (Hubel 
and Wiesel, 1970) and frogs (Laszlo, 1969), has indicated that from 
birth the cortices of these animals are responsive to elementary 
configurations of line, angle and motion. They have a congenital 
sensitivity to the world that appears to be operant before visual 
exposure to the world actually occurs. That sensitivity, then, is 
pre-experiential; it is innate. This would appear to indicate that 
the cortex has "wired into" it a series of "neural nets" that are 
able to resolve into archetypal geometrical forms the plethora of 
perceptual data that a neonate organism encounters. Empirical research, 
then, does indicate the existence of a basic perceptual 'language* 
embedded into the cortex which, once engaged, allows the organism 
to generate more complex analyses of its experience.* Once an 
organism begins 'talking' with its environment, it is able to develop 
a more discriminating perceptual 'vocabulary'. From the few basic 
eidetic 'words' that have been physiologically encoded, the organism is 
able to assemble those 'portmanteau words' of mature perception that 
* It is of note that Chomsky (1972, p.94) draws support for his own 
innateness hypothesis from such research. He argues that such 
innateness could well extend beyond the arena of perception and 
explain higher order cognitive capacities like language. 
enable it to engage in an infinitely richer and more subtle 'dialogue' 
with its surrounds. Experience thus leads to a general enrichment 
and diversification of the organism's innate visual vocabulary 
(Gregory, 1971, p.24). 
Perception, however, is not the only form of behaviour in which 
some semblance of a "deep grammar" can be descried. It has been 
observed, for instance, that babies are able to modify their innate 
sucking and mouthing rhythms to feed more efficaciously at the breast -
thus exhibiting a primitive and pre-linguistic problem solving capacity. 
Moreover, this compulsive sucking action, that is so characteristic of 
the neonate's behaviour, can be adapted to do other things than receive 
lactation. For, embedded within the "grammar" and "syntax" of sucking, 
is a whole repertoire of mouthing actions, like blowing glass, using a 
pipette, smoking a cigarette, which can be generated from it (Bruner, 
t 
1972). New sensori-motor 'sentences' or co-ordination can, as it were, 
be constructed from the basic syntax of sucking. And in an analogous 
way, Piaget (1971a, pp. 42-43) has noted how it is possible to see 
"logical mathematical structures" as sophisticated extensions of a 
tendency to generalize that which, from a very early age, is evident in 
the child's sensori-motor manipulations of his surrounds. In this way, 
mathematics could almost be regarded as one of the crowning achievements 
of motility! 
Seen from these perspectives, the matter of mental a priorism, 
providing its ambit is restricted to relatively primitive cognitive 
capacities, does have a degree of empirical credibility to it. The 
story of mental development, however, is not wholly a prioristic, just 
as it is neither entirely behaviouristic. It looks increasingly 
plausible that development is most satisfactorily explained by re-
garding it as a kind of experiential modification of innate patterns 
of behaviour. It is a matter of ontogenesis fusing with phylogenesis 
to produce an offspring of cognitive behaviour that emerges as much 
from what is cortically embedded as from what owes its origin to the 
environment. Thus there is some ontogenetic encoding and an amount 
of environmental influence, and it is the interaction between the 
two that gives rise to cognitive behaviour in all its diverse forms 
(Waddington, 1973, pp.39-40). 
What remains more contentious is the type and range of encodings 
that are ontogenetically "wired-in". Do these extend beyond the per-
ception of elementary geometrical structures, and include spatio-
temporal concepts like causality, or "universal grammars" that provide 
a preliminary syntactical foundation for the acquisition of language 
and logical thinking? Chomsky undoubtedly thinks so (vide supra), 
but his critics are less inclined to accept what is in the main a 
post hoc ergo procter hoc rather than empirical argument. Putnam 
(1967, p.98), for instance, has argued that language acquisition can 
be quite convincingly explained without the need to resort to "deep 
grammars". 
It might or might not be, then, that the ultimate foundations of 
knowledge are imprisoned somewhere within the anatomy of the cortex. 
If so, maybe physiopsychology will one day isolate the cortical 
regions that are responsible. In the meanwhile, hypotheses about the 
matter will have to prevail instead. But if there are "deep grammars" 
underlying perception, language, knowledge and so forth, it is clear 
that when experience activates them, as Chomsky (1967, p.88) rightly 
notes, a whole medley of schematizations are produced which 
differentiate and analyse the world in various and often very anti-
thetical ways. Thought and perception might have a parent in some 
a priori structures that are Innate, but when subjected to experience 
a whole progeny of a posteriori structures are produced; and these 
represent expressions of how the world is finally understood and 
perceived. It is the origins, then, of these surface grammars, en-
gendered by experience, which are articulations of the "deep 
grammars", that is a concern of this study. But the nature of 
experience is itself manifold, and the number of surface grammars in-
herent in it equally manifold, so that before the process of artic-
ulation can be fully described, it might be first desirable to typify 
the varieties of experience and the sorts of transformations they 
are capable of engendering. 
2.2 VARIETIES OF .EXPERIENTIAL TRANSFORMATION 
Experience is man's portal to the outside world. It is the door 
through which his consciousness flows in the struggle for sense and 
understanding. îhe world which experience encounters, however, is 
a thoroughly rich tapestry of diversity, a medley of infinite variety 
and unparalleled uniqueness, wherein it becomes impossible for a man 
to attend to everything that potentially has the power to impinge 
upon his consciousness. He must somehow adjust to this panorama of 
absolute and unending diversity, if sense and meaning is eventually 
to be yielded from it; he must somehow separate from the arena of his 
vision those elements of perception that are superfluous to the fuller 
understanding of his surrounds. It is a paradox, but it seems (see 
3.2) that fullness of vision is only made possible by limiting it! 
But what causes this condensation of vision to take place? What 
ultimately catalyses the transformation of the "deep grammars" of 
perception into thoroughly individualistic 'languages*, having a 
perceptual timbre all their own? Where do these 'languages* spring 
from? And in what tangible ways do they affect our visual accom-
plishment in the world? But first it needs to be demonstrated that the 
transformation occurs, and that a man's outlook is indeed affected 
by the things which are most prominent in the vista of his experience. 
And since the most prominent landmarks in a man's experience are the 
culture and topography he inhabits, it seems reasonable to infer 
that these two things would leave the heaviest 'footprints' on his 
outlook. But is this so? Does his culture and topography render 
a man conscious of vistas of reality of which he might otherwise be 
unaware? Or do they lead to fallacious distortions that,had a 
man been nurtured in another culture and environment, would have 
been seen as obviously false? 
In fact it has been shown that there is indeed some demonstrable 
correlation between perceptual sensitivity and the dominant character 
of a topography. Children, for instance, who are brought up in a 
largely "carpentered" environment - one that is dominated by 
straight lines, rectangles and horizons - do appear more prone to 
misperceive certain visual illusions than those children whose 
environments provide no opportunity to view horizons or vast distances, 
and vice versa (Segall, Campbell and Hersovik, 1966). Of course a 
tendency to be deceived in a test situation need not in itself reflect 
what might be the actual perceptual character of an individual in 
his 'natural habitat'; physiological factors could account for such 
deceptions (Cole and Scribner, 1974, pp.78-79). But although subsequent 
field research has tended to weaken rather than strengthen Segallos 
hypothesis, there is still a body of evidence - mainly of an anecdotal 
kind (Cole and Scribner, 1974) - that does suggest that the dominant 
character of a habitat might serve to foster certain styles of per-
ceiving and inhibit others. The child brought up in a visually 
claustrophobic environment, a forest for instance, often finds it 
difficult to adjust his mode of seeing to uninterrupted distances, and 
will often misconstrue the nature of things observed in an expansive 
environment.* It is possible, then, for someone to be visually liter-
ate in one environment and illiterate in another. This has shown to 
be particularly pronounced in the interpretation of perspective. A 
comparative study of Zambian and Scottish children revealed con-
vincingly that the former experienced difficulties disentangling the 
right visual significances from the three dimensional mode of repre-
sentation in perspective (Lloyd, 1972, p.107). It seems perspective 
is not immediately accessible without a previous background and 
familiarity with it as a représentative device. This background is 
more likely to be possessed by Scottish children, because they have 
been brought up in a habitat where perspective is constantly used 
to portray the recession of distance. The matter of perspective, 
however, whilst it finally affects visual outlook, springs from a 
rather different experiential source than topography. Properly 
speaking, its influence should be attributed to culture, not landscape. 
* A good example of this is provided by an anecdote of Cole and 
Scribner*s (1974, p.97). They once took a child, who had been raised 
in the African jungle, to a port, where they all stayed in a tall 
hotel from which, far out to sea, could be seen a large oil tanker. 
"The child, who had never seen such a view before, and was not 
familiar with tankers, commented on the bravery of men, who would 
go out to sea in such small boats". 
Research showing the probable ethnocentricity of perspective, then, 
highlights the ramifications that cultural experiences are likely to 
have on an individual's outlook on the world. Arguably topographical 
influences are really quite trivial by comparison, and really only pre-
vail in exceedingly 'eccentric' environments like deserts and forests. 
In more balanced environments their effect is likely to be so minimal, 
they can all but be discounted. This means, then, that the bulk of 
transformative influences, affecting the individual, originate from his 
cultural experiences; and that if there are major differences between 
the 'outlooks' of individuals these differences are attributable to 
culture, rather than the character of the topographical regions where 
those individuals live. Discrepant cultural milieux therefore should 
initiate correlatively discrepant outlooks on the world; they might 
tend to blind the onlooker to things which are transparently clear to 
an onlooker brought up on a 'diet' of different cultural experiences. 
In fact, the differing reactions, already discussed, do suggest that 
this close bond between outlook and culture is more than just an im-
perative, it is a fact. 
That cultures tend to breed outlooks, which are sometimes very 
dissonant with one another, is amply born out by studies of cultures 
of an extremely contrasting character. Anthropology is legion with 
examples of the profound differences, for instance, which prevail 
between the Western and scientific outlook on reality, and that of the 
African. It seems it is not just reactions to things like perspec-
tive that are grossly affected by variant cultural background, but 
reactions to the world in general. And although it has been argued 
(Horton, 1974) that the differences have been sometimes overdramatised. 
and that there are more evident parallels between Western science and 
African thought than perhaps anthropologists have been prepared to 
acknowledge, it does seem that African thought can serve to trammel 
outlook to a state of inflexibility where it becomes impossible to 
accommodate even the most elementary principles of Western logic. The 
Azandes and their incorrigible faith in the ineluctable power of their 
oracle is regularly cited as evidence for this. Thus the regular and 
dramatic failing of the oracle was always ingeniously accommodated 
in some explanation that lay beyond criticising the oracle itself. 
That was always considered beyond suspicion. The recalcitrant example, 
which the oracle appeared not to explain and which should have led 
the Azandes to lose faith in the ineluctability of their oracle, was 
in fact totally outside the scope of their concern. There was 
nothing intrinsically wrong with the oracle, rather it was the manner 
in which the oracle was prepared that was in error. It was as 
though the Azandes could "reason excellently in the idiom of their 
beliefs" (Evans-Pritchard, 1937, p.338), but not outside them. Their 
culture had closed them off from the possibility of comprehending the 
ways of Western logic. 
That contact with Western logic might yield perspectives on the 
world, contained in rather different frameworks of rationality, is 
also born out by cross-cultural studies of cognitive development. 
Greenfield and Bruner (1969) have demonstrated how Western schooling 
(and the knowledge dispensed therein) tends to accelerate the growth 
of operational thought by encouraging the ready discrimination between 
different points of view. On the other hand, children brought up in 
environments where rather different modes of schematization prevail, 
do not have that benefit, and often find it difficult to differentiate 
between the self and the external world. Operational thought, there-
fore, tends to be retarded for the lack of appropriate cognitive 
stimulation. 
Belief idioms, then, have the power to permeate and mould even 
the immature vision of the world; they can train it in directions of 
thinking that are often difficult to relinquish or modify. It is 
almost as if culture were a powerful magnet, drawing the threads of 
our thought in directions from which it is almost impossible to turn. 
The fate of the individual's outlook on the world is often beyond his 
control; for it lies incarcerated in the culture to which he belongs, 
and to which, from birth, he is constantly exposed, learning the 
ways of the world, as the ways of his culture. And this causes major 
problems of cognitive disorientation when the individual encounters 
the thoughts and values and outlooks of a culture other than his own. 
Arguably this is only an ethnographical problem, which is met only 
when rival cultures try to set up 'conversation' with one another. It 
is also a problem the intellectual 'missionary' worker might confront, 
when he tries to convert African tribes like the Azande to the ways 
of Western science. But it is not a problem that is exclusively 
inter-cultural. It is just that when a single culture is being con-
sidered the magnitude of intra-cultural discrepancy between belief 
idioms is likely to be more diminished than it is between very 
contrasting cultures. However, it is not entirely absent. Moreover 
with the ascendancy of more pluralistic societies, particularly in 
the West, the scale of this intra-cultural discrepancy is likely to 
be on the increase rather than the decline. To infer, for instance. 
that the canons of Western rationality and science are imiformly and 
egalitarianly distributed, without intellectual variation, throughout 
the Western world, is to infer an illusion not a reality. The make-
up of each nation's "cultured habitus" (Bourdieu, 1971, p.194), in 
which the average Western man's rationality ultimately has its in-
cipience, harbours too many idiosyncracies and nationally engendered 
proclivities to create a wholly homogeneous cultural identity through-
out the West. Of course rationality does not even dwell in all of 
them, and even where it does, it has been posited (Duhem, 1954, pp.69-
81) that what is essentially the English, the German, the French way 
of regarding the world introduces its own subtle nuances into artistic 
and scientific activity. There are national styles of thought, just 
like there aire of dress! In this regard, Duhem (1954, p.64) claimed, 
for instance, that English and French novelists could be divided 
about their respective attentions to detail. Amongst the English that 
attention was always inordinate, with excessive concern being given 
to the minutiae of a novelistic scenario. They tended to follow the 
principle of Baconian induction, by constructing a verbal edifice of 
reality from its individual components. In contrast to this, the 
French novelist tended to quest after condensation. He was interested 
in producing 'sketches', not detailed drawings of reality; he wanted 
to sum up a scenario in a few lines, not a few pages.* 
* It is important to place these observations in the right chrono-
logical context. Duhem's generalizations (his book. La theorie. 
Son objet et sa structure, was first published in 1906) referred 
exclusively to Nineteenth Century novelists; and as generaliz-
ations they would appear to have less aptness today. They 
certainly-would not accommodate, for example, the French school 
of writing known as Nouveau roman, for its writers have made a 
virtual cult out of inordinate attention to detail. 
Duhem (1954, pp.69-72) extended this style of analysis to the 
practises of English and French scientists. He noted, for instance, 
that whereas the former were pre-eminently "model builders" and 
tended to see the material world in very mechanistic terms, the 
latter were very much more abstractionist in their tendency and were 
inclined to turn nature into algebra rather than machines. It was 
as though the Gallic mode of science was essentially Cartesian, the 
Anglo, Baconian. 
But it is possible to characterize the general intellectual 
complexion of a nation's people in terms other than the novels they 
write and the science they are inclined to do. Indeed, it is one of 
the favourite preoccupations of comparative educationalists to seek 
out those cultural qualities that are caused by different emphases 
in different systems of education. They try to discover what it is 
t 
that education contributes to the spirit of a people. For whilst each 
nation tends to share common social and educational goals, each tends 
to place a rather idios3mcratic set of stresses upon them. One 
nation, for instance, might emphasize "character formation", another 
"individual development", and presumably the recipients of education 
sponsored under these emphases will come to acquire these traits. The 
signature of a nation's personality is written into its schools. 
Bereday (1964,pp.26-t27) has tried to decipher some of these signatures. 
He argues that English education tends to register the desire in its 
society for law and order, whereas the American registers a tolerance 
and permissiveness evident in American society as a whole. It is out 
of this permissiveness that emerges the individualism characterising 
the average American. But it is possible to oversubscribe to the 
power of education. Education is not solely responsible for moulding 
the character of a nation's affectivity. There are more things than 
just 'school' which are responsible for promoting American individual-
ism. One could equally point to the church, the economy, the political 
system, the family,as all equal to education in the promotion of 
individualism as the desirable American disposition. 
In the main, however, Bereday's observations tend to reinforce 
the hypothesis slowly being shaped here: that an individual's exper-
iential milieu or habitus nurtures into existence, often covertly, 
an outlook that is to some extent consensual amongst all the members 
of a particular culture. But what have not so far been identified 
are the sorts of strands in the habitus which are most instrumental in 
altering outlook. Whilst, then, some of the after effects of cultural 
experience have been typified, their specific origins have not. 
2.3 LANGUAGE AND'OUTLOOK 
It has been noted (see 2.1) that it is experience which allows men 
to enter into a dispositional discourse with reality; but it is 
language that allows that discourse to be recounted and communicated, 
and knowledge, that allows it to be understood and explained. Language 
and knowledge then, permit an egress out of the confinement of pri-
vate consciousness and an ingress into a world of shared experience 
and common understanding. They allow our private discourses with the 
world to be exchanged with others. Language and knowledge, then, are 
very much the currency of a culture. They enable ideas about reality 
to be traded, bargained with and sold, thereby allowing all the 
members of a culture to profit from the experience and sometimes 
private understandings of others. But what needs to be understood here 
is the effect of this 'currency' upon the individual's consciousness 
of the world. Can there be, for instance, a thoroughly virgin dis-
position to the world that remains unaffected by language and know-
ledge? Do both language and knowledge permeate the roots of 
consciousness to the degree that a thoroughly uncoloured vision 
of the world is impossible? Does the medium demanded by the need 
for consensuality make nonsense of the idea of a culturally neutral 
transposition of the world? The only way of course to answer these 
questions is to trace the lineage of any distorted patterns of thought 
about reality back to language and knowledge. It is that tracing 
which will remain the objective of the next three sections. 
If all languages at their core share a common "deep grammar" as 
Chomsky (see 2.1) insists that they do, then the proposal that par-
ticular languages 'are sufficiently distinctive to evoke equivalently 
distinctive patterns of thought might have less veracity to it than 
has been implied. However, as Chomsky (1972, p.71) admits, the body 
of homogeneous principles at the core of all languages, does not 
prohibit considerable variation at a surface level between languages. 
For from the same deep grammar an infinite number of linguistic vari-
ations can be generated, and it is this that accounts for the wide 
diversity of language types that are housed in the 'Tower of Babel'. 
Thus, if the deep grammar hypothesis has some measure of veracity to 
it, it will be the surface rather than the deep aspects of a language 
that generate idiosyncratic views about reality. After all, it is the 
deep grammar that mankind as a whole shares, and the surface grammar 
which makes for differences between Swahili and English. But then 
there is the problem of identifying which of the surface aspects of a 
given language generate significant modifications of outlook. The best 
way to approach this problem is to examine some languages. 
It has been observed (Jespersen, 1922, p.429; Revesz, 1956, p.61) 
that so-called "primitive languages" exhibit a high level of discrimin-
ation and hardly any generalization at all. They can analyse the dis-
crete elements of reality to an exceedingly high degree of specificity, 
and would no doubt make excellent tools for taxonomy,* yet are singu-
larly lacking in words to cover concepts or ideas. On the other hand, 
it has been argued that what primitive languages lack in the area of 
concept formation, they make up for in their capacity, not only to 
achieve fine measures of discrimination, but to express emotions and 
affective dispositions (Bowra, 1962, p.259). Poetry comes more 
naturally to them than science. 
Now if language and outlook are in some way connected, then 
primitive languages might perhaps be *parent' - given their pro-
pensity for highly particularistic vocabularies - to an outlook on 
the world that is inordinately sensitive to the minutiae of the 
world. It might also be expected too - given the limited array 
of conceptual vocabulary in such languages - that this might restrict 
their users' capacities for "formal-operational" thought. So are these 
ramifications evident, and are there any other modifications of out-
look that can be attributed to the qualities of language? 
* Not that this is a forte necessarily restricted to the 'family' of 
primitive languages. It has been claimed equally of Arabic, a 
language notable for a considerable lexicon of words to describe 
animal and plant species (Martin, 1975, p.119). Moreover, it has 
the added advantage that the perimeter of its usage is consider-
ably greater than most primitive languages, which, whilst they 
might carry out a very thorough taxonomy in the regions in which 
they are used, do not have much currency beyond them. 
In fact the classificatory acumen of some 'primitive* peoples has 
been attested to. The stories of them outwitting in taxonomical 
'agility' Western trained biologists are legion in the anthropological 
literature. But whether this acumen springs from language is another 
matter. For it does not seem that classificatory ability and language 
are necessarily close neighbours (de Lacey, 1974, p.63). On the 
other hand, there is strong evidence to support the fact that the 
discriminations which are available in a language do condition our 
perception of the world. This is particularly true, it seems, in 
the area of colour. There is suggestive evidence indicating that 
the same colours were actually 'seen' differently by speakers of Zuni 
and English, due to different denotations used for the colours in 
those languages (Martin, 1975, -p.119) . 
But it is not merely in matters of 'discrimination' that language 
is said to contaminate outlook. The very grammar of language, and 
the way it comes to symbolise the to and fro of experience, can in-
sinuate in its users a veritable Weltanschauung. That it has this 
power is the substance of the so-called 'Sapir-Whorf' hypothesis which 
takes as its premise the belief that human beings, in their attempts 
to understand reality, are very much at the mercy of the language they 
use (Whorf, 1972, p.134). As evidence for this, Whorf contrasted the 
nature of Standard Average European (SAE) with the language used by 
the Hopi Indians. He noted how very time-laden 'European' is as a 
language, in the main constructed around a matrix of time and space. 
In that matrix there are many tenses available for denoting and 
specifying events happening at a different time and in a different 
place. As a language, European, it was Whorf s contention, was pre-
eminently Newtonian in outlook. Yet in Hopi all is one! The tissue 
of time is entirely absent from its grammatical fabric. Instead, 
space is substituted for duration, and everything is related to every-
thing else in terms of the distance which separates them. Any dis-
tance, for instance, which separates objects subverts the possibility 
of simultaneity; for the further away an object is, the further back 
in 'time' that events must happen to it (Whorf, 1972, pp.62-63). It is 
as though the grammar of Hopi has a relativistic framework inhabiting 
it, in which a 'spacescale' takes the place of a timescale. 
Many of the said ramifications of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis have 
in fact been discredited. Yet despite heavy critical onslaught on that 
hypothesis, most-linguists would appear to concede, that, if it does 
not exactly generate a world view, language must impart something to 
the way we interpret reality (Martin, 1975, p.125). Given that so 
much of the discourse about reality is conducted in language, it 
would be highly improbable if language did not imprint something of 
its more dominant character upon the way reality is interpreted and 
understood. After all, what is it about SAE that makes the 'future' 
appear to be in 'front of us' when in another language, Quechua, it 
is always 'behind' one? Yet the logic of Quechua is sound enough: 
what is past can be seen, it is in front of us; but not the future, 
that is always out of view, behind one. Here, then, is an example of 
a complete reversal of outlook about the nature of past and future. 
And if such things are possible between Quechua and SAE, is it not 
also possible that, within the 'family' of languages that comprises 
SAE, comparable conceptual distinctions might also be brought on by 
the individual differences between the languages. It might also be 
that such differences are partially responsible for the 'national 
styles of thought' that Duhem (see 2.2) and others have claimed exist. 
What this might mean in concrete terms is the possibility that Kenner 
(1973, p.97) has alluded to: that German provides as natural a 
*habitat* for Hegel, as English does for Locke, and French does for 
Descartes; for, as Kenner argues, their respective philosophies would 
appear to reverberate with the qualities of their respective 'mother 
tongues *. 
It could be, then, that language does impede an entirely un-
contaminated vision of the world. However it is not the only element 
within a culture to have a mutative impact on outlook. If it was, 
the limits to thought would be imposed by the limits to language. The 
path of understanding in a culture would be circumscribed by the 
Weltanschauung inhabiting its language. There would be no escape from 
the metaphysics imputed therein. And this would mean that there could 
be no reciprocity of thought between languages supporting rival and 
contradictory systems of metaphysics. Yet this is not true: the user 
of SAE can understand how it is possible for Hopi to measure out 
chronology on a * space* rather than timescale. Moreover, understanding 
that empirical legitimacy does not flow from SAE. For arguably it is 
only Einstein that allowed Whorf 'to see' the permissibility of the 
relativistic sjnitax of Hopi. However, Einstein's theories were not of 
SAE; they came from physics, and physics belongs to the cultural 
domain called knowledge. So that if there were any metaphysical 
projections that stemmed from SAE, which restricted Western man's 
outlook, knowledge served to liberate them. A man's vision of the 
world, then, is not necessarily monopolised by language. If it was, 
SAE, given its Whorfian features, could have only produced a Newton, 
not an Einstein. Therefore, to see the complete picture of a man's 
vision of the world, not only must those transformations which have 
their provenance in language be considered, but also those which would 
seem to have their provenance in knowledge - and which occasionally 
serve to modify those of language. 
2.4 KNOWLEDGE AITO OUTLOOK 
It will be argued in this section that man's eloquence in the 
world is as much enhanced by knowledge, as it is by language; and that 
knowledge injects into the compass of his ordinary outlook a range 
of awarenesses outside the range of language. This section, then, 
will examine the expansionist effect of knowledge on outlook. 
Goethe once said men only see what they know. Such a statement 
is sententious enough to encompass the notion being developed here: 
that knowledge augments outlook. But the risk of sententiousness 
is a paradox: that in the desire to be concise it is possible to end 
t 
up saying more than should be said. This is certainly true of Goethe's 
statement. For when taken to its logical conclusion it tends to 
impute that men without knowledge are men without sight; and that the 
epistemologically impoverished are somehow visually deprived. Yet 
as Dretske (1969, p.17), in another context, argues, "total ignorance 
is not a sufficient condition for total blindness". The absence of 
knowledge does not mean the absence of visual sentience. However, it 
needs to be asked what sort of sentience is totally devoid of 'know-
ledge'? What is a primal outlook like, from which accents of ex-
perience, belief, knowledge, language have been purged? Is it possible 
to emphathise with a person having a virgin outlook on the world? 
Dretske (1969, p.75) has proved philosophically that primal 
vision is not really any different from any other vision. It merely 
differs in the kinds of interpolations that are placed upon it. Thus 
at the retina a tomato is seen as a "patch of red", irrespective of 
whether it is seen as a 'tomato' or noti The world does not suddenly 
undergo a change of countenance because of knowledge; it is not a 
chimera that dutifully changes its forms according to the dictates of 
episteme. But, on the other hand, primal vision does differ quali-
tatively from informed vision, otherwise babies and those who re-
cover their sights after a protracted period of blindness, would 
immediately see the world as differentiated into the shapes, forms and 
entities that constitute ordinary vision. Yet this is not so. It 
would seem that the world of initial vision is abstract rather than 
naturalistic, and that what is 'seen' is a rhapsody of colour and form 
which makes little or no sense; it is a sentience without a signifi-
cance (Gregory, 1974,pp.20-25; Hanson, 1969a,pp.131-132). With the 
onset of visual comprehension, what is mere sentience slowly gives way 
to a perception in which unity and discrimination prevail. What was 
seen to be formerly rhapsodic is seen to be possessed of independent 
entities, whose properties can be regularised and patterned. Dretske, 
then, is right to assert that when the apperceptive aura surrounding 
the seeing of a tomato as a 'tomato' is stripped away the "sensory 
core" of a red patch remains. This would be a Kasper Hauser's* vision 
of it. However, what Dretske does not point out is that the residual 
redness will be suffused in the whole welter of colour and general 
formlessness that is initial vision, and will remain thus suffused 
* Kasper Hauser was a German version of the 'wolf-child', who, having 
managed to survive in the wild, apparently since birth, was dis-
covered and brought back into orthodox society, where some attempt 
was made to educate him. 
until it is recognised as belonging to the class of red patches that 
are tokens of 'tomato-ship*. It is at that stage that the act of 
'seeing' graduates to what Wittgenstein (1972,11, xi) called "seeing 
as", or the condition of informed vision. Thus what Goethe should have 
said is that men only see a^ something what they know. It is that 
which marks the difference between seeing as a mental rather than a 
purely retinal act. 
If the proposition that has been wrought from Wittgenstein has 
any substance to it, then it ought to be possible to detect measurable 
differences in perceptual outlook in moving from one field of knowledge 
to another. After all, it has been asserted that whilst all men would 
appear to see the same image at the retina, the way that image is 
'mentally' seen and interpolated is largely dependent on the current 
theories and knowledge that are currently to use Gregory's (1971, p.15) 
apt word, "contaminating" the mind. However it would also have to be 
acknowledged that beneath the specialised visions that are evoked by 
particular forms of knowledge there is a common 'vocabulary' of viewing 
that enables most men to cope with a relatively orthodox repertoire 
of experiences. It is true too that this vision of the familiar world 
would also be contaminated with 'theory' and 'knowledge'; but it 
is also true that that theory and knowledge would not be consciously 
trained into existence, but simply acquired in the ordinary, run-of-
the-mill of experience. Being able to make the substitution tomato for 
'red patch' would be like this. It is something that in their dis-
courses with 'reality' most people could do without consciously 
thinking about it; for all intents and purposes, it could be regarded 
as a non-mediated ascription. But more than just this, the ability to 
see some red patches as tomatoes is a socially generalised ability - at 
least in societies familiar with tomatoes - which is not restricted or 
specific to groups of particular epistemic predilection. In this sense, 
it is unlike that ability possessed by the welder, who, from noting the 
characteristic shape and colour of a flame, knows whether his torch 
is being fed with the proper ratio of oxygen and acetylene. Those 
unfamiliar with the art of welding will of course 'see* the same 
flame, but only the welder will be able to 'visually' analyse its 
chemical composition. In the same way, where the trained radiologist 
sees on an X-ray plate the symptoms of a physiological condition, the 
untrained eye will only see a meaningless welter of shape and form. 
And often the good diagnostician does not need X-rays and laboratory 
tests to recognise the nature of a patient's syndrome. He can 'sight 
read' a patient, and learn from any proclivities in his pallor, 
posture and gait, what it is that ails him (Dretske, 1969, p.179; 
Abercrombie, 1974, p.43; Bruner, Goodnow and Austin, 1962, p.10). Not 
that the 'eye' is sole claimant to sagacity in matters of perceptual 
subtlety and nuance. The sense of taste and hearing are equally cul-
tivatable and capable of making minute discriminations and differ-
entiations. Those who blend teas or taste wines, or who have a sense 
of perfect pitch bear this out; they have perceptual 'taxonomies' 
which alert them to the subtlest of distinctions. Singers of perfect 
pitch, for instance, can often 'hear' the difference between a British 
A-flat and a German one, even though the difference in actual frequency 
is often only of the order of two or three cycles per second! 
It seems, then, that the senses can be fostered so as to develop 
an exaggerated sense of recognition, or what Polanyi (1962, pp.54-55) 
has called "connoisseurship". That connoisseurship, in fact any 
sufficiently specialised vision that is characterized by heightened 
awareness, would appear to emerge from pursuing some avocation or 
other.* Connoisseurship is seemingly differentiated from that more 
consensual and socially generalised vision of reality - which is not 
exaggerated in any particular direction or other - and which is 
characteristic of ordinary and non-vocationally orientated vision. 
By comparison with connoisseurship, it is likely to be a vision of 
the world that is infiltrated with coarse rather than subtle dis-
tinctions; and that is prey to overlooking the gradations of nuance 
which can often be identified in the most familiar. But then men can 
have an eminently satisfactory rapport with reality without having 
to look too closely at it; they can gloss over the fine detail of 
the world, and still see what they need to see. The contrast, then, 
between the avocational and the ordinary view of the world is not 
so much that the scenario of things is seen any differently, but that 
different and more sophisticated inferences can be drawn from the 
world. It is as though reality consists of an infinite number of 
'hieroglyphs', whose meaning becomes more and more profound the deeper 
their observer is capable of looking into them. Moreover, the world 
is also 'homcnymous' :the same scenario, the same object, can carry 
different denotations to different people. The hieroglyphs of reality 
are polysemous. But which meaning dominates depends, as Woozley 
(1967,pp.18-19) points out, on the "interests" and avocation of the 
observer. It is not merely a matter, then, of 'informed vision' 
for all that is seen, which is at all significant is informed vision -
* The matter of perfect pitch may be the exception to this. It is 
often argued that it is one of those congenital 'gifts' that is 
there because of nature, not nurturing. 
but rather of the type and species of knowledge that informs vision. 
The carpenter's vision of a "card table" (Woozley's example) will then 
be rather differently focused from that of a draper; and whereas the 
one might "remark (on) the legs, the jointing of the sides", the other 
- the draper - will look to "the precise colour, nap, and quality of 
the baize" (Woozley, 1967,pp.18-19) covering the card table. But 
neither will look beyond the most outward manifestations of the table; 
for their attentions will only be magnetised by its surface attributes, 
not the ones in the substratum of the wood and the baize, and in the 
material world in general. To be drawn to them requires a vision in-
formed by a différent set of epistemic imperatives altogether. Thus 
it will be the physicist who will tend to 'see' the hieroglyph 'table', 
not as mere baize and wood, but as an "aggregate of electrons, protons 
and neutrons". His 'vision' of the table will be like a Pointillist 
painting, made up of many microscopic parts. On the other hand, the 
chemist will be drawn to the table's chemical composition, the bio-
logist to the cellular construction of its xylem. And then of course 
there would be some who might look altogether beyond the physical 
properties of the table. The art historian might 'see' it thus, in 
being primarily interested in whether the table belongs to the Baroque 
or Rococco era of furniture design. 
The same object, then, can take on different significances al-
together when envisaged from different epistemic and vocational per-
spectives (Bertalanffy, 1971,p.249). But antecedent to these signifi-
cances coming into view, there is the acquisition of the appropriate 
epistemic perspective, and that is by no means a spontaneous acquis-
ition. For if knowledge, as Kanson (1969a, p.149) has characterized 
it (and it is a characterization that is thoroughly commensurate with 
the view of knowledge being developed in this study), supplies the 
spectacles behind the eyes through which the world is seen, then it 
takes time and considerable training to look through those spectacles 
in the way, say, a physicist does. Meanwhile, the layman will remain 
"blind" to quite a lot of what the physicist sees (Hanson, 1969a, 
p.104). Of course the physicist and the layman always receive the 
same visual image at the retina, but the way that each respectively 
transposes that message into sense often differs radically. For as 
has been indicated, the physicist's 'hieroglyph' is not necessarily 
the carpenter's, -and vice versa. Thus the carpenter walking into the 
physicist's laboratory will register its furnishings and effects, and 
possibly the way they have been put together, but not their signifi-
cance within the framework of physics. To do that, he "must learn 
some physics". Until he does so, he will remain a stranger to the 
world that the physicist sees (Hanson, 1969b, pp.15-17). That world, 
in effect, will be like a hieroglyph without a Rosetta Stone; it will 
be, to adopt the jargon of semiosis, all sign and no signification. 
The move from "seeing" to "seeing as", then, is accompanied by 
the acquisition of what will be called 'epistemic behaviour'. For 
it is knowledge that serves to direct attention of particular 
phenomena and elevate sensitivity to the world; it is through knowledge 
that the significance of things comes to be magnified and amplified. 
So that whilst the scenario of reality remains relatively constant, 
it is the way an individual's attention to that scenario is directed 
which is subject to modification. It is the style of Hansonian 
"spectacles", then, which an individual wears that alters, not the 
spectacle they observe. Thus it has been argued that different disci-
plinary and vocational "spectacles" promote rather different species 
of 'seeing' that are alerted, in an exaggerated sense, to those 
features of the world which are of paramount importance to the disci-
pline. In this way, knowledge would appear to have a similar trans-
formative impact on outlook as language and topography. But know-
ledge is immensely more pluralistic than either of these things; its 
' spectacles* come in many different 'frames'*; so that more diversity of 
outlook and varieties of epistemic behaviour would be expected to 
spring from it than either language or topography. Moreover, know-
ledge is subject -to change and radical amendation. Thus even though 
the basic 'frames* of knowledge tend to remain the same, some of the 
* lenses* contained within them are periodically renewed, and as a 
consequence give birth to new visions of the world. Entailed, then, 
in the mutability 'of knowledge is the possibility that new knowledge 
generates correlative changes in outlook and epistemic behaviour. If 
this is so, then it should be possible to show how knowledge colludes 
with outlook to both constrain and expand our perception of the 
world. 
2.5 SCIENCE: SOME CHANGES IN OUTLOOK 
It has been science's task to free the secrets that lie interned 
in Nature. But Nature has proved, in the past, to be a thoroughly 
effective gaoler, who no doubt still harbours Her deepest secrets in-
carcerated in the maximum of security gaols! Even those secrets that 
scientists have managed to wrest from Her, were only liberated after 
a long and arduous intellectual struggle, in which some of the best 
minds of mankind have taken part. And even then, what scientists 
managed to 'get out' of Nature's prison often turned out to be nothing 
more than a 'confidence trickster' who proved very willing to lie and 
spoof about the true physical condition of reality. Scientists, then, 
have often been taken in by Nature, and sometimes it has taken gen-
erations of them to realise it. If ever a discipline is testimony 
to the belief that 'things are never quite what they seem', it is 
science. For it is legion with false conquests of ignorance that have 
led to a pack of erroneous and aberrant notions about what nature is 
really like. Often scientists have placed a completely false con-
struction upon what it is they are seeing in nature. This section 
will report some of those false constructions, and the change of out-
look that was needed to correct them. 
In looking up to the 'heavens', astronomers seemed to have had a 
more solid alliance with error than truth. For virtually the whole 
history of astronomy proves that a science can long exist on gross 
misconceptions, and also in quite elementary areas of understanding. 
Take, for instance, the appearance of Saturn: ever since astronomers 
had first seen this planet through their telescopes they had puzzled 
over its rather odd 'physiognomy'. Various astronomers * had sketched 
it in its various phases, and most had pictured it as a kind of 
planetary 'Big Ears', with large lobes, that periodically changed 
their form, extruding from the main body of the planet. It was not 
until these rather idiosyncratic extrusions were construed as a ring 
encircling the planet, that a correct visual interpretation of Saturn 
* Huygens, Helvetius and Galileo were principal amongst these. In-
terestingly, Galileo did conclude that Saturn was probably enringed, 
but he did not report this conclusion. This brings out another 
feature of science, to be dealt with in a later chapter, that of 
its publicness. 
was made. Now astronomers would have difficulty in seeing it in any 
other way (Gregory, 1971, pp.119-122). 
The problem of seeing Saturn correctly, then, was a bit like those 
puzzles gestalt psychologists are fond of setting, in which a figure of 
a man is hidden. It generally takes some time to isolate the man from 
all the irrelevant forms that are serving to dissemble him. However, 
once seen, it is difficult to see the puzzle as anything other than a 
man. Most stimuli patterns, then, have the potential to be compre-
hended in a number of ways; a multitude of visual meanings can be 
inferred from them. What science tries to do is outlaw that ambiguity; 
it endeavours to elicit that meaning which most accords with the facts 
as they are observed; it shows which configuration amongst the many 
possible is most plausible. Having done that, it serves to transform, 
as it did with Saturn, our vision of physical reality in some way. 
Seeing which 'is due to epistemic behaviour is, as Hanson (1969a, 
p.131; 1969b, p.19) has pointed out, "theory laden". But sometimes 
those theories can interfere with an authentic apprehension of 
reality. Instead of guiding scientists to the truth, they can send 
them down false trails of speciousness, and cause them to see things 
that are an hallucination of a theory, not of reality. The attempt to 
account for the perturbation in the perihelion of Mercury was subject 
in this way to the malevolent influence of a theory. 
So confident were Eighteenth Century astronomers in the efficacy 
of Newtonian mechanics, that they had come to believe that that 
mechanics could explain virtually any phenonmenon in the universe. 
That confidence had been somewhat strengthened by the fact that 
Newtonian mechanics had produced a reliable explanation of the per-
turbation of Uranus and led to the prediction and eventual discovery 
of a new planet, Neptune. Astronomers naturally assumed that what 
applied to Uranus must equally apply to an analogous case of perturb-
ation, that of Mercury. Thus another planet, Vulcan, was hypothe-
sised into existence, which to perturb Mercury, it was supposed, must 
orbit somewhere between it and the Sun. And a number of astronomers 
even reported sighting the existence of this planet, not realising 
that what accounted for Mercury's perturbation was another theory 
altogether, one that had not yet been formulated (Hanson, 1962). 
This does not really undermine the proposition that seeing is 
"theory laden"; rather it shows that sometimes seeing becomes laden 
with wrong theories. With Mercury's perturbation, it was a matter of 
having too much faith in the infallibility of a theory; it was im-
possible 'to see' that Newton's system could sometimes be in error. 
The system had an aura of absoluteness about it that blinded scientists 
to alternative ways of regarding physical reality. Theory, then, 
can sometimes serve to blunt, not sharpen our vision of things; it 
can imprison, not release, our outlook, and blinker us to the possi-
bilities that lie outside the ambit of a theory governing our vision of 
things. Rather than accelerate understanding, theories can sometimes 
retard it, as was the case, for instance, with the discovery of the 
sub-atomic particle known as the "positron". That particle, like 
the true cause of Mercury's perturbation, was only discovered after 
'offloading' a theory that was apparently governing 'seeing' in sub-
atomic physics. For just as in the case of Mercury, it was a pre-
vailing theory that led to all sorts of specious conclusions about what 
was being observed, in particular, the nature of certain anamalous 
tracks that were seen on Cloud-Chamber photographs. Such tracks, and 
they were regularly photographed, were "discounted as 'spurious*, or as 
'dirt effects'" (Hanson, 1963, pp.135-139). No one until Anderson, in 
1932, had seriously considered that the tracks might in fact be the 
footprints of another sub-atomic particle, the positron. But to reg-
ister them as positrons required a radical readjustment of atomic 
theory, which most experimental physicists of the time were unwilling 
to make. Anderson, however, was able to offload the conventional view 
of the atom, and see that the positron was a vital element in its con-
struction, and that its existence would clear up the mystery of what 
had been formerly dismissed as "dirt effects" on the Cloud Chamber 
photographs. 
One of the negative effects of "epistemic seeing" is that it can 
serve to diminish the significance of the familiar. In opening our 
eyes to the world which normally goes 'unseen', knowledge can some-
times effect to emasculate our sensitivity to the ordinary and the 
apparently mundane. Yet the all too familiar can sometimes harbour 
a hieroglyph of profound epistemological significance. Anderson, for 
instance, saw positrons in that which physics had taught him were 
pieces of dirt. But he had to invent his own Rosetta Stone before he 
could see them thus; he had to overcome the conventional way of re-
garding the familiar. In much the same way, the Arctic explorer and 
scientist, Nansen, was also able to draw epistemological significance 
in the familiar that went well beyond its conventional connotation. 
For the 'flotsam' - the dirt effects of the land - he picked up off 
the coast of Greenland turned out to be the key that eventually yielded 
the existence of an Arctic Ocean (Nansen, 1897, pp.22-23). 
Scientific knowledge, then, often elevates to the level of con-
sciousness things, which, whilst they are in the compass of sensory 
apprehension, are not normally inferred to have much epistemological 
value, and therefore are overlooked. But 'de-familiarising* the 
familiar is not the only transformative effect of science. It has 
also been argued that its theories infuse 'vision*. That is, theories 
not only foist 'meaning' upon what is apprehended, but also act to 
unify, structure and order what is actually apprehended at the retina. 
The 'lenses' in the scientist's "spectacles", then, not only have the 
power of magnification, but also the power to 'colour' the interpre-
tation of what they magnify. They are, so to speak, tinted lenses! 
But science is only one amongst a whole gamut of epistemic behaviours. 
It must be asked, then, before accepting the proposition that all 
knowledge invades 'seeing', whether these transformative effects are 
indigenous to knowledge in general, or just to the sciences? Does 
psychology, for instance, similarly 'de-familiarize' the world it 
concerns itself with? Are the arts and the humanities also capable of 
influencing the outlook on the world? In short, do other modes of 
knowledge, not just the sciences, have the potential to load 'seeing' 
with theory? 
2.6 OTHER VARIETIES OF KNOWLEDGE AND SEEING 
It has been argued that scientific knowledge tends to alert in-
dividuals to phenomena which normally are not regarded as having any 
particular epistemological significance. Science, then, tends to 
dispel the syndrome-of-overlooking from the midst of consciousness 
and create awareness about that which is commonly taken for granted; 
it breathes new light into the realms of ordinary gazing. It is 
for this reason, it has been argued (Kohler, 1947), that psychology 
took such a long time to develop into a mature and independent science. 
Its initial territory was a realm of ordinary mental events that could 
be adequately comprehended without the need for sophisticated scien-
tific treatment. There was nothing a scientific psychology could 
really add that m e n , by dint of common sense and domestic lore, did 
not already own. In its beginning, then, psychology had to distance 
itself from being the science of the obvious; it had to throw off 
the shackles of the common sense attitudes to the mind; it had to 
penetrate through the patina of the familiar before it could make any 
real headway as a science. In the same way, Chomsky (1972, pp.26,63) 
has argued, linguistics has been dogged by its practitioners being 
prone to 'over familiarity* with their subject, language. As a result 
many things have escaped their notice, such as the obvious necessity 
for a universal grammar! Had linguistic theorists been able to put 
some "psychic distance" between themselves and language, and succeeded 
in making language "strange" rather than familiar, that might not have 
been the case. 
If Kohler and Chomsky are right, then, in the human sciences the 
familiar might be more of a hindrance than a harbinger of new know-
ledge. But then it might also be a Case of being able to transcend 
the familiar to return to it with renewed insight. Once that is 
achieved, it might be possible, as in science, to see the symptoms of 
greater epistemological truths residing in the more familiar aspects 
of social and mental behaviour. Certainly this is one of the virtues 
that has been claimed of educational theory (Entwistle, 1977, p.226). 
It does not help teachers in a direct way, as physics does engineers, 
but simply sensitizes them to problems of practice that previously 
lacked significance. Educational theory, then, has an attention draw-
ing function. For it brings into focus aspects of the learning situ-
ation that close familiarity has stolen the limelight from. As a 
theory, education transforms by awakening, and in this sense accords 
with one of the properties of scientific knowledge: that it raises to a 
level of consciousness things that have been customarily overlooked. 
But having brought the overlooked into the arena of awareness, do 
the human sciences then go on to impute an interpretation such that 
what is looked upon is seen in a particular epistemological light. It 
has after all been suggested that the human scientist's "spectacles", 
like those of the physicist's, also magnify, but do they also, accord-
ing to the 'lenses' used, tint and colour what is seen? In psychiatry, 
Szasz (1977,pp. 721-722) is most adamant that they do. He argues that 
the idea of a disease called 'schizophrenia' was invented, not dis-
covered. Mental diseases only began to 'exist' after they had been 
invented by pioneers like Kraeplin, Bleuler and Freud. Before that, 
it appears that they did not actually afflict the minds of ordinary 
men. It is only since the era of psychoanalysis that the symptoms of 
anguish, torment, depression and so forth have been seen to have an 
aetiology in a 'disease' like schizophrenia, for which sophisticated 
treatments and drugs have been devised as cures. But Szasz argues 
these treatments and drugs are treating a neologism Bleuler invented, 
not a real disease. It is only because pioneer psychiatry "managed 
to bring about the great epistemological transformation in our medical 
age: that is to say, from histopathology to psychopathology" (Szasz, 
1977, p.721-722) that society has now come to regard the problems of 
the mind as illnesses, which in the technical sense of the word they 
are not. 
Whether Szasz is right, that psychoanalysis pulled off a grand 
piece of epistemological deception in making us believe in the exist-
ence of mental illness, is an issue that remains well beyond the 
scope of this study. But plainly Szasz is right to the extent that 
psychoanalysis did provide a lens through which to see the probable 
provenance of certain forms of perverse behaviour. And the fact that 
these behaviours can be seen as symptoms of schizophrenia, or, as 
Szasz would prefer, simply the failure to become competent at exist-
ence, does show that the lens, just as in the physical sciences, 
can be modified or replaced. 
Whilst the effects of transformations in the human sciences would 
appear to be less well defined than in the physical sciences, it does 
seem that the human sciences have the capacity both to transform out-
look and to influence the way things are seen and construed. Is this 
a capacity that can be equally extended to the arts? Are they, also, 
epistemological endeavours that are spectacle and lens dependent? 
From the spectator's point of view it does seem that they are. It 
has already been noted (see 2.2), for instance, how perspective appears 
to be a culture bound sensitivity that is absent in cultures which 
have not developed it as a mode of pictorial representation. It seems 
in order to understand and interpret the way depth is encoded by per-
spective, people need to be exposed to painting and drawing wherein it 
prevails. And this is true of other devices used in painting, not 
just foreshortening (Gombrich, 1960, p.360). In fact it seems that 
the whole experience of 'reading* a painting is dependent on a famili-
arity with the vocabulary and syntax it uses to represent. Seeing a 
painting, then, is a thoroughly theory laden experience; it relies 
on what Aldrich (1963, p.21) has called "categorial aspection" or 
schooled looking. It is a matter of a painting's beholder playing his 
share in its 'creation', if he is to comprehend fully its pictorial 
verity. For painters are, above all, trompe I'oeil merchants who 
juggle the beholder's categorial aspections and make shortcuts to 
representation, which they anticipate the beholder will have the 
capacity to flesh out and make more corporeal. It is a matter of the 
beholder projecting his life and experience onto the arrested image 
and supplementing from his experiences what is not actually present 
in the painting (Gombrich, 1973, p.17). Paintings, then, capitalise 
on what psychologists call the "etc. principle". As such, they can be 
regarded as icons or anticipatory cues, that should stimulate into 
existence in the beholder - should he be laden with the appropriate 
aesthetic predispositions - the image the artist intended to create. 
But as Gombrich (1960, p.234) also points out, it is the skill of the 
artist that he knows what to omit and still leave the beholder with 
enough to 'complete' the image. The artist, then, must learn to 
identify with the categorial aspections of the beholder if he is to 
play on them, just as the beholder must identify with those of the 
artist if he is to realise how his aspections are being exploited 
and used to aesthetic effect. The artist must know when to leave a 
'visual etcetera', just as the beholder must know what it means when 
he sees one. Without that agreement, artistic communication would 
collapse, and does so whenever an artist initiates a new trick, a 
new etcetera principle, and the beholder has not learnt how to be 
deceived by it.* 
Unless episteme behaviour of the seeing as kind is present 
in experience, it is being argued, the aesthetic response to a painting 
is diminished. Without the appropriate categorial aspections, the 
aesthetic import of a painting is dull and indistinct; it is atrophied 
rather than round. But is this true of the other art forms? Is 
literature, for instance, only one tenth of the aesthetic experience, 
if there is no element of, to paraphrase Wittgenstein, 'reading as*^ 
in it? And is the experience of music similarly incomplete if it is not 
supplemented by a 'schooled ear'? Are there 'hearing as' components 
in the rounded appreciation of symphonies and sonatas? 
To take the case of literature first: competence at 'reading' it, 
like that of painting, is a matter of understanding the conventions 
that govern the way it realises the world and the human condition. For 
there is a 'language' to literature that is above and beyond the 
language it is written in, which must be "first internalised" if the 
reader is to "convert linguistic sequences into literary structures and 
meanings" (Culler, 1975, p.114). It is only if the reading is "theory 
laden" that a piece of literature comes fully alive, and begins re-
vealing its narrative 'subconscious'. Only in that way can the bridge 
* As was the case with Kandinsky's first experience of one of the 
series of haystacks that the French post-impressionist, Claude 
Monet, painted. According to Kandinsky's (1964, p.26) autobio-
graphy, previous to his experience of the Monet, he had only known 
exclusively Russian naturalistic art. He was therefore ill-prepared 
aesthetically for the experience of post-impressionism. His initial 
reaction to the Monet was one of non-recognition. It was simply 
a painting from which the "object" was missing. It was to Kan-
dinsky's eyes, for all intents and purposes, an abstract painting. 
That was because, in gestalt jargon, he was unable to disinter the 
'figure' of the 'haystack' from the 'ground' of the painting. It 
was all one to him. Monet's trompe I'oeil had failed. 
between the language of literature and the language of its interpret-
ation be crossed. And just as in painting, poets and novelists some-
times demolish that bridge by introducing new and unexpected literary 
devices. Thereby they temporarily lose their 'readers*, until the 
latter develop the theoretical spectacles with which to read the 
meanings harbouring in the new literary device. In fact it has been 
argued that poetry functions precisely to negate expectation and 
create surprise. Only in this way, does it "stimulate new awareness 
of the world" (Martin, 1975, pp.162-164). 
Some measure of antecedent *epistemic behaviour* is also required 
to hear music properly. As studies in ethnomusicology have shown, 
there "can be several possible structural interpretations of any 
pattern of sound, and almost an infinite number of individual responses 
to its structure depending on the cultural background" of its listeners 
(Blacking, 1976, pp.19-21). For instance, whilst many cultures exploit 
in their music the "dominant-tonic-dominant" sequence, the physical 
registration of that sequence is not always accompanied by relaxation at 
the tonic, and tension at the dominant, as it is for the listener 
'trained* in Europe. In the Nande culture, this response is com-
pletely reversed (Blacking, 1976, p.17). In fact it seems there are 
as many ways of playing and listening to music as there are languages 
in the *Tower of Babel*; and that to derive the full aesthetic impact 
from any of them requires a * trained* ear. For music would only 
appear to give rise to affective feelings if the *ear* is already 
attuned to the music, and charged with expectations about what it 
is that will be heard (Meyer, 1956, p.29). Indeed much of the 
pleasure of music seems to spring from it conforming to our expectat-
ions, to our theories about it.* 
2.7 EPISTEMIC VISION: SOME QUESTIONS OF ORIGIN AND USE 
The last five sections have attempted to demonstrate that whilst 
the mind might have at its core a series of genetically encoded 
'grammars* that universally guide perception and rationality (see 2.1), 
experience of the cultural and topographical 'habitats* furbishes 
the mind with sensitivities and rationalities that are specific, and 
not necessarily all that universal. So that if the mind is never 
totally rasa, it is also true that the initial script on the tabula. 
* Meyer (1967,pp.272-273) has argued that one of the reasons why contem-
porary music is rarely thought by the lay public to be a pleasure 
giving experience is its constant preoccupation with breaking every 
knowable musical rule. It is so unpredictable, it is so impossible 
to anticipate what contemporary music will do next, that the average 
listener cannot formulate any hearing theories to deal with it. 
Instead it remains a closed book of cacophony without any perceivable, 
and therefore pleasurable, aural patterns to it whatsoever. On the 
other hand, as the psychologist Valentine (1962,ppv4l4-"415)has demon-
strated, it is possible to build up a gradual receptivity to such 
music. He discovered that when exposed to continuous sessions of 
discordant music his subjects became as familiar with its "behaviour-
al patterns" as with their favourite symphonies. Indeed, for some, 
discord became as much to their taste as concord had formerly been! 
This experiment of Valentine tends to be confirmed by the rather 
eccentric musical education a pioneer of contemporary music, Charles 
Ives, experienced at the hands of his father. As a matter of prin-
ciple, Ives senior subjected his son to all sorts of discord and 
dissonance, in the belief that there was as much beauty and aural 
interest in them as any piece of conventional harmony and counter-
point. So whilst Ives senior would play the accompaniment of 
"Swanee River" in C his son Charles would sing it in E-flat! "This 
was to stretch our ears and strengthen our musical minds, so that 
they could learn to use and translate things that might be used and 
translated (in the art of music) more than they had been" (Ives, 
1973, p.115) - which of course Ives went on to do in the symphonies 
and sonatas he wrote. 
as the mind comes into contact with its physical and cultural sur-
rounds, is quickly supplanted, embellished and written over, rather in 
the fashion of a 'palimpsest*. But it would be a mistake to think that 
the various *caligraphies' of experience, which are responsible for the 
*palimpsestic' effect, are at all mutually exclusive; they are not. 
There is not, for instance, a strand of epistemic vision that is 
just due to topography, another that is just due to language and 
so on, without there ever being any question of possible interaction 
between the various 'furnishings' of experience. Interactions do 
happen, such that sometimes the visions that are due to topography, 
knowledge and language can all serve to modify one another in varying 
degrees. An example from geology will bear this out, and how it is 
that sometimes an epistemic vision can be indebted to topography for 
the view of the world it finally adopts. 
Geologists trained in the Middle West of the United States, far 
away from the manifestations of dramatic coastal erosion, were always 
inclined to the view that high plains or plateaux were formed by sub-
aerial denudation. On the other hand, their more littorally experienced 
collègues in Britain - who had the sea all around them and could 
observe the evidence of its enormous , erosive power - took the view 
that only the sea could be responsible for such geological formations 
(Pantin, 1968, pp.5-6). One topography, then, can cause one knowledge, 
another another, and yet both can be equally legitimate in the circum-
stances in which they were 'born'. And, as was suggested earlier, pre-
sumably what is true of topography is true of language. It, too, can 
covertly load knowledge with predispositions and prejudices that in 
their way help to influence the way segments of the world are regarded. 
Thus it would seem likely that 'epistemic vision' finally represents 
the outcome of the sum total of experience, not just portions of it. 
But having acknowledged that, it is also true that certain types of 
experience have a more pronounced impact on that vision than others. 
Those, for example, which are due to knowledge have much more of an 
impact than do language and topography. Indeed, knowledge often 
serves to nullify the malevolent influences that occasionally spring 
from the latter. 
Because it serves to broaden the compass of outlook much more 
than anything else in 'experience', it is with knowledge, and the 
modifications to outlook that it generates, that this study will in 
the main be concerned. Previous sections have already demonstrated 
that under the influence of knowledge, outlook is developed. This 
entails that the outlook is rendered sensitive to aspects of the 
familiar world, which, without the imperative of knowledge, would 
be overlooked. It has been noted how this is virtually the epistemo-
logical equivalent of wearing a pair of spectacles which colour 
and magnify aspects of the world. In a sense these spectacles are 
the theories which load vision and cause it to draw epistemological 
inferences from the world. It is knowledge, then, which finally con-
tributes the 'as' to seeing, reading, and hearing. 
There are, however, a number of unanswered questions and rami-
fications which flow on from regarding knowledge as an agent and source 
of perceptual transformation. For instance, is the fact that seeing 
becomes "théory laden", after exposure to knowledge, merely an exten-
sion of a mechanism that comes quite naturally to the mind anyway? 
Epistemic behaviour thus merely serves to exploit this mechansim. 
Could it also be that epistemic seeing is simply a heightened form of 
ordinary perception, and given that it might be, are its traits some-
what analogous and governed by the same psychological principles? And 
if knowledge does partake in altering what the mind becomes conscious 
of in reality is there some way of describing how that alteration is 
effected? Is there some way, for instance, of showing how it is that 
"seeing as" comes about, and what "seeing as", as opposed to just 
plain seeing, entails in terms of the relationship between knowledge, 
consciousness and reality? 
Answering this series of questions, as will be done in Chapters 
Three and Four, would thus help to explain the mechanisms behind 
'epistemic vision', and what mentally happens as the transposition 
from seeing to seeing as occurs. Yet whilst it has been indicated 
that it is knowledge that holds thè *key' to that transposition, no 
mention has been made about how that key is obtained or turned! 
Some mention has Keen made of the 'trained ear' and of 'schooled look-
ing', so that it could be inferred from such phrasing that it is 
education which is involved in that transposition. But in what ways 
does this view of education, as a kind of epistemological 'optometrist', 
supplying and fitting the spectacles of knowledge, accord with the 
conventional raison d'etre of education? If it does, is it possible 
that the institutional arrangements of education reflect the trans-
ition from non-epistemic to epistemic vision? Such questions will be the 
province of Chapter Five. 
The fact that epistemological transformation would appear to occur 
mostly in an institutional context introduces yet one more dimension 
to the process: the social. After all, education could be seen to 
exist solely to sponsor a discourse between those in the 'know' and 
those who are not. In effect this means that education would appear 
to facilitate the transference of epistemic behaviour from generations 
who possess it, to others who do not. Is it education, then, that 
brings about bespectacled vision? And does this imply that teachers 
are in some way skilled at getting consecutive generations of students 
to look epistemologically at the world in the way they do? 
But it has also been argued (see 2.4) that whilst the 'frames' of 
knowledge do not alter radically, the lenses contained within them 
often do. This raises the question of who it is that does that 
altering. Who is it, in what could be regarded as a knowledge community, 
that is ultimately responsible for creating new modes of "seeing as"? 
And how do these new modes serve to affect the relationship between 
extant knowledge, consciousness and reality? Is there some way of 
characterizing the genesis of new knowledge in terms of this relation-
ship? Then there is the matter of how this new knowledge gets into 
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circulation amongst all the members of the knowledge community. How 
is it that, so to speak, the new lenses of knowledge get to the mills 
of optometry? These are largely questions about the members (and 
their responsibilities) who comprise knowledge communities. Chapter 
Six will examine these questions. 
The matter of 'epistemic vision', then, would appear to evoke a 
very broad conspectus of questions that, when raised, as they have just 
been done, in congeries, do not seem to have much affiliation with one 
another. However, there are some threads of connectivity that can be 
traced amongst them, and which enable these congeries to be reduced 
to one central issue, and that is the matter of knowledge enculturation: 
what does it mean and how is it achieved? And since that issue 
of enculturation might harbour clues to the decipherment of the sorts 
of 'epistemic vision' discussed ^ 2 . 5 and 2.6, it is an issue that is 
of central importance to this study. It is worth asking, then, whether 
education or epistemology, since both these areas have raised issues 
about enculturation, have encompassed all the questions that the 
phenomenon of enculturation evokes? 
2.8 EDUCATION, OR TRAVELLING WITH A "DIFFERENT VIEW" 
Various metaphors have been used to insinuate that education and 
knowledge are close 'bed fellows'! Knowledge, for instance, has been 
described as the "stock-in-trade of the teacher" (Brubacher, 1962, 
p.74) and the "bedrock" upon which the superstructure of education is 
founded (Jenks, 1977, p.23). It has also been seen as a kind of 
Gothic cathedral around which the city of education (in true Medieval 
style) is built, so that its citizens can come to pray regularly at 
the altar of knowledge and seek, if not divine, then secular revel-
ations about the world. 
The quasi-religiosity of this final metaphor, which accords to 
knowledge almost sacrosanct status, is not without justification, for 
the "great God episteme", to use Popper's phrase, seems to have been 
an unrivalled deity in the pantheon of educational idols ever since 
the dawning of education. It is only now that the cult of knowledge 
in education is being smitten with critique and disillusion, and 
powerful movements of apostasy from it are beginning to emerge. The 
new educational idols thus tend to be existential rather than epistemo-
logical. There.is much talk, for instance, of educating the emotions 
and of broadening the compass of personal awareness. What Phenix 
(1964, p.193) has called "synnoetics" - the capacity to emphathise 
with other beings - has become the gospel of alternative education. 
Yet despite these assaults on the traditional direction of education, 
the cathedral of knowledge still stands; it has not yet been demol-
ished. Just like a real cathedral, then, it has survived the millenia, 
and seems destined to continue to do so. Indeed, it will be argued 
in this study, that if the frontiers of knowledge are to continue 
advancing, education cannot afford to capitulate to the apostates. 
For, rightly or wrongly, education is now hand-maiden to new develop-
ments in knowledge; and that, it will be suggested, has become its 
principal function. 
Of course this is an unfashionable way of regarding education, 
even amongst those educationalists (mainly of a philosophical frame 
of mind) who still maintain a faith in the broadly humanitarian 
benefits that can be had from knowledge. It is after all, they argue, 
the very factor of the knowledge, and the understanding that education 
is empowered to deliver, which makes for man being rational and 
autonomous (Langford, 1973, p.14; Wilson, 1975, p.35; Peters,1975b, 
p.3). Renege on that, and man is returned to the *brute* condition. 
Education, then, on this view delivers man from the claims of his 
instincts and the prejudices of his irrational self. It alerts him 
to the powers of thought and reason, and releases him from the 
stranglehold of a life tied to what James (1940, p.81) called "raw 
perceptual experience". 
This broadly melioristic picture of knowledge as harbouring the 
key to a worthwhile and meaningful existence represents a normative 
rather than a functional justification for education pivoting itself 
about knowledge. As such it accentuates a role for knowledge in educa-
tion of a rather different order from that which will be conferred upon 
it in this study. Nevertheless it is worth pursuing this role for a 
moment, for those who advocate it have views of knowledge that share 
certain similarities with that already delineated. Peters, whose 
advocacy of a normative justification for education is both thorough 
and exhaustive, has, in a number of influential essays (1965, 1968, 
1973), consistently argued that education principally exists to in-
itiate individuals into desirable states of mind. It is clear from 
Peters* various elaborations of what this means that he sees education 
as an enterprise dedicated to bringing about changed conceptual atti-
tudes towards the world. "To be educated", he wrote in his inaugural 
lecture to the London Institute of Education, "is not to have arrived 
at a destination; it is to travel with a different view" (1968, p.110). 
And as he says elsewhere, to be educated is to have one's view of the 
world "transformed by the development and systematization of conceptual 
schemes" (1973, p.256). Since these schemes are indigenous to the 
various domains of knowledge, it is evident that Peters feels that 
men ar̂ e transformed by what they know. Although he would probably be 
loathe to use it as a metaphor, it is clear that Peters sees know-
ledge as a kind of cognitive 'hallucinogen*, with mind-expanding 
capacities, that permit men to perceive and apprehend aspects of the 
world to which they had no previous sensitivity. 
In fact in the history of educational thought, Peters* notions 
about the effects of knowledge are by no means novel. Boethius was 
saying virtually the same thing in the Fifth Century! * There is 
* Boethius, for instance, wrote in The Consolation of Philosophy: 
"Everything that is known is comprehended not according to its 
own nature, but according to the ability to know of those who 
do the knowing" (1969, Book V). 
then, nothing particularly new in attributing to knowledge the power 
to transform. Nor indeed is there anything new in the complementary 
proposal that the: transformation occurs via some form of encultur-
ation . One of the most frequent catchcries of Peters, for instance, is 
"education as initiation". The vistas that knowledge unveils are not 
spontaneously revealed, but only become apparent as the child's aware-
ness is "differentiated in accordance with the canons implicit in the 
inherited traditions" of knowledge (Peters, 1965, p.l03). The doors 
of epistemological perception tend to open very slowly. It is their 
opening which Peters characterises as "initiation", and that in effect 
amounts to much the same thing as 'enculturation*. But whilst this 
characterization conveys the notion, apt or not, that being introduced 
to knowledge is like having the * truths* of some mystery cult re-
vealed to one, the connection between education and initiation is never 
explored by Peters in any but the most general terms. None of the 
'rites* and 'rituals' that might be involved are ever specified; nor 
are what might be taken as the phases of that initiation identified. 
Yet given that the outcome of education is travelling with a "different 
view", the obvious thing would be to characterize its itinerary. Then 
there is the more serious omission of asking what kinds of views are 
seen on that itinerary. Peters talks of "desirable states of mind" 
and of "getting inside the public forms of knowledge", yet remains very 
unspecific about what those "public forms" are. But, then, he has 
always tended to leave the more detailed ramifications of the 
epistemological parts of his philosophy to Hirst, 
Hirst's starting point is Peters' cul-de-sac. He, for instance, 
shares with Peters the belief that it is knowledge which has the 
potential to transform both the quality and character of experience 
(Hirst, 1968, p.123). But whereas Peters seems content to let his an-
alysis of education and knowledge rest at this juncture. Hirst is not. 
Thus it is a matter of some importance in Hirst's thinking about educa-
tion to establish the number and epistemological character of the "pub-
lic forms of knowledge". And this he does. For instance, he fixes the 
number of forms of knowledge, that have the property of "mutual irredu-
cibility" at seven, and argues that any "liberal education" worth its 
while will be built around these 'seven pillars of wisdom' (Hirst, 1974, 
p.84; 1968, p.133). What Hirst does, then, is add prescription to 
Peters' formula for education. He accepts its general principle that 
education should lead to "desirable states of mind", and then proceeds 
to indicate where it is these "desirable states" might be found. But 
whilst Hirst at least represents an advance on Peters, his attempt to 
delimit what are legitimate "forms of knowledge" has met with criticism 
on a number of counts. On straight epistemological grounds, it has been 
said (White, 1973, p.75; Hindness, 1972) that the forms are not neces-
sarily as autonomous as Hirst presumes them to be. Indeed, it has been 
argued that some are not even forms of knowledge at all (Gribble, 1970). 
Then it has been claimed (Elliot, 1975, p.51), that certain modes of 
thought are not exclusive to particular forms of knowledge, as Hirst 
seems to suggest, but operate throughout the whole spectrum of know-
ledge, e.g. appreciation. 
But not all the criticism of Hirst is epistemological in tenor. 
Jenks (1977, p.24), a sociologist, sees Hirst's view of knowledge as 
being essentially trapped in a "positivistic" framework. He argues 
that whilst Hirst constantly recognises that knowledge has a public 
domain to it - as he does - he eschews consideration of the ramifi-
cations that flow on from it, preferring to remain firmly entrenched 
in the logical features of knowledge. This causes an ethnocentricity 
to infiltrate Hirst's thinking, in that he cannot see the legitimacy 
of patterns of thought that remain outside the ambit of European cul-
ture. Anything that cannot be trammelled within a positivistic 
account of knowledge is taboo as far as Hirst is concerned. But gen-
erally what Hirst has failed to take into account in his reading of 
knowledge is that its legitimacy is often more likely to be determined 
by the epistemological values of people rather than logic. 
But even if these criticisms could be accommodated, there still 
remain serious oversights in Hirst's thinking about education and know-
ledge, especially in those areas of "initiation" and enculturation 
that this study is attempting to examine. For in those areas. Hirst 
has only really analysed the epistemological nature of the stuff 
"initiation" and enculturation are dispensing: knowledge. He has little 
to offer on the rites and rituals involved in its dispensing; for dis-
cussions about the initiation of individuals into the public forms of 
knowledge is virtually absent from his writings. Hirst, then, only 
indicates what sort of epistemological views might be glimpsed through 
education; but like Peters he does not indicate how individuals get to 
the point where they can look out over those views! 
Of course Hirst and Peters do not represent the whole world of 
educational thinking; but they are notable in the fact, that despite 
evident flaws and oversights in their thinking, they have at least 
recognised and tried to explain education's irrevocable bond to know-
ledge. And in many respects, as Jenks (1977, p.23) suggests, they and 
their 'epigones' are almost alone in the world of education in this, 
for although mind and knowledge are the two phenomena that are of 
major concern to education, the majority of educational theory seems 
to eschew their consideration. Instead, education has tended to con-
centrate on the "epiphenomena" of knowledge and mind: on curriculum 
planning, on child development, on social deprivation and so on. And 
whilst such things help to ameliorate the practice of education, they 
do not really enlighten understanding of the purpose and meaning of 
education. This Peters and Hirst have to some extent done, but in 
their earnest desire to supply a normative justification for giving 
knowledge such a prominent place in education, they have camouflaged 
a more underlying and functional purpose in education; and that is 
the advancement and perpetuation of knowledge and knowledge communi-
ties. About that purpose, Peters and Hirst, whilst they do 
occasionally acknowledge its existence, offer only the sketchiest of 
accounts. It might, then, given that educational theory is not 
proving to bear much fruit on the issue of enculturation, be worthwhile 
to look askance from education to see if epistemology- which, after all, 
is that part of philosophy which deals with knowledge - might have 
amongst its current concerns something related to enculturation and 
its effects. 
2.9 THE STATE OF THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL ART 
Like many of the phenomena that were formerly the sole prerogative 
of philosophy, discussions about the nature of knowledge have increas-
ingly fallen within the province of the human sciences. This cultiva-
tion by the human sciences of what once were pre-eminently epistemo-
logical problems has not entirely extinguished the role philosophy 
might play in understanding knowledge. If anything it has served to 
distinguish those aspects of knowledge which yield to philosophical 
treatment from those which the human sciences, like sociology and 
psychology, might more adequately deal with. For as has tended to 
happen in other fields of philosophy - philosophy of mind and natural 
philosophy, for example - this encroachment by the human sciences 
has led to a more intense cultivation by epistemology of those 
territories that psychology and sociology lack the appropriate method-
ologies to command (Komer, 1969,pp.278-279) . And in case there should 
be any confusion about where the boundaries might lie, philosophers 
in general, until quite recently, have been keen to demonstrate that 
their epistemological territory is of a decidedly different topography 
from that colonised by psychologists and sociologists (Reichenbach, 
1961, p.3; Popper, 1974, p.31). Nor is this particular boot totally 
on the philosopher's foot. Psychologists and sociologists have also 
felt a certain uneasiness about crossing into what they take to be 
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properly the territory of philosophy (Parsons, 1951,pp.360-361; Berger 
and Luckmann, 1973, p.14; Feigl, 1959). By common consent, then, there 
seems to have been something of a disciplinary "apartheid" practised 
when it comes to matters connected with knowledge. Philosophers thus 
have been somewhat reticent to consort with psychologists and vice 
versa, no doubt fearing that they might "contaminate" each others' 
pursuits (Kaplan, 1971, p.64). 
It has been said that psychologists do statistics to prevent 
their discipline degenerating into philosophy (Goldmann, 1970, p.22). 
Disparaging though that remark was intended to be to philosophy, it 
is sententious enough to conceal a basic truth about the nature of 
philosophy as distinct from psychology. For in their desire to render 
their discipline scientific, psychologists do play with numbers and 
statistics. In fact statistics are the meter readings of psycholo-
gists; they are the portals to a world of facts that cannot ordinarily 
be observed; and it is upon statistics that the empirical truths of 
psychology tend to rest. This is unlike philosophy, which is much 
less concerned with merging its identity with science. As a con-
sequence, it has less apprehension about treading in areas where 
psychology fears to tread. And not constrained by the aegis of 
science, philosophical truths therefore tend to be purchased from 
speculation rather than observation. A first point of demarcation 
between psychology and philosophy, then, centres on their respective 
methodologies. An epistemology that is due to philosophy thus will 
tend to be conceptual, that to psychology empirical. 
But the differences do not cease at rival methodologies. There is 
also the matter of preferred area of epistemological concern; and over 
this not only are'differences encountered between the human sciences 
and philosophy, but also within philosophy itself. It is a matter of 
knowledge - the common object of concern - being seen from a variety 
of perspectives. In sociology's case that perspective revolves around 
the "social construction of reality" and the way it is that knowledge, 
which is indigenous to different sectors of society, generates diff-
erent perspectives on reality (Berger and Luckmann,1973, p.115). 
Psychology's perspective, on the other hand, probes some of the inner 
cognitive mechanisms that might be responsible for that knowledge; it 
looks at the way it is essentially acquired, sired and stored. Still 
different again, philosophy ponders less about the cognitive and 
social attributes of knowledge and more about those which could be 
attributed to its logical features (Woozley, 1967, p.14). It is 
pledged to explore such areas as *What is knowledge?', 'Does it have 
any a priori components?', 'What is it to know?' and 'How does know-
ledge come to bear truth about reality?' 
Although most definitions of it eschew the notion that knowledge 
'maps' reality, preferring to stress the fact that the assertion 'to 
know' involves satisfying certain truth conditions (Werkmeister, 1968, 
p.266; Hamlyn, 1970, p.5; Chisholm, 1966, p.18), it is surely one of 
its more ineluctable features that knowledge, though it be a conditional 
assertion, does attempt to chart in some way the 'behaviour' of 
reality. Of course, the conditions that constrain knowledge assertions 
are an all important part of the anatomy of knowledge, for they help 
to control its veristic quality. But after the constraints have been 
applied, what remains is a knowledge that in some way reflects or 
comes to terms with reality. The two, reality and knowledge, are in-
dissolubly linked;' they are companions in the epistemological process 
(Harre, 1970, pp.279-299). 
Since it is reality that is being mapped by knowledge, questions 
about the epistemological authenticity of the latter evoke questions 
about the nature and status of the reality being addressed. Whilst 
it is highly improbable that they are likely to be incompatible, the 
mere fact that knowledge addresses itself to what 'appears' to it 
to be plausible 'reality', means that knowledge, if not exactly sub-
servient to metaphysics, is one of its principal satellites (Yolton, 
1965, p.l; Machan, 1970, p.258, Harr^, 1974, p.9). 
That knowledge, then, might have to surrender its assertions to 
metaphysics before they can be finally ratified, suggests that the 
truths of knowledge are ultimately dependent on the view of reality 
that is held. If it is held, for instance, that the 'flesh* of con-
crete reality secretes a universe populated by ideas and forms that 
only the scalpel of rationality can excoriate, then a knowledge derived 
empirically, that takes as its subject matter the flesh of concrete 
reality, will be, metaphysically speaking, an untenable sort of know-
ledge. Similarly, the strict empiricist who believes there are no 
ideas except in the experience of things, will frown on the rationalist 
assumption that there are, as its etymology suggests, in metaphysics, 
'things beyond the physical realm'. For the empiricist, knowledge 
will have its roots in a physical reality that is available to the 
senses, not a noumenal one that is not. But the ultimate arbiter as 
to whether such a reality exists, or is an illusion, as the neo-Platonists 
would have said, is metaphysics. This then would suggest that episte-
mology is ultimately reducible to metaphysics.* 
On the other hand, both knowledge and metaphysics have their 
incipience in the mind. And whilst it might be possible to divorce an 
'out-there' reality from the parameters of the mind, in truth that reality 
is only as good as the parameters of the mind allow (Heisenberg, 1971). 
As Russell (1973, pp.1-7) once pointed out, a distinction must be made 
between the world of matter and that world as it actually appears to 
human beings. The two often do not coincide, for the mind imprints 
its own characteristics upon reality, a fact which makes if difficult 
to appreciate things as they actually are. How much the 
* Or in these days of Berger and Luckmann (vide supra) perhaps sociology. 
After all, if anything is proof of a socially constructed reality, it 
is Plato's metaphysics. Plato firmly believed that it was only given 
to certain members of society the privilege to see the immanent forms 
beyond the physical realm. The rest had to make do with the shadowy 
world of things; and that was a world from which opinion, not know-
ledge, originated (Plato, 1973a, Book VII, 7). 
mind serves to subvert the appearance of things depends a great deal 
on the philosopher being read. For Kant it was considerable, for 
Locke a lot less. But whatever the case, the epistemologist has to 
recognise that mental questions can be as much the orbit of his 
concern as the nature of the reality to which knowledge addresses 
itself; and in dealing with such questions epistemology comes peril-
ously close to becoming a "chapter of psychology" (Quine, 1972, p.18). 
However, they are not so close as to becoming the chapter of the 
same book. Or if they are, then they are written in different styles. 
For as has been noted, the approach of epistemology is speculative, 
psychology mainly empirical. 
The official territory of epistemology, then, would appear to 
occupy a region bounded at one end by metaphysics and at the other 
psychology. But rather than being evenly spread over this territory, 
most epistemology'tends to reside near one or other of these borders, 
so that it either concentrates: 
(I) on the logical means by which knowledge tends to transcribe 
reality; and in doing this it tends to disregard any psycho-
logical factors that might infiltrate that transcription. An 
epistemology of this kind, then, tends to live according to the 
homily, "knowledge without a knowing subject" (Popper, 1973a, 
p.109), or 
(II) on discovering what it is about the state of mind *to know* 
that differentiates it from other mental states. In contrast to 
I, this kind of epistemology concentrates on finding out what 
it is a "knowing subject" contributes to knowledge; and in doing 
so, it stops just short of turning into psychology. 
If this represents the current state of the epistemological art, then 
plainly it is not going to say very much about processes like encultu-
ration, which, it has been imputed, arise from the coming together of 
mind and knowledge. That epistemology, which does in fact tend to be 
divided about the types I and II just delineated, is given further 
credence by the fact that a number of epistemologists have felt the 
"diremption" between I and I I to be an uncomfortable one. Not only 
that, but they have also felt that it might not be jurisprudent of 
philosophy to cut itself off from psychology any longer (Kaplan, 1971, 
p.64; Hamlyn, 1971, p.12). There are moves afoot, then, not only to 
create liaisons between the "object" (I) and "subject" (II) polarities 
of epistemology, but also to remove the barriers that, in the past, have 
tended to divide epistemology from psychology.* It is 'have tended' 
because, although this segregationist policy has prevailed amongst 
f 
orthodox epistemologists, there is a scion of epistemology, mainly of a 
phenomenological and 'subjectivist' kind, which although often maligned 
by orthodox epistemology, has on principle tried to bridge the gap 
between psychology and epistemology. And that is the epistemology 
practised by Polanyi and his disciples. 
In very broad terms, Polanyi finds it difficult to countenance a 
totally objective description of knowledge which does not also entail 
recognising the human qualities that contribute to it. To talk 
* Indeed, there is some evidence to suggest that epistemology could 
benefit from such a 'fellowship'. Had, for instance, the kind of 
experimental psychology that Piaget practises been in general 
currency in the 1920's, when the members of the Vienna Circle were 
formulating the tenets of Logical Positivism, they might not have 
been so dogmatic in advancing the belief that language and thinking 
are contingently necessary to one another. Piaget's demonstration 
of the existence of pre-linguistic thinking would have made nonsense 
of this, one of the most treasured pronouncements of Logical 
Positivism (Piaget, 1971a, pp.8-9). 
of a thoroughly de-anthropomorphised account of knowledge is to talk 
nonsense, because, with the 'best will in the world', it is impossible 
to escape from the subjective factors which introduce themselves into 
the 'siring' of knowledge. In all knowledge there is an ineradicable 
"personal component" that upsets the possibility of its ever being de-
anthropomorphised! Knowledge must therefore be seen through the per-
spective of the human framework and its peculiar cognitive propen-
sities, if it is to be seen at all. There can be no such thing as a 
wholly objective knowledge, for the possibility of its existence is 
made specious by the personal subjectivity of man's judgements and 
valuations. Even an apparently 'objective' scientific pursuit like 
observation is fringed with a subjectivity that inhibits an absolutely 
objective registration of reality. Even the act of reading a 
scientific meter is tainted with subjectivity. Thus the scientist 
keen to assign a wavelength to the colour blue, so that he can in-
terpret the readings on his spectrometer properly, must decide which, 
out of a myriad of possible 'blues' most nearly represents the quin-
tessence of blueness (Grene, 1974, p.163; Polanyi, 1962, p.119). 
Science, then, has not made the value judgement defunct. 
Polanyi's 'brand' of epistemology tries to transpose the insights 
derived from psychology - notably gestalt psychology - on to the 
problem of knowledge (Polanyi, 1969, p.29). Polanyi, however - and 
this makes his theories about knowledge particularly apposite to this 
study - was never content to reside solely in the subjective polarity 
of epistemology; for he did not allow his attempts to analyse the 
"personal component" in knowledge to obfuscate the fact that knowledge 
also has a "civic" phenomenon, controlled by external conditions and 
rules (Polanyi, 1962, pp.208-216). And it was these conditions and 
rules, which Polanyi believed ultimately made a measure of objectivity 
at all possible in knowledge. The knowledge act, then, whilst it 
might have elements of the personal in it, is finally trammelled by 
appeals to consensus and public controls. Without a certain amount 
of submission to them, complete epistemological anarchy would prevail. 
That it does not is because the personal components of knowledge are 
held in check by the public. Members of a knowledge community, then, 
are contracted to observe controls and ordinances in their dealings 
with knowledge; they must also ensure that those controls and ordin-
ances are transmitted from generation to generation, if the orderly 
epistemological 'conduct* they foster is to continue. That is one of 
the functions of "cultural apprenticeship" (Polanyi, 1962, p.207); for 
to learn a discipline is to learn that it is 'disciplined*, it is to 
become acquainted'with a set of rules and regulations that prevail 
there. Travelling along the road to knowledge is not merely a matter 
of becoming aware of different views, it is also matter of observing 
the 'highway code' that applies on that road! 
Polanyi's epistemology tends to lie at the crossroads of sociology 
and psychology, which makes it more qualified than some of the more 
orthodox types of epistemology to enlighten some of the questions 
about the function of education and enculturation that this study is 
trying to deal with. Furthermore, whilst Polanyi's anatomy of 
knowledge has occasionally been applied to aspects of education,* its 
* Broudy (1970) has done so in relation to aesthetic education, whilst 
Diller (1975) has examined Polanyi's notion of "apprenticeship" and 
its possible import for a differently biased form of education. 
Most recently, Dunlop (1977) has argued that education should be 
seen in terms of Polanyi's general theses about learning and know-
ledge. 
appositeness to the more overall questions about the function and 
nature of education has been rarely recognised. Philosophy of edu-
cation's "parasitism", whilst it has extended into positivism and 
analysis, has not yet caught up with Polanyi*s "subjectivism", nor 
either with a whole gamut of equally pertinent insights on education 
that are harboured in philosophy and sociology of science.* The 
problems of enculturation and initiation have in fact been largely 
left in abeyance by philosophy of education, due possibly to the fact 
that in matters of knowledge it has tended to pay most fealty to 
Types I and II epistemology. This has led philosophy of education 
down avenues of analysis of ideal knowledge and mental states, which, 
whilst it has served to apprehend what is perhaps meant by knowledge 
and knowing in the most abstracted sense, has to some extent dis-
tracted it from coming to terms with what 'real* knowledge in the 
'actual' institutional settings of education does, and why it does it. 
Yet there is now in epistemologies like those of Polanyi, and in 
philosophy and sociology of science in general, plenty of empirical 
and theoretical evidence about the institutional features and functions 
of knowledge communities - and they embrace education - which 
could yield more credible and realistic understandings about what the 
function of education is. It is to this evidence, then, that this 
study will turn. 
* Notable in these fields is the work, and it will be often referred 
to, of Toulmin, to whom Hirst (1974, p.100) in fact does acknow-
ledge some indebtedness, Kuhn, Agassi^ Hanson, Merton, Hagstorm 
and Crane. And if the bias does seem unduly scientific, when 
some more general purview of knowledge has been the declared ob-
jective of attainment, it is because sophisticated analysis of 
comparable distinction have not been encountered in other 
disciplines. 
2.10 GENERAL SYSTEM THEORY, AND A LOOK FORWARD 
This study will attempt, then, to build a model of the process of 
enculturation from the perspectives (a) of the individual knower and 
(b) of the community of knowers in general. It has been argued in this 
Chapter that whilst education is a central force in generating encul-
turation, as a discipline it has a relatively primitive understanding 
of the processes involved. Its philosophy has come closest perhaps 
to acknowledging that education is in the business of transformation, 
but rarely has that philosophy gone beyond that acknowledgement and 
tried to elucidate a further understanding of that transformation. But 
then philosophy of education for some time now has been in a "theory 
evaluating" rather than "theory building" mood (Broudy, 1969, p.115); 
it has been to some extent trapped in linguistic analysis, and where 
knowledge is concerned, positivism. By its very nature, this study 
will don a much more "theory building" tone, and perhaps eschew some 
of the analysis that has been current in philosophy of education. It 
will take as a mentor, for its generally broader methodological 
approach, the style of General System Theory. 
Notably General System Theory has, in rather *manifesto-ish' 
tones, attempted to countervail the proliferation of sub-disciplines, 
that is so characteristic of the atmosphere of modern knowledge; it 
has looked for principles of "homology" between them, and seen itself 
as a "grand unifying science" that is opposed to the advance of 
atomisation in knowledge generally (Bertalanffy, 1971, pp.31, 37; 
Laszlo, 1972a, p.13). System theory, then, is dedicated to a holistic 
rather than a discrete appreciation of the world; it lives according 
to the Aristotlean motto: that the whole is more than the sum of its 
parts. And whilst the tone of this ambition is perhaps rather over 
inflated, system theory does hold out the possibility that a problem 
can be approached from a much broader perspective than perhaps the more 
orthodox disciplinary approaches might allow. System theory, for 
instance, does sanction the practice of approaching problems from 
a variety of disciplinary viewpoints (Laszlo, 1972a, p.3); and it has 
been indicated in this Chapter that if the problems of enculturation 
are to be fully understood it will be necessary to do just that, and 
cross a number of disciplinary paths. 
But it is not merely because system theory would appear to 
sanction a methodological style apposite to the needs of this study 
that its services will be called upon. There is also the fact that 
system theory offers a series of concepts and theoretical ideas whose 
compass can be extended to the understanding of knowledge communities. 
For whilst the original ambit of systems concepts and theories were 
designed with biological systems in mind, those concepts and theories 
have been shown to have an applicability to broader cultural and 
social systems as well (Bertalanffy, 1971, p.209; Rapoport, 1968, 
p.xxi). Human social aggregates exhibit all the features of organised 
systems and a knowledge community is as much a social aggregate as any 
other organised system, and as will be shown, is subject to the same 
system properties. But it is not only social aggregates that can 
be treated "systematically". The psychological behaviour of men 
themselves can also be shown to exhibit system properties. That 
behaviour is an aggregate of parts; and it is how this aggregate of 
parts develops and reacts to knowledge that is examined in the next 
chapter. 
CHAPTER THREE 
FROM NEGENTROPY TO KNOWLEDGE 
"The Child's Toys & the Old Man's Reason 
Are the Fruits of the Two Seasons" 
(William Blake, Auguries of Innocence) 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Although in some extreme forms of rationalism (e.g. Platonism), 
there have been attempts to sever the connection knowledge has with 
a sentient reality, and to prove that all genuine knowledge is a 
subspecies of 'noesis* rather than experience, the fact that some 
sort of ontological experience is necessary before noesis can proceed 
means that all knowledge has its incipience, at some stage, in a 
variety of experience of some kind. There might be a subsequent 
desquamation of these origins, as knowledge becomes progressively 
more noetic and less experiential in character, but in its crudest 
and most rudimentary form all knowledge is furbished from an 
experience of reality.* But experience, which is itself a product 
of the mind, having its own particular mental traits, only represents 
the starting point of knowledge, that is all. The prerequisite 
experience, or the disposition to be aware and to take notice of 
things, as it has been described (Werkmeister, 1968, p.82), does not 
in itself lead to the spontaneous generation of knowledge. All 
animals, out of biological necessity, are capable, with varying 
degrees of percipience, of being aware of and of taking notice of 
* Not that this proposition is wholly inimical to the tenets of the 
Rationalist point of view. Plato (1973a,Book VI, 6) does 
acknowledge that the path to knowledge commences in a sentient 
reality. It is just that for Plato reality was essentially 
spurious, and therefore any knowledge that was generated from it 
was also spurious. In order to secure genuine knowledge, man had 
to look askance from the sentient reality to a realm where truth 
was revealed through the medium of rationality and dialéctica, 
rather than experience. Whether such a rarefied noesis is 
possible is another matter. Certainly, Euclidian geometry, 
which for many Rationalists represented the acme of their thesis 
about knowledge, appears to have had its origins, not in the mind, 
as the Rationalists were pledged to thinking, but in the solution 
to the very practical and 'experiential* problems of mensuration 
and surveying (Toulmin, 1972, pp. A32-435). 
some segment of their surrounds. But if experience is an entree 
to knowledge, then only man would appear capable of digesting that 
entrie such that what eventually springs from it is knowledge. If 
man, like the rest of the animal kingdom, obtains food for his body 
from the world, then he alone, from experiencing the world, derives 
'food for thought* and knowledge. Only his particular mental 
capacities seem capable of transforming experiential 'fodder' into 
an epistemological 'energy' that, as was concluded Chapter Two, 
can transform the way the world is regarded. But what was not 
indicated in that chapter was how and under what conditions experience 
eventually becomes a 'nutrient' for a new way of looking. Are the 
processes of 'epistemic seeing', for instance, somewhat analogous to 
those that govern ordinary seeing? Do they have their genesis in 
the same psychological mechanisms from which experience in general is 
'manufactured'? Is it possible that knowledge is simply a form of 
experiential coherency, par excellence? It is to this conspectus 
of questions, then, that this chapter will turn, in anticipation that 
answers to them will yield an understanding as to what mentally happens 
when men are released from the 'manacles' of initial perception, and 
become 'chained', instead, to knowledge. 
3.2 PERCEPTION AND HOMEOSTASIS 
In endeavouring to understand the nature of living things, 
biologists have frequently anchored their insights in some basic 
philosophical principle or other. This principle, which dictates 
the biologist's attitude to life in general, acts as a kind of 
cynosure, guiding his preconceptions about, and research into living 
things. Thus with different 'cynosures' to guide them, rival schools 
of biological thinking have tended to emerge. The latest 
manifestations of this rivalry centres around whether the nature of 
life can be best understood treating it *reductionistically*, or 
holistically. 
Biologists, who belong to the former school, believe that the 
true 'blue print' of life can only be discerned by analysing, 
preferably by the methods of physics and chemistry, the molecular 
fabric of living things (Grene, 1974, p.202; Olby, 1972, pp.232-233). 
The matter of life is contained in molecules like DNA, and its 
understanding comes from insights into their fundamental structure. 
Biologists of the contrary, and holistic frame of mind, generally 
remain unsympathetic to this atomistic policy of the 'reductionists'. 
They see the attempt to reduce life to so many long chains of DNA as 
exacerbating the understanding of living things as completely unified 
beings. Their's, then, is the creed of the General System Theorist 
(see 2.10): that the "whole is more than the sum of its parts": and 
they generally take issue with the "reductionist" principle that life 
can be inexorably reduced to so much physics and chemistry, believing 
that that pursuit rests on two false assumptions: 
(i) that living things are nothing more than aggregates of 
chemicals, and 
(ii) that they are therefore subject to the same physical 
laws that govern the rest of the inanimate universe. 
DNA might contain one 'code of life' and offer explanations about the 
mechanics of protein replication, but in itself it does not offer 
explanations about how it is an organism conserves its 'unity' 
through what amounts to a sometimes complex and creative set of 
interactions with its surrounds. Physics and chemistry might 
adequately describe DNA, but to infer from that that living things 
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are totally answerable to physical and chemical lavs reveals, 
according to one of the holistic biologists (Bertalanffy, 196?, p.62), 
a gross misconstrual of their real natxire. This equation between 
living and non-living things, that the reductionists seem eager to 
make, is really quite untenable in Bertalanffy's view. Because 
living things are radically distinctive in their rapport with 
reality, and are able to achieve physical states and conditions 
denied the inert eind non-living 'universe*, biology according to its 
holistic practitioners, will never fully be subsumable under physics 
and chemistry. It will always retain its independence from them, 
because the living things that biology deals with, whilst they might 
be composed from some of the same chemistry that pervades the rest of 
the universe, are really the physical exceptions in it. 
The exceptional character of living systems springs in the main 
from their apparent capacity to contravene, temporarily at least, the 
Second Law of Thermodynamics. According to this Law, the universe 
and the material substance from which it is composed, are all on the 
inexorable decline into a condition of maximum disorder or entropy. 
If there is a teleological principle rife in the universe, then the 
Second Law spells complete and utter degradation as being the final 
fate of things: for in effect the eschatological complexion of the 
universe will be maximum entropy. Living things, however, are 
temporarily able to delay this fate. By virtue of their capacity 
to interact with their surrounds, they can arrest the onrush of 
entropy, and introduce increased order into themselves, and some-
times, their surrounds. Living systems, then, have the ability 
to inhibit the progress of entropy formation. Indeed it is this 
ability of living things to introduce order and produce what 
Schroedinger (1967, p.74 et seq.) has called "negentropy" (negative 
entropy) that could be said to constitute, in 'vitalist' terms, the 
proper ^lan vital of life. And whilst it has been argued (Popper, 
1976, p.137; Pantin, 1968, pp. 36-42) that some non-living things * 
are equivalently capable of manufacturing negentropy and of defying 
the Second Law, the epitome of that capability and defiance is only 
really encountered in living things. For living things need to be 
able to countervail the force of the Second Law and combat the overtake 
of disorder, if they are to survive as unified organisms. 
Living things, then are able to procrastinate, for the duration of 
their existence, enslavement to the Second Law. But this procrasti-
nation is not a stagnant process, attained without struggle or effort, 
for in order to prevent the Second Law taking effect, living systems 
must engage in a "dynamic interaction" with their surrounds. They 
must be able to function as an "open system", and thereby have the 
capacity to assimilate from their surrounds the energy and the 
chemistry they need to regulate themselves as "going concerns" 
(Werkmeister, 1968, p.412); they must constantly have the capacity to 
re-instate the condition of so-called "homeostasis", when that is 
disturbed or thrown out of balance. The Second Law, as Brillouin 
(1968, p.149) points out, in effect means "death by confinement". 
For if the disturbance to homeostasis proves too great and beyond the 
power of external reconciliation, or if the living system becomes 
irrevocably separated from the reservoirs of life supporting chemistry, 
homeostasis will become impossible to maintain and the living system 
will die. It is not until the 
* e.g. self-winding watches, thunderstorms, thermostatically 
controlled heating systems (Boulding, 1956, pp. 66-75). 
point of nemesis, however, that the system finally surrenders 
itself to the tenets of the Second Law, and positive entropy asserts 
its power to cause chaos. In the meanwhile, however, by "sucking 
orderliness" from its environment, the living system is able to 
maintain itself stationary and at a fairly high level of 
orderliness. Thus whilst the rest of the universe is in a process 
of "winding down", living systems, by feeding off negentropy, are 
able to keep themselves "wound up" (Laszlo, 1972a, p.43; Katz and 
Kahn, 1966, p.92; Bertalanffy, 1971, p.28; Schroedinger, 1968, p.146). 
Perception, it was argued at the beginning of Chapter Two, 
provides a life-line to reality; it is a biological endowment that 
allows a living system to make contact with its environment. It has 
been argued in this section that it is contact and interaction with 
their surrounds which enables living systems to acquire negentropy. 
In a very real sense, then, the life-line to reality provided by 
perception is just that: for if a living system is to regulate its 
homeostasis, and stave off entropy, it must be perceptually alert 
and attuned to those segments of its surrounds that can supply it 
with the *raw materials* of negentropy. This nexus between 
perceptual sensitivity and existential need, which is apparent in 
all living systems, was first examined by the German biologist, 
Jacob von Uexkiill, who called it Umwelt-Lehre. "It essentially 
amounts to the statement that, from the great cake of reality, every 
living organism cuts a slice, which it can perceive and to which it 
can react owing to its psycho-physical organization" (Bertalanffy, 
1971, p.240). 
In living systems, then, there tends to be a specificity of 
receptor focus, which, whilst it can cause considerable sensitivity 
to certain regions of the world, both limits and debars that 
sensitivity to others. Different organisms and species therefore 
often experience different and sometimes incommensurate views of the 
world, due to their different needs and different anatomical make-up. 
Thus in the world of a fly, says Uexkiill, there are only "fly things"; 
in the world of the sea-urchin, only "sea-urchin things" (Cassirer, 
1973, p.23); and neither has the vision of the world quite like that 
of the tick's, which focuses solely upon the butyric acid secreted from 
the glands of certain mammals. 
Each organism, then, tends to inhabit an "environmental shell" 
(Taylor, 1971, p.113), whose perimeter and outer limits are determined 
by the organism's perceptual capacities. And whilst in the simpler 
organisms this "shell" might not be particularly capacious, it often 
accommodates aspects of the umwelt (ambient) that are denied to the 
perceptually more sophisticated and discriminating organism. The 
tick's rather threadbare world, for instance, might be rather lack-
lustre and bland when compared with the more enriched sensory 
experience of a higher organism, but as far as achieving homeostasis 
is concerned the tick need only be aware of butyric acid. The world 
beyond it is largely irrelevant to the tick's existential needs: 
hence, it remains blind to it. And although the higher's organism's 
'sensory spectrum' might encompass a much broader arena of reality 
than that of the tick, the same principle of sensory censorship 
determines how broad that spectrum is. The complex organism is not 
omni-sentient; its outlook on its local umwelt is just as 
ontogenetically ingathered as the tick's. Even though its "shell" 
might be very much more voluminous and embrace much more, it lives 
just as much in an "environmental shell" as the simplest of simple 
organisms. Moreover, whilst the higher organism might be sensitive 
to a great deal more of the "cake of reality", there are many slices 
of it that simpler organisms can *see* which it cannot. Human beings, 
for instance, might have a celebrated sensitivity in the optical 
parts of the spectrum, yet they remain *blind* to the infra-red and 
ultra-violet sectors of it. These are realms of electro-magnetic 
radiation which lie beyond the capacities of their senses. But this 
is not true of the pit-viper, which can see infra-red radiation! 
Nor of the bee, which is not only sensitive to the ultra-violet 
regions of the spectrum, but also to gradations and divisions of 
colour in the optical parts of it that are not developed in humans 
at all (Pantin, 1968, p.33). 
The perceptual range of its senses, then, can be said to deter-
mine the limits of an organism's 'ontogenetic universe', which in 
its turn is likely to be a reflection of its 'ontogenetic needs'. 
But even though within these relatively circumscribed limits a higher 
organism, like man, has the capacity to be conscious of a relatively 
broad segment of reality, in real terms he is only aware of a small 
speck of the range of electro-magnetic radiation in the universe.* 
His senses conceal very much more than they ever reveal (Koestler, 
1974, p.49). And even that segment of reality that is open to his 
gaze is likely to have filtered from it many of its most salient 
features. But whilst man's sensory domain might be subject to all 
* Not that this has proved an insuperable handicap for man. He 
has frequently pledged his ingenuity to devising instruments 
for increasing the dominion of his "ontological universe"; that 
would bring into view aspects of reality and its various 
electro-magnetic radiations that lie beyond the ambit of the 
unaided senses. The telescope and the microscope are obvious 
examples of such "sense extending" instruments (Harri, 1974, p.19). 
sorts of gross censorship, within their comparatively restricted 
domain, the senses themselves have the potential to react to the 
seemingly imperceptible. Their powers of discrimination and focus 
have exceedingly low thresholds of sensitivity. The sensory surface 
of the nose, for example, is capable of being affected by vanillin, 
one part by weight in 10^ parts of air; and as far as sight is 
concerned, it only requires an amount of energy equivalent to 10 ̂ ^ 
erg to excite the sensitivity of the retina (Cannon, 1968, p.256). 
And then once excited, the retinal nervous system possesses a really 
prodigious assemblage of neuronal resources to convert reality into 
a *picture* the brain can register. The retina, for instance, 
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consists of something like 10 sense cells that individually and in 
consort with one another serve to convert * reality* into an 
abstraction of colour contrast and brightness. Then there are a 
further 10^ nerve fibres in the optic nerve which transmit that 
abstraction to the brain (Popper and Eccles, 1977, pp.263, 432). 
In fact when the potential of all this nerve ^machinery* is added 
up, it seems that the eyes are capable of receiving types of 
images!! Fairly obviously if the brain is not to be drowned in a 
massive * tidal wave* of visual information, it has to be protected 
from the *glut* of imagery the eyes have the potential to produce. 
Of course, the mass of the information received at the eyes is not 
useful in any way. It can be overlooked without much threat to 
homeostasis being incurred. It forms, then, the background 'noise' 
of vision; and therefore by a process Foerster (1968, p.172) calls 
"computational economy", it can be subtracted from the focus of 
attention, and thereby leave a man to concentrate on the things 
which really count in his field of vision. 
At the interface between the receptors and reality there is a 
dominion that is vastly over populated with images and sensations. 
But as investigations into "cutaneous perception" have indicated, the 
pathway from the primary sensory areas - those of touch - to the 
cortex are a mass of synaptic relay stations that inhibit weaker 
"excitatory actions". When the skin touches an ill-defined edge, a 
more sharply defined signal tends to be received at the cortex, 
because the signals from the weaker excitatory actions have been 
eliminated (Popper and Eccles, 1977,pp.253-255). The transmission 
line from the receptors to the brain, then, practises, as it were, a 
progressive * genocide* on the large population of sensations that are 
registered at the skin. Only the strongest signals survive. What 
happens, in effect, is that during successive "synaptic relays" 
certain input sensations are switched off, "according to the exigen-
r 
cies of the situation" (Popper and Eccles, 1977, p.255). The final 
"read out" of touch at the brain, then, is a thoroughly abridged 
version of that received at the skin. 
From what was said about "computational economy", and the 
tendency to switch off homogeneous perturbations, it would seem 
probable that analogous processes of sensory abridgment operate in 
the arena of vision. Indeed, given the generally supererogative 
character of vision (vide supra) they would need to, if a man is not 
to be totally overwhelmed by all the surplus visual information in 
his surrounds. But if the processes are somewhat analogous, then 
they are a good deal more complicated and less well understood than 
those associated with "cutaneous perception". It is still not certain 
how the brain assembles a vivid 'picture* of reality from the "punctuate 
mosaic" of brightness and contrast received at the retina (Popper and 
Eccles, 1977, p.270). It is true that that picture is likely to be 
an abstract of, rather than a replica of, reality. During the 
creation of that abstract, then, certain excitatory signals at the 
retina are likely to be inhibited in order to strengthen the visual 
significance of others that will form the framework of the abstract. 
But then there is the question of how or what decides which signals 
inherited from the retina are to be retained or inhibited? 
Presumably, since the signals themselves constitute just one 
incessant bombardment from reality, there must be some cortical 
operations beyond the retina which finally intercede to decide which 
signals are placed out of sight. Those operations, then would 
possess the power to elevate the significance of certain signals 
coming from the umwelt, whilst relegating others; they would have 
the capacity to abstract meaning from the welter of sensation that is 
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awareness. Eccles (Popper and Eccles, 1977, p.363) notes that this 
new sort of "ghost" in the neuronal machinery would be enthroned in 
what he calls the "self-conscious parts of the brain". The 'ghost's* 
domain of power would reign over the integration of that immense 
diversity of material which arrives at the cerebral cortex. But 
though such a ghost might be wandering somewhere in the multitudinous 
avenues of the brain, it has to be asked what criteria it is that that 
ghost uses to carry out the abridgment of sensory data, and once having 
made that abridgment, how does the ghost conjure from it a 'picture' of 
reality inside the brain? 
Eccles considers that the abridgment of sensation is largely 
guided by the pressures and exigencies of circumstance (vide supra). 
It is need and want, then that are likely to alert and excite 
attention to certain regions of the world, whilst suppressing and 
inhibiting attention to others. And it has been noted in this 
section, that the most archetypal needs and wants, afflicting all 
living systems, including man, are those that surround the pursuit 
of homeostasis. If an organism is to maintain that, and defeat 
* slaughter* by entropy, it must have the capacity to interact with 
its surrounds, and obtain the appropriate orderliness from its 
umwelt. Initially, therefore, what the self-conscious parts of the 
brain will endeavour to "read out" from the reception areas of the 
body, will largely be related to the exigencies and pressures brought 
on by the need to maintain homeostasis. Sensory awareness, then 
will tend to strengthen those signals and excitations that are the 
hieroglyphs of negentropy, and weaken those which are not. 
The capacity to attribute different negentropic weight to these 
different hieroglyphs is again a self-conscious act that occurs beyond 
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the realm of the retina. It cannot be explained in terms of the 
assimilation of brightness and contrast, but only in terms of how that 
colour and brightness is abstracted and translated to make the 
hieroglyphs of experience. And since it seems probable (see 2.1) that 
the cortex is only equipped to recognise a few primitive shapes and 
forms, it is likely that a great amount of perception is learnt 
behaviour. It develops heuristically through a process that Popper 
(Popper and Eccles, 1977, p.429) has postulated is much like the process 
of "making and matching" that Gombrich (1960, p.320) has asserted is the 
way a painter assembles his *pictures' of reality. The self-conscious 
part of the brain tends to conjecture, from the information it already 
has in its possession, what reality might be like, and then compares 
this conjecture with the "punctuate mosaic" of reality received at the 
retina. Where the two coincide, the brain will assume that it has 
secured a reasonably accurate portrait. Where the conjecture does 
not co-incide with the "punctuate mosaic", an appropriate modification 
to the conjecture will be necessary in order to reconstitute the 
retinal information. 
If there is a 'ghost' in the neuronal machinery, then Popper's 
and other theories about perception (notably, Sherrington's, Bruner's, 
and that of Hanson, which was discussed 2.4) would indicate that 
that 'ghost' is invested with 'clairvoyant' powers. It is ever 
conjecturing about what it will see next and trying to anticipate 
what'reality's' next move will be. There is, then, as much 'foresight' 
as there is 'sight' in perception. Through experience there is a 
constant thread of anticipation running, as the mind speculates about 
what it is it is making contact with in reality. There is a strong 
element of expectation in perception; it is forever fraught with 
anticipation. It is, as was noted ̂  2.4, imbued with theories with 
which to analyse the world as it is imbibed. Normally the onrush of 
experience does no more than confirm our theories about reality. 
There is no need for any radical modifications to them. What was 
'made' of a segment of reality in the past still 'matches' with its 
current behaviour. The mind therefore can, so to speak, rest easy 
about that segment of reality, secure in the knowledge that it is 
doing what is expected of it. There is no need for the mind to be 
alert to any sudden and unexpected changes in its behaviour, for the 
mind knows there will not be any. It therefore can make on more 
"computational economy" (vide supra) in the myriad of images it has 
to cope with. Not only does this help to reduce experience to more 
and more manageable forms, but it also means that the mind can be 
doubly alert to those quarters of reality that suddenly violate its 
expectations (Bruner, 1974, pp.18, 70-71). Then all the "mental 
alarm bells go off", and the mind can devote its full attention to 
the regions of reality upsetting all prior expectations. 
The capacity to have preconceptions about the nature of reality, 
and the range of its possible behaviour, would appear, then, to be 
part of the repertoire of simply being human. Sherrington (1906), 
who called this capacity of man's "propriorception", saw it as being 
one of the fundamental necessities of life. In this section, it has 
been argued that as a necessity of life propriorception enables man to 
cope more effectively with the * information explosion* in his surrounds; 
and as a consequence of that, he is able to achieve more effectively the 
much more fundamental necessity of life, homeostasis. The need 
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regularly to secure and maintain homeostasis is a constant requirement 
of all forms of life, including man. Therefore man's other 
preoccupations, whether they be social, emotional, technological or 
epistemological, only develop and emerge, as will be made clearer ^ 
3.3, when the exigencies of homeostasis have been satisfied. 
Moreover, these preoccupations must be regarded as only capitalising 
upon and exploiting those endowments that nature, in the first place, 
no doubt only intended to be used for the acquisition of negentropy, 
not things like knowledge. Epistemological activity, then, is partly 
an extension and refinement of those activities needed to maintain 
homeostasis. How it is so will be the subject of the next section. 
3.3 FROM NEGENTROPY TO KNOWLEDGE 
Assimilating negentropy from their umwelt is for all organisms, 
whether simple or complex, the most preliminary and basic of all 
interactions. Without it, nothing else is possible. This "gross 
interaction", as it has been called (Angyal, 1958, p.59), then, has 
one bald concern, and that is to service the homeostatic requirements 
of a living system. It does little else but provend existence to the 
living system. "Gross interaction", then, is the most organically 
primitive of possible interactions with the environment, and in terms 
of Maslow*s (Cotgrove and Box, 1970, p.93) hierarchy of needs it 
occupies the base of a pyramid that has at its apex "self-actualization". 
Compared with "delicate interaction", which is Angyal*s second of 
possible interactions with the environment, "gross interaction" has a 
purely predatory character. During "gross interaction", then, the 
environment is preyed upon for purely existential reasons. The 
organism gets nothing from it other than what it needs to maintain 
homeostasis. This is unlike the outcome of "delicate interaction" 
which goes well beyond satisfying existential exigencies; for it 
supplies the organism with a "range of information" about its surrounds, 
which may or may not be pertinent to its existential well-being. 
"Delicate interaction", then, has little to do with the upkeep of 
existence. 
The freedom, however, to engage in "delicate interaction" rests 
on first satisfying a range of existential needs and wants. Unless 
they have been attended to, thereby neutralising any threats to 
homeostasis, an organism cannot really progress from gross to delicate 
interaction. Unless the self-preservative drives have been satisfied, 
the organism will remain too preoccupied with gathering the requisite 
negentropy for biological survival. "Delicate interaction" , then 
remains essentially an activity that is surplus to the mainstay of life. 
It is something done after the wants of homeostasis have been acquired; 
it uses any 'energy' or time that might remain after life's appetites 
have been satisfied. 
Delicate interaction, then, is extra to survival. It is nature's 
way of filling the time left after the resources needed for life have 
been acquired. Most higher animals engage in delicate interaction at 
some stage in their life, but most particularly when they are young. 
That it should be particularly pronounced when animals are young and 
immature is perhaps because most of their existential wants are 
catered for by their parents. Such animals, then, have all their 
survival needs under control, and have plenty of surplus energy that 
needs an outlet (Storr, 1972, p.120). The supply of negentropy thus 
being guaranteed, they are to some extent emancipated from bondage to 
"gross interaction"; they are thus free to indulge, and thereby use 
up their surplus energies, in delicate interaction. One form of 
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delicate interaction, which yields plenty of information about the 
surrounds, and which is particularly pervasive in the young animal's 
behaviour, is play. 
While the animal is young, play is habitually engaged in, and 
continues to remain, although to a less marked degree, an activity of 
adult life as well. That play might satisfy an instinct of curiosity 
about the world, and lay the foundations for a knowledge about the 
environment is plainly evident in the differences, and the significances 
derived from it, between the play of young children and chimpanzees. 
As Buytendijk (Grene, 1974, p.176) showed, they both have the capacity 
to delight in the same toys, and play superficially with them in much 
the same way; but only the child would place a toy aright when it 
toppled over. Only he made any conscious attempt to shape the world 
in accordance with the values and norms he was discovering existed 
there. The young chimpanzee always remained indifferent to such; it 
was a matter of no consequence to him whether the toy was upright or 
fallen. It was simply something to drag, not something to inter-
polate as having one position of stability that might be more correct 
than others. The chimpanzee, then, is inclined to leave the world as 
he finds it; but the child is conscious that it has regularities and 
patterns, from which benefits can be obtained if they are conserved 
and returned to when disturbed. The child soon leams that in the 
world things can be at his 'beck and call*; he discovers that by 
manipulating the world he can have some measure of autonomous control 
over it. Thus he begins to make epistemological projections about 
the world, and conjecture what will happen to it if he takes certain 
courses of action. There is, then, in a child's play a heuristic 
mentality, that subsequently becomes the springboard of knowledge. 
The pursuit of physiological homeostasis, which characterises 
"gross interaction", is largely an "instinctive and biochemically 
preprogrammed" activity (Laszlo, 1969, p.46). Once it has been 
achieved and the needs of negentropy have been secured, men, like any 
other organism, are free to participate in activities that are, 
biologically speaking, unnecessary. One of these activities is play, 
and through it men begin to read the world in more than purely 
survival terms. And what that ultimately offers is the possibility 
of introducing negentropy back into the same world from which negentropy 
was acquired in order to regulate homeostasis. But if through play a 
knowledge about the world can be gained that enables further control 
and orderings of it to be made, it would be a mistake to think that 
epistemological activity is simply a 'grown-up's' version of play. Of 
course there is, as Huizinga (1955) argues, a play element in all 
cultural and epistemological activities, but it is only an element, not 
an all dominating principle in those activities. For one thing, as 
Loizos (1966, p.4) points out in relation to animals, play is hardly 
the most economical way of gathering knowledge. If that was its sole 
point, there are many more efficient ways of securing information 
about the environment than simply playing with it. And if knowledge 
is an offshoot of play, it is an offshoot that arises by accident, 
rather than by design. For play, above all, is an "intrinsically 
worthwhile" activity, that has no end other than itself. Moreover, 
it tends to court the delights of "irrationality". "It confirms the 
supra-logical nature of the human situation" (Huizinga, 1955, p.4). 
whereas of course knowledge is supremely dedicated to understanding the 
logic of that situation. 
Play, then, only points the way to knowledge; it is not the most 
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effective way of actually getting it. Homo ludens is but a stage on 
the way to homo becoming sapiens. Indeed, the tendency for play to 
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oppose the dictates of reason and logic would often make it a very 
unsatisfactory preparation for the pursuit of knowledge. Yet men, like 
animals, play all their lives. It is not an activity that is 
restricted to childhood. But if play does not nurture knowledge, 
except in a very peripheral way, and it does not have any other purpose 
apart from itself, why is it such a compelling element in man*s 
existence? Surely there must be something more to play than it being 
a time filling exercise. Storr (1972, p.122), who has asked this very 
question, suggests that that in fact is its prime purpose. People 
play to offset, amongst other things, boredom; they engage in it to 
use up the surplus time left after gross interaction. But why should 
that be at all necessary? Could not man equally languish in the 
luxury of prolonged ennui and idleness? It seems not; for man would 
languish all right, but in a psychologically very harmful way. 
As experiments designed to monitor the effects of sensory 
deprivation - a most exaggerated form of boredom - have shown, when 
subjects are exposed to prolonged periods of darkness and silence they 
suffer devastating psychological changes (Zubek, Pushkar, Sansom and 
Gowing, 1966). Hallucinations are not uncommon, temporary amnesia is 
often experienced and very significant fluctuations of EEG activity 
are readily measurable. The ordinary brain functions, then are 
disorganised and disrupted to a remarkable degree by profound sensory 
deprivation. When these functions are not fed with the constant 
stream of varying sensation that is ordinary experience, it seems, they 
easily go into disarray. The optimum condition is that that sensation 
should be varying, for without that, as other experiments (Evans and 
Piggins, 1966) have shown, perception can be as disturbed as it is when 
it is subject to no sensation whatsoever. If, for instance, the eye 
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is artificially fixated upon a single and stabilized image, and given 
no opportunity to move, vision of the image gradually fades, until it 
ceases altogether. 
What these experiments tend to indicate is that perception tends 
to malfunction, unless it is constantly supplied with a steady stream 
of varying stimuli (Laszlo, 1972b, p.366; Zubek, Pushkar, Sansom and 
Gowing, 1966, p.294). Take the big buzzing confusion away from the 
reception areas of the body, and operations in those areas, together 
with allied functions in the brain, soon start to go awry. It is a 
matter, then, of finding an optimum level between over-stimulation and 
under-stimulation; for in the former case, as was noted 2.4, 
sensory perception is as much impaired as it appears to be when under-
stimulated. Babies, for instance, like those who regain their 'sights* 
after a prolonged period of blindness, tend to 'see* so much that they 
end up 'seeing' nothing. To their uneducated eyes, there is so much 
visual information in the world, that they do not really know where to 
commence looking in order to make sense of it. It is a 'cataract' of 
over-stimulation rather than of the eyes which stops them seeing things. 
In 3.2 it was argued that the senses, in conjunction with the 
self-conscious parts of the brain, are able to countervail the effects 
of being overwhelmed by the weight of information 'coming in' from the 
world by filtering a great deal of it out of view. There are plenty 
of processes of 'inhibition' operant that not only ensure that the 
brain receives the strongest perceptual signals possible, but also that 
they are the ones the brain is immediately interested in. The 
existence of these processes means that the vast dross of superfluous 
visual information received at the retina does not impinge upon the 
brain, but by-passes it. These inhibitory 'circuits' are helped in 
their 'work' to reduce experience to more manageable forms, by the 
tendency of the mind to anticipate and predict what it is it is 
'seeing'. What the mind is all the time expecting, it does not have 
to concern itself with. It can make a computational economy in that 
area of experience, and instead concentrate on that to which it needs 
to give its full attention. 
'Seeing', then, involves being able to dam up some parts of the 
'cataract' of stimuli that are constantly awash over the senses. But 
from what was said about sensory deprivation, if that damming were to 
proceed too far, so as to inhibit most of the incoming stimuli, all 
sorts of malevolent consequences would soon follow. The mind, it 
seems, can only take so many computational economies before it starts 
reacting adversely. It is as though perception too has a level of 
homeostasis, which must be maintained and 'nourished' with appropriate 
amounts of stimulus 'energy' if disorder and entropy are not to over-
take it. If the senses, then, do not actually die if they are put 
into confinement, they certainly suffer. 
During the periods of gross interaction this does not happen 
because the senses are likely to be well nourished with sensation. 
Since it is homeostasis that is at stake, perceptual arousal is likely 
to be very high and mostly alert to those excitations that promise a 
source of negentropy. The levels of computational economy will 
therefore be comparatively few. Sensory 'starvation', and some of 
the effects thereof, will be unlikely to occur. The maintenance of 
physiological homeostasis will simultaneously maiitain that of 
perception too. However, not all living systems, as has been noted, 
are engaged for all of their time in gross interaction. For those 
organisms which can achieve homeostasis comparatively quickly, gross 
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interaction need not be a permanent preoccupation. When the 
exigencies of survival are not a 'full-time' job, the organism is 
likely to have 'time on its hands'. It is during such periods that 
the organism can participate in activities which are seemingly surplus 
to its survival (Grey-Walter, 1963), But there is a sense in which 
those activities are very necessary to the continued alertness and 
sensitivity of perception. 
When a living system is disengaged from gross interaction, its 
senses are also likely to enter a phase of disengagement. Since the 
surrounds will tend to lose their significance for homeostasis - that 
having been achieved - there will be a level of 'switching o f f to 
many of the perturbations that occur in the organism's surrounds. 
The cataract of stimuli coming in from the surrounds will increasingly 
be dammed up. The world will be increasingly regarded as a reservoir 
of uniform and unvarying stimuli. And that is a situation the 
brain is prone to react against. For, as has been noted, it tends 
to react adversely to circumstances of extreme under-stimulation; 
and it will tend to do anything to overthrow the sensory torpor and 
instigate a renewal of input stimuli into it. 
The general unease felt with boredom, then, is no more than an 
attempt to compensate for too much computational economy and under-
stimulation. It is the mind ailing under the condition of sensory 
malnutrition. It is a seeking after a renewal of sensory excitation. 
It is the way in which the mind reacts when it wishes to swim again in 
a cataract of interesting and vigorous stimuli. 
For an organism like man, gross interaction has tended to become 
largely an activity of his prehistory. It would have preoccupied him 
for large sections of his time when he was a'hunter-gatherer *, and had 
no certain way of acquiring food except from the things which grew and 
ran around him. But for a great percentage of mankind, man's career 
as *hunter-gatherer', for the time being at least, is over. Whilst 
of course man still needs to attain physiological homeostasis, the 
versions of gross interaction he now engages in to do that are far 
less time consuming. Moreover, those interactions tend to be of an 
indirect and substitutive kind. For with the increased distribution 
of labour and specification of tasks in society, fewer and fewer 
members of society are directly involved in servicing man's 
negentropic needs.* These services, as their rendering has become 
* It is perhaps one of the less commendable paradoxes of Western 
culture that those who service the needs of homeostasis are 
frequently considered to occupy one of the lowest and least 
prestigious ranks in a society. Indispensability is not a good 
qualification in Western society; for the hierarchical arrange-
ments of most societies (both ideal and real) tend to give little 
more efficient, have in their turn led to the liberation of more and 
more sections of mankind from the need to engage in gross inter-
actional types of employment. It is as though, through the great 
improvements in negentropy production, gross interaction, for 
increasing sections of mankind, has itself become a matter of 
computational economy. 
Now it has been argued that when the need for gross interaction 
is displaced, compensatory activities must ensue if perceptual 
homeostasis is to be regulated, and some of the malign effects of 
sensory 'starvation' are to be avoided. One of these activities, it 
has been noted, is play; another, it will be argued, is knowledge. 
Sometimes play and knowledge can in fact have beneficial impact upon 
gross interaction, as it does foj instance in agriculture and 
recognition to those members of society who actually produce 
that energy from the environment which allows the rest of society 
to survive. This is very evident in the social organization of 
Plato's 'Republic'. There the division between the doers and 
the thinkers, the gross and delicate 'interactors', is pronounced, 
and defensible on the grounds that it was never meant to be other-
wise. That there should be some who did all the agricultural and 
manual work, and others who should rule and reflect on the profound 
truths of the universe, merely reflected the natural order of things. 
To go radically against that order, and expect the "bronze" and "iron" 
of society (the doers) to do the work of the "gold", Plato (1973a, 
Book III, 1) asserted would be the ruination of any stable society. 
The 'gold' in any society had to be "freed from all forms of manual 
work", for it was their purpose in life to be served upon, not serve. 
Besides, reflection on the lowlier and grosser tasks of human kind 
would lead to a debasement of their capacity to rule and to be 
philosophical. Therefore they had to be absolved from the need to 
engage in such tasks. Similar statements are also encountered in 
St. Augustine of Hippo. Pure philosophical thought, he considered, 
became tainted whenever it had to meddle in the more practical 
affairs of life. Thus music and medicine were liberalizing arts 
whilst they restricted themselves to theory; but directly music 
was played or medicine was practised these arts became illiberal 
and debased. But, then, as Howie (1969, p.274) pointed out, 
Augustine (as he himself acknowledged) was making pronouncements 
for a society in which all useful, and therefore in the main gross 
interactional work, was done by slaves. 
husbandry, or in the ritualistic hunting preparations undertaken by 
the African pygmies. About the latter, it has been said (Storr, 
1972, p.140; Read, 1955, p.41) that the inclusion in these 
preparations of the 'slaughter* of a mock antelope, drawn in the 
sand, amplifies the pygmy's "appreciation of reality". It sharpens 
their faculties in areas that are essential to the struggle for 
existence. The ritual also offers a kind of laboratory in which to 
try out the antelope hunt before it is, so to speak, tested in the 
field. It enables a plan of campaign to be rehearsed before it is 
actually staged. Therefore it is also a way of conjecturing what 
might happen in the scenario of the hunt, when it would be too late 
to make any radical alterations to that plan. 
Whilst it could be argued that such a ritual, and others like it, 
are no more than playful extensions of gross interaction, it is 
possible to see in such rituals, and the psychological mechanisms they 
are exploiting, the precursors of genuine epistemological behaviour. 
That is what makes them of relevance to this discussion. It is 
possible, for instance, to see in the pygmy's ritual at least, all the 
basic psychological predispositions that are inherent in perceptual 
behaviour (see 3.2), only in a more fully developed way. It has been 
noted, for instance, how the immediate exigencies of a situation can 
accentuate sensitivity to certain things in the path of vision. The 
pygmy's ritual does this too. It accentuates the seeing of antelopes. 
In doing so, it also permits a set of predispositions to be built up 
about antelopes that will enable their behaviour patterns to be more 
immediately and efficaciously anticipated. The ritual, as it were, 
synthetically adds to the propriorceptive tendencies that are a feature 
of ordinary and natural vision. For, as was noted 3.2, vision is 
something that relies for a great deal of its efficiency on prediction 
and foresight. 
When the preprogrammed operations of vision and instinct are 
rendered almost redundant by the quick attainment of homeostasis, it 
would appear that the mind commences developing its own programmes to 
satisfy the apparent 'greed* perception has for perpetual stimulation. 
Moreover, it would seem that these programmes exploit many of the same 
operations that infuse perception in general. What is endowed for 
the sake of gross interaction, then, becomes that which delicate 
interaction extends, refines and intensifies. It is as though, once 
having easily satisfied the imperatives of physiological homeostasis, 
man must have needs of creating another level of interaction and 
perception, which also has its own homeostatic requirements. Thus 
it will be argued in the next section, that in the constructs of 
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delicate interaction the same properties of "making and matching" and 
sensory amplification, that are the necessary products of non-epistemic 
and gross interactional seeing, are also evident. Physiological 
homeostasis, which nurtures a vision full of anticipations and 
conjectures, also nurtures culture and knowledge, which in their turn 
have the capacity to infuse vision with anticipation and conjectures. 
It is as though man, on both the gross and delicate interactional fronts 
of his existence, is constantly building plans of what it is he is 
endeavouring to see. In fact it has been argued that man's most 
natural role is that of a "scientist psychologist", who is ever 
attempting to predict and control his surrounds (Bannister and 
Fransella, 1971, p.12; Kelly, 1963, p.4). He does this by creating 
"templets" which he then "attempts to fit over the realities of which 
the world is composed". Kelly (1963, p.9; 1970, p.9) calls these 
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templets "constructs", and he sees it as their function to anticipate 
events with increasing confidence and efficacy. It is one of the 
basic themes of life, he says, to improve the capacity of these 
templets to fit the behaviour of reality. In keeping with Kelly's 
so called "personal construct theory", there is nothing more natural 
in man's behaviour than the pursuit of computational economy. But 
what is also significant is that those templets in effect serve to 
economise on the amount of data that a man must concentrate upon in 
order to have a satisfactory rapport with reality. It is in fact 
quite natural for man to make plans or templets about the future 
because, not only are they easy to store in the mind, but they can be 
"projected into an infinite variety of unforeseen situations" 
(Miller, Galanter and Pribram, 1960, p.292), as for instance the 
pygmies tend to do in their antelope ritual (vide supra). 
In the next section, it will be asserted that the apotheosis of 
the mental habits discussed in this and section 3.2 are encountered 
in man's epistemological activities. Knowledge, it will be argued, 
is the templet par excellence; and of all man's various 'crystal balls', 
its capacity to look into the future is the most reliable. But above 
all, it is one of the antidotes to that sensory starvation which would 
follow if man did nothing with the time he has on his hands after the 
obligations of gross interaction have been fulfilled. It supplies a 
new source for the negentropy that his perceptions, like his body in 
general, must secure if their homeostasis is to be regulated, and the 
sensory effects of entropy formation are to be avoided. Instead of 
turning to his surrounds for the fruits of survival, in delicate 
interaction man tends to turn to them for the fruits of knowledge. 
3.4 KNOWLEDGE: ITS INTEGRATIONS AND ITS EXPECTATIONS 
Sensation delivers the physiological framework from which 
knowledge Is eventually cast. The beginnings of knowledge are held 
within the way the world is experienced. There might be a 
progressive withdrawal from these origins as "logico-mathematical 
schematizations" are gradually substituted for experience, but 
experience is still indispensable to the constructs of knowledge 
(Piaget, 1971b-, p.73). The essense of its representational 
character might be slowly disguised as knowledge becomes more formal 
and abstract, but in all knowledge, no matter how removed from 
experience, there must be some vestiges of the world from which it 
was originally generated (Reichenbach, 1962). Knowledge, then only 
supplies a way of patterning the phenomena that are initially in 
ordinary experience; it is only the interpretation and integration, 
that forms ordinary perception, extended to the n^^ degree (Hanson,1971, 
p.24; Werkmeister, 1968, p.413; Popper and Eccles, 1977, p.431). 
It is simply what the mind normally does to manage experience realised 
to its utmost potential. Given then, that knowledge would appear to 
be a more highly evolved form of experience, it should be possible to 
discern the psychological 'signatures* that' characterise experience 
(as discussed in 3.2 and 3.3) in knowledge itself. Finding these 
signatures will represent the objective of this and the final section 
of this chapter. 
Man's capacity to enter into a transactional rapport with reality 
rests entirely with his biological endowments, his ontogenetic 
faculties. That these are necessarily circumscribed (see 3.2), and 
only have a limited "channel capacity" as far as registering all 
aspects of reality is concerned, has not prevented man securing a good 
deal of autonomy over his surrounds. His appreciation of reality 
might be physiologically limited, but this has not prohibited man 
being able to shape, rather than be shaped by, his environment (Taylor, 
1972, pp.211-230). By commanding the potential inherent in his innate 
faculties, man has been able to command the resources of his 
environment. 
The instrumental mastery of the environment, which has evolved 
through man's invention of tools and technologies designed to harvest 
and harness the forces of nature and make the process of gross 
interaction easier, represents for Taylor (1972, p.230) "the crossing 
of the cerebral rubicon". But before he made that crossing and 
embarked on the course of cultural evolution, man must have secured 
some elementary 'knowledge' about his surrounds. For example, the 
persistent use of a simple tool, like a stone to pound animal flesh, 
requires some initial insight into the hardness and durability of the 
stone. Whilst such insights are hardly the epitome of epistemological 
sophistication, to know that something is hard enough to endure a 
certain amount of usage does constitute a "valid claim", a "warranted 
belief", and therefore on two definitions of knowledge, Hamlyn's 
(1970, p.5) and Werkmeister's (1968, p.3), qualifies as knowledge. Of 
course those two items of knowledge alone would not have resulted in a 
tool to pound flesh. That required a supplementary creative act; one 
that involved connecting the fact that stones are hard and durable with 
a circumstance in which these characteristics could be exploited. It 
involved making what Koestler (1964, pp.35-36)has called a "bisociative' 
connection between stone and animal flesh on the one hand, and 
recognising the fact that a stone's durability and hardness has the 
potential to pound flesh on the other. Establishing that conjunction 
represents an example of "seeing things together". 
It is sometimes remarked that the capacity to make such 
conjunctions and form unions between otherwise disparate aspects of 
the world is a marked feature of the self-conscious part of the brain 
(Rrathwhol,1958, p.43; Reid, 1961, p.14; Popper and Eccles, 1977, 
p.373). Bisociation begins with conscious experience, which, it was 
noted 3.2, is largely a complex fused from the multiplicity of 
sensations received from the reception areas of the body. It then 
moves on to cement other fusions from the material of experience, and 
it is these that give birth to things like tools and knowledge. 
Two points begin to emerge from the discussion thus far. Firstly, 
it is perhaps possible to regard knowledge, as Piaget (1972, p.157) 
does, as simply a rather specialised form of biological adaptation. 
It helps to secure for man adaptations to his surrounds which Nature, 
t 
had She the time, might have eventually achieved, but which man, with 
his great ingenuity and capacity for invention, has accelerated. But 
Piaget*s view of knowledge is arguably limited in that it only really 
accounts for those sorts of knowledge that have consequence for man's 
adaptation to the environment. It does not really account for those 
less instrumentally biased sorts of knowledge, whose import finally 
has little impact on man's capacity to expedite gross interaction. 
But knowledge, of whatever variety, is the result of biological 
adaptation, that cannot be denied. Unless man possessed the 
appropriate abilities to make epistemological sense of his interaction 
with the environment, then no amount of interaction, no matter how rich 
and discriminatory, would deliver knowledge from it. Knowledge is not 
synonymous with experience. 
In many respects, knowledge is simply experience made more coherent 
(Hanson, 1971, p.6). The search for a greater unity than that which 
inhabits perception, then, is ultimately the mid-wife to knowledge. 
This view of the origin of knowledge is quite consistent with the 
general behaviour of the self-conscious parts of the brain. It has 
been argued, for instance, how the mind, in order to make visual sense 
of its surrounds, is constantly trying to introduce a measure of unity 
and order into the plethora of data to which the sensory receptors are 
potentially open. This is not only desirable, but essential. For 
the mind only possesses a very limited handling capacity for infor-
mation; and if it is to enjoy a reasonable rapport with reality, it 
must sanction a great deal of that to which it is potentially 
sensitive. One way of carrying out this sanction is to order 
experience and perception around basic schema or gestalts. This is 
what the ancients did when they looked up to the heavens and saw 
configurations of animals and gods (the signs of the Zodiac) in 
certain constellations of stars (Kohler, 1947, p.82). 
The senses, then, initially encounter a jig-saw of a myriad of 
pieces, in which it is scarcely possible to trace any form or 
interconnection; it is a universe without any signs of the Zodiac 
in it. But as the mind scans the jig-saw puzzle that the senses 
invite in for inspection, the mind begins to discern order and 
connection in it. From such it is able to piece together the 
commoner units of reality. These units constitute the gestalts upon 
which many of the preconceptions and anticipations of vision are 
finally based. The gestalts, then, supply a way of distilling reality 
to a degree where it can be imbibed without swamping the mind with an 
excess of information. Knowledge, it will be argued in the remainder 
of this section, is simply one more refinement of that distillate. 
Epistemologica! activity is an extention of that 'gestalting' 
process which the mind generally uses to cope with its experience of 
reality. But how far does knowledge extend the processes of ordinary 
perception, and what is involved in carrying out that extension? It 
has been said that the unification of experience, with which the mind 
seems permanently preoccupied, culminates in the output of knowledge. 
So is knowledge no more than a more holistic variety of experience? 
Oakeshott (1966, p.32) has suggested that it is. He has asserted 
that it is the degree of unity inherent in knowledge which finally 
differentiates it from the more common and mundane unifications of 
ordinary experience and perception. It is a second integration of 
the first integration of experience. But whilst knowledge might 
pirate a greater unity from experience, the vestiges of a recognisable 
experience, as has been noted (vide supra), tend to get relegated from 
t 
knowledge. Knowledge starts off as experience, but during the 
interregnum between it being that and becoming knowledge, the picture 
of experience is gradually erased. The greater unity of knowledge is 
achieved, then, at the expense of the representational character of 
experience. Knowledge might, as was asserted ̂  2.7, modify the way 
the world is regarded, but the manner of that regarding tends initially 
to be through "conceptual" rather than "perceptual" gestalts (Hanson, 
1971, p.29). Knowledge, then,is an abstract rather than a 
naturalistic icon of reality. Its unities will be 'reasoned', not 
'seen', to exist. 
If knowledge is an extension of certain sorts of mental behaviour, 
then it should exhibit, if only analogously, many of the same properties 
of structuration that the mind applies in its other 'contacts' with 
reality. However, it needs to be stated, as was noted ̂  2.3, that 
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knowledge in its most public form does its best to repress any 
psychological traits that the mind might impress upon it; and it is 
for this reason that it might be possible to distinguish a structure 
in knowledge that reflects (a) the idiosyncrasies of the mind and 
(b) the logic that tends to remove the idiosyncrasies of the mind. 
But first, does knowledge display any of the features which are 
associated with the characteristics of perceptual gestalts and which 
are a marked property of the mind's workings? It has, after all, only 
been asserted, not demonstrated, that knowledge unifies experience. 
It has been claimed that one of the qualities of perceptual gestalts 
is that they serve to give instantaneous form to a disparate collection 
of incoming stimuli.* They are the wholes, which in Piaget*s words, 
"have a quantitative value different from the sum of the parts" (1971b, 
pp.56-57). It is the formation of gestalts, then, which leads to an 
integrated perception of the world; it is they which hold the key to 
seeing things together. 
Associated with this power to structure and integrate experience 
that gestalts exhibit, there are accompanying qualitative features. 
Since the gestalt is in the business of reducing experience to simpler 
and more manageable proportions, it would be expected that one of its 
characteristic features would be the exhibition of simplicity and 
* Whilst the stimuli that gestalt psychologists are usually thought 
to have in mind when they talk about the properties of perceptual 
structuration are visual, it has been pointed out that many of the 
same properties are observable in the perception of aural stimuli. 
It has been suggested, for instance, that the diatonic scale is no 
more than a kind of gestalt 'picture* in sound (Kohler, 1947, p.81). 
Again Rubin's "figure/ground" distinction, which is regularly 
applied to visual stimuli, also has an equivalent in sound. It 
has been argued that the "dead interval" between two melodies 
supplies the ground which allows the melodies to stand out and be 
perceived (Kohler, 1947, p.111). 
economy. The gestalt is often characterised as displaying regularity, 
symmetry, simplicity and generally good aesthetic form (Piaget, 1971b, 
pp.56-57; Laszlo, 1972b,p.380). It generally makes a pleasing 
arrangement of the various parts of reality it serves to unify; for 
it packs the parts of reality into forms that are rounded and complete, 
that display a good deal of closure or pregnanz. Gestalts that do 
not do this, that are rugged, unfinished and lack much aesthetic appeal, 
do not appeal to the mind. Thus it is possible to measure on an 
encephalograph the heightened state of nervous tension that accompanies 
the perception of an incoherent shape which lacks much pregnanz 
(Laszlo, 1972b,pp.3764378;Berlyne, 1971, p.129). Perceptual complexity 
and disorder, which defies ready reduction to a gestalt, raises arousal 
level and causes displeasure. Moreover, it is the sort of nagging 
displeasure that does not finally vanish until a gestalt that can cope 
with the complexity and disorder is arrived upon, whereupon a feeling of 
pleasure and satisfaction is forthcoming. 
The gestalt, then, achieves a maximum of generalization with a 
minimum of omission; and provides a degree of pleasure, at its 
realisation, where otherwise there would only be agitation. That 
knowledge might have similar powers in it is not such an original 
proposition. It has been around at least since Kant. His 
description of knowledge, whilst of course it does not use the same 
vocabulary and theory as gestalt psychology, contains sentiments 
within it that sound remarkably gestalt-like in their tenor. He 
suggests, for example, that the sciences are forms of knowledge that 
possess a "systematic unity" about them. Each science houses inside 
it an "architectonic" that has the power to bring about their unity. 
It can make a union between parts of knowledge that would otherwise 
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remain a "disconnected and rhapsodic state" (Kant, 1969, p.471). The 
"architectonic", then, has the power to infuse unity into a given 
complexity and disorder, and in this respect has analogous powers to 
those of a gestalt. 
Hanson's view of knowledge is also one which centres on the notion 
that it is knowledge which is ultimately able to give greatest coherency 
to experience. It is knowledge, then, that gives a "conceptual pattern 
recognition" to the "dots" of reality the senses collect for the sake of 
giving man experience. Boyle's law began with those "dots"; it was 
then turned into a compilation of facts and figures about the pressure, 
volume and temperature of a gas. But whilst those facts and figures 
had some sort of correlation with the "dots" of reality, they really 
explained nothing (Hanson, 1971, p.8). They were observations in 
search of an "architectonic" to connect them. There was discreteness 
in them, but no holism. That was provided of course when it was 
discovered that the pressure of a fixed mass of an 'ideal' gas at 
constant temperature is inversely proportional to its volume. Then 
all the facts and figures jumped into place as do the head and shoulders 
of a man Figure 3.1 below. And what remained a pile of discrete and 
unrelated facts, before Boyle's law was infused into them, became after-
wards a pattern of order or a certain scientific explanation. 
Figure 3.1 
The Hidden Man (Hanson, 1969b, p.14) 
If the advancement of knowledge represents the pursuit of new 
theories, then that pursuit is realised in the glimpse of previously 
unseen gestalts (Grene, 1961^ p.193). That was assuredly what 
happened when Kekule discovered the cyclical structure of benzene. 
His often-reported day dream of a ring of snakes chasing each other's 
tails might not have much of the benzene in it, but for Kekule it 
represented a metaphor of the gestalt that could explain how it was 
that atoms of carbon and hydrogen were arranged in a molecule of 
benzene. 
Nor is the glimpsing of new gestalts entirely restricted to the 
physical sciences. For if the gestalt is the vehicle of 
generalization, the means by which the disjecta membra of experience 
become fused, then history, which is a discipline that stands or falls 
on its generalization, is full of gestalts. Indeed, if history did 
not attempt to synthesize the scattered remnants of the past, then it 
would simply remain a compilation of facts (Cassirer, 1973, p.177; 
Carr, 1974, p.64). History, then, looks for unity in the unique, and 
its practitioners are "chronic generalizers", who are constantly 
seeking out the *head and shoulders* in the immense mosaic of the past. 
History, unlike science, tends to deal with unique events. It 
deals with a world of limitless, not "limited variety"; it generalises 
essentially about non-recurrent events. This distinguishes it from 
science whose dominion tends to eschew the unique in favour of that 
which has a consistency and regularity about its behaviour. Science, 
then, tries to isolate from experience certain recurrent patterns and 
order, that, should certain antecedent conditions be known, can be 
predicted to occur again (Braithwaite, 1969, p.l; Hempel, 1966, p.75). 
Science, then, is an empirical form of 'crystal gazing*, which appeals 
to that aspect of man's behaviour (see 3.4) which tries to predict and 
anticipate the nature of his surrounds. It is a way of building 
those "templets", those "constructs", which man is attempting to overlay 
on the behaviour of (physical) reality. Boyle's law represents one 
such construct; another is the Theory of Relativity, and it is of 
note that Einstein considered that if the theory did not fit over 
reality and anticipate satisfactorily some aspects of its behaviour, he 
was willing to concede that, as a templet, the relativity theory was 
untenable. As it turned out, the theory did live up to Einstein's 
expectations. Observation did confirm that there was a "red-shift 
of spectral lines" due to "gravitational potential" to an amount 
predicted by the Theory of Relativity (Popper, 1976, p.38). 
In 3.2, it was noted that perception contains as much foresight as 
actual sighting. This would seem to be equally true of epistemological 
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behaviour. The conceptual gestalts that characterise this behaviour 
are as much to do with the future behaviour of reality as they are with 
the present. They provide a way of seeing how things might look if 
certain courses of action are taken. Thus knowledge serves to add 
still more to the repertoire of anticipation with which the mind, from 
the act of perception onwards, is constantly trying to charge itself. 
If man's behaviour, then, is largely future oriented, then the tendency 
to form conceptual gestalts of reality exaggerates that orientation 
still further. They are just one more way of achieving further 
computational economies. They are yet another way of prophesying 
experience, so that man can gain more profit from experience. 
Like perceptual gestalts, then, knowledge would appear to have the 
capacity to reduce the components of experience to more manageable forms. 
This reduction reaches its high point in the scientific law, which not 
only represents the distillation of reality to its most refined degree, 
but also exhibits the most reliability as far as anticipating the 
behaviour of reality is concerned. 
In the light of these affinities between the gestalts both of 
knowledge and of ordinary perception, it is worth asking whether the 
former do not only have the capacity to structure experience, but, 
like perceptual gestalts, do so in an equivalently elegant way? 
Are the gestalts of knowledge similarly prone to simplicity, 
regularity and generally good aesthetic form? Certainly, as far as 
the conventionalists like Poincaré, Duhem, Eddington (Popper, 1974, 
pp.78-79)and Mach (Polanyi, 1962, p.166) were concerned, knowledge, 
particularly scientific knowledge, was charged with elegance and » 
simplicity. Indeed, when it was a matter of deciding which of two 
competing scientific theories, both of which adequately explained some 
tr 
aspect of reality, was the more veristic, the conventionalists 
suggested that it was attributes like the elegance and simplicity of 
the theories that finally decided the matter. The theory which had 
a sense of incoherency about it, and did not exhibit much pregnanz, 
was often put to one side in favour of a theory which displayed all the 
qualities of bonne forme and good gestalt. 
In this connection, the notion that scientific theories can have 
an "intellectual beauty" to them (Polanyi, 1962, p.133), might have 
some psychological foundation to it. If the mind rebels against 
incoherency and the discursive, rambling form, and then infers that 
that might not be nature's style either, it would seem probable that 
there is a strong aesthetic component in knowing. Certainly, some 
scientists have felt this to be a component of their activities. 
Dirac (1963, pp.45-47)has recorded how Schroedinger, for one, arrived 
at the wave equation for quantum mechanics, not empirically like 
Heisenberg, but through a "beautiful generalization of De Broglie's 
ideas". Schroedinger invested much more epistemological verity in a 
beautiful arrangement of mathematical equations than he did in a 
theory conceptualised empirically via spectroscopy. Aesthetic 
considerations took priority over those of observation. He had 
more faith in his ability to evaluate a theory's aesthetic aptness 
than he did its empirical aptness. 
Summary. This section has attempted to demonstrate that 
epistemological activity, like perception, is an attempt to reduce 
the world to more manageable proportions. Indeed, it has been shown 
that many of the mechanisms that guide perception's reduction of 
experience continue to operate in knowledge. There is a certain 
amount of justification, then, in asserting that knowledge is an 
extension of experience and perception. In many respects knowledge 
is the most laconic way man has of expressing these two things. But 
it would be a mistake to think that the process is entirely one way, 
and that knowledge does nothing more than attenuate experience. If 
it did. Chapter Two could not have Ipeen written! For there it was 
argued that knowledge opens our eyes to experience, it does not cut 
it down, as has tended to be argued in this chapter. Before the 
discussion of the grass roots origins of knowledge can be finalised, 
some way of circumventing this apparent contradiction must be obtained 
3.5 FROM EXPERIENCE TO KNOWLEDGE AND BACK AGAIN 
It was argued ̂ 3 . 3 that, when the need for gross interaction 
fades, a perceptual vacuum tends to develop. The mind tends to feel 
very uncomfortable with such a vacuum, so it indulges in all sorts of 
compensatory activities that will fill that vacuum and prevent the 
perceptual system degenerating into entropy. One of these activities, 
it has been noted, is knowledge. And it was shown ̂  3.4 that as an 
activity knowledge, just like perception, engages in a rigorous 
campaign to unify as much experience as possible. It seems that 
reduction and integration come quite naturally to the mind. An 
efficient rapport with reality depends upon it. Thus it has often 
been asserted in this chapter that knowledge constitutes just one 
extra integration of perception. It takes the reduction of experience, 
inherent in perception, just one step further. Knowledge, then is a 
conceptual metamorphosis of perception. But although knowledge might 
end up as all concept and no percept, it still nevertheless, as was 
demonstrated Chapter Two, has a profound influence on the way 
things are seen. For knowledge is one of the richest sources of 
"theories" that finish up contaminating vision. So how is it, when 
t 
knowledge is often several times removed from the sensiblecworld, that 
it can re-introduce itself into our vision of things? 
In 3.2, it was noted that one of the more necessary functions of 
perceptual behaviour is that of "excitation" and "inhibition". The 
gestalt is only a final product of ̂  perceptual system that is 
constantly trying to extrude from vision all that is unnecessary to 
it. Perception, in effect, tries to function on a minimum of stimulus 
cues. It has to, unless it is to be overwhelmed by the welter of 
visual information for which our senses serve as gatekeepers. Thus it 
was suggested d^ 3.2 that the synaptic relay stations from the senses 
to the brain are "switching off" more sensations than are ever "read 
out" at the self-conscious parts of the brain. It is not only natural 
for perception to integrate, but to censor and abridge as well. 
But on what bases is that abridgment carried out? In 3.2 it was 
argued that it is largely immediate interests and the exigencies of 
circumstance that finally determine which stimulus signals are read 
out at the brain, and which are not. In the first instance, these 
immediate interests are likely to be mainly connected with survival 
and the requirements of homeostasis. But once those interests have 
been served, others are likely to take their place and determine what 
gets switched off and on during perception. When those interests 
are, in the main, epistemological is it likely that they too have 
control over the switchboard that is perception? Is it possible 
that knowledge can in some way encourage certain * calls* from the 
world to be relayed to the brain, whilst preventing others? If 
this is so, then, the "excitatory signals" that are transmitted to 
the brain will be likely to have epistemological significance, whilst 
those which do not, will be inhibited. 
However, such an epistemological sensitivity to the world - is 
not born ab ovo. As was argued ̂ 2 . 4 in order for the layman to see 
the world in exactly the same way as a physicist he must undergo some 
preliminary training in physics. Without that he will remain 
insensitive and blind to much of what the physicist sees. 
Epistemological sensitivity, then, is a product of educated looking. 
Unless an appropriate background is present, the mode of looking 
which accumulates from a long period of disciplinary experiences will 
be absent. It is perhaps within the power of knowledge, then, to turn 
the eye to the world in a particular way; it can perhaps render the 
mind sensitive to particular excitations coming from the world, whilst 
inhibiting others. But can this power of knowledge be demonstrated? 
This proposed effect of knowledge is in fact somewhat analogous to 
that underpinning the response to those 'ambiguous figures* which 
gestalt psychologists use to illustrate the fact that the world can be 
perceived in a variety of ways. The seemingly same stimulus can give 
rise to different perceptual responses. Take, for instance. Figures 
3.2 and 3.3 below:-
•Figure 3.2 
(Popper and Eccles, 1977, p.65) 
The American Indian / Eskimo 
Figure 3.3 
(Petrie, 1976, p.38) 
Duck/Rabbit 
Figure 3.2 shows ambiguously the profile of an American Indian and the 
back view of an Eskimo: at least, that is Popper's (Popper and Eccles, 
1977, p.65) perception of it; whilst Figure 3.3 can equally be seen 
as a rabbit or a duck. However, neither image is seen simultaneously; 
always one is suppressed in favour of the other. Indeed, sometimes it 
is quite difficult to see the second image. But why is it that one 
image tends to be seen first or remains dominant over the other? What 
leads to the American Indian being seen first, rather than the Eskimo, 
or vice versa? 
Of course it is possible that both Figures could remain to their 
observers simply an abstract melange of shapes, having no perceptual 
significance whatsoever. Supposing the observer had had no previous 
experiences of rabbits or ducks, and therefore had had no opportunity 
to develop a stereo-typic schema of their form. Would he see Figure 
3.3 as anything at all? Presumably not. Significance would be 
altogether inhibited from the Figure. Again it is possible that an 
observer who had had plenty of American Indian 'experiences*, and none 
of Eskimoes, would only ever see an American Indian in Figure 3.2. His 
considerable familiarity with Indians would serve to strengthen 
excitations indicating an Indian in the Figure, whilst it would suppress 
any significance in the rest of the Figure. But even if the 
physiognomy of the Indian is seen, need it be necessarily seen as an 
Indian? Not always. The author's own first response to the Figure 
was that it showed one of those monumental heads found on Easter Island. 
The Indian's headdress was only seen after Popper's caption to Figure 
3.3 had been read! Presumably, perhaps because the author has recently 
reread Thor Hyerdhal's Kon-Tiki expedition, the images of Easter 
Island were much more in the foreĝ round of his thinking than were 
American Indians. Had he seen a 'Western' the night before, things 
might have been different. 
What this tends to show is that the observer brings a series of 
prior dispositions to the world, and these influence the way the world 
is finally perceived and appreciated. What knowledge does is simply 
add another dimension to these dispositions. It can excite our 
perceptual sensitivity to new aspects of the world, whilst inhibiting 
the appreciation of others.* It leads to certain images dominating 
* This can have its disadvantages. Petrie (1976), who holds a similar 
our appreciation of things, and others being submerged. Thus, as was 
noted 2.4, Nansen saw epistemologica! significance in the same 
driftwood that Eskimoes used as fuel, and his accompanying sailors were 
indifferent to this significance. It was a matter, as it were, of 
Nansen seeing a M u c k ' in the driftwood, the Eskimo seeing a 'rabbit', 
and the sailors apparently seeing nothing of epistemologica! value at 
all. With the exception of Anderson, the same sort of situation 
prevailed amongst physicists before the positive electron was 
discovered (see 2.5). Most of the community of experimental physicists 
saw no epistemologica! significance in certain tracks on Cloud-Chamber 
photographs. It took Anderson to revise the picture, and show that 
where others had only seen pieces of dirt, there was in fact a positive 
electron. Anderson, then, saw the Eskimo lurking behind the American 
Indian. He was able to overcome the epistemologica! 'theory' that had 
» 
inhibited seeing the dirt as a 'positive electron'. He was able to 
turn a normally inhibited signal into an epistemologica! excitation. In 
doing so, he changed the view of the atom. 
The way an educated man apprehends reality, then, is as much 
centred in knowledge as it is in ejcperience. The one augments the 
other. Our sensitivity to the world is never an entirely separate 
process; it is always accompanied by knowledge. Interpretation 
constantly informs our vision of the world, and that interpretation 
is in the main generated from our epistemologica! background. 
view of knowledge to the one developed here, has argued, for 
instance, that because different disciplines tend to foster 
rather different "cognitive maps", the possibilities of inter-
disciplinary communication are limited. Unless communicants 
can learn to see each other's "observational categories", members 
of different disciplines will tend to have incompatible viewpoints 
on the same problem. And that would be anathema to the principles 
of "multidisciplinary effort". 
But there is nothing absolute about that background. It is open to 
suggestions from experience, just as experience is open to those of 
knowledge. Indeed, as will be shown ^ Chapter Four, there is a 
good deal of reciprocity between these two elements of consciousness. 
Thus, just as knowledge serves to modify experience, so experience 
can serve to modify knowledge and our understanding of the world. 
There is, then, a constant 'to and fro* between the world of 
experience and the world of knowledge. Indeed, it will be argued 
in Chapter Four that this to and fro between knowledge and experience 
is the very life-blood of epistemological activity. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
COGNISER, COGNISED AND COGNITION 
"Man is eager after knowledge, and the love of 
legend is but the prelude to it." 
(Strabo) 
"All nature is but art, unknown to thee: 
All chance, direction which thou canst not see; 
All discord, harmony not understood." 
(Alexander Pope, Essays on Criticism) 
4.1 KNOWLEDGE: A TRIANGULAR RELATIONSHIP 
To suppose that the strands of the knowledge process can be 
separated is to misapprehend the nature of knowledge. For there is a 
marked degree of reciprocity between those strands that makes a mockery 
of any attempt to separate thei9,as if they were independent of one 
another. Any description of knowledge that does not accommodate this 
reciprocity, or does not acknowledge that epistemological activity is 
a marriage between reality, experience and knowledge itself, therefore 
will only represent a partial description of knowledge. What, however, 
is singularly true about the process is that that reciprocity is 
managed by "human intervention" and human intervention alone (Popper 
and Eccles, 1977, p.46). A human presence is the sine qua non of the 
knowledge process. The true epistemological 'celebrant* of the 
marriage between experience and reality, from which knowledge 
eventually springs, is the mind. For whilst it is possible to 
identify independent objectifications of knowledge in the content of 
books and journals, and to some extent observe empirical exemplifi-
cations of those contents in the behaviour of reality, without a mind 
to formulate and place a construction upon those contents, they would 
either not exist at all, or if they did, they would remain permanently 
inert and passive. The mind is the active agent in the knowledge 
process. 
Within the internal confines of something called 'mind*, however, 
it does seem possible, if only for clarification's sake, to distinguish 
separate strands - two to be precise - of the epistemological 
enterprise. From the point of view of the mind, for instance, there 
is an 'out there', beyond the corporeal limits of the body, that can 
be usefully denoted 3S reality5 and a similar, but separate 'out 
there*, which has uncovered order in and explained aspects of reality, 
and which is generally called 'knowledge*. The interface between 
these two cardinal elements of the epistemological enterprise lies 
somewhere in the mind. But from what was asserted about knowledge 
and its impact upon the perception of reality, in Chapters Two and 
Three, as an 'interface', the boundary between knowledge and reality 
is exceedingly permeable; for it permits through it insights from 
reality and knowledge that mutually serve to modify one another. The 
traffic between reality and knowledge is two way; so that knowledge 
is not only an extension of experience, it can also serve to enlarge 
and extend the experience of reality. If experience represents an 
initial 'dialogue* with reality, then the vocabulary of that dialogue 
is eventually augmented with a lexicon that knowledge is able to supply, 
The transaction, then, that occurs between reality and knowledge, 
in, so to speak, the 'market place' of the mind, is one of mutual 
support. Reality adds to the 'revenue' of knowledge, and knowledge in 
return adds new insights and levels of awareness to the experience of 
reality. However, it is always the mind which is instrumental in 
carrying out such transactions. To participate therefore in 
epistemological activity is to participate in a triangular relationship 
which has as its 'apex' the mind, and as its two vertices, reality and 
knowledge. 
Whilst such a threefold description of the epistemological enter-
prise is not particularly novel,* the model of it to be developed in 
this and subsequent chapters, will show that not only can a threefold 
* For instance. Mead (1934, pp.75-76)and Cohen (1944, p.28) both 
conceived models of epistemological meaning that indicate that 
description of that enterprise describe - as no other descriptions have 
done - the properties of knowledge in general, but also how it is: 
(i) that knowledge is acquired and created, 
(ii) that there are different varieties of knowledge in the 
epistemological spectrum, and 
(iii) that different members of disciplinary communities acquire 
rather different epistemological responsibilities towards 
knowledge. 
But before showing how it is a 'triadic' model of knowledge can 
accommodate these aspects of the phenomenon of knowledge, that model 
first has to be developed and presented. Its development will be 
embarked upon by first giving a more comprehensive description of the 
three components involved in all forms of epistemological behaviour, 
namely mind, reality and knowledge, or, as they will be called here, 
respectively, the cogniser, the cognised and the cognition. 
4.2 THE COGNISED (C,) a 
That reality which comprises the universe of physical entities 
will be called the 'cognised* • ^^ constitutes the external world, 
the *out there' beyond the limits of the mind, the world of "rocks and 
trees and physical fields of forces". It comprises all that is matter 
and energy in the cosmos (Popper, 1973b, p.20; Popper and Eccles, 
1977, pp.36, 359). But more than just the material constituents of 
such meaning resides somewhere between a stimulus, the thing to which 
the stimulus refers and the individuals for whom the stimulus has the 
potential to have meaning. This is not so very different from 
Einstein's "three-fold distinction between an external world, the 
observer's perception of that external world, and our notions of it" 
(Margenau, 1951, p.249). But of all the broadly "interactionist" 
epistemological models that prefigure the one to be developed in this 
study, those of Laszlo (1969, p.46; 1972b, p.387) and Eccles (Popper 
and Eccles, 1977, p.359) - itself an extension of Popper's - show 
greatest similarity to it. 
the natural and man-made world, the cognised can also, when it becomes 
the subject of epistemological reflection, embrace the world of man and 
his inner psychological states. The cognised, then, consists of all 
those inner and outer 'environments' from which all knowledge is cast, 
and to which knowledge is ultimately always addressed. In short, the 
cognised consists of everything about which it is possible to have 
knowledge. But within that 'everything', it is also possible to 
discern three dominant classes of cognised. For as Laszlo (1972a, 
pp.30-33)and Eccles (Popper and Eccles, 1977, p.359) have pointed out, 
there are three major universes of physical entities: 
(i) there is that universe in the cognised which consists 
exclusively of inorganic and non-living matter, and which 
after Laszlo, will be henceforward designated the 
"sub-organic" cognised (C^ ). It comprises the whole of 
^ 1 
that material universe which is neither organic nor 
living, or a cultural product of man; 
(ii) secondly, there is that universe exclusively populated 
by the world of 'living things'. It is the world of 
biological species and of their biochemistry and 
anatomies; it is the world of things organic rather 
than inorganic. It will therefore be referred to, 
again after Laszlo, as the "organic" cognised, (C^ ); 
(iii) lastly, there is that universe which can be approxi-
mately designated as comprising all that which man 
creates out of his own 'mentality'. In its domain 
fall all those artifacts, like works of art, tools, 
books, machines, which are the physical exemplifications 
of man's creativity. Included in this domain are also 
the less tangible manifestations of that creativity, 
like society. Everything in fact that is essentially 
a cultural progeny of man belongs to this last domain 
of the physical universe, the "supra-organic" cognised 
(C, ). 
If the "sub-organic", "organic" and "supra-organic" represent the basic 
genera of the cognised, then it is possible to make further 
differentiations in these genera by considering the spatio-temporal 
features that generally mark the physical entities of the universe. 
Some of these entities, for instance, will constantly recur both in time 
and space. There will be no end to the ubiquity and regularity of 
their behaviour. Many of the entities that inhabit the sub-organic 
cognised (C^ ) are like this: that is what makes them potentially 'law 
abiding*. But not all of the universe is disposed to being so regular 
or ubiquitous. Other elements of it display obverse qualities 
altogether. Not only do they display non-recurrence, but that non-
recurrence is limited to particular regions and localities of the 
cognised. Historical events are good examples, for they have a capacity 
for infinite variance whether they are looked at from the point of view 
of time or place. 
It is also possible to differentiate the genera of the cognised in 
terms of their duration. Some of the cognised, for instance, will 
vanish in a micro-interval of time. They will exhibit almost 
imperceptible ephemerality; their existence will be over in an 
infinitesimal amount of time. On the other hand, there are events in 
the cognised which only take place over millenia. The evolution of 
animals is an example. The chronological plane it occupies is 
extensive, not limited. It is an event of history, but one in which 
pattern is observable. 
The existence of most forms of knowledge, in fact, is contingent 
upon the cognised not being infinitely variable (Werkmeister, 1968, p.104) 
If it were, then dirt-effects on Cloud Chamber photographs - to take a 
specific example - would be simply dirt-effects, and nothing more. The 
epistemological enterprise would be permanently stifled with the percep-
tion of a rife and impenetrable disorder. It would prove impossible to 
perceive any 'hidden men' (see 3.4) in the cognised. But this is not 
the case. For the cognised does, in all three of its possible domains, 
in some measure at least, exhibit a "limited variety" of behaviour 
patterns. The cognised is not always totally non-recurrent, nor is 
ubiquity a quality that is totally alien to it. Therefore it becomes 
possible to discern order and pattern in the cognised, and make 
predictions about its possible behaviour. However it always needs some 
agent of consciousness to do that ordering and make those predictions; 
and that agent occupies the second vertex of the triangular relationship 
that is knowledge. 
4.3 THE COGNISER (C ) 
r 
The agent of consciousness, who attempts to apprehend order in the 
cognised, will be' called the cogniser (C^). He is the knower in the 
epistemological drama, and as such is its principal and most 
indispensable protagonist. His is the role of a Socrates, not so much 
in a dialogue with his fellow philosophers, as in a soliloquy with his 
surrounds. It is he, then, who is ultimately 'midwife' to the truths 
that lie secreted in the 'womb' of the cognised. If the cognised is, 
so to speak, 'pregnant'with epistemological meaning, then it is the 
cogniser who'delivers'the meaning from the cognised. Nansen carried 
out such a 'Socratic' delivery when he saw epistemologica! significance 
in a piece of coastal driftwood; so too did Leverrier when he recognised 
that the perturbation of Uranus could only be due to the existence of 
another planet. But without a Nansen, a Leverrier to act as the 
'midwife' to that knowledge, it would have remained linbom'. 
Upon the cogniser, as was noted the existence of all 
epistemologica! activity depends. If he fades from the picture of 
knowledge, so too does the significance of knowledge itself. Whilst 
it is possible that the physical objectifications of knowledge, i.e. 
books and journals, could go on existing in the absence of man, their 
contents would remain, as it were, in 'suspended animation' until 
resuscitated by a cogniser. Knowledge might, as Popper (1973a, p.154) 
has tended to argue, because it retains the possibility of being 
actualised, have separate ontologica! status, but that status is only 
realised if there are cognisers around to actualise it. The ontology 
of knowledge only comes to mean something when the ontology of a 
cogniser is brought to bear upon it. Moreover, the ontology that is 
required to resurrect knowledge, whether that knowledge be from books 
or reality, is of a specific kind, with attributes all its own. 
The ontology of the cogniser approximates to what Popper (1973b, 
p.20) has called "World Two". It is pervaded with a sense of 
consciousness and a variety of psychological states; it is commensurate 
with the way reality is perceived and experienced. But whilst these 
things underpin ontology, and are in some measure antecedent to know-
ledge, they are not, as was noted ̂ 3 . 1 , in themselves commensurate 
with knowledge. For knowledge is synonymous with a higher and more 
extensive integration than that which either experience or perception 
has the capacity to carry out. Not that the capacity to form more 
synthesized unions of the cognised is wholly alien to the general 
workings of the mind. The need to abridge the narrative of sensation 
and generally make experience more manageable is a constant preoccupation 
of the mind. And it is this preoccupation that forms, as was noted in 
Chapter Three, the backcloth from which knowledge eventually emerges. 
For it was argued in that Chapter, that knowledge is just one more 
variation on what is a perennial theme of life; to construct the means 
of integrating and predicting reality still further. 
The cogniser, then, is an 'alembic* to the cognised. Through him, 
the components of the cognised are progressively distilled. The 
apotheosis of that distillation is knowledge. It represents a précis 
of the dialogue the cogniser has with the cognised. It is experience 
reduced to its very quintessence, to its least common denominator. In 
order to reduce the constant burden of experience, the cogniser has 
need to minimise the proportions of the cognised. One of the outcomes 
of that minimization is knowledge, the third vertex of the epistemo-
logical triangle. 
4.4 THE COGNITION (C ) 
n 
Man, according to Popper (1973a, p.154; 1973b, p.20; 1976, p.181), 
in living in the one world, in fact ends up by living in three! There 
is first the world of physical states. That world has been called here 
the cognised. Secondly, there is the world of consciousness and mental 
states. Via that consciousness, a cogniser is able to experience the 
cognised. World Two, then, is the portal to the things of World One. 
Through its 'doors' passes the 'material' from which man eventually 
fashions the substance of his Third World. For that world consists of 
the products of the human mind (Popper and Eccles, 1977, p.16). It 
is a new objective world formed from the psychological states that 
are peculiar to man; it represents an external realization of some 
of the subjective experiences of men. In World Three, then, are 
found not only language, tools, social institutions, customs, works 
of art, but also man's "theoretical systems ... critical arguments": 
anything that in fact is found in "the contents of journals, books 
and libraries" (Popper, 1973a, p.106; 1976, p.187).* World Three 
represents the material embodiment of man's creativity and his 
capacity to find order and pattern in his World Two experiences of the 
cognised; World Three represents the memory bank of his culture, and 
it contains his 'recollections' of his attempts to make sense of and 
control the cognised. A substantial part of that 'bank' is filled 
with knowledge, or what will be called here, 'cognition' (C ). 
n 
Knowledge, it was argued ^ Chapter Three, arises as a defense 
against the twin psychological enemies of the mind: boredom and 
sensory overcharge. The mind is able to win the battle against 
'overcharge' by a process of stimulus reduction. It removes from 
the centres of its attention all those stimuli that are irrelevant or 
redundant to the attainment of states such as homeostasis. But that 
reduction can sometimes go too far and leave the mind perceptually 
* Lest it be assumed that the artifacts of the supra-organic cognised 
(see 4.2) and those of World Three are in any way synon3rmous or 
equivalent, it needs to be stated that consideration of physical 
status is the sole criterion for determining which class of the 
cognised an artifact belongs to. The physical status of artifacts, 
however, is quite irrelevant to determining whether they belong to 
'World Three' or not. Rather it is their capacity to cause action, 
thought, ideas, communication that determines their membership there 
or not. Thus a book remains an object of the supra-organic cognised 
until it is read and its ideas are assimilated. At that stage it 
graduates to World Three status. In the same way works of art 
retain their membership of the supra-organic cognised until they are 
bored; and that can be as potentially harmful as an overcharge of 
sensations. The mind wins its battle against boredom by seeking 
out new stimuli that will keep the perceptions alert and in 'good 
working order*. One means of capturing new stimuli, it was noted 
3.5, is to engage in epistemological activities. For one of the 
influences that has been attributed to knowledge is its power to 
render the perceptions sensitive to aspects of the world not normally 
in the foreground of vision. Knowledge, then, helps to widen the 
vista to which consciousness is open. But it does more than just 
broaden vision. There are other aspects to knowledge apart from its 
power to supply the senses with nourishment when they are in danger of 
'starvation*. That is only its psychological function, not its » 
epistemological function. 
Knowledge has the potential to heighten sensitivity to the world. 
The assertions knowledge makes essentially concern themselves with 
the nature of the cognised. And whilst those assertions are often 
conditional and subject to publicly agreed criteria, what knowledge 
does with the framework of those criteria is try to uncover order in the 
flux of natural phenomena. It tries to strip the veil of mystery 
that clothes reality and prevents man seeing directly its innermost 
secrets; it attempts to seek out the true metaphysical blue-print of 
looked at, whereupon they become part of World Three. It can be said, 
then, that the artifacts of the supra-organic cognised have a rather 
ambiguous status. They are physical entities all right, but they are 
ones whose physicality harbours the capacity to evoke ideas, actions, 
theories and so on. But the only arena in which the supra-organic 
contents of World Three have the capacity to carry out that evocation 
is in the World Two of a cogniser's consciousness. It should be 
further stated, then, that Worlds One and Three only come to have 
epistemological significance when they are a focus of World Two 
interest. In this respect, the outside world, of whatever variety, 
is potentially reducible to World Two. 
the universe (Getzels and Csikszentmlhalyl, 1976, p.139; Duhem, 1954, 
p.7; Agassi, 1975, p.37; Horton, 1974,pp.133-134). Whether that 
*blue-print* eventually comes to be *peopled* with elementary particles 
or gods, it still amounts to the same thing: an attempt to find the 
most likely ghost that haunts the mechanisms of reality. That 
represents the goal, the *holy grail* of all knowledge, whether it be 
mythical, religious or scientific. It is not so much the underlying 
objective of knowledge which alters between the different forms of 
knowledge, but rather the criteria that determine whether the *ghosts* 
in reality they respectively exorcise are spurious or not; it is those 
criteria which are subject to modification and which cause the 
epistemological differences between mythical, religious and scientific 
knowledge. But before examining those differences in more detail and 
the divisions which exist in the spectrum of knowledge, it is useful to 
discover whether a knowledge that attempts to angle order and explanation 
in the cognised is more properly a science than an art, and if it is so, 
why? 
4.5 COGNITION: ART OR SCIENCE? 
As classifications of the substantive content of knowledge, the arts 
and sciences are often seen as being the absolute antithesis of one 
another. Their methodologies and objectives are also often held to be 
dissimilar and irreconcilable. It is as though art makes a cult of 
subjectivity and unrestrained private expression; and science attempts 
to check fancy and imagination by reason and empirical demonstration. 
Equally, art is often seen as science with value and ethical dimensions 
added to it; science, with them taken out of it. Yet these ways of 
distinguishing the arts from the sciences are comparatively recent in 
origin. They did not prevail, for instance, in the middle ages. 
Then a rather different, but nonetheless still apposite distinction was 
used to differentiate an art from a science. 
The notion that an art, like any other form of knowledge, could in 
its own way obtain legitimate *blue prints' of the universe, would have 
been foreign to the age of the 'Seven Liberal Arts*. For whilst it 
was true that the 'quadrivium' was intended to help students penetrate 
the natural order of things, it was only really a foundation for 
epistemological activity. One began with mathematics and eventually 
progressed to physics. In the same way, the arts that comprised the 
'trivium' were not really areas of knowledge in the modern sense, but 
disciplines that aided the arts of communication, of speaking and of 
writing. Studying the 'Seven Liberal Arts' enabled students to become 
I-
acquainted with, and to master the tools for getting and dispensing 
knowledge (Ackerman, 1967, p.14). They were repositories of technique 
rather than knowledge. But the actual gathering of that knowledge, or 
the partaking in what was called "scientia", was a higher form of 
epistemological activity, to which the techniques learnt in studying 
the'liberal arts'were often applied. As the Medieval philosopher, 
John of Salisbury pointed out, an art was a system of reason that was a 
"substitute for the spendthrift and redundant ways of nature, a concise, 
a direct method of doing things" (McGarry, 1955, p.33). It was 
primarily a device, a method for structuring experience. But what gave 
rise to the need to structure experience was "scientia" or the capacity 
to make certain formulations about the nature of things. Thus, whilst 
all men who were trained in the 'liberal arts'became artists, only a 
very few reached the level of "scientia", where they had the insights 
into the nature of the world characteristic of scientists. In order to 
attain and communicate those insights, however, they required the 
techniques of the 'liberal arts' (Ackerman, 1967, p.20). 
Historically speaking, then, an art was an epistemological 
activity in which knacks and techniques tended to predominate. It is 
this sense of the word that has been retained when the 'art' of cooking 
or painting is spoken of. It is, of course, quite within reason to 
speak of the 'science' of cooking or painting, but the ramifications 
are very different. Whilst it is possible to imagine cookery treated 
scientifically, and to envisage that that science would encompass such 
things as the calorific values of food and the chemical changes that 
occur to it when cooked, it would be only in a roundabout and indirect 
way that such knowledge would improve the preparation of meals. For 
t 
only mastering the techniques and arts of cooking would do that. 
Yet artists often see their activity in quasi-scientific terms. 
John Constable, the landscape painter, referred to his paintings as 
experiments in "natural philosophy" and as inquiries into the laws of 
nature (Gombrich, 1960, p.175). Apd the art students that Getzels and 
Csikzentsmihalyi (1976, p.18) made a longitudinal study of, frequently 
spoke of their studio paintings as voyages of epistemological discovery, 
either into themselves or the world around them. But though artists 
might like to think of themselves as questing after the laws of nature, 
rather after the style of the physicist, that goal in most, but not all, 
cases is subsumed in considerations of technique and ways of registering 
experience. Formal considerations often assume much more importance 
than considerations of content. If they did not, there would be no 
difference between art and science. 
In an art technique remains uppermost; in a science, the reverse 
prevails; content subsumes technique. In science it is what is 
displayed when the veil covering reality is lifted that is all important; 
in art it is the way that unveiling is conducted which is of more 
interest. Thus if art and science do make analogous epistemological 
incisions into the often inscrutable face of reality, for science the 
incision is enough in itself; for art it is the manner and style of 
incision that counts. With these differences between science and art 
in mind, it will now be possible to build a spectrum of knowledge. 
4.6 COGNITION AND THE SPECTRUM OF KNOWLEDGE 
Reality remains undivided until conquered by the classifications 
of knowledge. There are, arguably, no natural divisions in reality 
that would indicate one province of reality belongs to science, another 
to religion, and so on. Rather those divisions have been imposed on 
reality by man as he has progressively tried to make sense of it. 
Accordingly, man the cogniser may be regarded as a kind of *prism* 
through whom the *white light' of reality comes to be refracted. As 
it does so, that light is broken up into the colours that comprise the 
spectrum of knowledge. This section will concern itself with the range 
of that spectrum, and the * chromatic* divisions of knowledge which exist 
in it.* 
* The attempt to do so is not all that original. Philisophers both 
ancient and modern, have often tried to examine the whole gamut of 
knowledge and seek out its fundamental, non-reducible components. 
Bacon (1937, p.377), for instance, felt all "human learning" 
consisted of "history, poesy and philosophy". In fact his analysis 
of knowledge was quite typical of other early attempts. His is no 
more than the culmination of such attempts, which had begun in 
Classical philosophy, and had become something of an idee fixe with 
the early encyclopaedists and Medieval schoolmen. All of them 
In trying to pinpoint the epistemological latitudes that philosophy 
occupies, Russell (1972, p.13) once suggested that its territory seemed 
to lie in the 'no man's land* between the dogma of theology on the one 
hand, and the definite knowledge of science on the other. In effect, 
Russell was indicating that the twin outposts of knowledge are religion 
and science, and that everything else of an epistemological kind, 
including philosophy, can be located somewhere between them. Behind 
this assertion, that religion and science constitute the two extremities 
of knowledge, is the notion that they both tend to exhibit opposite 
forms of epistemological behaviour. The definite knowledge of science, 
for instance, is demonstrable; it is empirically supportable. This 
is not so with the knowledge of religion. It requires an act in a 
» 
laboratory to demonstrate a scientific truth; an act of faith would 
serve to demonstrate a religious one. Religion therefore tends to be 
the stuff of dogma and otherwise irrefutable beliefs; it tends to be 
begotten by revelation and divine inspiration, rather than, as is the 
case with science, by experience and observation. If knowledge, then, 
is warranted belief (see 3.5), science is the most warranted, religion 
the least. 
tried to seek out the atomic components of epistemological activity. 
With the proliferation, in modern times, of many more types of 
knowledge, attempts to analyse the whole gamut of knowledge have 
become somewhat more complex, although they are still as earnestly 
pursued. In recent years, for instance, there has been a whole 
series of attempts to describe the various types of 'rooms* in what 
perhaps is no longer a 'house*, but *mansion* of intellect. The 
attempts of Phenix (1964), Tykociner (1964), Hirst (1968), Morris 
(1946, pp.123 et seq.) and Koestler (1964, p.332) are notable in this 
regard. Most of these attempts - with perhaps the exceptions of 
Morris* and Koestler*s - have tended to accentuate the divisions 
inherent in knowledge. They have not tried to show any connecting 
* doors* that might exist between the various * rooms* of knowledge; 
or conceived of knowledge - as will be done in this section - as a 
spectrum ranging between two basic and antithetical epistemological 
styles. 
All knowledge, then, tends to fall into camps that are either 
demonstrable or not. Science and religion are the respective 
paradigms of either camp in their most extreme manifestations. All 
the other forms of knowledge, according to whether they aspire to the 
condition of science on the one hand, or religion on the other, can be 
located somewhere on a continuum between them. Religion and science 
are, as it were, the 'red' and 'violet' of the knowledge spectrum; 
they represent the extreme "left" and "right" of epistemological 
behaviour (Bruner, 1974, p.31). They, so to speak, form the limits 
between which the compass of all knowledge is spread and ranged. 
It is perhaps worth pondering what might lie beyond these limits. 
Are there some epistemological equivalents in the knowledge spectrum, 
for instance, of 'ultra violet' and 'infra-red' light? If so, what 
are they? 
t 
To go beyond religion, into the 'infra-red' parts of the 
knowledge spectrum, is presumably to enter a world which for its 
'inhabitants' is transcendent and available only to divine and 
inexpressible 'afflatus'. It is a world whose experiencing perhaps 
provides the springboard for religious doctrine and knowledge, but 
whose experiencing is essentially private and spiritual. To the left 
of religious knowledge, then, is a cognised whose domain is essentially 
non-material, that is 'trans-organic', and available only to gnosis and 
divine illumination. It is that cognised which the great mystics, 
like Catherine of Siena or, in modern times, Jacques Maritain claimed 
to have experienced. 
By contrast, the 'ultra violet' parts of the knowledge spectrum 
are thoroughly centred.in the material and tangible world. For to the 
'right' of science lies technology and a world to which knowledge is 
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applied. It represents the domain in vhich scientific theory is 
given some material and objective form and it is manifested in tools 
and the application of theory to the most concrete and tangible 
problems encountered in reality. The 'ultra-violet' parts of the 
spectrum, then, represent the domains -where World Three knowledge 
gets translated back into World One terms; it occurs at the cross-
roads between theory and practice. 
Neither the 'ultra-violet' nor the 'infra-red' parts of the 
epistemological spectrum, however, will be of much concern here. 
Rather it will be the knowledge divisions that lie between the 
extremes of religion and science, and which make up, so to speak, the 
'primary' and 'complementary' colours of the knowledge spectrum that 
this section will try and differentiate and position on the spectrum. 
For if religion and science, as has been argued, constitute the basic 
antinomies of knowledge, and everything else is simply a mollified 
version of one or either of them, then it should be possible to draw 
up a spectrum of knowledge on which the other disciplines can be 
located, according to whether their epistemological proclivity lies 
in the direction left of science or right of religion. 
The capacity to carry this out is of course dependent upon whether 
the primaiy colours of knowledge do display some basic proclivity towards 
one or other of the antimonies just described. This is true, for 
example, of the human sciences. Ever since the late Nineteenth Century, 
when they began to emerge as disciplines in their own right, psychology 
and sociology have tended to employ the methods encountered in the 
laboratory to bear on the problems of the mind and of society. With 
the incorporation of scientific methods, the human sciences gradually 
broke the yoke that had tied them to philosophy. And it is of note, 
in this connection, that many of the first practitioners of 
psychology, for instance, were originally trained as natural scientists 
Freud had been trained as a medical practitioner; Wundt a biologist; 
Mach a physicist. Throughout the Nineteenth Century, in fact, there 
had been cultivated the belief that a physics of human behaviour was 
not only desirable, but inevitable. This belief that the problems of 
mind and society could respond to the positivistic methods of science 
is very evident in the epistemology of Comte (1970, p.13) and Mill 
(Hearnshaw, 1972, p.225). The early practitioners of the human 
sciences, then, were convinced that importing the epistemological 
rigour of science would result in much more reliable théories about 
man than mere philosophical speculation. The method of the laboratory 
has been that to which, rightly or wrongly, sociology and psychology 
have, in the last hundred years or so, frequently aspired. They are 
disciplines, then, that are heading * right' on the spectrum, not quite 
fully fledged sciences, but not yet totally without philosophical 
features. They are, as Hudson (1976, p.157) has said in connection 
with psychology, disciplines that "should stretch continuously ... 
from the creative and scholarly arts on the one hand, to the estab-
lished sciences on the other"; they occupy a region, then, somewhere 
between the 'reasonableness' of philosophy and the empirical 
certainties of science. 
In many respects, history is likewise continuously stretched 
between philosophy and the sciences. Moreover, it would appear to be 
only the English who have difficulty in recognizing the scientific 
status of history. For, "in every other European language the 
equivalent word to 'science' includes history without hesitation" 
(Carr, 1974, p.56). In Germany, for example, history would be 
regarded as Wissenschaft but the actual methodological predilections 
of history need not necessarily be concordant with it being a genuine 
science. Indeed, there is a good deal of debate about the 
epistemological status of history. Whilst there have been some, 
notably Hempel (1974) who would see history as having the potential to 
become a science, others have been much more sceptical. History is 
basically unlike science, it is argued, because it deals with unique 
events, it is often interpreted from a thoroughly subjective point of 
view and lacks the power to predict the outcome of events (Carr, 1974, 
p.62). The most it can do is to rescue some general significance in 
events that can never be experienced again. Whether that means 
principally peering into the minds and psychology of the "rational 
agents" supposedly responsible for the course of historical events, as 
the advocates of verstehen techniques suggest; or simply gathering 
generalizations together from the historical remnants left after the 
events themselves have 'passed away*, as the "colligationists" insist, 
seems to be a matter for the methodological persuasions of the 
individual historian. For, unlike science, history does not appear 
to have a consensus methodology as its core, which all its 
practitioners tend to follow (Ziman, 1968, p.19). The methodological 
position of history, then, is much more fluid and less fixed than that 
of the human sciences. But to the extent that the generalizations 
historians compound, if they are to be considered valid, must have the 
corroborative support from the raw materials of history, history is 
scientific; that is, if documentation, archaeological evidence, 
chronologies - history's raw materials, its 'meter' readings - are to 
be considered legitimate grounds for empirical support. But unlike 
science, historical events, the causes which generated them and the 
effects they give rise to, cannot be fully replicated in something like 
a historical 'laboratory', so that if there are laws in history, as 
Hempel (1974) has postulated, then their causal efficacy cannot be 
measured or assessed. For if science, at least in terms of Hempel's 
"deductive nomological" model of it, permits predictions about the 
future behaviour of the cognised to be made, then the nearest history 
can ever get to such clairvoyancy is retrospection. It remains a 
discipline, then, more concerned with seeing successfully into the past, 
than the future. 
But not all historians have wanted to be scientists of the past. 
The more speculative history, that Marx and Hegel practised, inclined 
towards the left hand side of the knowledge spectrum and towards a 
synoptic and philosophical history which endeavoured to isolate some 
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overall, hegemonic principle in the events of the past. History, for 
such historians, was partly deus ex machina. Its events and 
happenings were moulded by some all pervading "world spirit". It was 
the duty of the historian to observe the events of the past as if they 
represented the unfolding of the hegemonic principle. He was supposed 
to see the 'hands' of the "world spirit" at work. History, it was 
assumed, had some ultimate purpose to it, a telos, and the function of 
the historian was to decode that telos. 
History's 'chromatic' wavelength on the knowledge spectrum tends 
to stretch, then, from philosophy on the one hand, to psychology on the 
other. But if a certain methodological ambivalence tends to make its 
exact placement rather difficult, then such problems are multiplied when 
it comes to the arts. Firstly, there is the general epistemological 
problem of deciding whether the arts are a form of knowledge at all. 
If they do not make warranted truth claims - that being the most 
conventional way of defining knowledge - then there is no reason to 
include them on the knowledge spectrum. They would be World Three 
phenomena all right, but not part of that province of World Three 
occupied by knowledge and cognition. Yet some artists, as was noted 
in 4.5, do claim an epistemological status for their activities. 
They would probably concur with Lawrence (1963) and argue that there 
are domains of human experience which are closed to the method of 
science; that only the more intuitive and less rational methods of 
art can open the mind to an understanding of. But if the arts do deal 
in epistemological truths, prohibited to other forms of knowledge, 
there is the additional problem of the arts being something of a 'rag-
bag* phenomenon. There is literature, music, painting and a host of 
subsidiary activities that all in their own way have had, or continue 
to have, the epithet 'art' applied to them. And on the surface at 
least all these activities are very dissimilar to one another. 
Therefore, given perhaps their highly idiosyncratic natures, is it 
possible to generalise from the condition and apparent objectives of, 
say, literature to the other art forms? After all, if the activities 
that comprise the arts are vastly dissimilar, it would seem unwise, 
lest it should dissemble their true appearance, to admit characteristics 
of any one or two of the arts that might be said to be equally true of 
them all. Music is a case in point. For whilst it is not improbable 
that literature does occasionally have insights into the nature of the 
human condition equivalent to those of the human sciences, this would 
apply, if at all, much less to music: for in Stravinsky's (1936, p.91) 
oft quoted words "music is by its very nature, essentially powerless 
to exnress anything at all". Even if the nature of a truth claim is 
made as all accommodating as possible, it is difficult to quite see 
how it could legitimately embrace the expressions of music. Except 
on those rare occasions when music tries to be representational and 
onomatopoeic, and create aural pictures of the world, it is generally 
non-referential; its only subject matter is itself. It is a kind of 
emotional mathematics. For whatever music says it is either internal 
to itself, or about a world which exists beyond that of material fact 
and physical entities. 
So that if music, and it is one of the major arts, does not live 
up to, in the conventional sense of the word, being knowledge, should 
its consideration for possible inclusion on the spectrum of knowledge 
be rejected? The problem is further compounded because there is 
undoubtedly a thing called 'musical knowledge* that composers and 
performers need in order to write and play music. 
Perhaps a way of circumventing this problem is not to regard the 
arts as being in any way epistemologically equivalent at all but to 
regard them as having differences that can be arranged, as Reid (1969, 
p.87) has done, on a scale which has at one end of it those arts, like 
the novel, in which 'subject matter' looms largest, and at the other, 
those, like music, in which it looms least. From what was said ̂  4.4, 
it seems likely, in all events, that formal and technical considerations 
in the arts predominate over subject matter. This predominance is at 
its most extreme in music, where devotion to form and structure and its 
technical realization is almost an end in itself, and least in the novel 
where, whilst considerations of form are not always absent, they are 
there to a less marked degree. But even if, in the arts, there is a 
tendency for method considerations to take priority over those of 
content, content is present in them, and its presence does have 
pronounced proclivities. 
The arts have been spoken of as possessing the acumen to see more 
deeply into the affairs of men, and as lying somewhere between the 
enquiries of physical science and the left-hand domains of the 
knowledge spectrum, like religion and philosophy (Reid, 1961, p.98; 
Polanyi, 1962, p.199; Toulmin, 1972, p.396). They have also been 
spoken of as encompassing variously the concerns of psychology in that 
they sometimes seek to discover the mechanisms of human action, and 
often of overlapping upon the concerns of the theologian and philosopher 
(Getzels and Csikszentmihalyi, 1976, p.139). But if literature and 
poetry often make their province what Peters (1975a, p.99) has called 
the "concrete universals of life", it is also true that literature and 
poetry seek to plumb the depths of, and record what the French poet, 
Mallarmé, acknowledged to be, an Orphic order in the universe 
(Raymond, 1962, p.24). There are some poets, and Mallarmé was one, 
whose art tries to evoke the spiritual and gnostic side of man and 
reality. Its quality is deliberately visionary. It is also true 
that literature can sometimes serve the same end as history (Nathan, 
1970). They might differ in their, respective concern for exact 
verisimilitude, but literature, albeit fictionally, does, like history, 
attempt to recreate the past. Leopold Bloom was not a real Dubliner, 
but the Dublin that James Joyce created for Bloom to domicile in was 
as faithful a recreation of a Dublin on 10th June, 1904, as it was 
within Joyce's powers of research to recreate. In fact, the novel 
Ulysses is virtually a living museum in words, which, should Dublin 
suddenly vanish from the face of the earth, would enable, at least 
according to Joyce, the city to be rebuilt exactly as it stood on 
'Bloomsday', 1904. 
The arts, then, tend to be spread out over a number of 
epistemologica! domains, and can encompass in their concerns the 
philosophical, the psychological and the historical. On the spectrum 
of knowledge, they have a relatively 'broad wavelength' that can 
extend from the furthest left parts of the spectrum to the right. 
Summary. Most of the conventional areas of knowledge can be 
located somewhere on a continuum which takes as its two end points a 
knowledge that can be demonstrated and refuted, and a knowledge for 
which it is impossible to do either of these two things. For whilst 
it is perhaps not quite wholly true to say that left-hand knowledge 
never proffers demonstrations of its validity, it tends to conveniently 
overlook and ignore counter-instances and refutations of that claimed 
validity (Agassi, 1975, p.221). Left-hand knowledge, then, tends to 
make a speciality of defying falsification; it is very resistant to 
refutation, and transcends the capacity to be scientifically tested. 
And since it tends to eschew the necessity of empirical support for its 
assertions, left-hand knowledge can take for its subject matter worlds 
which are not normally available to experience and observation in the 
conventional sense. It is almost as if another cognised, a 
transcendent cognised, a 'C ', must be invented to accommodate the 
world to which left-hand knowledge frequently claims it has the key to 
knowing. 
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One end of the knowledge spectrum (see Figure 4.1 above), then, is 
formed from thos^ domains of epistemological activity which range over 
man's religious, metaphysical and essentially speculative concerns. 
Its concerns are the very antithesis of those which are dealt with by the 
knowledge found at the opposite end of. the spectrum. For the latter are 
thoroughly rooted in the material world, a world that is open to the 
senses and available to experience and that can be demonstrated to 
exist in man's actual not mystical experiences. It is the world, then, 
that the physical sciences, above all, wrestle with, and try to make 
true statements about. And it is the essential feature of such state-
ments that they remain refutable and falsifiable (Popper, 1974, p.41). 
That is the criterion which demarcates physics from metaphysics, 
speculative from empirical knowledge. All the other modes and divi-" 
sions of knowledge can be located, as is shown Figure 4.1, somewhere 
between them, for the reasons given in this section. Of course, the 
spectrum can only present a most generalized picture of knowledge. 
Whilst, for example, it shows there is often considerable overlap 
between the domains of philosophy and religion, history and philosophy, 
the spectrum does not indicate that philosophy is sometimes concerned 
with the sorts of mental and social problems that psychology and 
sociology often investigate; or that the natural sciences often have 
a strong philosophical element in them. The spectrum, then, only 
shows the approximate relativity of the various forms of knowledge to 
one another. Nor are the divisions in that spectrum necessarily all 
that absolute. For whilst the wavelengths of the colours that comprise 
the optical spectrum can be said to remain fixed, the wavelength of each 
band of knowledge in the spectrum is forever fluctuating as the domain 
of its concerns either expands or contracts. This will become clearer 
in the next section, where the evolution of knowledge will be discussed 
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in terms of the placements of its various forms on the spectrum. 
4.7 THE SPECTRUM AND THE EVOLUTION OF KNOWLEDGE 
The march forward of knowledge has been, up until now, the story 
of a gradual movement towards the right hand side of the knowledge 
spectrum. In the beginning it was myth that tended to tell the story 
of reality, now it is science (Popper, 1976, p.59). And instead of 
peopling the universe with gods and deities, and explaining its 
behaviour in terms of their actions, now man peoples it with atoms 
and molecules. The evolution of knowledge, according to Comte (1970, 
pp.1-2), passed through at least two stages before it developed into 
science. There was firstly the theological or fictitious stage which 
was the beginning of knowledge. During this stage, the activities of 
the universe were ascribed to a series of supernatural agents; it was 
the stage of a mythical interpretation of reality. Immediately 
succeeding it came a stage of knowledge, the metaphysical or abstract 
stage, when the phenomena of reality were explained away in terms of 
an all pervasive "abstract force". It sought out some immanent cause -
which was available to philosophical reasoning - that would explain the 
happenings of the universe. Typical of this approach to the world was 
Plato's; Plato held that beneath the world of sensation and perception 
was a world of ideas and forms. The most elevated form of philosophical 
reasoning, dialéctica, could penetrate and understand this world. With 
the evolution of such metaphysical styles of knowledge there is a move-
ment rightward from theological to philosophical knowledge. 
Commensurate with this move, there is usually an attempt to repress the 
epistemological significance of empirically derived notions. They do 
not gain their sovereignty until knowledge reaches its final state of 
evolution: the stage of science, or what Comte called the "positive 
stage". During that stage - which is the stage that knowledge 
furthest right on the spectrum has reached - the "actual laws of 
phenomena" start with experience arid observation of the world. They 
have their incipience in what is sensorily available. 
The emergence of the modern, autonomous disciplines of science has 
been identified with the period of Newton's Principia (the late 
Seventeenth Century). Bochner (1969) aptly calls this period the "age 
of eclosion". The epistemological fruit born during this period was 
sown in other fields of knowledge. The capacity of science to harvest 
so much more epistemological truth than previous modes of knowledge led 
to them becoming largely defunct. With the coming of science, all 
real epistemological power was transferred "to the nominally Lower House 
of objectively demonstrable assertions" (Agassi, 1975, p.472; Polanyi, 
1962, p.266). Moreover, this power has tended to spread outwards 
from physics to other areas of knowledge, such that it now encompasses 
large sections of the spectrum (see Figure 4,1). As the power of 
belief in religion, and of reason in philosophy, have given way to the 
experimental procedures of science, there has been a progressive 
encroachment upon the territories of knowledge that were once the 
prerogatives of philosophy and religion. As disciplines have 
discovered themselves, under the mentor of scientific method, they 
have tended to declare themselves independent of previous epistemo-
logical liaisons. This, it was noted ^ 2.8, is particularly marked 
in the case of a discipline like philosophy. After the advent of the 
Principia, the physical sciences were the first to break free from its 
methodological influence. With the coming of the autonomous 
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discipline of psychology, the same thing has tended to happen to 
philosophy of mind; and many of the concerns which formerly belonged 
to it, have become embraced by psychology. In the same way, economics 
and political science have also tended to be led out of the *arms* of 
philosophy. Thus, whilst Adam Smith, in the 'arms of philosophy' 
felt he could moralise about the condition of man and his political 
institutions, for Thorstein Veblen those same 'arms' had a deleterious 
effect. Whilst economics and political science were burdened with the 
normative questions that an allegiance to philosophy obligated them to 
raise, they were prevented from becoming fully objective sciences 
(Riesman, 1958, p.70). 
As disciplines have sought to emulate the condition of science, 
there has been an appreciable exodus from philosophy. Its former 
domain has become somewhat diminished. The fastest growing regions 
of the spectrum, then, are at its right-hand end. 
But if philosophy and theolgy have been forced to retreat from 
the foreground of epistemological activity, they are still very much 
in evidence in its background. The insights of natural science, for 
instance, are often painted on a broad scenario that metaphysics 
provides. The superstructure of science has always tended to be 
built on a framework of "fundamental presuppositions, notions, terms, 
methodological judgments and decisions" (Holton, 1967, p.98). 
These have formed the themes around which scientific activity has been 
conducted. In Newton's case, this theme constituted the belief that 
at the heart of the universe was a God, who controlled all the forces 
and the observed order therein. However, in being committed to the 
absolute incorruptibility of that theme, Newton tended to restrict the 
compass of those questions he was willing to ask about the workings of 
the universe, lest their answers should presumably corrupt the theme. 
In a rather different sense, it was a metaphysics that formed the 
backdrop from which Einstein cast his theory of relativity. For 
whilst it is true that the contradictions inherent in the Michelson-
Morley experiment were something of a catalyst in the generation of 
that theory, it is also true that Einstein was led as much to the theory 
by those contradictions, as he was by the speculations about space and 
time in the philosophy of Hume and Mach (Toulmin, 1971, p.26). 
It is possible, then, for a philosophical or religious stance to 
cohabit with one whose character is outwardly scientific and empirical. 
There would appear to remain vestiges of earlier epistemological states 
even in science. Indeed, it could be said that within the divisions 
of the sciences, the spectrum tends to recapitulate itself. Physics, 
for instance, has a speculative polarity where theories might be 
conceptualised on a largely philosophical plane, and another polarity 
where the articulation of theory begins with observation and experi-
ence. Certainly, in the human sciences this recapitulation of the 
spectrum, from speculative philosophy through to empirical science, 
is very much in evidence. Take, for instance, psychology: it ranges 
essentially from the irrefutable, and therefore "metaphysical" 
theories of psychoanalysis (Popper, 1969, p.3A) - which have no 
scientific status whatsoever - to behaviourism, which has representéd 
psychology's most concerted attempt to ape the methodology of science. 
And it was noted ̂  4.6, that much the same sort of left- and right-
handedness of epistemological style prevails in history. 
What is being observed, then, in the spectrum of knowledge is 
something of a 'Chinese box* effect. This effect becomes even more 
pronounced when so-called 'second order' disciplines - those that seek 
to describe or articulate the 'mechanics' of disciplines proper like 
science and so on - are considered. Within them, spectrums within 
spectrums tend to proliferate all over the place. Science is a good 
example. For at the second order level, not only are well 
established areas of philosophy, history and sociology of science to 
be found, but within say something like sociology of science, are 
practised left- and right-handed varieties, which tend to reflect the 
spectral range of knowledge in general (see Figure 4.2 below). 
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One tendency that is evident in some forms of sociology of science 
is the tendency to formulate philosophical generalizations and all 
encompassing theories to explain the social dynamics and behaviour of 
scientists in scientific communities. The work of Merton (1972) would 
be strongly representative of this tendency. At the opposite extreme 
to the approach of Merton, would be that sort of sociology of science 
which seeks empirical evidence for those theories and generalizations 
(Sklair, 1973, p.109 et seq.). It tries to establish whether 
scientists, in actuality, hold the norms and values that Merton has 
prescribed for them; it attempts to go beyond left-handed abstract 
analysis, and discover some right-handed demonstrations of that 
analysis (Nelson, 1974, p.13). 
Within each of the major divisions of knowledge, then, the 
epistemologica! spectrum tends to repeat itself, and goes on repeating 
itself even in second order disciplines. The displacement of 
philosophy as a way of understanding the behaviour of the cognised has 
not let to the relinquishment of the philosophic attitude in science. 
Science still requires a 'left-handed' attitude to answer certain 
queries. Indeed, as will be indicated in the next section, the need 
for this epistemologica! 'left-handedness' becomes more inescapable 
the further one moves away from the physical science domain of the 
spectrum. The reason is not that the knowledge involved is becoming 
progressively closer to philosophy, but rather that the knowledge is 
dealing with a cognised that fosters far more philosophical speculation 
about it than is perhaps needed to understand the sub-organic cognised 
(Cj ), the domain of the physical sciences. 
4.8 COGNITION AND COGNISED 
.In many respects, the capacity of the physical sciences to explain 
the behaviour of some (and 'some' d,s very much the operative word in 
this context) aspects of the universe is not so much a matter of the 
efficacy of scientific methodology as it is a matter of the nature and 
scope of the cognised that the physical sciences elect to investigate. 
For in moving from left to right along the spectrum, there is, with 
each division of knowledge, a progressive 'retrenchment' in the amount 
and diversity of cognised examined. Part of the explanatory success 
of physics and chemistry is that "so much of the wealth of natural 
phenomenon is excluded from their study" (Pantin, 1968, p.5). The 
compass of their concern is limited, and contains comparatively few 
indeterminable variables. And it is because they censor so much of 
the complexity that exists in natural phenomena, that Pantin has called 
physics and chemistry "restricted sciences". 
In moving from the physical to the life sciences the complexity of 
phenomena dealt with increases markedly. No longer are simple 
conglomerates of atoms the subject of investigation. Because their 
components are much broader and more variable in their behavioural 
patterns than those encountered in the sub-organic cognised, it 
becomes much harder to reduce the phenomena of living systems to laws 
and theories. The subject matter of biology, then, is an infinitely 
richer and more abundant source of variability than that encountered 
in the physical sciences. It therefore becomes harder, though not 
impossible, to make laws about the organic cognised. 
In moving to those domains of knowledge, like history and sociology, 
that deal with the phenomena of the supra-organic cognised (C ) -
the realm of man's cultural creations - the restrictions on the 
cognised become even fewer. The complexity of phenomena concerned 
with here tends cor relatively to increase, whilst the capacity to make 
general laws about those phenomena is vitiated accordingly. Of course 
that vitiation has a lot to do with the considerable irregularity of 
the phenomena involved. Ordinarily, as has been noted (see 4.2), 
the explanatory success of knowledge is somewhat contingent on regular 
patterns of behaviour being observable in phenomena in general. If 
they displayed infinite variation, knowledge, of any sort, would 
become impossible (Pantin, 1968, p.32). One of the perennial 
difficulties encountered in history - which prevents it emulating 
physics - is that it tends to deal with events which are unique and 
grossly idiosyncratic. Therefore, it is impossible to expect of 
history the 'clairvoyant' powers that it has been suggested (see 3.4) 
are characteristic of physics. For one thing, the cognised that 
history seeks to explain, embraces many more less determinable 
variables than physics (Belth, 1966, pp.158-159). To open an examination 
on the causes of a historical event is to open a veritable Pandora's 
box of unexplained forces and unpredictable consequences. In the same 
way, social explanation is also prey to innumerable factors that remain 
difficult to circiimscribe in some epistemological formula or other. 
Society is not like a physical field of forces, controlled by a 
'superordinate'. Rather it is built up out of a copious number of 
idiosyncratic actions on the part of individuals. A society is as 
much an exemplification of the accidental as it is of that which has 
been deliberated about and formulated. Society, then, like the 
historical event, is as much agitated into being by unpredictable 
forces, as it is by those which have been planned to occur (Watkins, 
1973, pp.91-92,104). Thus it is more difficult to formulate laws in 
history and sociology than in physics. Therefore, what tend to be 
found in history are not laws, but interpretations. For, given that 
it is impossible to find some dispassionate law that will connect up 
the manifold elements of history in one way, and one way alone, it 
becomes possible for the historian to interpret those 'elements' from 
a multiple number of perspectives. Thus, what counts in history is 
often not the events, but the way the historian chooses to interpret 
them (Carr, 1974, pp.23-24). 
In an equivalent way, psychology is also prone to interpreting 
the same mental and social events differently. This is evident in the 
fact that, by comparison with the physical sciences, psychology is rife 
with different schools of thought. There are behaviouristic 
psychologists, for instance, on the one hand, and hijmanistic psycholo-
gists on the other, and both seek to deny the implications of each 
other's viewpoint on the nature of the mind and mental events. 
Therefore, in order not to misconstrue a psychological insight or 
pronouncement, it becomes important to know whether the psychologist 
making it is speaking as a behaviourist or as a humanist. Whilst 
such sectarianism is not wholly absent in the community of physicists -
there are theoretical and experimental physicists, for instance - it 
never reaches the proportions of significance that are evident in the 
human sciences. This 'sectarianism' might, as Toulmin (1972, pp.391-392) 
asserts, reflect the fact that the human sciences are as yet very 
fledgling disciplines. They have not yet achieved the "theoretical 
compactness" of physics and biology, if indeed this could ever be 
possible, for it is also probably true, as is being asserted here, that 
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the very unrestricted nature of man's behaviour makes it difficult to 
be theoretically compact about that behaviour which, even in vitro, 
often proves to be diffuse, variable, inaccessible and unpredictable. 
It has been claimed (Bochenski, 1968, p.19), that a characteristic 
of Western scientific method is that it endeavours to exclude any 
emotional or subjective colouration that might be introduced into it by 
scientists. Science, thereby, succeeds because its practitioners are 
able to detach themselves entirely from the objects of their observation. 
And whilst there are some, like Polanyi and Grene (see 2.9), who would 
quarrel with this depersonalized picture of science, in terms of degree, 
from what has been said in this section, science remains much more 
objective and depersonalized than say history: which retains, by 
necessity, much more of it anthropomorphic dimension than does science. 
Indeed, in moving from history to science, it could be said that that 
dimension becomes progressively more avoidable and less of a hindrance 
to the pursuit of objectivity. Thus, it is a matter of some 
importance to know whether a historian is speaking as a Marxist or a 
nationalist, since these positions will possibly taint the construction 
he places upon historical events. But with the physicist, the matter 
of his ideological persuasion has less import to the evaluation of his 
physics; for as a discipline, physics is mature enough, by and large, 
to protect itself from such colourations. 
A.9 THE KNOWLEDGE TRIAD 
That it is possible for a cogniser's predispositions to intrude 
upon, and thus 'finger-print* historical knowledge, indicates once 
again the interdependence that the elements in the knowledge process 
constantly have with one another. Of course, it is possible - as has 
been done in this chapter - to isolate those elements and examine them 
independently, as if they were free 'atoms' in the knowledge process; 
but, properly speaking, those atoms are not independent at all, but 
interdependent. One of the objectives of this section, then, will be 
to map that interdependence. 
It was implied ̂  Chapter Two that the knowledge process should 
be properly regarded as a 'triangular relationship'. The beginnings 
of that relationship occur in the kind of perceptual 'dialogue', and 
the associated 'biogrammars' used, which a cogniser engages in to 
become conscious of his surrounds (C^). For, as was noted ̂  3.2, 
it seems that in order to make sense of his surrounds, the cogniser 
must somehow 'budget' his experience of his surrounds to the minimum. 
Unless he does so, he will be overwhelmed by the excess of perceptual 
information to which he is potentially sensitive. 
But the budgeting of 'stimulus reduction' can sometimes go too 
far, so that a cogniser can come to want fresh areas of perceptual 
stimulation (see 3.3). Unless all sorts of malign psychological 
effects are to ensue, he must fetch in from his surrounds new 'inputs' 
that will keep his perceptions alert and attentive. It is from under 
the auspices of this 'stimulus seeking', that knowledge eventually comes 
to emerge. But in effect, knowledge only represents one further mode 
in the budgeting of experience. For it has also been suggested that 
knowledge constitutes just one more manifestation of the urge to reduce 
experience to more manageable proportions. Knowledge, then, represents 
just one further 'précis' of experience. 
However, it is a precis whose syntax and content can serve, in 
quite dramatic ways, to transform the cogniser's vision of the cognised. 
It can cause him to see 'hidden men' in the vast and disparate mosaic 
that is reality; and also to see Eskimoes where others, without his 
knowledge, would only see American Indians. 
Knowledge, then, not only supplies a more spartan and laconic 
'reading' of reality, but also enables 'words' to be read in reality 
which, in the ordinary course of experience, would go unrecognized. 
It has the power to raise to levels of significance aspects of the 
cognised that would normally escape attention. Knowledge is hewn 
ultimately from the cogniser's experience of the world, but when it is 
incorporated back into that experience, it serves to modify the way the 
world is regarded. There occurs, through the consciousness of a 
cogniser, a reciprocity between knowledge and the experience of the 
world. In fact, that reciprocity is the heart and the key to the 
knowledge process. The problem remains of how to represent that 
reciprocity. 
In fact, as analogues of that reciprocity, some of the models of 
linguistic meaning, and the diagrams that have been produced to 
pictorialize them, will do quite adequately. For it turns out that, 
just like knowledge, meaning is also, at least according to one body 
of linguistic opinion, a threefold process.* Analogously, the three 
components of the knowledge process can be represented as Figure 
4.3 below: 
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What Figure 4.3 illustrates is the reciprocity which occurs between 
the components of the knowledge process, as they have so far been 
identified. It can be seen, for instance, that within the overall 
triadic relationship that occurs between a cogniser, his cognition and 
the cognised, there are three associated dyadic conjunctions that also 
* Ogden and Richards* (1936, pp.10-11) model of meaning is representa-
tive. A lengthier and more detailed description of the possible 
analogues, together with other parallels drawn from semiology, that 
are pertinent to an understanding of the epistemological process, is 
given ^ Appendix I, Semiology and epistemology. 
participate in the relationship. Thus, there is what will be called 
the 'a-dyad* sensitivity, or that accxjmulated experience arising from 
being exposed to knowledge (C^)• *a-dyad' sensitivity is registered 
in the way the cogniser regards the world; it constitutes his ability 
to see Eskimoes in the cognised, where others, because of a rather 
different epistemological background, might see American Indians 
instead. The 'a~dyad* is the *plane*, then, along which "theory 
contamination" is ultimately manifested. However, that "contamination" 
does not arise ab ovo. Rather it comes into existence as the cogniser 
assimilates from the cognition domain (C^) the various ideas and 
theories about reality contained within the domain. That assimilation 
occurs along the *b-dyad*. But almost independently of the cogniser, 
the knowledge that exists within the cognition domain, and which 
provides an "interpretative framework" (Polanyi, 1962, p.143) through 
which the cogniser gazes upon the world, forms a nexus with the 
cognised, especially where scientific knowledge is concerned. The 
knowledge, then, in the cognition domain tends to match the observed 
behaviour of reality; and in coming to assimilate that knowledge, the 
cogniser gradually comes to recognise that matching. He recognises 
that its *c-dyad* validity accords with his own 'a-dyad* * reading* of 
reality. 
But assimilating knowledge does not just comprise assimilating a 
'picture*. For in order to become aware of the accuracy with which 
knowledge represents reality, the cogniser must become aware of the way 
a knowledge has come to encode the behaviour of reality. For 
knowledge, like a painting, also has its conventions of perspective, 
light, shade and colour, which, so to speak, govern the way reality is 
depicted in knowledge. And if knowledge is to be seen properly, the 
cogniser must, in addition to the knowledge itself, assimilate these 
conventions.* 
However, the reciprocity that occurs between the elements of the 
knowledge process need not be one of complete and utter parity. The 
elements participating in the process do not always have the same degree 
of significance in the triad; indeed, as will become clearer in the 
next section, they can sometimes serve to override one another. 
4.10 KNOWLEDGE AND THE KNOWLEDGE TRIAD 
The cogniser*s 'posture' towards the cognised can take one of 
three positions. Each of these positions accords a rather different 
status to the epistemological significance of the cognised and 
cognition. And as a result of this, the character of the reciprocity 
that exists between them and the cogniser is subtely different, and 
gives rise to rather different epistemological 'products'. This 
section, then, will consider the different styles of reciprocity, and 
the products they would appear to engender. 
So far, it has only been indicated that the cognised is glanced 
at through the lenses that knowledge is able to supply. But of course 
it is quite possible to shut off the influence that might stem from 
knowledge, and respond purely intuitively to the cognised. Such a 
posture, then, would tend to eschew any obligation to trammel responses 
to the cognised within the conventions of knowledge. It would allow 
"fancy and imagination" complete reign, without any attempt to keep 
them in check within an epistemological framework. This, it has been 
* These conventions will be examined in detail in 5.4. 
argued (Margenau, 1972, p.3), tends in fact to be the procedure of the 
arts. 
Whilst it is perhaps not wholly true that the artist has total 
freedom of expression - there often being the need to contain that 
expression within some artistic form or other - the rigour with which 
the "make believe" of art is subjected to epistemological test is 
certainly a lot less than that encountered in science (Pasmore, 1975, 
p.10). The validity of the *c-dyad' has much less claim upon the 
concerns of art than it does science. Moreover, the aegis of 
objectivity that tends to guide the pursuit of scientific truth, and 
which represses subjective colouration in it, is a much less dominant 
feature in artistic activity. It is almost as if the subjectivity -
that in science would be considered deviant epistemological behaviour -
becomes the very thing which is celebrated in art. Certainly, there 
t 
is very little attempt to exclude it. Yet it is also true, in spite 
of this absence of epistemological constraint, that art does offer 
penetrating and valid insights into the nature of the cognised (see 
4.3). Subjectivity might be autocratic in its domain, but this does 
not prevent some of the expressions of art having a certain amount of 
objective validity. It is perhaps"only that those expressions remain 
essentially inexplicable or otherwise unanswerable to reason or fact. 
The conventional route which leads to scientific truth, and whose 
itinerary can be demonstrated and pointed out, is often not followed in 
art. The normal processes of reason, rationality and logic that 
characterize most forms of knowledge in the cognition domain, are often 
suspended in the case of art. Rather, art represents a manifestation 
of that "intuitional wit" which the Seventeenth Century Spanish 
physician, Juan Haarte, spoke of, and by which means, without art or 
study, surprising and unprecedented knowledge about the world are 
arrived at (Chomsky, 1972, p.9). And it might be, as Bergson (1944, 
pp.167 et seq.) pointed out, that this "intuitional wit" or what he 
preferred to call "instinct", is displaced out of existence by the 
onset of reason and "intelligence". Creative insight of the artistic 
kind, then, could well be fettered by the kinds of rationality that 
exist in the cognition domain. The efflorescences of artistic thought 
that come from creative insight might stop flowering altogether if the 
cogniser allows the cognition domain to influence unduly his outlook on 
the cognised. It might only be by suppressing the influence of the 
cognition domain that artistic activity flourishes. 
If art has tended to work by the repression of cognition, and its 
constraints, there is at least one body of influential philosophical 
belief - rationalism - that opposes any ascriptions of epistemological 
significance to the cognised. For the doctrine of rationalism has 
tended to hold that there is a variety of ubiquitous and absolute truth, 
which, transcending the differences of time and place, becomes 
available to pure reason rather than science. The truths of mathe-
matics and logic are supposedly ava;Llable in this way. They can be 
proved without essential reference to empirical findings; there is no 
need to resort to "observational statements" to support them (Hempel, 
1966, p.l). The cognised (the real world) can be discarded without 
manifestly affecting the capacity to pursue mathematical truths. For 
the empirical constructs that form the foundation of natural science 
tend to be absent in mathematics and logic. They can stand up on their 
own without the cognised. In fact, both mathematics and logic are 
rather expansions of themselves than of the cognised. Once created, 
as systems they tend to release themselves from the real world, and 
concern themselves only with the abstract "structures and forms" and 
relations that lie amongst them. Mathematics and logic tend to 
create the objects of their own discourse, and then keep within the 
confines of that discourse (Lange, 1964, p.50; Polanyi, 1962, pp.184-6) 
As disciplines, then, they tend to talk with themselves, rather than 
with the world. In this sense they are in direct contradistinction to 
the empirical sciences. But like them, the sciences are also repres-
sive. For, as has been noted (see 4.8), the sciences attempt to rid 
themselves of any subjective colouration that might be introduced by 
a cogniser. The ultimate judge of scientific truth, then, is not 
personal feeling or reason, but reality. It supplies the standard 
against which the truths of scientific knowledge are measured. For in 
the sciences, it is important that there should be a demonstrable 
correlation between knowledge and the world as it is experienced. 
t 
Where the two can be shown to be incommensurate, knowledge will be 
considered to be absent. The story of scientific knowledge, then, is 
a matter of improving the match that exists between cognition and the 
cognised. That the match can at all be ameliorated is because science, 
alone amongst the various forms of knowledge, offers the possibility 
of having its truths overthrown by more perspicacious and accurate 
* readings* of experience. For the cognised can not only supply support 
for the validity of cognition, but it can also harbour evidence that 
can be used to testify against that validity. 
With the knowledge triad, then, three different types of recipro-
city would appear to prevail. The first tends to reject the cognition 
domain, and respond to the cognised in a private and self-expressive 
way. Out of that reciprocity would appear to spring the products of 
art. The second type of reciprocity is in a sense no reciprocity at 
all. It tries to repress the cognised altogether and discover the 
'necessary truths' that pervade thinking and rationality; it aims, 
so to speak, for a cognition without a cognised. The third type of 
reciprocity tries to establish a compatible rapport between the 
cognition and the cognised. It seeks in the cognised some formulae 
that will enable the behaviour of the cognised to be explained. 
Scientific knowledge is generated from this third type of reciprocity. 
Scientific knowledge, however, is subject to modification. The 
validity of the 'c-dyad' is by no means absolute or immutable. The 
fact that it is not so introduces another behavioural trait of the 
knowledge triad. 
» 
4.11 CONSONANCE AND DISSONANCE IN THE TRIAD 
Whilst scientific knowledge possesses epistemological character-
istics that are to some extent peculiar to itself, and which are not 
quite so keenly adhered to in some other parts of knowledge, its 
general tendency to establish an objective correlation between itself 
and an aspect of reality appears to remain a perennial theme of 
knowledge in general. What distinguishes scientific knowledge, above 
all, is that it tries to formulate a knowledge that fits the observed 
patterns and behaviour of reality. Other forms of knowledge, as was 
noted in 4.10, either try to overlook any epistemological obligations 
they might have to reality, or in aiming to establish a correlation of 
sorts between themselves and reality, do not bother too much with the 
objectivity of that correlation. For scientific knowledge, however, 
that objectivity is all important. The observations of reality always 
act as a first criterion against which to measure the epistemological 
authenticity of scientific knowledge. Where there are any 
irresolvable discrepancies between the observations of reality and the 
postulated behaviour that knowledge indicates that it should be 
following, there will not be scientific knowledge, only what Polanyi 
(1962, p.123) has called a "logical" or "heuristic gap". The 
progress of scientific knowledge, then, can be regarded as the gradual 
reduction of that gap - the gap between cognition (C^) and cognised (C^^ 
Expressing these general epistemological characteristics of 
scientific knowledge in terms of the triad, it can be said that 
scientific cognition strives to make an integration of cogniser 
experience that most nearly corresponds to the observed facts about the 
cognised. It aims to establish what will be called a state of 
epistemological 'consonance* between the knowledge (C^) and reality 
(Cj) radicals of ,the triad, the *c-dyad*. The establishment of that d 
'consonance' in effect, amounts to narrowing the "heuristic gap". 
In quantitátive terms, this consonance could be expressed as 
numerically lying somewhere on a continuum of values between 0 and 1, 
where '0' corresponds to an absolute and conclusive refutation of the 
C involved, and '1' its absolute confirmation. The nearer the value n 
C approaches 1, the more plausible the scientific explanation n 
involved. The gap between itself (C^) and the cognised (C^) is 
minimal and exhibits considerable consonance. But since a scientific 
proposition can never fully be verified - since an infinite number of 
examples of its verification can never be observed - the value of C^ 
is always and ultimately asymptotic to 1. The more confirming 
instances that are observed, the closer the value of C^ approaches 1. 
Similarly, at the refutation 'end' of the continuum, the value of 
falsified or unverifiable C knowledge is asymptotic to zero. After n 
all, just as it takes an infinite number of examples to confirm the 
irrefutable truth of a scientific proposition, by inference, it should 
take an equal number to finally falsify it. It can be said, then, ' 
that the value of C lies on a scale somewhere between 0 and 1, or: 
n ' 
0 < C < 1 
n 
Thus the value of C^ formed from the proposition "griffins once existed" 
to use a favourite example of Ryle's (1970) - can be regarded as 
tending very close to zero; and presumably will continue to maintain 
that tendency until some paleontological evidence is uncovered in the 
cognised that would corroborate the proposition. The probability of 
that happening on present trends in paleontological evidence is, 
however, increasingly remote, thereby serving only to depress the value 
of C still further. That being so, whilst it cannot be said with 
n 
absolute certainty that 'griffins never existed*, it does seem more 
probable that their existence is a product of man's fantasy rather than 
of his scientific enquiries. 
But though a scientific proposition might initially possess a C^ 
value very close to 1, it does not necessarily follow that this value 
is fixed once and for all. Scientific propositions and the theories 
embodying them, as has been noted, are periodically overthrown when 
empirical evidence gathered from the cognised shows their continued 
tenability to be open to question. When that overthrow occurs, and a 
scientific theory is refuted, the value of C^ reverts to zero, and a 
"heuristic gap" opens up between it and the cognised. Indeed, it is 
their capacity for refutation which is the most salient feature of 
scientific theories. Any knowledge which does not offer the oppor-
tunity of empirical falsification is not, properly speaking, scientific 
knowledge; it belongs instead to that realm of irrefutable knowledge. 
which is metaphysics (Popper, 1969). 
With the possibility that scientific theories are frequently 
subject to refutation and overhaul, it would appear that the 'c-dyad' 
is not permanently in a condition of consonance. When, for instance, 
a theory is being overturned, thus opening up a "heuristic gap" between 
the cognition and the cognised, consonance is displaced. What occurs 
in its stead will be called a state of epistemological 'dissonance*, 
implying simply that the harmony which once prevailed between the 
cognition and cognised radicals of the triad has been temporarily upset, 
In fact, dissonance would appear to be as necessary to the functioning 
of scientific knowledge as consonance. For if consonance was the 
permanent condition of the 'c-dyad*, then, in Popperian terms, the 
knowledge involved would presumably be closed to the possiblity of 
refutation, and therefore be unscientific. It would be of the sort 
"griffins once existed". 
Scientific knowledge undergoes progressive refinement as it 
alternates between the states of consonance and dissonance. For the 
displacement of the dissonance generally means that the degree of 
correlation between C and C , over the replaced C has also been 
n d ' n 
increased. 
If he states it in rather different terms, Kuhn (1973) makes a 
similar kind of assertion about the progress of scientific knowledge 
when he argues that that progress pendulates between phases of 
so-called "revolutionary" and "normal" science. During the former, 
the credibility of a scientific theory (or "paradigm" in Kùhn's 
terminology), is thrown into serious doubt; whilst during normal 
science, that paradigm's credibility undergoes further stringent test, 
and in being so tested, is gradually articulated in those parts of the 
cognised to which it seems to have applicability (Kuhn, 1973, p.23). 
In the nomenclature of this section, then, the practise of normal 
science serves to reinforce the consonance that has already been found 
to prevail between a scientific theory and some aspect of the cognised. 
It makes for greater asymptosy in the value of C^ knowledge; for, in 
adding further corroboration to the validity of the paradigm, the 
'c-dyad' value of the C^ draws closer to unity. Normal science, then, 
sustains and augments the harmony that already exists between the 
cognised and cognition radicals of the triad. 
By contrast with the reinforcing activities of normal science, 
during phases of "revolutionary science" "anomalies" are discovered in 
the articulation of a paradigm. These anomalies serve to weaken the 
accord which previously existed between the cognition and the cognised 
radicals of the triad. In effect, they serve to defy the legislation 
of the paradigm; they represent examples of recalcitrant behaviour in 
the cognised, which a paradigm is unable to predict or manage. The 
perturbation of Mercury was an example of such recalcitrant behaviour 
(see 2.5). When considered solely within the framework of the 
Newtonian paradigm that perturbation was completely anomalous. The 
existing rules established by the paradigm failed in this case. It 
was an instance of the paradigm going "bad" on the scientific community 
(Masterman, 1972, pp.82-83). With the accumulation of such recalcitrant 
behaviour, the tenability of the paradigm eventually collapses 
altogether. And a heuristic gap of unbridgeable proportions opens 
up between the cognition and the cognised. A state of dissonance, in 
effect, prevails between them which persists until a replacement 
paradigm is formulated that is able to accommodate the anomalies evoked 
by the dysfunctional paradigm. In fact, it is when that modulatory 
paradigm - one that restores harmony to the *c-dyad' - is formulated, 
that a "scientific revolution" is bom. 
But before the "change of intellectual clothes" (Toulmin, 1972, 
p.101), that a scientific revolution demands, occurs, there is firstly 
the problem of identifying, then resolving the dissonance that is 
sensed to be apparent along the *c-dyad*. That of course has nothing 
to do with the *c-dyad' itself, but rather the sort of beliefs and 
interpretations that a cogniser bring to bear on that 'c-dyad*. It 
might sound trite to say it, but unless there is a cogniser in the 
triad, the consonance or otherwise of the 'c-dyad* will go, so to speak, 
unheard. For it is only the cogniser who is finally able to judge 
whether the 'dyad* between C and C, is harmonic or discordant, and it ^ n d 
is also only he who possesses the capacity for modulating that 
dissonance. 
* 
But how is that dissonance registered? And once registered, is 
there some psychological mechanism that might explain why the cogniser 
should remain particularly disposed to regulating it? Does for 
instance the state of epistemological dissonance cause such intolerable 
levels of psychological discomfort that cognisers are driven to extreme 
lengths of tenacity and resourcefulness to be rid of it? 
Knowledge, it was argued 3.4, can be regarded as a kind of 
conceptual gestalt. It represents a more integrated and cohesive - if 
more abstract - form of experience. And in likening knowledge to 
gestalts, it was also argued that the gestalts of knowledge also share 
with those of perception the structural qualities of simplicity, 
elegance, bonne forme, unity and so on, if anything to a more marked 
degree than those of perception. When dissonance occurs, however, the 
structural cohesiveness that knowledge tends normally to display 
becomes disrupted and fragmented. The capacity of a paradigm to 
amalgamate disparate elements of the cognised becomes increasingly 
reduced. This happened in the case of Newtonian mechanics with 
Mercury's perturbation. Mercury's behaviour remained outside the 
compass of the Newtonian gestalt. Yet it should not have done so. 
In effect, the failure of the mechanics to deal with Mercury was 
tantamount to pregnanz being lost from the gestalt. It is at stages 
like this, then, that a scientist apprehends dissonance, and has to 
begin living in a world that "is out of joint" (Kuhn, 1973, p.79). 
The need to recover 'c-dyad' harmony, to put the world back into 
epistemological joint, therefore, acts as the psychological motivation 
to a cogniser activity. 
It was also noted ^ 3 . 4 that gestalts in which pregnanz or 
closure is absent - which are not in fact true gestalts - tend to be a 
source of psychological discomfort. It is possible, for instance, to 
demonstrate the heightened states of tension and emotional arousal that 
accompany feelings of structural disunity in a perceptual situation. 
The mind, then, feels distinct unease if it has to confront situations 
where unity and cohesion are absent. They are a source of considerable 
tension for the mind; and it is of note that there would appear to be 
strong drives to reduce such tension. It is of equal note, that when 
such tension is reduced, and a gestalt is produced to combat the feeling 
of disunity, the mind achieves an overriding sense of relief and 
satisfaction, of pleasure and gratification (Kreitler Kreitler, 1972, 
pp.12-13). 
If parallels, then, can be drawn between the perceptual and the 
epistemological circumstances, it seems probable that when a piece of 
knowledge loses its pregnanz, it too is a source of 'mental disturbance' 
and discomfort, which does not cease until a new gestalt is uncovered. 
Certainly, if recovering that pregnanz is seen to be like solving a 
problem, then, according to Wertheimer (1945), there are undoubted 
similarities. For he noted that when a problem is encountered in the 
environment it triggers a mental process that only ceases when the 
solution to the problem has been found. Wertheimer, in fact, sees a 
problem as a structurally incomplete situation. It is a gestalt from 
which the link of pregnanz is missing. The solution to a problem, 
then, supplies that missing link. But what that missing link really 
amounts to is a new gestalt of knowledge that is better able to 
incorporate those elements which a previous gestalt, as it were, 
* locked out* of its compass. It was in this sense that Newtonian 
mechanics locked out of its compass the perturbation of Mercury, which 
in due course led to a structurally imcomplete situation. Initially, 
as was noted 2.5, the first attempts to fill the "heuristic gap" 
were centred on explaining the perturbation in terms of the Newtonian 
gestalt. But whilst all sorts of ingenious explanations were invented 
to accommodate the perturbation in that gestalt, none was ultimately 
satisfactory. There was always some dissonance inherent in those 
explanations that upset the attainment of structural completeness and 
the solution of Mercury's problem. That was because the problem of 
Mercury's perturbation could never be solved within the Newtonian 
gestalt; it required a different gestalt altogether to explain it. 
There had to be a completely new organization and "reconstruction" of 
the fundamentals involved, one which would alter altogether.some of the 
extant generalizations governing the behaviour of those fundamentals 
(Kühn, 1973, p.85). That organization was, of course, forthcoming 
with the advent of the theory of relativity, for within the gestalt 
of relativity it proved possible to accommodate the problem of Mercury's 
perturbation, and thereby modulate the dissonance it had caused. 
To explain Mercury, then, required a fundamentally new way of 
looking at the universe. Since the advent of Newtonian mechanics, 
scientists had grown used to seeing everything in the universe in its 
terms. Because of the considerable causal efficacy of that mechanics, 
scientists had developed a faith in them to the degree that they had 
almost come to believe that they were inviolable (Born, 1962, p.101; 
Capek, 1964, p.xiii; Einstein, 1951, p.21). Scientists had become 
so habituated to assuming that the universe only ever obeyed the rules 
of Newtonian mechanics, that it had become virtually impossible for 
them to break the habit. They were rather like those subjects on 
whom Postman and Bruner (Kuhn, 1973, p.52) conducted their anomalous 
playing card experiments. In an analogous way, as Kuhn points out, 
just as those subjects had not been able to perceive that what they 
were seeing was not a 'red heart' but a 'red spade', because of their 
habitual familiarity with playing cards, so scientists could only ever 
see the universe as a 'red heart'. So that when a 'red spade' in the 
form of Mercury's perturbation, came along, it took them some time to 
see it as such. Their preconceptions had to be jerked out of old 
habits. One set of 'seeing as' theories had to be substituted for 
another. In fact, they had to undergo a complete "gestalt switch". 
To use an analogy cited earlier: they had to see Eskimoes where 
previously they had only seen American Indians. 
To overcome a dissonance and cross a heuristic gap, then, it 
might first be necessary for a cogniser to rid himself of some theory 
that is "contaminating" his view of the world. This was necessary in 
the case of Mercury. However, this is but one possible variety of 
modulation that may occur in the triad; a number of others will be 
examined in the next section. 
4.12 VARIETIES OF MODULATION: SOME EXAMPLES 
With Mercury's perturbation, the paradigm of Newtonian mechanics 
had tended to reach the limits of its extensibility. Henceforth, 
objections, doubts and suspicions began to gather which were eventually 
to undermine the paradigm's supposed inviolability. Dissonance in 
the paradigm, then, tended to erupt slowly as counter-instances in the 
cognised were revealed which proved to be beyond the power of the 
paradigm to accommodate. The incipient collapse of one paradigm, then, 
tended to provide thé circumstances from which another was born. Since 
it is doubt and objection that are the prelude to dissonance, the 
modulation which subsequently brings about that consonance to the 
'c-dyad' which is required when a paradigm is overthrown will be called 
'aporetic' modulation. Not all new knowledge, however, is born by 
devouring an extant paradigm and carrying our aporetic modulation. 
This section in fact will concern itself with other and less drastic 
ways of bringing knowledge into the world; it will also show how these 
ways can be accommodated within the framework of the triad. 
Most scientific activity - that which Kuhn describes as normal 
science - in fact is concerned with merely seeking confirming instances 
that will reinforce the tenability of a paradigm. Calculating another 
physical constant for a chemical compound or element would fall into 
this category of epistemological activity. The methods of calculating 
that constant have been established and have been well authenticated. 
The researcher does not have to invent any radically new methodological 
procedures, or break any new theoretical territory to engage in normal 
science. He merely follows an attested set of procedures that are 
normally used. Yet though his practices might be routine, the 
researcher is modulating a dissonance of a kind. If a physical 
constant for a particular chemical compound remains unknown, then there 
is a "heuristic gap" between that unknown and the cognition domain; 
and that gap - though it might be relatively easy to cross -
constitutes a dissonance. Because the modulation of such dissonance 
tends to supply further evidence demonstrating the incontrovertible 
nature of a paradigm, such modulations will be called 'apodictic' 
modulations. Unlike aporetic modulations, they tend to supply further 
grounds to support rather than refute the empirical credibility of a 
paradigm; they tend further to augment its consonance. 
But it is not always necessary that there should be some paradigm 
or theory to sponsor and guide the gathering of knowledge; for 
sometimes that paradigm does not exist; it has first to be fabricated. 
That is sometimes affected by the patient and painstaking accumulation 
of facts from the cognised, and then hoping that some overall order or 
generality can be discerned JLn those facts. The classical expositions 
of this mode of knowledge gathering are Darwin's theories about 
hereditary (Grene, 1974, p.191; Harré, 1974, p.37). But whilst 
"fact collecting" was an important ingredient in the creation of those 
theories, on its own it did not bring them about. That needed an act 
of "scientific imagination" that was able to produce a "conceptual 
gestalt" that could encompass and give a whole to the sum of all the 
accumulated facts. 
Since knowledge gathered in this way tends initially to follow the 
principles of Baconian induction, the modulation which finally brings 
such knowledge about will be called an * inductive* modulation. What 
it attempts to do is envisage a comprehensive theory that will explain 
all the facts that have been collected about a certain phenomenon in 
the cognised. It is a matter, then, in inductive modulation, of the 
facts coming first, and the theories later. This will become more 
evident in the following example. 
In 2.5, some brief references were made, in another context, about 
how it was the Norwegian explorer, Nansen, came to discover the 
existence of an Arctic Ocean. The route to its discovery, in fact, 
fell into four main stages, beginning with a set of inductive 
observations. These concerned driftwood found off the coast of 
Greenland, in the Denmark Strait. It is perhaps important to note at 
this juncture, since it bears on certain issues to be raised Chapter 
Six, why Nansen's attention should have been aroused to the driftwood 
(a) at all, and (b) in a way quite different from the Eskimoes, who 
saw such driftwood only in functional terms - it being a source of 
wood for their throwing sticks! For Nansen's interest in the drift-
wood was of a different epistemological order altogether. It was 
not situated in the 'ultra-violet' domains of the knowledge spectrum 
(see 4.5), like that of the Eskimoes, but rather in those domains 
occupied by geography and botany. The reason for these grossly 
different reactions to the driftwood - to build on the thesis developed 
in Chapter Two - is related to the rather different 'epistemological' 
emphases in the respective backgrounds of Nansen and the Greenland 
Eskimoes. Trained as a .botanist, Nansen would have been more than 
ordinarily sensitive to the various specimens of the floral world he 
encountered, especially where those specimens proved on initial 
sighting to be so topographically incongruous. For in being able to 
identify the driftwood as belonging to larch and fir, Nansen soon 
realised that of all the places bounded by ice those trees were only 
found in Northern Siberia, a place very remote from the Denmark Strait 
where he had found the driftwood. Since such wood does not normally 
'travel' of its own volition, and continental land masses could be 
regarded as relatively fixed in their positions, Nansen presumed there 
must be something wrong with current theories about the nature of the 
Arctic land mass: that is, that it was simply an extension of Franz 
Josef Land. For the observed fact that pieces of driftwood were being 
regularly transported from Northern Siberia to the Denmark Strait was 
dissonant with the notion that the Arctic was "one continuous track of 
land" (Nansen, 1897, p.15). And since Nansen could be certain of his 
dendrological facts, and since there was also some evidence that the 
mud compacted into the ice seemed also to be of Siberian origin, he 
was forced to conclude that perhaps the Arctic was not a fixed land 
mass at all, but one continuous ocean in which: 
"a current flows at some point between the Pole and Franz 
Josef Land from the Siberian Arctic Sea to the east coast 
of Greenland" (Nansen, 1897, p.24). 
It was on that current, and the ice floes that conveyed it, that the 
(Siberian) driftwood travelled. At least, if that current existed -
and Nansen still had to prove that it did - it would serve to modulate 
the dissonance between the C knowledge that the Arctic is a land mass, 
n 
and certain inductively gained evidence retrieved from the Arctic 
cognised (C^ ), that seemed to contradict that fact. As a postulate, 
then, the hypothesis that there was an Arctic current appeared to 
re-establish the consonance that Nansen felt was absent along the 
'c-dyad'. But in order to verify his hypothesis, so to speak, to 
* sound out* its consonance, he had to demonstrate the existence of 
Arctic drift. This Nansen subsequently did in embarking on a three 
year voyage from Spitzbergen to Greenland, on the very ice floes upon 
which his driftwood has travelled in the first place. That was the 
proof finally required to render the 'c-dyad' harmonic again. 
In a sense, Nansen's discovery of Arctic drift was both an 
inductive and an aporetic modulation. For whilst the evidence he 
gathered from the cognised led to a new theory about Arctic geography, 
in doing so it also challenged an existing theory about it. To that 
extent, the theory was aporetically induced. But it is not always 
the case, as it was with Nansen, that the empirical facts come first, 
and the theory which will accommodate those facts, second. Sometimes, 
as happens in situation of what will be called ^retroductive' 
modulation, the theory comes first, and the facts which will support 
that theory, second. It was in this way that Kepler worked out the 
orbit of Mars (Peirce, 1931, p.31). He started out with a 'law' -
that Mars proceeded around the sun in circular orbit - and then tested 
that law against the evidence. He worked from the cognition radical 
of the triad to the cognised, instead of the other way about, as happens 
in the case of inductive modulation. Eventually, Kepler was forced by 
the evidence to reject the 'law' and enjoined, apparently with great 
reluctance, to accept that the orbit of Mars was elliptical. Thus, 
Kepler was able to work out and predict the positions of the planet as 
it journeyed around the sun. If these predictions corresponded with 
the positions of Mars as they were observed, then his new law was 
consonant with the cognised. 
The need for retroduction modulation, in fact, tends to become much 
more of an imperative where the cognised being dealt with is difficult 
to examine and observe, even with the aid of "sense expanders". 
Obviously with a premium on the number of satisfactory observations 
which can be made, inductive modulation in such circumstances becomes 
a difficult way to generate knowledge. It becomes easier to formulate 
a hypothesis about what the cognised might be like, and to see whether 
in fact observation bears it out. This certainly tends to be the 
procedure of much epistemological activity in the field of "elementary 
particle physics". Thus, the neutrino, for instance, was initially a 
hypothetical construct conceived to account for the apparent lack of 
conservation of energy in beta particle disintegrations. In order to 
do this, it was hypothesized that the neutrino would also have to 
possess certain designatable properties (Hanson, 1969b, p.124). But, 
of course, until such a particle was observed with the properties 
accorded to the neutrino, the *c-dyad* concerned with it would remain 
an unresolved dissonance; and retroductive modulation would remain 
incomplete. 
Retroductive modulation, however, is not always restricted to 
understanding the phenomena of the sub-organic cognised (C^ ). The 
Swiss pioneer of semiotics, Saussure, brought much the same 
methodological technique to bear on the problem of understanding the 
phonemic character of certain archaic languages, phenomena of the 
supra-organic cognised (C ). What Saussure addressed himself to 
in particular was the nature of the "vowel alternation" that must have 
occurrred in the link language that existed between Sanskrit and ancient 
Greek. The trouble was, at the time of Saussure's speculations, 
that link language was not available for its phonemic features to be 
examined and analysed. Retroductive modulation was therefore forced 
upon Saussure. Sanskrit and its descendent, ancient Greek, did 
exist and therefore could be analysed. And by inspecting their 
phonemic features, Saussure postulated that within the link language 
there would be one phoneme which had the property that it "could 
stand alone to form a syllable, like a vowel, but it could also combine 
with another vowel, like a consonant" (Culler, 1976, p.66). Until the 
language containing that phoneme was discovered, however, the dissonance 
or consonance of Saussure*s postulate remained undetermined. In fact, 
some fifty years after Saussure's initial speculations about it, a 
language. Hittite, was found that contained a cuneiform that operated, 
phonetically, exactly as Saussure predicted. Then, and only then, was 
the retroductive modulation finally complete, and a consonance between 
cognition and the cognised attained. 
Where the derivation of scientific knowledge is concerned, the 
resolution of dissonance in the triad, whether managed by aporetic, 
apodictic, retroductive or inductive modes of modulation, ultimately 
centres around securing the sort of empirical evidence from the cognised 
that will support the tenability of the knowledge involved. It is a 
matter of improving the balance between the cognition and cognised 
radicals of the triad. In fact it is by improving that balance that 
scientific knowledge tends to progress. But in other disciplines (see 
4.9), the pursuit of knowledge tends to be less dependent upon creating 
a balanced equation between C^ and C^. Indeed, there is sometimes an 
attempt to repress the pursuit of that equation altogether. So without 
the cognised to monitor the epistemological efficacy or otherwise of 
knowledge contained within these disciplines, how does modulation and 
progress occur within them? That will be examined in the next section. 
4.13 NON-EMPIRICAL MODULATION 
In moving from the left- to the right-hand ends of the knowledge 
spectrum (see 4.6), it has been observed that there is a progressive 
increase in the degree of testability to which the knowledge involved 
can be submitted. Thus, that knowledge on the extreme right of the 
spectrum demands that its truths offer the possibility of demonstration 
in the cognised; whereas that to the extreme left - because"it 
frequently deals with metaphysical realms, realms beyond the world of 
experience - cannot be demonstrated or refuted on empirical grounds at 
all. But of course, and it is somewhat of a paradox, the principal 
varieties of extreme left-hand knowledge - religion and mythological 
knowledge - frequently claim to offer explanations about the nature 
and condition of the empirical cognised. Myths about the origins of 
man and the universe, whilst they might defy the precepts and rules of 
Western logic and science, however, make perfect sense within the 
framework of the culture that upholds them. They only appear dissonant 
when an alien set of epistemologica! criteria, say those of right-handed 
science, are applied to them. Otherwise, as was noted in the case of 
the Azande (see 2.2), given the set of premises and propositions that 
govern mythological thinking in the culture, they appear as consonant 
with the facts of reality as Einstein*s theory of relativity does to 
a modern scientifically literate culture. Yet it is frequently a 
property of left-hand knowledge that it remains unresponsive to its 
epistemological failings. Rather than modify the knowledge itself -
as tends to happen in the right-hand sectors of the spectrum - when 
anomalies are unearthed in the left-hand knowledge, a series of 
"secondary elaborations" are formulated that will excuse these 
anomalies (Horton, 1974, p.162). The central tenets of left-hand 
knowledge tend to be protected from findings that would threaten to 
overthrow them. A taboo tends to be placed on those modes of know-
ledge and that kind of evidence which are incompatible with the 
orthodoxies of left-hand knowledge. It is as though the rhythm of 
consonance and dissonance, that normally generates scientific 
knowledge, is suspended when it comes to left-hand knowledge; and 
that dissonance when it happens, poses no outward threat to the 
knowledge itself. Epistemological activity, then, within the ambit 
of left-hand knowledge tends to be mainly concerned with conserving 
the epistemological status quo; and modulation within it, with 
circumventing and proffering explanations that will parry and counter 
threats to that conservation. 
When it comes to the arts a rather different set of imperatives 
are responsible for generating modulation. Whether art in fact is a 
vehicle for knowledge and truth is a matter of debate, although it was 
asserted ^ 4.6 that certain forms of art do propound quasi-
epistemological propositions - albeit non-testable propositions (Kuhn, 
1974b, p.245). But having said that, art's epistemological 
activities are also diverse and various. It does not appear to take 
any single domain in the cognised as properly its own, but, as was also 
noted in 4.6, art tends to embrace in its dominion religious, 
psychological, social and historical concerns. And although growth 
and development are discernible in the arts, it is not that linear and 
sequential growth that, comparatively speaking, tends to be encountered 
in science (Crane, 1972, pp.26-28). Thus, whilst it is impossible to 
envisage Leverrier's astronomy without Newton's physics, George Eliot's 
novels are not necessarily constructed on the insights into social and 
psychological behaviour that are available in Jane Austen's novels. 
Nor does art seem to involve the kind of knowledge that strips the 
patina from reality and offers visions of it not previously glimpsed 
or known about. The epistemological differences between Shakespeare 
and Ibsen are not of the same order that divide the science of Newton 
and Einstein. For art rarely penetrates new frontiers of 
epistemological awareness. Art is rather a continuous variation on 
a limited set of themes; it has a concentric rather than sequential 
pattern to it; it is constantly returning to perennial subjects, like 
the nature of tragedy and so on (Bell, 1966, p.140). Whereas science 
moves forward conquering unexplored regions, revealing the new 
'inhabitants' that dwell there, art tends to revolve on its axis, 
exploring the same themes it has always explored. 
But yet art does change, very visibly so, and in ways that are 
just as revolutionary as anything found in the sciences. There is a 
world of difference between a painting by Giotto and one by Ingres, and 
more so between the paintings of Leonardo and Picasso. So is it 
possible, as Dryden (1969) postulated in 1669, that just as "natural 
causes" have become better known since the time of Aristotle, that 
poetry and painting and the other arts have also driven closer to 
perfection? But if art's content and subject matter do not change, 
what does it mean to attain that perfection? 
Because pre-Twentieth Century Western art tended to hanker after 
realism, its progress could be explained in quasi-empirical terms. 
Representational painting of the sort Giotto and Ingres executed was, 
after all, only an iconic way of making an equation between the 
cognition and the cognised radicals of the triad. The summit of 
perfection in painting therefore, as Vasari indicated in the Fifteenth 
Century, would be attained with the summit of realism and the exact 
reproduction of nature (Gablik, 1976, p.155). It is possible, then, 
to see the development of painting as simply the attainment of this 
end. Certainly, this has been the approach of Gombrich to the 
problem of explaining the history of painting. Conscious of Popper*s 
theories of scientific development (Gombrich, 1960; Magee, 1972, 
p.228), Gombrich sees the pursuit of likeness and verity in painting 
as a progress story of "error elimination" and "false hypotheses" 
about how that likeness can be more effectively achieved. Development 
in painting, then, like that of science, has had, until quite recently, 
the persistent objective of augmenting the harmony between cognition 
and cognised. It has aimed to make it more consonant. But whilst 
Gombrich does offer a way of accommodating the newer developments into 
his theory of artistic development, the major weakness in his approach 
is that it fails to explain in a convincing way, the course art takes, 
after it is diverted from realism, and goes abstract. Other ways, 
notably Gablik*s (1976), have tried resurrecting a kind of "culture 
epoch" theory to explain this most recent direction in art*s course. 
Gablik, in fact, sees the history of painting as recapitulating the 
stages of Piagetian cognitive development. With the coming of 
abstraction, the history of painting has done no more than move into 
its "formal operations" phase! But whatever the reason for painting, 
and art in general, for taking the various courses it has, plainly, 
since art does not always emulate the sciences, there must be other 
reasons for generating revolutions in it, that, moreover, would tend 
to spring from rather different sources than those that cause paradigm 
collapse in the sciences. For if one of the reasons for paradigm 
collapse in the sciences is the breakdown in the marriage between C^ 
and C^, except when art is decidedly empirical - and that tends to be 
so only in the case of some eras of painting and literature - there 
must be some other stimulus for change in it. If that stimulus can 
be found, then, some clue about how changes occur in the arts might be 
forthcoming. 
The ability to respond to art in a profound and meaningful way, 
just like that required in science, it was noted (see 2.4), is some-
what dependent on "theory contamination". Without an appropriate set 
of theories to augment the perception of art, much^of the meaning, 
symbolism and expression inherent in it will never be discerned. To 
see a painting in all its aesthetic 'colours' needs as practised an eye 
as does the radiologist interpreting an X-ray plate; and what is true 
of painting is equally true of reading a poem or listening to a piece 
of music. Unless the observer of art possesses theories then the 
experience of art will be superficial and impoverished. But, 
paradoxically, it is possible to become over-imbued with theory about 
art. One can have such a comprehensive appreciation of an art, that 
there is nothing new to see in it; art, in such circumstances, can 
have no more surprises. It is a bit like the situation with the 
playing card experiments discussed earlier. And in such a situation, 
art, as Koestler (1964, p.336) has pointed out, soon "loses its emotive 
Impact, its transcendental appeal and aesthetic impact". It becomes 
stagnant and its expressive power becomes blunted. Art becomes a 
"superior entertainment", not a powerful and moving expression of the 
human condition. In Adorno's (1973,pp.33-34) view, this is what 
happened to music in the late Nineteenth Century. Certain harmonies 
were exploited to a degree that their musical possibilities became 
emasculated. They became "impotent clichés" that served only to send 
the sensibility to sleep. No real intelligence or imagination was 
required to appreciate them. 
The way out of this creative cul-de-sac is to confront the world 
with an art form which is a revolutionary departure from orthodoxy. 
This proves to be the only way in which the art world can be awakened 
from its complacency and be made to look at art with a fresh and 
intelligent gaze (Koestler, 1964, p.33). In art, then, consonance 
for any period leads to aesthetic ease and repose, and that is 
ultimately anathema to the vigour of art. If art is not to sink into 
an expressionless torpor, it needs periodic shocks and reforms. The 
forms in which art presents itself need to be renovated and overhauled. 
It is the recognition of this need which is the equivalent to the 
dissonant state encountered in science. And when these renovatory 
forms have been conceived, an artistic dissonance is modulated. Thus, 
in music, as if to repudiate the over exploitation of tonality in the 
Nineteenth Century, one finds composers like Schoenberg and Webern who 
were keen to expand the "limited number of tonal combinations" and 
embrace all the notes of the chromatic scale. What is seen in their 
music is the dethroning of tonality and the renouncement of key modu-
lation, the dominant principles of the Romantic symphony and sonata. 
In their stead came the "emancipation of dissonance" (Schoenberg, 1951, 
p.137), and that offered a range of musical possibilities not 
previously explored in the history of music. 
What serves to generate change in art, then, is not so much a 
refutation of C by C,, but rather modifications in the method for 
n d 
generating C^. The shifts that occur in artistic development are 
modal rather than, in the strict Kuhnian sense of the word, paradigmatic 
It is not so much that the * knowledge' in art is discovered to be 
anomalous or falsifiable, but that the methods for creating that 
knowledge prove, so to speak, anomalous and falsifiable. If, in fact, 
science and art were at all analogous in this respect, then in science 
too there would be periodic and wholesale disillusionment with the 
scientific method, and scientists would become suddenly committed to a 
method that acquitted their epistemological interest more powerfully 
and effectively. But in science, of course, it is the matter of 
knowledge which is subject to review and modification, not the manner 
of generating it. 
These observations about the probable forces engendering change 
in the arts and the sciences respectively, in fact accord with what 
ultimately differentiates an art from a science. For ^ 4.5 it was 
indicated that, in an art, technique is uppermost to epistemological 
content, whereas in a science the reverse situation tends to prevail. 
Thus it would be expected that in art more attention would be given to 
the framework in which epistemological content is presented, rather 
than the content itself. And this tends to be so, for the majority of 
major changes in art tend to be those affecting the method rather than 
the matter of art. That is where the mass of modulation occurs. Now 
whether these methods, these frameworks which guide artistic activity, 
are technically paradigms or not, is another matter. Kuhn (1969) has 
his reservations; some of his disciples much less so. Crane (1972, 
pp.134-138)for instance, sees the "discovery of perspective, Igor 
Stravinsky's bitonality, James Joyce's experiments with words", as 
paradigms that, just as their equivalents in science, serve to orientate 
the outlook and practises of the artistic community as a whole. But 
certainly science and art do have in common the fact that their 
respective developments pass through phases of revolution, wherein a 
paradigm is overthrown and replaced, and phases of normality, when a 
paradigm is simply applied as a matter of course. Where art and 
science differ somewhat is in the matter of what causes the paradigm 
to be communally revoked. For artists seem to find fault with their 
paradigms out of a different sense of revisionist critique than that 
of scientists. Artists tend to quarrel with the methods dictating 
the practises of their discipline, as artists should! Scientists, 
on the other hand, quarrel with the content of their discipline. 
Methodology, because it is of more paramount concern, is more 
ephemeral in art than it is in science, and therefore more subject to 
change. 
4.14 SOME CONCLUSIONS WHICH ANTICIPATE CHAPTER FIVE 
This chapter has shown that the phenomenon of knowledge is 
properly speaking a conjunction between itself, the knower and his 
relation to something called reality. A model of this relationship 
in the triad has been developed. But as far as this study is 
concerned, the triad is only the very beginning of the epistemological 
story. It has been implied, for instance, that in order to perceive 
dissonance in the triad, the cogniser must initially have a commitment 
to the knowledge area involved. But how and under what conditions 
does a cogniser attain that commitment? For plainly not all cognisers 
who may have some measure of that commitment are either capable or 
qualified enough to perceive that, in fact, a paradigm is anomalous or 
dissonant, let alone modulate it. That perception tends to be the 
privilege of those cognisers who are at the "research frontier" of a 
disciplinary community. In the final half of this study, it will be 
argued, that in disciplinary communities different types of cogniser 
can be identified, of whom only a few are trained to recognise and 
modulate dissonances. The other members of the community tend to 
have other, but no less essential, responsibilities in such 
communities. What the remaining two chapters of this study will 
attempt to do, then, is describe and typify these responsibilities 
and show how they, like other aspects of the phenomenon of knowledge, 
can be accommodated within the 'arms' of the knowledge triad. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
THE DISCIPLINARY CONTINUUM AND ADMITTANCE 
INTO DISCIPLINARY COMMUNITIES 
"Learning is but an adjunct to ourself 
And where we are our learning likewise is". 
(Love's Labour Lost, Act IV, Sc.iii) 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Whilst it has been indicated that the knowledge triad produces an 
authentic portrait of the epistemological enterprise, as far as accom-
modating the social profile of knowledge is concerned, it is singularly 
lacking. This could be acceptable if that profile was at all an in-
consequential aspect of knowledge, whose features were only peripher-
ally attached to the functioning of knowledge. But that is not so. 
Of course, the social dimension of knowledge need not form the princi-
pal focus of epistemological attention. Indeed, it can be neglected 
altogether. It is often contended, for instance, that true knowledge 
can be divorced from the social context in which it is formed, and 
that therefore investigation into that context, as far as understand-
ing the logical and conceptual features of knowledge is concerned, is 
quite otiose. But whilst what remains an essentially Platonist view 
of knowledge is venerated in some quarters and still serves to vin-
dicate approaches to knowledge that seal it off from social and 
human considerations, newer ways of examining knowledge tend to re-
gard a wholly de-anthropomorphised and 'de-socialised' account of 
knowledge as a mythical abstraction that has no foundation in the 
actuality of knowledge. 
If not exactly suspended, then, the ethic of a Platonist ap-
proach to knowledge is treated with a degree of healthy circum-
spection. This is because obedience to its principles tends to dis-
guise what are functionally inescapable facts about the condition of 
knowledge. Firstly, there are those facts which emerge from the 
consequences of what is, in the history of epistemology, essentially 
the Humean ethic: that there is "no knowledge without knowers". It 
was the application of that ethic - with its obligation to seek out 
those facets of knowledge which are influenced by man's psychology -
that principally gave birth to the triad. But embodied in the Humean 
ethic is another inescapable fact about knowledge: that it is pre-
eminently a social activity (Ziman, 1968, p.8; Storer, 1966, p.75). 
Paradoxically, it is precisely to prevent degeneracy into the distor-
tions of anthropomorphism and to uphold the tenor of its objectivity, 
that the whole phenomenon of knowledge is contracted to having the 
social dimension that the Platonist would have epistemology deny. For 
in order to achieve the Platonic ideal of a knowledge untainted by 
human prejudice, there must be somewhere within its framework a norm-
ative order of some kind that will permit the effects of subjectivity 
and speciousness to be isolated. That normative order, as will be 
shown in Chapter Six, exists principally in the social arena of know-
ledge. It is possible, then, to speak, as Merton (1972, p.67) does, 
of knowledge being a rational or conceptual system which is constrained 
by a social envelope of consensual standards. These standards form the 
'moral code' of a knowledge community, and it is how each respective 
community and its members come to submit themselves to that code that 
will represent one of the main themes of this, and the next chapter. 
At the end of Chapter Four, it was indicated that advancing the 
frontier of knowledge represented, in terms of the triad, modulation of 
'c-dyad*dissonance. But in order to perceive that dissonance, the cog-
niser must first have acquired an epistemological sensitivity capable 
of alerting him to any discord that there might be between established 
knowledge and the behaviour of the cognised. That sensitivity, it has 
been argued, arises as the cumulative effect of being exposed to know-
ledge. For knowledge serves to transform a cogniser's outlook and am-
plify aspects of the cognised vhich normally lie outside the compass 
of ordinary sensitivity. Or if they do not, then their epistemological 
significance remains unregistered. There are, however, more elements 
to epistemological sensitivity than there are in a transformed vision 
of the world, for knowledge itself represents more than Just a pre-
scription for looking. There is, for instance, what has just been 
referred to as the *moral code* of knowledge, to which the various 
transmutations of looking must be answerable if they are not to be 
considered deviant. That code, then, serves to trammel a cogniser's 
conduct, and make it conform to patterns that are considered acceptable 
in the knowledge community as a whole. Then there are the various 
publicly accredited ways of transmuting the experience of looking into 
knowledge. They also constitute a major zone in the complexion of 
epistemological sensitivity which must be mastered if the cogniser is 
to develop the capacity to modulate dissonance and create new know-
ledge . 
It can be said, then, that what Ayer (19T2, p.33) has called the 
"accredited routes to knowledge" take in, as part of their itinerary, 
(a) a perceptual sensitivity, (b) a communally defined 'moral code' 
and (c) a repertory of epistemological knacks for processing experience. 
And whilst, in this study, it has repeatedly been stated that the 
route to acquiring these elements of an epistemological sensitivity 
travels via education, the description of the 'journey' involved has, 
at best, only been cursory. It remains another of the objectives 
of this chapter, then, to compensate for this by supplying a detailed 
acount of the sorts of 'obstacles' and 'landmarks' the cogniser 
encounters in education as he progressively makes 
his way to the research frontier of knowledge. 
5.2 THE STYLES OF EPISTEMOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY 
Whilst it will be argued that disciplinary communities require 
new knowledge, and, therefore cognisers to produce that knowledge, not 
all cognisers need be in the business of modulating dissonance in order 
to serve in those communities. Similarly, it is possible for cognisers 
to exist outside of disciplinary communities altogether, and still be 
profoundly sensitive to knowledge. Thus, the cogniser whose responsi-
bility revolves around gathering new knowledge, and who requires for 
the purpose an 'acquisitive sensitivity', represents only one type of 
cogniser. Another cogniser on whom the existence of the disciplinary 
community depends is the type who possesses the 'educative sensitivity' 
required for transmitting knowledge and all its associated features. 
Teachers, who in the main possess this sensitivity, then, are alert to 
the problems of communicating, rather than acquiring knowledge. They 
have been trained and equipped with the means of transferring knowledge 
from one generation of cognisers to the next. But teachers not only 
transfer knowledge to those who will subsequently become bona fide 
members of disciplinary communities, they also cultivate in some cog-
nisers a purely 'appreciative' sensitivity towards knowledge. 
There is, then, an element of duplicity in education's subserv-
ience to the knowledge ideal. Firstly, there is the functional obli-
gation to manage the training of those cognisers who will eventually 
give service in the various disciplinary communities. In the past. 
this training tended, in a rather laissez-faire manner, to occur out-
side the framework of educational institutions.* Today, however, it 
is difficult to secure admittance into disciplinary communities, and 
gain recognition therein, without the credentials that educational 
institutions award. That being the case, since the numbers who ex-
perience education are great, and the numbers who eventually become 
professionally employed in the "knowledge industries" are comparatively 
small, it could well be argued that perhaps education should re-examine 
its epistemological *idol', and select one that accords much more with 
the needs of the majority. But if education's instrumental end of 
serving the needs of knowledge communities disproportionately favours 
the minority, that argument is often countered by imparting benefits 
to knowledge that can be taken advantage of by the majority. And it is 
at this juncture that education's functional idolisation of knowledge 
fuses with certain melioristic ends that attach to knowledge the power 
to develop understanding and reason in all, and not just the minority. 
Since these things are held to be desirable in themselves, in that 
what makes man essentially man is the pursuit of rationality and truth, 
education's allegiance to knowledge is doubly reinforced. Thus, the 
assumption that it is knowledge which has the capacity to make man 
* Although the natural sciences have been extant for several centuries, 
it is only in the last hundred years or so that they have achieved 
some measure of academic representation in universities and schools. 
Whilst the early universities, like Bologna and Paris (but not 
Oxford and Leipzig), did of course have, their chairs of science, in 
the case of Bologna since the Fifteenth Century, they were never 
considered to be as academically respectable as other disciplines. 
In fact it was not until the mid-Nineteenth Century that the edu-
cational networks and bureaucracies that now form the context in 
which the training and practise of scientific researchers occurs, 
were established. That first occurred in Germany. There, models 
of scientific education were developed, which, having a previously 
unknown educational effectiveness, soon became the pattern for 
universities outside Germany to follow (Ben-David, 1971). 
a more reasonable creature has often been used to vindicate an educat-
ion which takes knowledge as its centre of gravity.* 
But aside from all the existential benefits that are said to 
accrue from acquiring knowledge, its dominant presence in education is 
often defended on A m o l d i a n grounds: that knowledge represents one of 
those excellencies of our culture to which people ought to be intro-
duced. The principal purpose of education, according to this view, 
is to foster, lest it be silenced, a "conversation" with the various 
achievements of human civilization (Oakeshott, 1967, p.199; 1973, 
p.170). That is because in order to participate in that conversation, 
the cogniser must first master its syntax and grammar. This mastery 
does not arise in a vacuum, but requires implantation. Education has 
evolved to carry out that implantation over all parts of the knowledge 
spectrum. For it is true of both the arts and the sciences, at even 
the level of 'appreciative sensitivity', that substantial training and 
epistemological background are required if their significance is to 
be fully registered. In connection with science, this, it has been 
noted, has often been pointed out by Hanson (1969a, 1969b). It seems 
an educated vision is absolutely essential if the full repercussions of 
scientific theories and laws are to be appreciated. And what is true 
of their appreciation, as was noted m 2.6, appears to be equally true 
of paintings, poems and pieces of music. A set of educated precon-
ceptions and expectations is a vital part of deciphering an artist's 
* This is the stance taken particularly by R.S. Peters and his 
followers, who have made a virtual cult of reason and its develop-
ment. Quite legitimately, it has been asked (Watt, 1976), however, 
whether there are not more sides to a man's psyche than reason; and 
that if education takes as its sole centre of gravity only those 
forms of knowledge in which reason resides, might not these aspects 
of the psyche be inhibited from developing to their full potential? 
* cryptograms'. Unless they are present in the cogniser, that is all 
art will remain, an unrecognisable cryptogram. Thus, the concept of 
an aesthetic tabula rasa, devoid of preliminary predispositions to art, 
is a contradiction in terms; for art is only ever appreciated via the 
mechanics of an educated vision. 
It would seem, then, that if education does serve the knowledge 
ideal on the functional grounds that no other institution in society 
currently manages the training of personnel for the disciplinary 
communities, then that function can also be justified on normative 
grounds; that a broad general education in the major areas of knowledge 
is in any case good for humanity. Knowledge not only makes scholars, 
but is the key to becoming a better person as well (Frye, 1967, p.75; 
Langford, 1973, p.14). This, combined with the fact that much the same 
kind of initial epistemological background is required to appreciate 
knowledge as is needed to communicate or acquire it, would suggest that 
education's current allegiance to knowledge is no more than the 'killing 
of two epistemological birds with the same institutional stone'. Edu-
cation, then, serves the dual function (a) of preparing cognisers to 
do service in disciplinary communities as, amongst other roles, teach-
ers and researchers and (b) of transforming the mental outlook of 
others, who, although they will not serve in such communities, will 
have the capacity to appreciate knowledge long after they have left 
school and university. Of these two functions, this chapter will 
essentially be concerned with the first, and how it is that disciplin-
ary communities come to recruit cognisers to their service. 
5.3 THE DISCIPLINES AND THE NATURE OF ORDERLY EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONDUCT 
So far, the transformative effects of knowledge on cognisers have 
been considered primarily from the perspective of the kinds of per-
ceptual ramifications they have on the outlook of cognisers. It has 
been suggested, for instance, that knowledge serves to amplify the 
power of the cogniser's senses, allowing him to perceive aspects of 
reality that otherwise would remain unperceived. But this amplific-
ation does not involve any artificial modification of the mind's 
powers; for the transformation in outlook that knowledge engenders 
merely channels what comes naturally to the mind anyway. It directs 
to epistemological quarters what the mind normally does in its in-
formal encounters with 'reality'. And just as certain kinds of 
language and topography serve to exaggerate perceptual sensitivity in 
directions that others do not, so certain knowledge amasses in the 
cogniser awarenesses and expectations about the behaviour of reality 
that those lacking that knowledge are denied. Knowledge, then, ex-
ploits that capacity of man to construct from his experience of 
reality a reliable set of predictions about the world and its behaviour, 
In such terms, knowledge is no more than a sophisticated manifestation 
of what was described earlier as one of the fundamental necessities 
of animal life, the "propriorceptive act". 
But as was also noted earlier (see 5.1), knowledge is more than 
just a mode of looking. It might serve to transform outlook; left at 
that, however, that is all it remains; an outlook. For knowledge also 
consists of a repertoire of procedures for integrating that outlook. 
Knowledge, in fact, arises from what is done to the outlook, it is 
not synonymous with it. Reorientation of attention, then, on its own, 
would only allow the cogniser to perceive knowledge, not formulate it. 
That only comes about when what is perceived is converted into terms 
that can be accommodated by the various epistemological procedures for 
dealing with experience. Bringing about that conversion involves 
conceptual rather than perceptual aspects of knowledge. 
Admittance info a disciplinary community involves transformation 
on both epistemological planes: the perceptual and the conceptual. 
Knowledge, then, not only promotes a mode of looking, but a set of 
methodologies that will enable that looking to be converted into 
knowledge. 
Before embarking on any knowledge training the cogniser lacks any 
of the requisite sensitivity needed to become a member of a disciplin-
ary community. He will have an 'a-dyad* outlook on the world, but it 
will be one that is neither circumscribed nor specialised enough to 
be compatible with that outlook of a disciplinary community. But as 
a cogniser undergoes training, his epistemological sensitivity gradu-
ally comes to conform with that of the community as a whole. 
The notion that epistemological training serves to trammel cog-
nitive behaviour is implicit in the etymology and current usage of 
the word 'discipline*, as are other pertinent notions about knowledge 
activity. To these. Hirst and Peters (1970, p.125), have drawn par-
ticular attention. The notion, for instance, that a *discipline* im-
poses cognitive constraints evokes analogies with the behavioural 
connotations in the infinitive case of the word 'discipline*. For 'to 
discipline' is to bring to order or to achieve some measure of control 
within the parameters of a defined set of constraints. This entails 
the introduction of a degree of order that otherwise would be absent. 
Discipline, then, in the behavioural rather than the epistemological 
sense, carries with it associations that link the establishment and 
maintenance of order to rules and regulations, designed to delimit be-
haviour. Co-incidentally, this is not an inappropriate description of 
knowledge, for it also comprises a set of rules and prescriptions, 
which allow both experience to be organised and epistemological con-
duct to be controlled.* The epistemological and behavioural senses 
of the word 'discipline', then, are close allies. 
There is another sense, this time springing from its etymology, in 
which the word 'discipline' is apposite. The notion that a discipline 
is essentially "a body of subject matter that is teachable" (Walton, 
1963, p.5), with the accent on "teachable", is reinforced by the fact 
that discipline shares a root with the Latin word discipulus, meaning 
pupil or student. What this tends to emphasise is that the intelligent, 
'law abiding' behaviour that is a mark of the epistemologically disci-
plined cogniser, does not arise of its own accord, but emerges out of 
the slow accretion of knowledge. Moreover, those experiences - and 
this is where the etymology of discipline shows its appositeness -
are carefully managed by teachers, who ensure that a student - the 
discipulus - not only acquires the substantive content of a discipline, 
but also those rules and regulations that are a feature of its norm-
ative structure. 
Admittance to a disciplinary community, then, is carefully con-
trolled. The passage from discipulus to 'disciplinarian' - achieved 
* It is also interesting to note in this connection that 'discipline' 
shares similarities in its connotations with the archaic sense of 
the word 'art'. The medieval philosopher, John of Salisbury 
(McGarry, 1955, p.36) pointed this out when he noted that 'art' 
stems from the Greek word 'artant', meaning to delimit by rules 
and precepts. 
when the former can dispense with his teacher (Peters, 1963, p . 18) 
and practise a discipline autonomously - is full of sanctioning 
procedures, designed to ensure that the student acquires an epistemo-
logical outlook that is compatible with the disciplinary community at 
large. This passage makes for epistemological conformity, rather than 
deviancy. 
Two things, then, have emerged from this discussion of the word 
'discipline*. Firstly, there is the notion that a discipline comprises 
a set of prescriptions which legitimate certain sorts of epistemo-
logical behaviour, and legislate against others. Secondly, there is 
the notion, implicit in the word's etymology, that that behaviour is 
transferred principally in the student-teacher relationship. What 
has still to be described are (a) the sorts of rules which character-
ise epistemological behaviour and (b) the nature of the passage, and 
the sanctions therein, that mark the transition from discipulus to 
disciplinarian. 
5.4 THE TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR OF KNOWLEDGE 
The epistemological structure of a discipline is framed from a 
collection of specific facts, theories and laws that arise from the 
application of a repertoire of methodologies needed to make sense of 
the 'raw material' of experience. These methodologies of knowledge 
remain antecedent to the production of its substantive content. Thus, 
in terms of a basic epistemological distinction made by Ryle (1970, 
p.28), it is possible to "know that" Boyle's law states that the 
pressure of a fixed mass of gas at constant temperature is inversely 
proportional to its volume, but it is another matter "knowing how" to 
formulate that law. In disciplines, then, there are "facts" which 
constitute the discipline's substantive content, and also "knacks" 
by which that content comes to be extracted from experience; and it 
is the latter which permit the formulation of things like Boyle's 
law. 
Another way of looking at the epistemological structure of a 
discipline is to draw an analogy between it and language. Using 
language, for instance, it is possible to articulate a large number 
of statements about the world. In order, to make sense, however, 
those statements must observe the rules and regulations that govern 
the construction of sentences and the use of words in a particular 
language. In fact, as Wittgenstein (1972, p.7e) pointed out, there 
are clear analogies between using language and playing a game. They 
both depend, to a degree, on following a code of rules; and in as 
much as knowledge is also constrained by sets of rules, it too can be 
regarded as sharing features with games. For to obtain results 
from a 'knowledge game', the players in it, just as in any other game 
- sporting or language- must also agree to abide by the rules that 
govern epistemological play. And so, just as cricket is not cricket 
if it is played to the rules of football, so neither is history 
history when played to the rules of chemistry. Games, then demand 
conformity to, not contravention of the rules that preside over what 
is acceptable and non-acceptable play. Deviancy is not permitted, and 
sanctions and penalties are imposed on those players who constantly 
break the rules; for to do so is to sabotage the progress of the game. 
The game metaphor, as it applies to knowledge, suggests that the 
transition from discipulus to disciplinarian, in part, amounts to learn-
ing the rules of the knowledge game that govern a discipline. As will 
become clearer (see 5.7), it is the function of the teacher - and he, 
after all, manages that transition - to ensure that the discipulus 
displays both a willingness and an ability to play the 'knowledge 
game*; or if he displays a recidivistic defiance of the game's rules, 
his admittance into the disciplinary community is to be prevented. 
Part of the transforming process of a disciplinary system, then, is 
devoted to modifying any recalcitrant behaviour that might be exhibited 
by student cognisers. 
But there is yet another characteristic of games, for which 
analogies also can be found in epistemological contexts. It is that 
games do not have one overriding characteristic common to them all, 
but rather that they share certain "family resemblances" which form a 
complicated network of similarities, sometimes overall, sometimes only 
in detail (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.67). For instance, it has often been 
posited that the epistemological structure of a discipline, and the 
knowledge game it often forms a panoply for, displays a great deal of 
systemic unity. It is a structure that appears to strive after a 
holistic rather than a discrete organization of its parts. Indeed, 
according to Kant (1969, p.471), Cicero (1967, Book I, xl,186-189)and 
Hugh of St Victor (Taylor, 1961, p.82), the family similarity of dis-
ciplines is that they all communicate a unity to things which are nor-
mally disconnected and sundered. They supply the means - identified 
by Kant as the "architectonic" - of welding into some solid, coherent 
epistemological framework things which are ordinarily discrepant with 
one another and in a "rhapsodic" state, to use Kant's happy word. 
Disciplines, then, provide the basis for encapsulating and accommodat-
ing components of the epistemological process that otherwise would 
exist only in a condition of separateness from one another; and. 
because of this separateness and discreteness, could not, on their 
own, constitute autonomous disciplines. Thus, as Hugh argued, "in-
vention" and "judgement" did not exist as independent disciplines, in 
their ovm right, but instead were subsumed in the discipline of "argu-
mentative logic". 
Some considerable degree of corporate unity, then, is a distingu-
ishing feature of disciplines. It is of note, in this connection, that 
an observation frequently made about burgeoning disciplines is that 
unity is an attribute which is often foreign to them. They lack the 
sort of "architectonic" which would communicate a coalescence to their 
parts and diminish any lack, of unity in them. Thus, Morris (1946, 
p.188) noted in the 1940*s that whilst the relatively new discipline 
of Semiotics had developed a "language to talk about signs", it was 
not sufficiently evolved to unify that talk and make laws about sign 
phenomena. It was a discipline still in what Huxley (Holyroyd, 1972, 
p.48) called the "natural history" phase of its development. As such, 
its epistemological development had not reached the level of more 
mature disciplines, like the physical sciences; for unlike them. 
Semiotics did not possess the * grammar* which permitted generaliza-
tions and predictions to be made about the cognised. It was a dis-
cipline, then, which although it had a lexicon to annotate the cognised, 
could not form sentences from that lexicon. 
It is for much the same reason that "art history" has also been 
seen as a discipline that has yet to get beyond the "natural history" 
phase. As a discipline, it has perfected the art of giving names and 
addresses to what Berenson called "homeless paintings", but, according 
to Rosenberg (Walker and Walker, 1975, p.87), any "formal analysis" 
that goes beyond 'lexicography' is absent. Like Semiotics in 1946, art 
history is a discipline still in search of an architectonic. 
Thus one "family resemblance" that has, in the past, been attri-
buted to disciplines, namely unity, does not appear to be all that 
pervasive. This is particularly true where new and * immature* dis-
ciplines are concerned. What appears to be more pervasive, in that it 
is also found in * immature* disciplines, is that they all appear to 
have as their foundation a basic vocabulary of fundamental concepts 
and terms upon whose existence the discipline is wholly contingent. 
Hirst (1968,pp.128-129) who, along with a number of other writers (Gow-
in, 1970, Schwab, 1971; Toulmin, 1972; King a ^ Brownell, 1966) has 
attempted to identify the fundamental features of a discipline, sugg-
ests, for instance, that concepts like gravity and acceleration in the 
sciences, God in religious knowledge, number, integral and matrix in 
mathematics, are peculiar to these respective "public forms of know-
ledge". They constitute the constellation of basic presuppositions 
upon which the discipline's existence rests. When a new discipline is 
being brought into existence, it is these presuppositions that are con-
ceived first; for it is they which supply the means of classifying and 
ordering that cognised with which the discipline will be vitally con-
cerned. Whilst it remains essentially preoccupied with 'baptising* 
the cognised, the discipline will remain in a pre-synthesis condition. 
Once it advances beyond that stage, however, and tries to make general-
izations about the cognised, the discipline will often proliferate sub-
specialities concerned with taxonomy and the gathering of raw data. 
The taxonomical sciences in biology are a case in point, as are the 
various "auxiliary sciences" of history, like archaeology, epigraphy 
and chronology, which supply the historian with facts he will try and 
integrate (Carr, 1974, p.11). 
But neither names nor facts speak for themselves. Part of the art 
of the historian is in some measure ventriloquial; he puts his words 
into the mouth of facts (Carr, 1974, p.11). He forms 'sentences* from 
the raw facts that are presented to him by the auxiliary sciences of 
history, and with these sentences he hopes to explain how it is certain 
historical events came about. The physicist or, for that matter, any 
other disciplinarian, employs much the same sort of strategy; initially 
they ask the question why and answer it by making plausible connections 
between the raw facts about the cognised they have at their disposal. 
In fact, this proclivity to synthesize, to unify, to "form networks of 
possible relationships", or to establish what amounts to conceptual 
and logical connections between the basic vocabulary of the discipline, 
represents a second feature of "public forms of knowledge" (Hirst, 1968, 
p. 129). This is what Hugh (vide supra) obviously had in mind when he 
suggested that argumentative logic was an independent discipline be-
cause it formed a canopy for discrete logical activities like judge-
ment and invention. In the same way such encapsulations are observ-
able in physics. For instance, the laws of motion establish a 
network of relationships between fundamental concepts like mass, 
space and time. Nor is this syncretic property of discipline necess-
arily restricted to those areas of knowledge at the right-hand end of 
the spectrum (see 4.6). For instance, in religious knowledge there are 
strong conceptual connections between the notion of original sin and 
redemption; and in music too there are similar sorts of syncretic 
connections. As Cicero (1967, Book I, xl,186-189)pointed out, the 
phenomena of "rhythm, sounds and measures" are all interconnected. 
Another feature attributed to the public forms of knowledge is 
that they have distinctive ways of testing their epistemological 
statements against experience (Hirst, 1968, p.129). This was noted 
when the knowledge spectrum was discussed (see 4.6). It was observed 
for example that in progressing from the left- to the right-hand ends 
of the knowledge spectrum the demand increases for empirical valida-
tion. Whilst this is not a criterion wholly absent from left-hand 
knowledge,* the more common means of corroboration is via an act of 
faith or divine revelation. 
Then there are the half-way-house disciplines which are increas-
ingly trying to ape the physical sciences, but which, because of the 
subject matter they take as their cognised, namely man, often find it 
difficult to produce empirical pronouncements that quite match the 
epistemological efficacy of genuine scientific statements (see 4.8). 
It seems they are left with an unavoidable philosophical strand which 
serves to redress their unscientific character. 
But there are more criteria for checking the legitimacy of know-
ledge than merely, as in science, checking such knowledge against the 
observed behaviour of reality. It is a fundamental part of the logic 
of scientific knowledge to establish a symmetrical relationship between 
the two. There are other constraints, however, on scientific knowledge 
apart from this, and which are also designed to prevent the production 
of deviant knowledge. There is, in addition to the logic of a 
* Since the Seventeenth Century, when scientific knowledge began un-
veiling an uncanny and bespoke order in the universe, religion has 
tended to draw comfort from what was a very convenient extrapola-
tion: that only a divine, omnipotent being could be the architect of 
such order. Not that scientists were totally immune to this pro-
posal themselves. Newton, who did so much to launch m o d e m science 
into being, was committed to believing that science should support 
not negate the tenets of religion. In fact Holton (1967, p.94) has 
noted how this inmixing of left-hand metaphysic with right-hand 
knowledge was instrumental, in Newton's case, in inhibiting certain 
insights he might otherwise have had. (See also 4.7). 
particular area of knowledge, what could be called its 'moral code*. 
All disciplinarians and other members of a knowledge community must 
observe this code in their conduct with knowledge. Of course in 
some disciplines this moral code is more pervasive and restrictive than 
in others. Science is again a case in point, for its moral code can 
be very delimiting on epistemological behaviour. But however limiting, 
this code and the norms which it embraces, again serves to order con-
duct and reduce the possibility of exercising absolute epistemological 
freedom. 
There is, then, within a disciplinary community like science, not 
only a consensus methodology, which scientists more or less employ to 
process their experiences of reality, but also a set of standards which 
it is assumed scientists will observe in their treatment and evaluation 
of scientific knowledge. There is a set of what Merton (1972, pp.66-8) 
has called "institutional imperatives" which, in their advancement of 
"certified knowledge", men of science are bound to observe and expected 
not to contravene. Loyalty to these overriding principles leads to the 
maintenance of scientific standards, and the prevention of deviant 
knowledge entering the repository of certified knowledge. And whilst 
at times these standards - "universalism, communism, disinterested-
ness, organised skepticism" (Merton, 1972) have sometimes been flouted, 
as in the Velikovsky affair for instance (Polanyi, 1967, p.74; Mulkay, 
1969, p.131); and whilst there is also a certain amount of evidence 
to suggest that scientists, in actuality, do not adhere as rigorously 
to the Mertonian norms as the theory would impute (Sklair, 1973, 
pp.151-152)the general notion that science obligates its practitioners 
to follow a certain code of practice would suggest that the acquisit-
ion of scientific outlook is partly synonymous with the acquisition 
of a set of acceptable behavioural patterns. Whether this is true to 
the same degree of other disciplines - that there are within them 
equivalent Mertonian norms to be acquired - is debatable. What seems 
more certain is that the general values of science do exist in other 
disciplines, but in a mollified and less rigorous form, and most 
significantly, to a less pervasive degree. The human sciences, for 
instance, are very prone to sectarianism. There is not a compact body 
of values which all human scientists appear to accept and submit them-
selves to; instead, values vary from sect to sect, faction to faction, 
according to the general epistemological policy that each sect or 
faction chooses to uphold (Toulmin, 1972, pp.391-392). 
But it would be wrong to infer that because a discipline's 
logical and normative structures have been articulated and made ex-
plicit, that would-be disciplinarians - the discipuli - simply 
assimilate such and are able to practise the discipline without more 
ado! That is not the case at all. For one thing, although a Merton 
or a Hirst might have descried various principles operant in each of 
the major disciplines, discipuli are not compelled to study them 
overtly as a preparation for admittance into disciplinary communities. 
That is because the actual genesis of scientific knowledge does not al-
ways follow the path accorded to it by logic. A background in philo-
sophy or sociology of science, then, need not necessarily ameliorate 
the practice of actual scientific research (Scheffler, 1973, p.35; 
Medawar, 1970, p.9). This raises the question, then, of how it is the 
discipulus secures, if they are not spelt out to him overtly, the logic 
and standards of disciplinary practice. But before investigating that 
question, it needs to be asked whether there are not more things to a 
discipline than that which its logical and normative structure serves 
to encapsulate. And if there are, might this justify why merely 
spelling out overtly the canons and norms of disciplinary practise 
does not alone constitute the required background for advancing the 
frontiers of knowledge? 
In discussing the processes of taxonomical identification, Pantin 
(1969, p.109) differentiated the style of procedure adopted in the 
field from that used in the laboratory. He noted how the taxonomy of 
worms in the latter case tended to follow the routine, logical course, 
as spelt out in taxonomy handbooks, of classifying the internal anatomy 
of the worms against some paradigm species, in this case Rhyncodemus 
bilineatus. Yet in the field, Pantin was able to achieve much the 
same classification by a process he called "spontaneous illation". 
The worms were instantly recognisable as Rhyncodemus bilineatus, 
without any need to analyse the intricacies of their anatomy. Pantin 
attributed this capacity of his to the accumulated result of a long 
series of biological experiences, "unconscious as well as conscious". 
It was not solely due to the techniques and procedures learnt from 
taxonomy handbooks. 
Pantin's experience, then, would suggest that indeed there are 
more sides to knowledge than those substantive, logical and normative 
features which have been delineated thus far. Indeed, the tenor of 
Pantin*s remarks would indicate that there might be some epistemo-
logical features of knowledge which transcend explication and defy 
verbalization altogether. In this he is certainly supported by Oake-
shott (1967, p.7) and, in particular, by Polanyi (1962, 1969) whose 
whole subjectivist epistemology rests upon a basic dichotomy between 
a dimension of knowledge which can be rendered "explicit" and another 
which remains "tacit" and beyond the realm of specifiable formulation. 
Polanyi suggests this is particularly evident in areas of human activ-
ity in which "skilful knowing" is much in evidence. An admittedly 
trivial example, but one which Polanyi (1962, p.49) is fond of citing, 
is cycling. 
The laws which bicycles obey when in motion, and the sort of 
centrifugal forces that must be overcome if balance is to be maintained, 
can be explicitly formulated; the physics required is known. But the 
capacity to ride a bicycle is far from being contingent upon knowing 
the physical laws which govern its motion. Rather, the "knack" of 
cycling relies on a complex set of psychomotor co-ordinations, which 
although they cumulatively obey the laws of physics, are individually 
mastered without reference to those laws. There is, then, to cycling, 
a tacit dimension which is unspecifiable and inarticulatable, and which 
can only be acquired through the trials and errors of experience. 
Now, cycling is quite an unsophisticated activity and can be mas-
tered very quickly provided one is willing to suffer a few spills and 
falls. Moreover, it is an activity that is autodidactically masterable. 
In that sense, it is rather different from the epistemological abili-
ties being discussed in this study in that they result (a) from the 
gradual accretion of manifold but controlled disciplinary experiences 
and (b) from the interaction between a discipulus and master disci-
plinarian. They are not acquired spontaneously or autodidactically, 
as is the case with cycling. But even so, there are still tacit dimen-
sions to them which transcend textual formulation. Pantin*s taxonomical 
illations are a case in point: and Polanyi (Polanyi and Prosch, 1975, 
pp.31-32)himself has stressed the importance, for instance, of the 
tacit element in the surgeon's skill. That skill is formed, not from 
the "diligent reading of textbooks", but through the training of the 
eyes, ears and sense of touch, to which the more practical context of 
medicine is patrimony. It is only in the arena of doing, then, that 
the tacit element in skilful knowing can be acquired; and although 
there are epistemological activities in which such skills and knacks 
are not uppermost * - where such things as observational acumen are 
less important - it would seem that to every science there is also an 
art, in the sense discussed 4.5, which comprises a set of techni-
ques, whose mastery is ameliorated through experience and practice. 
Some of that art, it has been mooted (Polanyi, 1962, p.53, Hirst, 1968, 
p.129), can only be "learnt from a master at his job". Solitary study 
of the symbolic expressions of knowledge does not yield aspects of a 
discipline which can only be acquired through relating to a master 
disciplinarian. The tacit dimensions of knowledge are to a degree like 
this. Since they transcend formulation, they can only be acquired 
through the discipulus experiencing them in the hands of disciplin-
arians who have considerable and proven mastery of them. Through see-
ing and experiencing the tacit dimension of knowledge in direct oper-
ation, the discipulus/apprentice "unconsciously picks up the rules of 
the art, including those which are explicitly unknown to the master 
himself" (Polanyi, 1962, p.53). 
* Very theoretical sciences, like mathematics, which do not gather 
their data directly from the empirical world, presumably require 
from their executants less perceptual sensitivity. It is there-
fore less important for a mathematician than a biologist to be 
trained to look, at least in the usual sense of the word. But this 
does not preclude the possibility of there being tacit dimensions 
to disciplines like mathematics. It has been noted of mathematics, 
for instance, that for every significant theory there are an in-
finite number of trivial ones. Part of the mathematician's feeling 
for his subject, and that is tacitly generated, comprises being able 
to distinguish what is genuinely interesting mathematics from the 
welter of "altogether trivial statements and operations" (Polanyi, 
1962, p.188). 
It is possible, then, to acquire the substantive elements of a 
science from books. But if the discipulus cogniser wishes to acquire 
the art which supports the execution of that science, he must 'appren-
tice* himself to a community of disciplinarians practising the discip-
line's art. But more than just that, if a disciplinary art and the 
total epistemological sensitivity it gives rise to, is to be perpet-
uated there must always be a new generation of cognisers willing to sub-
mit themselves to the authority of master disciplinarians. Of course 
it sometimes happens that there is not a new generation of willing 
cognisers. In this case, a kind of 'generation gap' occurs in which a 
disciplinary art fails to get passed on and is eventually lost. The 
rupture proves so profound and irrevocable that the art cannot be re-
created with quite the same degree of finesse and virtuosity. For 
instance, since the appropriate tacit skills have been lost, it seems 
virtually impossible to replicate violins which have quite the same 
timbre as a Stradivarius or a Guarnieri. The tradition which created 
such violins came to an end when the last violin-making members of 
the Stradivarius and Guarnieri families died out. With more public 
forms of knowledge, which have a great deal more explicitness about 
them, inter-generational transmission is arguably much less of a 
crucial factor in the perpetuation of a discipline. If disciplines, 
like violins, have certain je ne sais quoi aspects to them, as it seems 
likely they do, then it would be expected that apprenticeship to rather 
different master disciplinarians would cause in their apprentice 
discipuli rather different styles of skilful knowing and epistemo-
logical sensitivity. And to the extent that those discipuli who 
also tend to perpetuate the trail of distinctions their teachers have 
already achieved, there is a certain amount of evidence to suggest that 
the more masterly the disciplinarian, the more masterly his discipulus 
offspring are likely to be. Thus, the epistemological genealogy of 
most Nobel laureates usually includes other Nobel laureates in its back-
ground (Cole and Cole, 1973, p.232). Some laureates have been particu-
larly fecund in this regard. Between them, for instance, Leibig and 
von Baeyer could have counted somewhere in the region of forty six 
Nobel Laureates as their former students (Jevons, 1969, p.35). But 
the significance of the je ne sais quoi factor in a discipline is 
never intense enough such that once its influence is terminated, a 
school of igkilful knowing is irrevocably lost, and that the discipline, 
as a consequence, suffers irreparable harm. That is because that fac-
tor is not the crucial element, as it is in the case of making a 
Guarnieri, in the creation of new knowledge. It might be an ingredi-
ent in the process of its creation, but it is never the sole one. 
Summary. This section has described the epistemological struc-
ture of a discipline. It has been suggested that that structure is 
formed from two layers, one of whose epistemological features can be 
adequately described and made explicit, whilst the other cannot. It 
has also been indicated that successful disciplinary practice is a 
product of conflating the two layers of the fabric; and that the latter 
part of the structure, the tacit dimension, emerges not from the 
cumulative experience of the disciplinéis explicit manifestations -
as they are set out in textbooks - but from the context of actually 
practising the discipline. One of the functions, then, of education 
is to supply the context and framework for the tacit dimensions of 
a knowledge to be acquired. That such a context might prove expe-
ditious is in part due to the fact that a modicum of disciplinary 
tacitness can be conveyed through a student/teacher rapport. But more 
than just conveying the je ne sais quoi eXements of knowledge, edu-
cation also supplies the context in which the explicit elements of 
knowledge can be acquired. By allowing the discipulus to experience 
an "arsenal of exemplars", in which the normative and logical features 
of knowledge are concretely displayed, he eventually comes to dwell 
inside a "disciplinary matrix" (Kuhn, 1 9 7 ^ , p.462). There is, then, 
a two-fold advantage in conducting the initiation of the discipulus 
via exemplars, rather than those epistemological features which phil-
osophers and sociologists have abstracted from knowledge. For the 
exemplar, when articulated in the educational context, permits the 
discipulus to simultaneously acquire some of the explicit and the 
tacit dimensions of knowledge. But as will become clearer 5.5, 
education also serves to act as a kind of 'quality control' of the 
discipulus cogniser. Admittance to a disciplinary community turns out 
to be a process of rigorous selection, in which the strongest measures 
are taken to ensure that the discipulus cogniser not only secures an 
epistemological sensitivity appropriate to the discipline involved, 
but also displays the capacity to work within that discipline's values 
and standards. That capacity, then, will be displayed in his ability 
to master the arsenal of exemplars he confronts in the context of his 
education. 
Part of the function of education, then, is to carry out personnel 
selection for disciplinary communities, and to bring about a level 
of epistemological conformity compatible with the standards and values 
subscribed to by the various disciplinary communities. How education 
does so, will constitute the theme of the next section. 
5.5 KNOWLEDGE COMMUNITIES AND THE BUREAUCRATIZATION OF KNOWLEDGE 
Disciplinary systems exist in order to perpetuate themselves and 
the knowledge which they accommodate. Part of their function is de-
ployed, then, in educating the kinds of cognisers who can either ac-
quire new knowledge or communicate it to others, or both. For without 
the recruitment of appropriately trained cognisers, to occupy the 
positions of disciplinary responsibility, when the current generation 
occupying them dies off, the discipline will also die off, at least as 
an active knowledge * gatherer*. That is because it will not secure 
the appropriate level of personnel input to maintain its social fabric. 
And this does occasionally happen, admittedly mainly in sub-disciplin-
ary fields. "Invariant theory" mathematics suffered just such a fate. 
Its exponents failed to recruit students who had a strong commitment 
to the field, and thus its epistemological development was arrested 
(Fisher, 1967). But above and beyond mere commitment, the students 
recruited to a disciplinary system, if they are to make a contribution 
to knowledge development within it, must be thoroughly acquainted with 
the areas which have been developed, and more importantly, those which 
remain to be developed. Students must be familiar with what counts as 
the orbit of certainty in a given discipline, and be prepared to move 
beyond it. That moving beyond, into new territories of epistemological 
awareness, however, tends to follow the same basic methodological routes 
and observes the same basic standards which have always prevailed in a 
discipline. New knowledge, then, as was imputed at the beginning of 
5.4, is a matter of forming new sentences from the grammar and syntax 
that is universally accepted and applied in a disciplinary community. 
Therefore in order to create that knowledge, the cogniser must first 
not only have a familiarity with the sentences which have already been 
formed in a discipline, but also with the grammar and syntax that are 
usually used to form those sentences. It is a matter of treading old, 
before breaking new ground; that treading, however, must be seen to 
accord with the *gait' that is normally used in the discipline. The 
cogniser, then, must first prove himself capable of upholding the 
traditional disciplinary standards, before his own contributions to 
knowledge will be considered and recognised. That is because the 
advancement of knowledge, as Kuhn (1963, p.343) has pointed out, con-
sists of making iconoclastic statements within the framework of a 
rhetoric that is traditionally used in a discipline. It is a matter 
of being simultaneously a radical and a conservative, and of allowing 
the constraints that come from being the former to check and chasten any 
epistemological informality that is generated by being the latter. 
In these terms, education can be seen to serve a dual function. 
The role of initiation into the public forms of knowledge that is often 
accorded to it, then, amounts to ensuring (a) that those cognisers 
wishing to gain entrance into disciplinary communities are equipped 
with the standards and ordinances that normally prevail there, and (b) 
that, having been thus equipped, the cognisers exhibit the ability to 
observe those standards and ordinances in dealing with the discipline's 
knowledge. Education, then, is very much in the business of bringing 
about epistemological conformity. It is charged with the responsi-
bility of standardizing cognisers, of rendering, to borrow two concepts 
developed by Piaget (1932) in connection with moral development, their 
"heteronomous" epistemological behaviour "autonomous". But apart from 
just 'normalizing* the cogniser - and it has been suggested that that 
process occurs more or less continuously as the substantive content of 
a discipline is transmitted - the context of education facilitates 
the transmission of certain tacit values (see 5.4). 
Education, therefore, can be regarded as the itinerary a cogniser 
must follow if he is to.be permitted to reach the research frontier of 
a discipline. It is an itinerary which not only allows the cogniser 
to see and experience the principal 'landmarks* in a discipline's 
history, but also in the process of doing so, allows him to acquire 
those values and epistemological methods which he will find necessary 
to advance the frontiers of knowledge. Education prepares the cogniser 
ior his 'expedition' into the unknown regions of knowledge by making 
him trek the old routes to knowledge. By doing so, it inculcates the 
set of values which are commensurate with a discipline (Cole and Cole, 
1973,p.86). But what of the educational route itself? Are there some 
general characteristics of it, which not only apply to all disciplinary 
communities, but which also transcend the institutional variations of 
localised educational systems? 
In considering these two problems, it is of note that it is only 
during the last hundred years or so that education has taken over the 
"management of knowledge" (Davies, 1972, p.124) as its principal 
function. Of course in the preceding centuries education was always 
associated with knowledge, but it is only since the Nineteenth Century 
that the Academy has become the setting in which the advancement of 
knowledge is largely conducted. Thus whilst the Academy was always 
a mecca of scholarship, it is only recently that that activity has 
been considered enough in itself. Previously there had always been 
that obligation to justify the existence of the Academy, and the 
activities that went on therein, in terms of some extrinsic goal or 
other. That goal was for the most part ecclesiastical; the Academy 
was regarded as a kind of secular seminary; it was a kind of *pro-
fessional school', responsible for training the "classical sinecurists" 
who ran the church (Dore, 1976, p.19). And that responsibility con-
tinued right up until the Seventeenth Century and even into the uni-
versities that were founded in the New World; for when Harvard was 
founded, part of its charter stressed the need to ensure the church was 
not administered by an "illiterate ministry" (Millet, 1962, p.37). In 
fact the full secularization of universities - together with the con-
commitant substitution of epistemological for ecclesiastical goals -
does not really commence until the Nineteenth Century, and then at 
first only in Germany. But once established there, and initially only 
in the science faculties, the idea of a university surviving upon 
faith becomes increasingly anachronistic. It is replaced with the 
notion that the principal function of the university and the Academy is 
to conserve, transmit and advance knowledge (Millet, 1962, p.40, Watson, 
1973, p.133). 
It is noticeable that, co-incidental with this change of function, 
there also arose in education, bureaucracies specifically designed to 
train personnel who could deal with and produce knowledge. It was not 
that bureaucracies did not exist to do so before education adapted it-
self for the purpose, but that those which existed were relatively 
diffuse, undefined and unstructured. Knowledge was a kind of cottage 
industry that, though capable of producing results and highly signifi-
cant epistemological "commodities", lacked overall direction and organ-
ization (Coser, 1965, p.252). Thus, even without the bureaucratic 
framework education has given it, science could, as far as the advance-
ment of knowledge was concerned, be an enormously fruitful dis-
cipline.* It was just that those advances tended to occur largely 
outside of the Academy and in largely non-educational settings. More-
over, particularly in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, they 
were largely carried out by amateurs and dilettantes. The phenomenon 
of a professional scientist, whilst not unknown, was not in any way 
common. It is of note, for example, that of the original members of 
the Royal Society only a bare one-third devoted themselves in the 
main to science. Science, was for many of its first practitioners, 
an indulgence, a hobby, a pastime rather than a full-time occupation. 
Not that within this atmosphere of scientific amateurism there were 
not institutions to protect the standards of scientific research and 
to permit the dissemination of scientific ideas. The existence of 
* Whether this has served to accelerate the growth of knowledge is a 
matter of speculation. Weber, for instance, noted that all forms of 
bureaucratization have a damaging affect on the individuals partici-
pating in them. They cumulatively act to alienate their partici-
pants. Rather than foster an individual's capacity to contribute 
and initiate, it was Weber's belief that bureaucracies did no more 
than "dry up the well springs" of creativity (Coser, 1965, p.252). 
If this were true then the bureaucratization of knowledge should 
be registerable in a deceleration of its growth; and that, on 
recent evidence, is profoundly not the case. But, then, any of this 
very evident growth in knowledge needs to be compared with the equal-
ly evident growth in numbers of those presently serving in knowledge 
bureaucracies. If the two do not correlate - and they frequently do 
not (vide infra) - then it could well be argued that knowledge bur-
eaucracies, whilst not exactly arresting the growth of knowledge, 
do not catalyse it to a great extent either. A better way of 
approaching the issue is to examine it historically, to see whether 
diffuse, non-bureaucratic organizations of knowledge did not retard 
its growth. Here the evidence is more strikingly on the side of 
bureaucratization. For instance, whilst there were impressive 
scientific achievements in ancient Mesopotamia, Greece and China, 
the overall growth and progress of science in these places was 
largely stunted and always ended up ceasing altogether. Accord-
ing to Ben-David (1971, p.22), this cessation was in part due to 
the fact that the social frameworks needed to disseminate new 
knowledge and train new scientists did not exist. 
institutions like the Royal Society and, in France, the Académie des 
Sciences were in many respects the first steps towards the progressive 
bureaucratization of science. What education did, then, was simply 
rationalize the prototypes of an institutional framework that had al-
ready developed, particularly in the science disciplines, and apply 
them overall to other disciplines. It made aspects of the "invisible 
college", that cojoined certain activities in science, visible. This 
was particularly true of the training of scientists, which, as has been 
noted, only became a fully institutionalised affair in the Nineteenth 
Century. Since then the phenomenon of the detached scientist working 
outside of the Academy has become a thing largely of the past.* A 
modern day Mendel would not have to work his life out in an obscure 
monastery; he would be attached to a prestigous university department 
(Cole and Cole, 1973, p.213). He would not have had to suffer the pen-
alty of retrospective recognition because the modern methods of dis-
tributing knowledge would have ensured that his work on genetics was 
correctly reviewed and evaluated. The advantages that have accrued to 
science, as a result of its bureaucratization, then, include things 
like the more effective training of scientists and the more efficient 
transmission of new knowledge and research. 
The method of enculturation that has prevailed for the last 
hundred years or so in the scientific disciplines has tended, because 
of its apparent success there, to become the pattern which the other 
disciplines have followed. Not only have they adopted comparable 
* This is not to forget, of course, that industry and Government employ 
very many research scientists. The differences, especially in the 
matter of the purposes of their respective researches, between the 
industrial and government scientist and the scientist working in 
the Academy will be examined ^ Chapter 6. 
methods of training, but the modes by which knowledge is disseminated 
in the disciplines are analo ous. Thus even the creative arts, long-
time thought to be alien in the Academy, are increasingly being hosted 
there. It is the university, then, that has, in the Twentieth Century, 
become Prince Esterhazy to the arts. And with their colonization by 
the Academy, it could be said that cultural advances occur almost 
exclusively within the atmosphere of the campus setting. 
Nor are the numbers involved in the knowledge industry particul-
arly small. In the sciences alone, for instance, it has been calcul-
ated that there are something like one million practising scientists 
today (Cole and Cole, 1973, p.40). Add to this the numbers involved 
in their initial education, and to that number those involved in the 
administrative and technical services needed to support active scien-
tific research; then repeat that survey across the whole of the spec-
trum of knowledge, and the figures involved start to form significant 
percentages of a nation's population, which indeed they do. In the 
USSR, for instance, something like 2%% of the population is involved 
in some form of higher education (Watson, 1973, p.129), and doubtless 
comparable figures could be produced for other nations in the 
developed world. 
The knowledge industry, then, is very *big business'. Like any 
other big industry or organization it has certain personnel needs if 
it is to run itself efficiently. Part of the function of education, it 
has been argued (see 5.3), is to supply these needs. Not only then is 
education very much concerned with managing knowledge, it is also very 
much responsible for selecting those who will get into knowledge man-
agement. Thus a great deal of the business in any disciplinary commun-
ity is simply concerned with quality control. On the one hand, there 
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is that control exercised to ensure that new knowledge conforms to the 
epistemologicai standards which normally prevail in a discipline. 
These controls were discussed and the way they are applied will 
be examined more thoroughly ^ Chapter Six. On the other hand, there 
are those controls which are exclusively concerned with ensuring that 
a disciplinary community secures the personnel, of requisite calibre, 
which it needs for its continued survival. It is with these latter 
controls, and how they are generally exercised, that the remainder of 
this and the next section will be concerned. 
Education's unbounded loyalty to the knowledge ideal has already 
been mentioned. The major focus of that interest in knowledge comes 
to bear in the arrangement and construction of the curriculum, or "the 
course that is run in education". Therefore defining the curriculum 
is virtually synonymous with defining education itself (Barrow, 19T6, 
pp. 17-18). Progressive educationalists are inclined to emphasize this, 
and supply very open-ended definitions of the curriculum. Amongst 
progressives, therefore, it is not uncommon to hear the curriculum 
defined as the totality of experiences a student has in school. Thus, 
walking down a corridor is as much a part of the course that is run in 
education as studying D.H. Lawrence's Sons and Lovers. Both desultory 
and determined experiences can comprise the curriculum. Unfortunately 
such open-ended definitions of the curriculum pay little or no deference 
to the fact that some curriculum experiences have considerably more 
educational import than others. Without doubt, for instance, Lawrence 
does more for the student than corridor walking. In terms of ascribing 
educational significance to the experiences of the curriculum, it is 
necessary, unfashionable though it might be, to suggest that the 
curriculum serves to promote, above all else, the knowledge ideal. 
Anything else is very much subsidiary to the realisation of that 
ideal. 
What this entails is that the curriculum principally exists to 
distribute knowledge experiences, and by virtue of this entailment, to 
bring about admission of students into disciplinary communities. The 
arrangement of education can be regarded as a kind of * disciplinary 
continuum', along which knowledge experiences are variously distributed. 
As students progress along that continuum, and are subjected to plan-
ned disciplinary experiences, they slowly acquire a loyalty to a 
specific discipline. Complementing that loyalty is a set of values 
and methodological principles that the student will need in order to 
practise a discipline. 
But admission to a disciplinary community is not ipso facto a 
product of experiencing disciplinary knowledge and displaying a 
loyalty to the values which characterize it; for that admission is 
only secured after the student has satisfied the 'community' that he 
is capable of practising the discipline in accordance with its stan-
dards. The disciplinary continuum, then, is also marked by procedures 
for checking that students are acquiring the values that are associated 
with a discipline. If they are not, then their further advancement along 
the continuum will be discouraged or prohibited. Getting into a 
disciplinary community, then, is very much a matter of the survival of 
the intellectually fittest. At seemingly pertinent stages along the 
continuum, therefore, there are procedures for measuring that fitness. 
The problem, then, is to generalize these characteristics and to 
assemble some model that will accommodate the procedures used in 
disciplinary selection and also explain how it is that knowledge comes 
to be distributed to the would-be members of a disciplinary community. 
5.6 DISCIPLINARY CONTINUUM: PERSONNEL ASCENT 
In very general terms, it can be said that passage along the 
disciplinary continuum serves to transform the cogniser*s outlook on 
the world. The through-put processes inherent in the continuum exert 
to create what has been previously called an 'epistemological 
sensitivity*. Further, that sensitivity represents something of a 
consensus view of the world, as it is defined by the disciplinary 
community at large; and its acquisition represents the culmination of 
a cogniser's disciplinary development. That development can be seen 
to consist of three major and distinct phases: 
(i) a pre-paedeutic phase, which corresponds to the cognitive 
state of the cogniser before his passage along the disciplinary 
continuum commences. It is the state of non-epistemological 
awareness and non-epistemic seeing; 
(ii) a propaedeutic phase during which the cogniser's outlook slowly 
undergoes transformation, according to the type and range of 
disciplinary experiences he encounters during his education; and 
(iii) a meta-paedeutic phase during which the cogniser, having 
mastered the methods and practices of a particular discipline, 
has the capacity to gather new knowledge for it. 
Of these three phases, it is the intermediary one, the second, during 
which the cogniser acquires an epistemological sensitivity; and it is 
therefore that phase which the disciplinary continuum serves to describe, 
Since it is principally within the context of education that an 
epistemological sensitivity is acquired, the pattern of a cogniser's 
disciplinary development tends to reflect the institutional structure 
of education. That structure generally has four major sectors to it; 
and even though national systems of education do vary in detail, 
especially in the matter of when disciplinary specialization commences, 
most would appear to conform to this overall tetradic structure. 
Thus, most educational systems can be compartmentalized into primary, 
secondary, tertiary and what, for the purposes of the continuum, will 
be labelled 'quaternary* sectors of education. Whilst the age at 
which the transition from one sector to another does vary between 
educational systems, as a general rule primary education takes place 
between the ages of 5 and 11, secondary 11 and 18, tertiary 18 and 22, 
quaternary 22 and 26.* The time span of the disciplinary continuum, 
then, is approximately twenty one years in duration. But though all 
children are compelled to experience a modicum of primary and secondary 
education, and thereby to embark on the disciplinary continuum, only 
very small percentages of them become contributing members of 
disciplinary communities. The attrition rate on the disciplinary 
continuum is in fact quite considerable, although its magnitude is far 
greater in some systems than others. In this respect, the system of 
education in the United States would appear to be most lenient of all, 
permitting, as it does, something like 50% of an age group to enjoy 
some form of higher education (Grant, 1973). By comparison with 
European systems of higher education, that of the United States is 
positively generous and all accepting (Grant, 1973, p.32). For 
* The initial years of schooling are generally fixed by government 
legislation, so no variation is possible there. It is noticeable, 
however, that the age at which tertiary and quaternary education 
occurs is increasingly fluid. The phenomenon of the mature age 
student, studying for his first degree, is not exceptional these 
days. Some universities even insist, as a 'matriculation* 
requirement, that their would-be alumni have spent a minimum of a 
year in the outside world doing orthodox work. Griffiths* 
University, Queensland, is one such university. 
example, in West Germany only some 10% of school leavers gain 
admission to higher education. What is more, in the German system, 
which still retains a form of selective secondary education, that gate 
begins to close at the age of ten, when all Grundschule students sit 
for an examination which will determine whether they will go to the 
Gymnasium or not. Since the Gymnasium represents the principal 
'nursery* for university, failure to be admitted into it at that age 
virtually denies the student the possibility of a tertiary education. 
Before systems of comprehensive secondary education became firmly 
established, much the same sort of system of early selection prevailed 
in Britain and France. In Britain, for instance, selection for the 
equivalent of the Gymnasium, the grammar school, occurred at the age of 
eleven, again by means of a public examination. In France, a similar 
examination, conducted at ten rather than eleven, served to demarcate 
those suitable for an education at the more academically inclined lycée  
from the rest. The advent of comprehensivization* in these two systems 
effectively postponed 'university* selection until eighteen, thus 
serving to accommodate the student whose academic talents only bloomed 
in late adolescence. The mechanism of attrition that functioned at 
the transition from primary to secondary education served to exclude 
such students from further progress along the disciplinary continuum. 
Instead, those mechanisms now operate just before the transition is 
made from the secondary to the tertiary sectors of education (Halls, 
* It has been observed that the academic egalitarianism of the 
comprehensive school is largely an illusion. Such schools are 
in fact academically stratified and can be regarded as only 
accommodating under the one roof the partitioned systems of 
education they served to displace (Ford, 1969, p.9). On the other 
hand, the comprehensive school does permit a fluidity that enables 
the 'late developer* to graduate to an academic stream. 
1976, pp.203-220; Bell, Fowler and Little, 1973). At that stage, 
those students who have survived a school's selective mechanisms, and 
who desire to continue their education, must sit for a set of public 
examinations which enable the matriculation requirements for university 
to be acquired. Most systems of secondary education, whether they be 
comprehensive or selective, have such an examination. The West German 
system has its Abitur, the British, its 'A* levels, and the French, its 
baccalauréat ;. and even in the United States, usually the exception 
when it comes to the matter of educational selection, a number of 
states (e.g. New York State) have retained a public examination for 
those who wish to be admitted to the more academically prestigious 
universities. 
The attrition rate in these examinations can be considerable. 
Until quite recently, for example, it was something like forty per cent 
in the baccalauréat (Yarmolinsky, 1960, p.171). On the other hand, 
it is sometimes convenient to have a high attrition rate. If there 
are only a limitéd number of university places available, it is some-
times necessary to inflate matriculation requirements, if only to cause 
attrition. This to some extent happened in Britain, where the nominal 
two *A' levels required for matriculation, was a minimum requirement 
only. Because of the competition for places in tertiary education, 
universities could often choose from students who possessed as many as 
four high passes in 'A* level subjects. When demand outstrips the 
availability of places, entrance requirements tend to be elevated just 
as when the number of available places exceeds demand there is a 
corresponding relaxation in entrance requirements. This process of 
"certificate devaluation", as Dore (1976, p.6) has called it, has 
tended to prevail throughout the world in the 1970's. 
It is in the tertiary sector of education that personnel selection 
for disciplinary communities begins in real earnest. Thus, the 
attrition may actually increase within the tertiary sector rather than 
decrease. Admittedly, most of that attrition rate is due to personal 
factors, rather than just plain academic failing. General indifference 
to university life and anxiety brought on by the pressure of academic 
work are, for instance, proven causes of students leaving university 
prematurely. In Britain, for example, the "mortality rate" of 
students in the science and technology faculties of universities is 
particularly high (Miller, 1970, p.12). In technical colleges, the 
situation is even worse. Up to half the initial student intake fail 
to complete the courses they enrolled for. 
In universities, at least, it does not seem that high intellectual 
attainment necessarily correlates with academic success. Often it is 
the ablest students who quit from university, and they do so for 
personal rather than academic reasons. Thus for whatever reason, the 
"mortality rate" in the tertiary sectors of education can account for 
up to 30 and 40% of the intake students never graduating. Again this 
figure can vary from one system of education to another. It tends to 
reach the 30 or 40% mark in countries like the United States, Canada 
and Australia, whereas in Britain, perhaps because of its more rigorous 
matriculation procedures in the late 1960*s, it was as low as 14% 
(Miller, 1970, pp.10-11).* 
* On the other hand, the author recognizes that there might be other 
factors, often of a transitory rather than a long term nature, which 
might vary these circumstances. The economic recession in the 
Western world during the 1970*s, for example, and the consequent 
tendency of governments to reduce levels of public spending on 
education places new demands on tertiary education to preserve its 
absolute numbers of students. A secondary result of this is that 
the attrition rate is reduced; greater percentages of incoming 
The ordeals of disciplinary initiation do not cease with 
graduation. If the cogniser wants to progress further and secure an 
"academic berth" in a knowledge community, there is an obligation to 
obtain a higher degree, and for that the cogniser must progress into 
the quaternary phase of education (Wilson, 1964, p.48). And just as, 
at the other turnover points along the disciplinary continuum, 
progression is decided on contest, so also is the progression from 
tertiary to quaternary sectors of education. 
The possession of a first degree does not automatically grant 
admission to higher degree work. The academic 'weeding out' process, 
then, continues even into the last sector of propaedeutic education. 
Only the 'best' students are admitted into it, the epithet 'best' 
generally entailing that such students possess a first degree classed 
at honours level. 
Whilst the disciplinary continuum ostensibly exists to transform 
cognisers in accordance with the principles of public forms of know-
ledge, a contemporaneous aspect of that function is that it selects 
out those cognisers who have capacity and talent enough to be admitted 
into disciplinary communities. Whether it is finally efficacious at 
this - and there is considerable evidence (vide infra) to suggest that 
it is not - that selection is generally based on some formal, public 
examination, designed to predicate a cogniser's capacity to graduate 
and succeed in the next stage of the continuum. These examinations 
generally occur at the nodes between one phase of education and another, 
and serve to test the adequacy of a cogniser to pursue initiation any 
students actually obtain degrees and diplomas; the purchasing power 
of these credentials tends to be reduced; and it may be doubted that 
the degrees and diplomas have the same academic merit as they did 
when the attrition rate was higher. 
further. In this way, a disciplinary community recruits the cognisers 
it needs. The continuum, and the capacity a cogniser has to maintain 
mobility along it, then, is very much a proving ground for the cogniser 
Proof of his capacity to do so, is available in the number and quality 
of 'tokens' he has managed to accumulate on the way. For it is a 
characteristic of institutionalized education that it awards tokens to 
those who display the ability to master a discipline at a particular 
academic stage. Moreover, these tokens are recognized outside the 
disciplinary continuum and the "groves of Academia", and can be used 
to secure employment in general. Thus education is not only a 
'credentialing' agency for the knowledge industry, but also for the 
world at large. 
In a very real sense, the epithet 'initiation', which has been 
given to the processes occurring along the disciplinary continuum, is 
apposite. Firstly, the ordeals which the student cognisers undergo 
whilst waiting to be admitted into a disciplinary community, whilst 
they may not be as exacting as some forms of religious initiation, are 
very much of the testing kind. They are designed to sort out, so to 
speak, the 'intellectual' men from the boys! Secondly, there are 
undoubtedly rituals and ceremonies which accompany the business of 
initiation into public forms of knowledge. The whole ritual of the 
graduation ceremony, and the diluted version of the same thing which 
occurs on speech and prize giving nights in schools - which are 
designed to reward and highlight the acquisition of certain academic 
credentials - are not so remote from the rituals of a religious 
initiation ceremony. Lastly, there is the notion implicit in the 
concept of initiation that through it the cogniser becomes aware of 
what Bernstein (1974, p.374) has called the "sacred" aspects of 
knowledge. Initiation into a discipline, which Bernstein sees in a 
very disparaging light, has all the hallmarks of becoming privy to the 
secrets of some sort of epistemological 'mystery cult*. It is a very 
private world, which only the cognoscenti and the initiate can fully 
appreciate. In essence, the hierarchy of a disciplinary community 
protects its hieratic order, by only releasing its deepest secrets to 
a few, chosen and highly selected acolytes. 
In the worst possible of lights, the disciplinary continuum could 
be said only to make a token gesture to egalitarianism. In that same 
rather sepulchral light, it could be said that education is, in effect, 
practising what amounts to a rather cerebral form of 'eugenics*. It 
is in the business of breeding a 'master race' of cognisers who can 
manage the disciplinary communities in the most effectual and intellec-
tually capable way possible. Indeed, a cynic could be forgiven for 
thinking that education is principally subservient to the 'great god 
episteme' by virtue of it wishing to perpetuate itself. After all, 
whilst the tokens education awards can be used to obtain work outside 
disciplinary communities, it is there that they have principal import 
and worth. 
Thus, it can be said as a generalization, that one of the primary 
functions of the continuum is to produce cognisers capable of keeping 
the continuum itself functioning. The continuum, then, not only acts 
as a means of personnel ascent - and for many that ascent simply takes 
them off the continuum - it is also, for those who survive the distance, 
a mode of personnel descent back down along the continuum; although, 
this time, they return with a rather different set of roles and 
responsibilities. Thus the academy not only supplies an institutional 
context in which the advancement and conservation of knowledge can be 
conducted, it is also a context in which knowledge is transmitted as 
well. But what is important to note is that those cognisers doing the 
transmitting are also responsible for the conservation and advancement 
of knowledge. Such cognisers, then, having reached the epistemological 
limits of the disciplinary continuum are expected, so to speak, to 
retrace their footsteps back down the continuum, one or two phases, and 
communicate their disciplinary expertise to the up and coming body of 
student cognisers. This is equally true of those other cognisers who 
wish to remain in a disciplinary community, but whose academic talents 
have not taken them much beyond the tertiary phase of education. 
Having reached that level of disciplinary mastery which falls short of 
actually gathering new knowledge, such cognisers are generally fed 
back into the earliest phases of the disciplinary continuum in order 
to teach, an activity for which they are generally expected to do some 
preliminary training. Because their role pre-eminently is to teach, 
it is not incumbent upon them, as it is with the teachers in the 
tertiary sectors of education, to do research. 
The role of the teacher in relation to his student, and the 
cognitive benefits that are supposed to accrue from it, will be 
examined in more detail d^ Chapter Six. What is of interest at this 
juncture is to describe the sorts of forces that prevail to determine 
(a) the teacher's placement on the continuum and (b) the types of 
students that that placement will entitle him to teach. And since 
what determines these things is very much related to the bureaucratic 
organization of education, is there some way of achieving this 
description which reflects that organization? In fact there turns 
out to be a relatively easy way of codifying this relationship. 
The continuum, it has been argued, can be divided up into four 
major sectors of education. The question now being raised, then, is 
what sort of epistemologica! qualifications are required to teach in 
each of these particular sectors of education? This can be initially 
settled by considering the institutional level to which disciplinary 
training is expected to be carried before teaching is allowed in 
specified sectors of the continuum. For instance, it has already 
been indicated that teachers in the tertiary and quaternary sectors of 
education (t^C and t.C , where t denotes teacher and the subscript 
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numerals, three and four, the sectors of education in which they teach, 
i.e. in this case, the tertiary and quaternary sectors respectively) 
are, if not already in possession of a higher degree, at least working 
towards one. This latter qualification is even more importunate in 
the case of the teacher in the quaternary sector (t^C^) who, after all, 
is supposedly training students to gather knowledge for themselves and 
therefore should have considerable research experience. It is often 
not simply a matter of a doctorate, but that the teacher involved has 
a research reputation in the disciplinary community at large. The 
higher that reputation, the more post-graduate students the teacher is 
likely to attract.* It is a case, then, of the cogniser's capacities, 
having been extended well beyond the propaedeutic phase of the continuum, 
being able to communicate his experience of acquiring knowledge to the 
students (s,C , where s denotes student) who come to him for super-
4 r* 
vision in their particular research project. 
From these observations, it can be said, as a general rule, that 
* J.D. Bernal's work on the X-ray crystallography of proteins and 
nucleic acids acquired him such a reputation that he was sought 
after by graduate students the world over. One was Francis Crick, 
who, on inquiring if he could work with B e m a l as one of his students, 
was given the curt reply by his secretary, "Don't you realise that 
people from all over the world want to come and work under the 
Professor?" (Olby, 1972, p.233). 
where the tertiary and quaternary sectors of education are concerned, 
it is anticipated that the teachers involved will be one institutional 
phase in front of their students. Equally, this rule would appear to 
prevail in the earlier two phases of the disciplinary continuum. 
That it does so enables the relationship between the institutional 
level of training reached as a student and the sector of education that 
that training qualifies the student to teach in to be conveniently 
represented on the following diagram: 
It can be seen from this diagram, that teachers in the secondary sector 
of education, whilst they are not expected to have completed a research 
degree, are expected to have a first degree with an appropriate *major* 
in the discipline they anticipate to teach. In other words, although 
it is not incumbent on secondary teachers to have been quaternary 
students ^^ required that they should have been tertiary 
students (s^C^). As an additional prerequisite, it has become policy 
in recent years that such teachers have also completed a minimum of one 
year*s teacher training. This latter element is particularly 
emphasised in the preparation of primary teachers (t^C^). With them, 
as the diagram implies, disciplinary development is not expected to 
extend much beyond that received in the upper 'reaches' of the 
secondary school. Proportionately speaking, the emphasis of their 
training lies in the direction of the methods and knacks of teaching, 
rather than in the direction of the subject matter that they teach. 
Another general rule of the continuum is that as the level of 
disciplinary training rises there is a corresponding decrease in the 
level of teacher training expected. Thus, teachers in the tertiary 
and quaternary sectors of education - who have most disciplinary 
expertise - are not obligated to pursue any teacher training whatsoever, 
It is more important that they exhibit prowess in scholarship than 
teaching (Miller, 1970, p.150). In other words, in moving from the 
primary to the quaternary sectors of the continuum there is a complete 
reversal of what could be called 'pedagogic priorities*. 
There are of course reasons for this being quite justifiable. 
Firstly, there is the fact that the primary teacher does not deal with 
a homogeneous group of students, all equally able and intellectually 
capable. Not only this, but the students he deals with are mostly in 
a state of incipient cognitive development. Both these factors entail 
that a major responsibility of the teacher revolves around tailoring 
knowledge to meet the special cognitive needs of his students. As 
Peters (1970, p.256) has pointed out, such a teacher needs not only to 
be an authority on some subject, but also an authority on the ways of 
teaching it. And whilst the teacher working in the latter sectors of 
the continuum should also consider the way he is communicating his 
discipline, the fact that he is dealing, for the most part, with a 
cognitively more homogeneous corpus of students means that his problems 
in that quarter are manifestly simpler and less exigent. But the 
major difference between the teachers working at opposite ends of the 
disciplinary continuum is in the degree of their respective knowledge 
expertise. As has already been intimated, this gets progressively 
more pronounced in moving from the primary to the quaternary sectors 
of the continuum. This in turn reflects the disciplinary attrition 
which occurs as the student passes from one sector of the continuum to 
another; for although the student, when he embarks on the continuum, 
is given the opportunity to experience a wide range of disciplines and 
subjects, if he survives to the end of it, that range has been narrowed 
down to one discipline, and often one specialty within that discipline. 
And of course mounting specialization for the student entails greater 
and greater specialization on the part of his teachers. 
The age at which disciplinary specialization commences tends to 
vary, like everything else on the continuum, with the system of educa-
tion being considered. But in no system has it yet commenced in the 
primary school; for there, between the ages of five and ten, students 
are given an adequate grounding in the "survivor skills", together 
with an epistemological baptism, whose scope tends to embrace the 
overall character of the knowledge spectrum. Students, in the primary 
school, then, are introduced to some science, history and geography, 
and are encouraged to express themselves in music, drama and painting. 
They are exposed to a broad array of disciplinary experiences which 
are explored in none but superficial depth. The training of primary 
teachers, and the wide range of disciplinary expertise that is expected 
of them, tends to reflect this. They are very much the 'Jacks and 
Jills' of all epistemological trades and the 'masters and mistresses' 
of none of them. 
With the transfer from primary to secondary education, the same 
broad array of disciplines is studied, although this time in much 
more depth. Not only is this reflected in the greater disciplinary 
expertise of secondary teachers (vide supra), but it is also apparent 
in the fact that instead of one teacher communicating the whole spectrum 
of knowledge - as tends to happen in the primary school - that spectrum 
is compartmentalized, and each teacher tends to teach one or two 
sections of it only. Moreover, there begins in the secondary school, 
paizicularly in the English system, a gradual attrition of the number 
of disciplines studied, such that by the time education in that sector 
is completed, the student can be studying as few as three disciplines. 
An added feature of this specialization, is that these disciplines 
often do not represent a selection of disciplines drawn from the spec-
trum as a whole, but rather from one particular quarter of it. Thus 
by the time students reach the English sixth form,their epistemological 
proclivity towards the arts, humanities or science sections of the 
spectrum has generally been settled. 
This is said to have both advantages and disadvantages. It has 
been pointed out, for instance, that early specialization in the 
sciences cultivates an ebullience for research, and that this is its 
chief merit (Jevons, 1969, pp.100-101). On the other hand, it has been 
argued that there is a need to retain a broad general education right 
up until the completion of secondary education, and this the English 
system does not cater for. In this respect, the style of secondary 
education encountered in Scotland and on the continent, particularly 
in Germany and France, in which little or no disciplinary attrition 
occurs, is perhaps preferable. If anything, as Elvin (1977, p.35) 
has indicated, the nine or ten subjects that are often studied in the 
baccalaureate and Abitur is a little too extreme in the direction of 
non-specialization, whereas what is really required is a balance between 
over and under specialization. 
Disciplinary attrition, once commenced in the seconary school, 
remains a marked feature of the rest of the propaedeutic part of the 
continuum. Thus, the closer a cogniser gets to entering a 
disciplinary community, the greater a particular discipline comes to 
dominate his curriculum. Instead of studying a multiplicity of 
disciplines, he studies just the one. At the beginning of his educa-
tion, the cogniser is expected, as it were, to study the whole galaxy 
of knowledge. Upon emerging from secondary education, that same 
cogniser is usually concentrating upon a particular constellation in 
that galaxy, say the sciences or the arts. In moving to university, 
there is a further concentration of interest, and the cogniser is 
expected to study just one particular star in that constellation. He 
will do so with teachers whose field of interest does not, as is the 
case with secondary teachers, cover the whole of the star, but only a 
particular aspect of it. 
In the tertiary sector of education, then, there is not only 
attrition of disciplines, but also often attrition within a particular 
discipline; and this tendency continues into the final, quaternary 
phase of the continuum. For there, students, along with their teachers, 
specialize and research into a sub-field of a particular discipline. 
Attenuation of disciplinary interest reaches a degree of specialism such 
that it has been calculated (Polanyi, 1962, p.216) that any single 
scientist is probably only competent enough to judge about one hundredth 
of the total output of research in science. 
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Summary. The disciplinary continuum - of which Figure 5.1 above 
is a schematic representation - is an attempt to describe the 'life 
history* of a student cogniser. It shows where that history begins and 
ends, as well as the points at which major cognitive metamorphoses might 
occur. The continuum can be regarded as showing the route by which a 
disciplinary community usually secures its personnel. It has been 
noted, that the community rejects many more cognisers than it accepts. 
The attrition rate on the continuum is quite considerable. But whilst 
there are still others who do collect the appropriate tokens and 
progress a great distance along the continuum, only a very few of these 
are admitted to the meta-paedeutic phase of the continuum. Those who 
do not make it quite there, and who choose to remain in the knowledge 
industry, are usually 're-cycled' back down the continuum as teachers 
in the earlier phases of the continuum. The continuum, then, is 
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characterised by both an upward and downward mobility of cognisers, 
the degree of that mobility being determined by contest. At the same 
time as longitudinal promotion occurs there is a lateral attenuation 
of disciplinary experience. This reaches its peak in the research 
for a higher degree. 
The notion that a disciplinary community needs a regular input of 
cogniser personnel in order to survive and to maintain its social 
equilibrium, suggests the possibility that perhaps some of the concepts 
of gystem Theory, briefly touched on 2.10 and 3.2, could be used to 
explain and describe some of those dynamics of disciplinary communities 
which have been identified in this section. Before pursuing that 
possibility, however, it might first be useful to outline in more 
detail the principles of System Theory and some of the concepts that 
are regularly used therein. 
5.7 SYSTEM THEORY AND DISCIPLINARY COMMUNITIES I 
Whilst the impetus that originally led to the emergence of 
"General System Theory" (G.S.T.) as an autonomous area of knowledge 
came from the life sciences - out of the need to isolate features that 
would more readily demarcate living from non-living systems - the 
territory of General System Theory now tends to incorporate not only 
biological, but technological and cultural systems as well 
(Bertalanffy, 1967, p.64). In the sense that living systems also 
share characteristics in common with the latter, and thereby are not 
the unique entities they were originally supposed to be, G.S.T. now 
tends to concentrate its systemic divisions about systems which are 
"open" and those which are "closed", with living systems and their 
"isomorphs" falling into the former category. Thus, it has been 
suggested (Bertalanffy, 1971, p.207; Katz and Kahn, 1966, pp.99-104) 
that the organization and structure of society display "open system" 
characteristics which have analogous parallels in the behaviour of 
living systems. If this is a valid proposition, then, since it has 
been asserted that a disciplinary community is a social organization 
facilitating the communication and acquisition of knowledge, the 
community should exhibit the features that are characteristic of open 
systems in general. Showing that in fact a disciplinary community 
can be regarded as an open system together with all the ramifications 
that this has for its social structure, remains the objective of this 
and the next section (5.8). 
A system is generally defined as an amalgam of elements in some 
kind of interaction with one another (Bertalanffy, 1971, p.85). The 
particular property of an open, as opposed to a closed system, is 
that it has the capacity to disobey - temporarily at least - the Second 
Law of Thermodynamics. Whereas the remainder of the matter in the 
universe is subject to prosecution by this law, it is in the nature of 
an open system to defy it, and instead of inexorably degenerating into 
chaos and "entropy", as the law says it should, the system is capable 
of maintaining itself in a "steady state" condition. This is because 
the system has the capacity to assimilate from its surrounds the 
requisite energy needed to secure stability and order, and to stave off 
degradation into entropy. Closed systems lack this capacity. They 
cannot participate in the sort of exchange with their surrounds - since 
they are sealed off from them - that would furbish the system with the 
requisite energy needed to inhibit the formation of entropy. In the 
closed system, then, a steady state condition cannot be achieved. 
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because the system cannot expedite the energy importation required. 
Its only destiny in 'life* is to produce more and more "positive 
entropy", and that leads to maximum disorder between the parts of the 
system (Bertalanffy, 1971, p.38). 
Schroedinger (1967, p.219) once remarked that the most obvious 
feature of life was that it was able to "feed off negentropy". In 
the sense that all living systems are open systems, and that by virtue 
of their ability to interact with their surrounds, they can preserve 
their systemic unity, his statement is true. But to reserve, as 
Schroedinger does, that privilege to living systems alone is wrong. 
Thunderstorms, steam engines, self-winding watches are also capable of 
doing so (Pantin, 1969, p-37; Popper, 1976, p.137). They too, just 
like living systems, have the capacity to keep themselves "wound up" 
and in a state of homeostasis. They too can contravene the workings 
of the Second Law of Thermodynamics. 
But if the system, of whatever variety - mechanical, social or 
biological - was suddenly starved of an importable energy, or lost the 
ability to execute an ingestive rapport with its surrounds, it would 
also be deprived of the capacity to produce the requisite energy needed 
to regulate a level of order and stability in the system. A prolonged 
deprivation, and it of course does happen, would mean the system would 
eventually lose the ability to preserve its unity. In such circum-
stances, it would quickly revert to the condition of a closed system. 
Manufacture of 'negentropy', then, is the way an open system protects 
itself from closing down. 
The operative word is of course 'manufacture'. For although the 
system might retain the capacity to ingest energy from its surrounds, 
unless it is able to transform what is ingested and turn it into terms 
that the system can utilize, the function of ingestion is redundant. 
Somewhere within the system, then, there must be operant certain 
"through-put" processes (Katz and Kahn, 1966, pp.93-94) which permit 
the input to be appropriately transformed. But before that trans-
formation can commence, the system must first determine the levels of 
input required. For this purpose, open systems generally have 
incorporated into them feedback circuits capable of registering loss 
of homeostasis and level of input required to restore it (Thornton, 
1972, p.165). The feedback circuit, then, is the medium by which a 
system conducts a 'dialogue' with its surrounds, and through which a 
system is able to secure the adjustments needed to sustain homeostasis. 
It is the means by which the internal mechanisms of a system make 
contact with the outside world. 
But assuming the system can secure the requisite energy and input 
needed to maintain homeostasis, the way of achieving that goal can take 
a variety of paths and means. This flexibility of systems to secure 
the same end multifariously embraces the principle that, in G.S.T., is 
known as "equifinality" (Bertalanffy, 1971, p.46; Katz and Kahn, 1966, 
p.100). It is a principle that will be seen to be particularly 
apposite in connection with disciplinary systems. Similarly apposite 
are the principles of "compartmentalization" and "redundancy". Whilst 
these principles were originally formulated in connection with the 
selective permeability of cellular membranes, as principles they have 
an applicability that can be readily extended to the "macro-cultural 
structures of man" (Thornton, 1972, pp.180-181). Input, then, by this 
process of compartmentalization comes to be distributed to those parts 
of the system which require that input to sustain homeostasis. And 
in order to ensure that the requisite distribution occurs, a 
"redundancy" factor is built into the system, such that if one route to 
the upkeep of homeostasis fails, another can be taken. The system has 
something in reserve, as it were, to countervail the effects of 
malfunctioning. This ensures that the work a system must 'get done* 
to maintain its steady state actually gets done. 
It has already been noted that some G.S.T. concepts which have been 
attributed to living systems can be applied to social organizations. 
Of course such organizations usually lack the localised holism of 
living systems. Indeed, the boundary of the organization can sometimes 
span the globe and there might be a very fluid distribution of members 
within it. But even discounting the topographical discursiveness of 
the organization, it usually possesses a structural unity that serves 
to ensure a coalescence of its various discrete parts. This unity 
represents a way of introducing maximum order into the social organi-
zation, and therefore in itself represents a defiance of the Second 
Law (Angrist and Hepler, 1973, p.189). 
It has been suggested that in order to preserve this unity, an open 
system needs a regular flow of input. In a disciplinary community, 
this comprises a regular supply of personnel or cognisers who have the 
requisite sensitivities needed to operate within the epistemological 
parameters of the discipline. Unless those cognisers are forthcoming, 
the social connections within the community, which largely facilitate 
the transmission and creation of new knowledge, will become ruptured 
and the system will inexorably degenerate into entropy. But more than 
just the rupture of unity, the termination of cogniser supply also 
means that when the generation of cognisers currently occupying 
positions of important epistemological responsibility in the community 
"die off", there will be no one to replace them. Since there will be 
no cognisers to manage the affairs of the discipline, the advancement 
of knowledge will cease. No personnel input, then, means no output 
knowledge; and since disciplinary communities primarily exist for that 
purpose, the community will eventually close down. Entropy will 
develop within the system. 
But it has also been argued that input on its own cannot sustain 
homeostasis. Before that can happen, the system must somehow trans-
form that input into forms which the system can utilise. Thus in 
order for a disciplinary community to sustain its social structure, and 
in order for that community to execute that function which the social 
structure supports - namely, the advancement of knowledge - the input 
cogniser group must first acquire the repertoire of skills and 
epistemological sensitivities which the disciplinary system, so to 
speak, 'feeds o f f . But if the output of a disciplinary system is 
knowledge, and the epistemological sensitivity needed to produce it is 
an * acquisitive* one (see 5.2), it has also been noted that that 
sensitivity is educated into existence; it is not born spontaneously, 
but only follows from a long, sustained period of training and 
apprenticeship. That apprenticeship, which is equivalent to 
transforming the cogniser input, occurs on what was called 5.6 the 
* disciplinary continuum*. The various transformative processes 
contained on that continuum amount to the through-put work that the 
system must do to secure an output of knowledge from the input 
cognisers. However there are other likenesses between an open system 
and a disciplinary community besides this, and they will be explored 
in the next section. 
5.8 SYSTEM THEORY AND DISCIPLINARY COMMUNITIES II 
It was noted ^ 5 . 7 that disciplinary communities, like any other 
social organization, could be regarded as possessing the properties of 
an 'open system'; for like any other system, a disciplinary community 
requires an 'input' of energy to sustain itself in a condition of 
homeostasis. Without that requisite input energy, to keep it 'wound 
up', the disciplinary community would simply, like any other system, 
degenerate into entropy and chaos. The disciplinary continuum, then, 
can be regarded as attending to the 'energy' requirements of knowledge 
communities; for passage along it, it was suggested 5.7, results 
in the student cogniser acquiring the skills and abilities needed to 
serve in a knowledge community. The continuum, as it were, transforms 
the student 'input' and produces, as an 'output', a cogniser acceptable 
to the disciplinary community at large. Those who are not, those who 
do not acquire the right 'tokens', to press on along the continuum, 
are either encouraged to think about joining other disciplinary 
communities, or discouraged altogether from working in any section of 
the knowledge industry. There is, then, a distribution of energy input 
some of it goes out of the knowledge system altogether. The remainder 
stays, to be distributed within the system itself. Thus, according to 
the level of disciplinary training he has received, the cogniser can be 
appointed to a variety of positions on the continuum. This might also 
be dependent on the personnel needs of the disciplinary system; for it 
is possible for the 'continuum' to produce a glut of cognisers who 
cannot be readily assimilated into the disciplinary community, but who 
must seek positions elsewhere, either lower down the continuum, or 
outside of it altogether. It does seem however that over-production 
of cognisers, because of the scarcity of positions in the community and 
the increased competition for reward, can lead to increased epistemo-
logica! innovation in disciplinary communities (Mulkay and Turner, 
1971, p.47). Recognition being harder to attain, cognisers are 
forced to diversify their field of interest and to be that much more 
original in their knowledge contribution to a disciplinary community. 
On the other hand, it is equally possible for the continuum to 
under-produce, especially in the area of particular kinds of cognisers. 
And it occasionally happens that forces outside the disciplinary 
system itself will insist that this paucity be rectified. A recent 
case of this was the United States Government's concerted attempt to 
improve the quality of scientific education by making it rival and 
excel that of the USSR. A precedence for this government inter-
ference in education, in very similar circumstances, is to be found in 
the United Kingdom, after the First World War. The excellence and 
the superiority of the German "war machine", just like the capacity of 
the Russians to launch a 'Sputnik', was attributed to the quality of 
the scientific and technical education available in Germany. After 
the war was over, the United Kingdom duly tried to emulate the 
excellence of that education (Landes, 1972, p.76). 
The manner of producing cognisers does not have to be all that 
similar. As has been indicated, in discussing national variants of 
the continuum, there are many ways of achieving the same cogniser end. 
Thus specialization does not have to, and rarely does in fact, begin 
contemporaneously; rather the age at which it begins tends to slide 
up and down the continuum, according to the system of education being 
considered. Then there is the related question of 'nostrification'. 
Between different systems of education, university degrees are often 
not of comparalDle academic yalue and significance. It all depends 
upon the particular academic goals established by different education 
systems for their tertiary institutions. Generally speaking, hovever, 
major systems of education tend towards the attainment of equivalent 
degrees of epistemological sensitivity. In comparative international 
terms, then, the continuum has some measure of 'equifinality': there 
are many ways of attaining the same end. 
Just as there are different institutional networks for achieving 
the same cogniser result, so within those networks there are alternative 
routes for achieving that result, such that if one fails another can 
take over. There are, as it were, equifinalities within the overall 
equifinality. This amounts to there being an element of redundancy 
built into the system. Thus, comprehensive secondary education is 
far more redundant than a selective system because it can accommodate 
the late developer whose academic talents are not revealed, say, at ten 
years of age. Similarly, a system that delays tho need to specialize 
in a particular discipline as far along the continuum as is possible, 
is accommodating to those student cognisers whose loyalty to a 
particular part of the knowledge spectrum might change the more that 
part is studied. A system that allows a student to change loyalties 
three-quarters of the way along the continuum is obviously more 
redundant than one which does not. It is of note that in the English 
system, notorious for its encouragement of early specialization, one 
or two universities, Keele and Sussex for instance, mount first year 
courses that are sufficiently broadly based in their curriculum as to 
countervail any of the effects of premature specialization. Such 
courses give the student the opportunity to realign his loyalty if 
he so desires. Such safeguards serve to increase the level of 
redundancy inherent in the system. 
Another characteristic of open systems, described in 5.7, is 
compartmentalization. In connection with disciplinary systems, this 
characteristic is revealed in their tendency to distribute the input 
energy, in this case cogniser personnel, to that part of the system 
where their talents and abilities can be most readily utilized and 
exploited. Hence, within the various phases of the continuum the 
cogniser's ability is continually evaluated and tested, in an effort 
to ascertain to what phase of the continuum the cogniser*s forte might 
be best suited. 
Although it is much less easy these days, it is still possible to 
by-pass the bureaucratic network - designed for the purpose - and 
secure admittance into a disciplinary community. The continuum need 
not necessarily be the sole route into it; it is just that, with the 
tokens it supplies, it is easier to achieve admission via that network 
than it is via non-publicly-accredited routes. Einstein is a case in 
point. He left university with a poor first degree and did most of 
his * quaternary research' in a non-academic setting, a Swiss patent 
office (Ziman, 1968, pp.64-65). Another, although for rather different 
reasons, is Francis Crick, who, together with James Watson, helped to 
crack the structural code of DNA. What is interesting about both of 
these research workers is that neither was initially trained in the 
field in which they eventually 'made their names'. Crick was a 
physicist, who worked in the area of hydrodynamics before embarking on 
molecular biology. His knowledge about the latter in fact came largely 
through self-tuition rather than a conventional education in biology and 
chemistry (Olby, 1972). Thus although he did not possess the tokens 
appropriate to research in molecular biology. Crick was not prevented 
from making a highly significant contribution to that field. It is 
possible, then, to avoid the disciplinary continuum and still eventually 
become a member of a disciplinary community. 
5.9 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has tried (a) to specify in more concrete terms what 
is meant by epistemological sensitivity and (b) to describe the institu-
tional route by which that sensitivity is generally acquired. 
Description of the latter was achieved by assembling a model of the 
institutional process of knowledge initiation. That model has been 
called the 'disciplinary continuum*. It was argued that the continuum 
is an *open system* and that therefore it should display the features 
of open systems. It was shown that it did. But the disciplinary 
continuum not only produces cogniser personnel as its output, it also 
produces knowledge. Indeed, if a discipline is to remain intellectually 
alive, then it must advance the frontiers of knowledge. If it does not, 
then it will become defunct. Thus, some of the cogniser personnel 
produced by the continuum must prove themselves to be capable of 
advancing the frontiers of knowledge by doing just that. The cogniser 
output produced by the continuum must itself produce knowledge output. 
The way that knowledge is produced, evaluated and disseminated by 
a disciplinary community evokes issues not so far discussed in this 
study. The way knowledge is produced, evaluated and disseminated also 
involves a whole new 'breed* of cognisers of rather different 
sensitivity from that of the teacher and the student discussed in this 
chapter. The next chapter, then, will examine the meta-paedeutic 
phase of the continuum and suggest how it is that knowledge comes to 
be circulated in disciplinary communities. It will also develop a 
typology of these communities, and show how it is that each of the 
roles described can in fact be represented on the knowledge triad 
formulated in Chapter Four. 
CHAPTER SIX 
THE PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION OF KNOWLEDGE 
"Tout, au monde, existe 
pour aboutir a un livre" 
(Mallarmé, Quant au Livre) 
6.1 TOWARDS A TYPOLOGY OF A KNOWLEDGE COMMUNITY 
Whilst the proposition that a corpus of knowledge can exist 
independently of a community of knowers is not wholly strange to some 
varieties of epistemology (see 5.1), it is a proposition whose chief 
strength is imaginary rather than factual. Pursuance of its absolute 
verity, for instance, would involve neglecting all the assertions and 
observations of preceding chapters, as well as those to be made 
subsequently in this chapter. It is also somewhat ironic that much 
of the strength of the proposition rests on the existence of a community 
of knowers to begin with. For, as was noted ^ 5 . 5 , such communities 
serve to ensure that knowledge is purged of subjectivity and the sort of 
values that might otherwise sabotage its objectivity. The proposition, 
then, has its functional roots in a world of persons that the concept of 
a wholly non-subjective account of knowledge would serve to deny. 
Much as though the logician of knowledge might try to banish the 
possibility that knowledge has its provenance in people, that possibi-
lity is really a hypothetical abstraction born of a liaison with a 
Platonic ideal and not of the empirical facts about knowledge. A 
great deal of this study, then, has been concerned with confuting the 
viability of a Platonic epistemology. Chapters Four and Five, for 
instance, with their accounts of how it is that personal and social 
factors insinuate characteristics into knowledge, vindicated the 
position that there are strong and unavoidable humanistic streaks in 
knowledge. But those streaks, it needs emphasizing, are never 
uncontrolled or untrammelled. The parameters of what is acceptable 
epistemological behaviour are w e l l defined, and one of the reasons for 
knowledge having a social dimension to it, is to make sure that the 
humanistic streaks in knowledge do not 'get out of hand' and disgrace 
the limits of acceptable epistemological behaviour in a disciplinary 
community.* Knowledge, then, is in part socialised to impose a 
check on those personalities who would deviate from the communally 
accepted norms that govern and pervade the workings of a disciplinary 
community. The progressive institutionalization and bureaucratization 
of knowledge - described d^ Chapter Five - are responses to the needs 
to uphold disciplinary standards and to filter out would-be defectors 
from those standards. The existence of education, playing as it does 
a major role in selecting suitable cognisers to serve in disciplinary 
communities, is testimony to the normative expectations that are 
prevalent in epistemological behaviour. Thus the disciplinary 
continuum (see 5.6), which was an attempt to map the institutional 
route ** a cogniser must follow to gain admittance into a knowledge 
community, in effect amounted to plotting the major stages of 
disciplinary socialization. 
It is through education that a disciplinary community comes to 
propagate its values to successive generations of cognisers. It is 
the discipline's answer to DNA! And in this connection, it was noted 
in 5.5 how the most succinct way of propagating these values was via 
* Buckley (1972, p.189) makes the pertinent remark that, "... 
knowledge is not positively and finally given merely through infor-
mation input to sensory apparatus, but rather is actively 
constructed and reconstructed through continual interchange between 
the individual and his physical and social environment". 
** Whilst the admittance to disciplinary communities tends to take 
place these days exclusively via institutions of education, this 
does not prohibit the possibility that that admittance could take 
place by other means (see also 5.8); or that the way these 
institutions have evolved to conduct disciplinary initiations are 
in any way absolute. 
the knowledge that openly manifests them. Since the one is the 
extension of the other, the distribution of a discipline's normative 
values can occur concurrently with the distribution of its substantive 
content. But the purpose behind that propagation is never merely 
distributive or conservative. For disciplinary systems, the business 
of propagating themselves is only a means to more overriding 
epistemological ends. There is, for instance, the general meliorative 
end: that contact with knowledge and pursuit of the truth it embraces 
enhances the reasoning capacity of men and women in general, not just 
cognisers. That end, as was noted ̂  5.2, is frequently advanced to 
justify knowledge occupying a pre-eminent role in the educational 
process. It is the argument used to defend the 'liberal education' 
tradition. Fortunately, it is also a rather convenient end, for it 
permits education a degree of ambidexterity in its practices. On the 
one hand, for instance, it means that educational systems, without loss 
to their effectiveness, can dedicate themselves to educating men and 
women via knowledge, whilst on the other, carrying out the initiation 
of a few of them into disciplinary communities via some of that same 
knowledge. But although disciplinary systems - and the medium by 
which they carry out that function, education - exist to manage the 
distribution of knowledge, that function is really subsumed under a 
greater epistemological goal: which is to manage the production of 
new knowledge. 
The 'life blood' of a discipline, then, is the acquisition and 
creation of new knowledge. All the members of a disciplinary 
community are really dedicated, either directly or indirectly, to the 
realisation of that goal. Anything else, such as the problem of 
circulating new knowledge to the disciplinary community at large, is 
really subsidiary. Production comes first, the problems of distri-
bution second. However, it is around both these functions that the 
bureaucracy of knowledge happens to be concentrated and organized. Not 
all members of a disciplinary community, for instance, are involved, 
per se, with gathering new knowledge. As in all bureaucracies - that 
is why they exist - there is within that of knowledge some measure of 
distribution of tasks and responsibilities. Specialized competencies 
are, for example, required to gather rather than to distribute knowledge, 
which in its turn requires specifics skills and training. The identi-
fication of cognisers with the requisite competencies is in the main 
executed by meritocratic selection; for the ruling class of a disci-
plinary community is above all things a meritocracy; and part of the 
function of a disciplinary continuum is to generate that meritocracy 
into being. 
If disciplinary communities have taken on the properties of 
bureaucracies - with roles and responsibilities being delegated to 
cognisers of a particular level of competency and ability - it should be 
possible to draw up a typological classification of such communities. 
A rudimentary classification, for instance, can be centred on the 
cogniser*s relation to the commodity of the community - knowledge. 
In very simple terms, all cognisers are either concerned with producing 
or distributing knowledge; and, as will be seen, all other roles that 
accrue to the cogniser are functional variations on this basic classi-
fication. Teachers, for example, are primarily distributors, whereas 
those cognisers working at the frontier of the discipline, near to the 
edge of nescience, are producers. This most primitive of typologies 
can be extended to accommodate other styles of knowledge production and 
distribution. Distribution, for instance, can be as well written as 
taught, thus evoking another type of cogniser; and then there are 
those cognisers who take on the task of acting as the 'conscience* of 
the discipline by criticising its means and methods of productivity. 
Neither should the purely entrepreneurial roles, which are less 
concerned with production of knowledge and more with the organization 
of the disciplinary community, be overlooked. They are important to 
the functioning of a disciplinary community, for they act to direct its 
operations and generally oversee the production and distribution of 
knowledge. And lastly there is, of course, the role of the student 
who is the recipient of distributed knowledge. 
From these observations, a provisional typology of a knowledge 
bureaucracy can be assembled. The typology would consist of categories 
of cognisers who are capable of executing the following epistemological 
functions : 
(a) the dissemination and distribution of knowledge through teaching 
or writing; 
(b) the creation and production of new knowledge that will either 
add to or refine the extant corpus of knowledge within a 
discipline ; 
(c) the critical evaluation of new knowledge, such that any 
deviations from the publicly accredited routes to knowledge 
can be identified; 
(d) the assimilation of an appropriate body of knowledge and the 
values it upholds. 
In addition, there is the meta-epistemological function which 
involves administering the institutions which have evolved to produce 
and distribute knowledge. It is a function that requires the cogniser 
to deal not so much with the matter of knowledge as with the institu-
tions that handle knowledge. And since organizational problems affect 
all parts of a disciplinary bureaucracy, this sort of cogniser is 
likely to be found there too. But that is not necessarily true of the 
other categories of cognisers, for the ambit of their responsibilities 
tends to be restricted to particular sectors of the knowledge conmunity. 
Thus, in terms of the divisions of the disciplinary continuum (see 5.6), 
cogniser roles *a* and 'd' tend to figure most prominently in the 
propaedeutic phase, whereas those of 'b* and *c' are more prominent in 
the metapaedeutic phase. 
Yet another way of composing a typology of cognisers can be 
achieved by relating the tasks and responsibilities just outlined to 
the model of the knowledge triad 'constructed* ^ 4 . 9 . This has the 
advantage that in portraying those tasks and responsibilities on the 
triad, it highlights what is epistemologically involved in executing 
them. To some extent this approach to analysing a cogniser's role 
has been prefigured ^ Chapter Four, where it was employed to elucidate 
the mechanics of producing new knowledge. It was noted, for instance, 
(see 4.11), that in order to generate new knowledge, the cogniser is 
often involved in modulating an observed dissonance between the 
cognition and the cognised radicals of the triad. It will remain, 
then, one of the objectives of Chapter Six to apply a similar analysis 
to the evaluation, distribution and assimilation of knowledge, and to 
ascertain if these also can be represented within the framework of the 
triad. But before that will be possible, the triad will have to be 
modified in one important respect. 
6.2 TRIAD INTO TETRAD 
Since no prescripti.n was made about the matter, it could be 
assumed that the radical (C^) assigned to the cogniser ̂ 4 . 3 could 
refer equally to plural or singular 'varieties* of knowers. The 
triad was similarly culpable in this regard. But then there seemed 
no virtue or pertinent epistemological insight to be gained from 
forcing such a distinction, so the radical was left, as it stood, to 
impute cognisers both in particular and in general. With the sugges-
tion, however, that knowledge possesses a social dimension - or, in 
other words, cognisers in the plural - there might now be some point 
in modifying the triad to incorporate this dimension. After all, 
aside from the fact that the whole commerce of knowledge is conducted 
in a communally governed framework (see 5.5), there are certain 
features necessary to that commerce which only arise from very intense 
and intimate cogniser contacts. And at present the triad has no way 
of accommodating these contacts, or of describing the epistemological 
exchanges that might occur in them. The notion, then, of a singular 
cogniser operating in a social vacuum is one that is foreign to the 
concept of knowledge. Even on a very fundamental and elementary level, 
the human relationship is a vital cogniser nexus from which the 
operations of knowledge cannot escape. This is, for instance, b o m 
out by the necessity of the teacher/student relationship, whose existence 
the triad, as it presently stands, tends to disguise. For instance, 
from examining the triad it could be surmised that the process of know-
ledge assimilation occurs in a social vacuum, without any real need for 
teachers to mediate in the process. The exchange between the cognition 
and cogniser radicals of the triad can be entirely managed by the 
student cogniser. He does not need direct and intimate contact with 
other more expert and competent cognisers to facilitate the acquisition 
of epistemological skills and facts. And to some extent the existence 
of the 'autodidact' - the self-taught man - who manages to acquire a 
level of epistemological competence quite in excess of his formal 
educational experiences, moreover in 'solitary confinement*, would 
tend to bear this out. But before acceding to the implications that 
flow on from the phenomenon of the *autodidact' and the concept of the 
self-educated man, the phenomenon really needs to be more thoroughly 
examined. When that is done it soon becomes apparent that the 'auto* 
in *autodidact* is not so auto after all; for whilst the autodidact 
might claim to have had no direct physical contact with teachers, in 
the orthodox sense, he will have had contact with * teachers* of sorts 
through the books and writings that he will presumably have read to 
have obtained self-tuition. The word *self*, then, in the participial 
adjective * self-taught * is really a misnomer. Admittedly, the auto-
didact does not have the benefits - and there are several, as was 
suggested d^ 5.5 - of * person to person* teaching, but he does have 
the benefit of a teacher. His teacher, however, unlike that of the 
usual student, is cast in the role of an author and not a pedagogue. 
The moral to be drawn from the 'autodidact* is that even in the 
attempt to deny the sociality of knowledge, it is implied. However 
much the cogniser might try to incarcerate himself from the community 
that knowledge represents, he is indubitably, even if only by proxy, 
involved with it. There is, then, to all knowledge a civic coefficient, 
whose value is determined by the level of personal involvement a 
cogniser has with a knowledge community. With the autodidact the 
value of that coefficient is relatively low; with the cogniser, 
working at the frontier of his discipline, certain factors (vide infra) 
make it imperative that it be much higher. It is a matter of any 
engagement with knowledge bringing the cogniser into contact with other 
peoples' minds, both living and dead. For as the French Eighteenth 
Century philosopher, Fontonelle, put it: "an educated mind is, as it 
were, composed of all the minds of preceding generations" (Gablik, 1976, 
p.35). 
A cogniser travels to knowledge through the auspices of a discip-
line's social dimension. At present, the triad does not portray this 
part of the cogniser*s itinerary. It only indicates that, principal 
amongst the cogniser*s epistemological relationships, are those he has 
with knowledge (cognition, C^) and reality (cognised, C^)- What is 
now being suggested is that in fact the cogniser*s epistemological 
outlook is also compounded from another relationship: that which he 
has with other cognisers. There is involved in the knowledge process, 
then, a *plane of conviviality', along which the cogniser establishes a 
rapport with past and present members of a knowledge community. And 
it is to accommodate this plane, and the ramifications that flow on from 
its existence, that one more vertex will be added to the triad, thus 
transforming it into a 'tetrad*: 
Figure 6.1 
- THE KNOWLEDGE TETRAD -
COGNISED (C^) d 
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The principal advantage of the tetrad compared with the triad is that 
it makes it possible to incorporate those inter-cogniser rapports which 
are a vital part of the commerce of knowledge. Those rapports come in 
a variety of styles and types. Their style is likely to be determined, 
however, by the kind of cognisers involved. For instance, if the 
prescript 'y* in the expression yC^ denotes a student, then the inter-
cogniser rapports involved are likely to be an assimilative style and 
to be conducted largely with teachers (tC^). But as the student 
(sC^) progresses along the disciplinary continuum, the pedagogic bias 
of that rapport tends to weaken and change. Indeed, if the student 
progresses to the metapaedeutic phase of the continuum he will become 
involved with a different set and caste of role cognisers altogether. 
The tetrad, incorporating as it does the social dimension of 
knowledge, enables a more comprehensive and authentic picture of the 
epistemological process to be framed. It will permit, for instance, 
the representation of the kinds of rapport and exchanges which occur 
between cognisers in their dealings with knowledge; and as these are 
a vital adjunct to the knowledge process, a model which accommodates 
them is obviously more plausible and veristic than one which does not. 
It is to the modified model of the triad, then, because of its greater 
flexibility and better schematic representation of knowledge, that much 
of the subsequent discussion of role cognisers will resort when it 
seems enlightening to reproduce these roles diagrammatically. That 
discussion will commence with an examination of the role of student 
cogniser. 
6.3 STUDENT COGNISER (sC^) 
The embryo of cogniser development is found in the student; but 
how that embryo develops depends on a number of factors, not all of 
them epistemological. Cognisers, for instance, are made not born; 
and their making occurs as they proceed along the disciplinary 
continuum. It is there that knowledge instigates its impressions 
upon the cogniser, effectually drawing his attention to quarters of 
the world that would normally lie below the threshold of his awareness. 
Before that happens, the cognition vertex of the triad and all the 
verities about the world it acts as a vendor for, is virtually absent 
from the cogniser*s percipience of the world. The cogniser, of 
course, still perceives the world, but without the benefit of know-
ledge. He is a prisoner in his own consciousness and the 
constructions it chooses to place upon the world; for whilst he 
remains a 'captive* in the pre-paedeutic phase of the continuum (see 
5.6), he is estranged from the public domain of knowledge. It is only 
when he embarks on the continuum - and enters the first phase of know-
ledge initiation - that the * secrets* of the cognition domain are 
revealed to the cogniser, and he becomes aware of a publicly authen-
ticated 'reality* that is epistemological rather than perceptual. It 
is at that stage, then, and only then, that the cognition vertex of the 
triad penetrates the consciousness of the cogniser; and as it increa-
singly does so, the cogniser becomes much less the slave of his own 
egocentric interpretations of the world, and more the willing partici-
pant in a communal interpretation of it. And as that participation 
becomes more intense, the consonance between the cognition and cognised -
which is the condition of established knowledge - gradually gives way to 
dissonance. For, as the cogniser becomes epistemologically aware, he 
begins to sense discrepancies between some of the knowledge he has 
assimilated and the observed behaviour of reality. But that only 
occurs when the cogniser begins to emerge from the chrysalis of 
cognitive metamorphosis that is the continuum. And, in any case, 
before that happens, the cogniser is subjected to a whole plethora of 
transformations that serve to determine what sort of dissonance he, as 
a 'mature* cogniser, will eventually come to modulate. 
Whilst it may be assumed that the cogniser*s mind, before it *sets 
foot* on the continuum, is a virtual tabula rasa that is susceptible 
equally to any epistemological influence whatsoever, there are factors -
perhaps psychological, perhaps pedagogic - which cause the cogniser to 
develop a stronger orientation to some parts of the knowledge spectrum 
than others. It has been noted that, as his education proceeds, the 
cogniser gradually learns to look at the world through the *eyes* of 
knowledge, rather than his own. But the dominion of knowledge, as 
discussion of the epistemological spectrum (see 4.6) revealed, is wide 
ranging and diverse. It is *polyommatus* - many eyed - and so the 
question is inevitably raised, what are the major factors that influence 
the cogniser choosing one *eye* of the knowledge spectrum rather than 
another? Some of these factors are obviously pedagogic, and these 
will be dealt with more thoroughly 6.4, when the role of the teacher 
cogniser (tC^) will be examined. There is evidence (Griff, 1970, 
p.147), for example, which indicates that, of all influences, the 
"public school experience" of art is a major factor in the recruitment 
of students to artistic communities. Conversely, it has been pointed 
out that a major factor in the decline in the recruitment of students 
to scientific communities is the poor quality of science teaching in 
the secondary sector of education (Zinberg, 1974, p.242). That that 
should be particularly worrying is due to the fact that most scientists 
decide upon a commitment to science as a career between the ages of 
thirteen and fifteen. 
It would appear that education's role in fostering disciplinary 
loyalty only serves to cement and give outer-direction to disciplinary 
tendencies that are incipient in the cogniser from a very early age, 
indeed from the earliest age possible! For example, there is a strong 
correlation between "primogeniture" and being either a successful 
artistic or scientific cogniser (Getzels and Csikszentmihalyi, 1976, 
p.164; Hudson, 1975, p.121). Newton and Einstein were both 'first 
boms' in their families; not that that means much in itself, except 
that it might have generated that degree of emotional independence and 
isolation which is a marked personality trait of the scientist (Gardner, 
1973, p.319; Cotgrove a ^ Box, 1970, pp.50-51). Indeed, scientists 
would appear to find the company of the natural and physical world much 
more to their liking than that of people; and whilst it would be 
difficult to characterize scientists as out and out misanthropes, it is 
of note that they often transfer the scientific mode to their dealings 
with people. Scientists, for example, quite often expect to trammel 
their human relationships in the same cordon of order and determinism 
that marks their dealings with the physical universe. They employ the 
methods of empiricism not only in the laboratory, but in their lives as 
well. 
These autobiographical ramifications however do not necessarily 
stem from just studying science, for there is some evidence to suggest 
that they are already incipient in the cogniser before he ever reaches 
the continuum and begins a formal scientific education. Most potential 
scientists, for instance, spend relatively isolated and lonely child-
hoods, exiled from the pursuits and interests of their contemporaries. 
They would appear to be socially inept and gauche from the first. 
It is as though these precocious Ishmaels of culture prefer to 
sublimate their problems with people in unravelling the riddles of the 
physical world; for from an early age scientists are very materialist 
in instinct. A strong interest in the physical world and a delight 
in discovering new knowledge are often dominant passions in the child-
hood of the scientist (Hudson, 1975, p.137; Miller, 1970, p.82). 
This was certainly the case with Max Planck, who, in recalling the 
origins of his scientific mentality, noted how it was stirred into 
life by the realisation that the laws of reason echoed the sequences 
of sensory impressions received from the world. From the moment, 
which was in early childhood, that he saw the connection between the 
two, Planck came to regard the pursuit of scientific reason as the 
"most sublime pursuit in life" (Planck, 1950, p.13). But it is not 
just scientists who reveal their talents at a very early age. It 
would appear to be equally true of very gifted artists. It is said 
that Picasso could draw before he could talk, and that at four Bartok 
could play from memory forty songs (Storr, 1972, pp.170-171). Education, 
then, sometimes merely serves to reinforce an epistemological *life 
style' that the pre-paedeutic cogniser is beginning to lead anyway. 
The roots of disciplinary allegiance, at least in a number of well 
known individual cases, often seem to lie much deeper than the service 
education can perform. It only capitalizes on what at a profound 
psychic level has been determined anyway. The intellectual is an 
outgrowth of the deeply personal, and it is as much inner as outer 
directed. 
The type of thinking that science elicits is that which Hudson 
(1966, p.102) has characterized as "convergent". It tends to attend 
to the impersonal aspects of culture and is inclined to take flight 
from the expression of human emotions. It is the kind of thought 
that finds the security of authority, order and absoluteness much more 
acceptable than the vagaries of irrationality and extreme subjectivity, 
On the other hand, "divergers" - Hudson's opposite category of 
thinkers - do not find themselves retreating from the domain of 
affectivity and are in fact quite at home in it. Indeed, they are 
inclined to loathe the exactitude and manifest determinism of 
convergent thought (Hudson, 1970, p.16).* Thus, whereas convergers 
are inclined to develop an interest in the right-hand end of the 
knowledge spectrum, divergers feel more naturally inclined to its 
left-hand sectors. Their appetite for knowledge is more readily 
satisfied by art rather than science. 
In terms of cogniser development, it would appear that a loyalty 
to the arts or science ends of the knowledge spectrum emerges at 
particular phases of a child's general psychological development. It 
has already been noted, for instance, that an enthusiasm for science 
and things of the material world is evident in scientists often well 
before the onset of adolescence. The scientist usually has a strong 
commitment to his discipline when others are still vocationally very 
* These are unlikely to be mutually exclusive categories of thought. 
Indeed, it could be argued that there are elements of divergency in 
convergency thought, and vice versa, as Elliot has to some extent 
pointed out (Elliot, 1971, p.122). The writing of a poem - which 
would presumably be, in Hudson's terms, a divergent activity - is a 
case in point. What could be a more convergent activity than 
searching for a word which most nearly satisfies the demand of the 
content and metre? As an activity, the search for such a word is 
much like finding the next number in a number series, a thoroughly 
convergent activity. 
immature. That the scientific outlook should be cemented so early is 
probably because children in general, between the ages of five and ten, 
are much interested in 'reality testing'. They are in the psycho-
logical phase of 'latency' and have temporarily withdrawn, to explore 
the effects of the material world, from human relationships. The 
qualities of convergent thinking, then, tend to crystallise in this 
phase of latency, which of course correspond to the primary sector of 
the continuum (see 5.6). Thus, if there is already in the cogniser 
a tendency to convergent thinking, previous to the latency phase, the 
exercise and excitement of reality testing would serve to exaggerate 
it still further. 
Divergent thinkers, on the other hand, would find the phase of 
latency rather inimical to the development of their epistemological 
interests. The materialistic orientation of latency, with all its 
accompanying 'misanthropy', is not particularly conducive to bringing 
to consciousness the diverger's more artistic temperament. In fact 
it tends not to surface until adolescence when, following the phase of 
latency, there is a reawakening of an interest in the more emotional 
affairs of life. People once again enter the scenario of an 
individual's psychological development. Naturally the proto-scientist 
who, when it comes to people, is inclined to be reticent and uneasy, 
remains unmoved by the social interests of adolescence. He is happier 
cultivating the materialistic outlook, whereas the diverger, who has a 
more innate sympathy for the irrational and capricious subjectivity of 
human affairs, often discovers a burst of epistemological enthusiasm 
for the arts. For it is they which resonate most strongly with the 
diverger's desire to enumerate and understand the emotional issues that 
are pressing on him in his own dealings with other people (Hudson, 1973) 
Adolescence, arguably, is an age of art, whereas the stage of latency, 
which precedes it, is essentially one of science. Thus it is more 
likely that a loyalty to the arts and the disciplines at the left-hand 
end of the knowledge spectrum comes into existence during the secondary 
sectors of the continuum, whereas that for science, as has been noted, 
develops in the first.* 
It is cogent to reflect that perhaps * trans-disciplinary* 
experiences have as much impact on the choice of disciplinary allegiance 
as those formal mechanisms which are performed in education to encourage 
that allegiance; and that apart from the psychically embedded factors 
that might predispose a cogniser to the right- rather than the left-
hand end of the knowledge spectrum, there are also some seemingly very 
peripheral factors, like being bed-ridden and coming from a family of 
Unitarians, which also exert an influence on disciplinary choice. For 
it has been found that many an eminent scientist suffered a major 
illness during childhood, which, it is suggested, provided the oppor-
tunity for the development of a rich fantasy life (Roe, 1953, pp.87-89). 
As to their religious background the vast majority of scientists come 
from liberal Protestant families. The Unitarian Church has a 
particularly good record for producing scientists. Roman Catholicism, 
it seems, is unconducive to breeding the rational mindedness that is a 
requirement for science (McClelland, 1962). 
To some extent, then, a student's disciplinary persuasions are 
* Not that such loyalties are irrevocable. Apart from the student 
cogniser who has a change of disciplinary heart in mid-stream, there 
is also the well documented phenomenon of something like fifty per 
cent of science students, after graduating, leaving their chosen 
discipline altogether (Zinberg, 1974, p.242). Paradoxically, it 
is often because, at University, they have discovered the pleasure 
of being a diverger. 
provisionally moulded by factors which educators may be powerless to 
mollify or negate. The pre-educational experiences of early childhood 
might have a more pronounced impact on disciplinary preference than has 
hitherto been conceded (Hudson, 1973, p.71). But if it is these 
experiences that finally determine where a student will 'plant* his 
epistemological loyalties, it is also true to say that other 'trans-
disciplinary* experiences can compound to influence the emphases that 
are apparent in a cogniser's epistemological sensitivity. The world 
around a cogniser, for instance, can in quite tangible ways affect the 
construction he places upon it. In its own way, the environment can 
act as a pedagogue upon the cogniser's sensitivity and lead to 
distorted pictures about the nature of reality. Geologists, it was 
noted ̂  2.7, brought up in the Middle West of the United States, far 
away from the manifestations of dramatic coastal erosion, were inclined 
to the view that high plains or plateaux were formed by sub-aerial 
denudation. On the other hand, their more littorally inspired 
colleagues in Britain - who had the sea all around them and could see 
its erosive power - took the view that only this power could be 
responsible for such geological formations. 
It was indicated earlier that the cognition vertex of the triad 
served to impress itself upon the student cogniser's vision of the 
world, transforming it in all manners and modes. It was suggested 
that it added a dimension - the dimension of knowledge - to the 
cogniser's outlook that he did not previously possess. The argument 
which has followed this initial assertion, whilst not actually super-
seding it, has tended to indicate that the student cogniser's role in 
the process of epistemological initiation is not quite so inert as all 
that. Whilst he might be an epistemological tabula rasa in the very 
substantive aspects of knowledge, it does seem that he might often have 
some very archetypal predisposition to certain sorts of knowledge: and 
that the role of education is not, after all, to implant these 
predispositions, but to encourage and render them more substantial. 
Thus the influence of the C^ vertex is not to subvert the cogniser*s 
*un-epistemological' disposition to the world, but to make it more 
overt and known to him. Its influence, when exercised, enables him 
to see that the epistemological path he is 'instinctively* treading 
conforms to the canons and directions of science or art. 
Whilst the cogniser*s contact with knowledge might serve to 
displace some of his more personalized responses to the world, it is 
true to say that some of them, together with certain autobiographical 
experiences, are instrumental in eliciting from the cogniser the 
commitment to knowledge which education will try and evince from him. 
The student cogniser*s awakening to knowledge, then, is compounded 
not just from epistemological experiences, but from personal, cultural 
and sometimes topographical ones as well. In fact, his cumulative 
epistemological sensitivity arises from a conjunction between his 
private experiences of the world and the more generalized and public 
* readings' of it available in knowledge. It is the teacher who first 
introduces the student to those public readings. 
6.4 TEACHER COGNISER (tC^) 
The role of the teacher can be summed up quite succinctly: it is 
to act as an intermediary between knowledge and the student. He acts 
as the medium through whom knowledge flows on its travels from the 
cognition to the cogniser radicals of the triad. His role helps to 
justify turning the triad into a tetrad: 
Figure 6.2 
THETEACHRR COGNISER 
^ V 
COGNITION (C^) COGNISER (sC_) r 
COGNISER (tC^) 
The teacher, then, in a disciplinary community is very much concerned 
with marketing and distributing knowledge. He is the 'salesman* in 
the knowledge manufacturing business. He is the middleman between the 
knowledge producer and the customers of knowledge, its students. He 
is the link between the acquisition of knowledge at the research frontier 
of a discipline and its consumption by cognisers stationed very remote 
from that frontier. 
Conceptual analysis has tended to reveal that some overall aim or 
purpose is logically elemental to the activity of teaching (Hirst, 1973, 
p. 167; Downie, Loudfoot and Telfer, 1974, p.4). Without that aim, the 
philosopher of education is usually loathe to supply the epithet 
'teaching' to the activities being considered as potentially 'teacherly'. 
Teaching, then, is teleologically orientated, and the telos to which it 
is orientated is learning or the development of the mind's capacity to 
reason. Now the latter, it has been argued (see 5.2), is the sine qua 
non of knowledge: hence teaching's bondage to it is quite in accord-
ance with this aim. 
The distribution of knowledge is usually executed in one of two ways 
The first occurs by proxy, through books, journals and other means of 
'literary* dissemination; and whilst they might not be intentionally 
didactic,* clearly anything which communicates knowledge and which 
therefore has the power to raise understanding and develop reason, 
rightfully deserves to be seen as a 'teacher*. However, the 'teacher 
by the book' - and he will have a section to himself (see 6.8) - and 
whose 'existence' can only be read 'between the lines', is a teacher 
of a totally different order from the teacher who distributes know-
ledge, so to speak, in the flesh. It is with the role of the latter 
sort of teacher that this section will be concerned. 
It is also worth bearing in mind that teachers are relatively 
ubiquitous 'creatures'. Attempts thus to cordon them within the 
limits of educational institutions does not make sense when plainly, 
these days, teachers are equally at home on television and radio as 
they are in the classroom. The sense of doing so rests mainly on the 
fact that teachers in educational institutions are involved in giving 
'tokens' to their students which are needed to gain entry into the 
next stages of the disciplinary continuum. On the other hand, their 
colleagues 'on the air' are not involved in giving tokens. Television 
and radio, for instance, do not generally award exchangeable tokens for 
viewing or listening to a 'lecture' given on them by a Jacob Bronowski 
or a John Kenneth Galbraith.** On the other hand, it would be hard 
to deny that such men are not teachers, and great ones at that, who. 
* Some modes of 'literary' dissemination, for example, are inten-
tionally didactic. Their purpose is 'to teach'. The average 
school textbook is like this. 
** There are, of course, nowadays, many exceptions to this; for 
example, the 'Open University' in the United Kingdom, which conducts 
many of its courses on radio and television, thus successfully 
bringing the lecture theatre into the living room. 
very much in the tradition of T.H. Huxley and Michael Faraday, have 
made profound and major intellectual movements accessible to the 
ordinary man in the street. It is just that the teaching they do 
does not directly accrue to its recipients anything in the way of 
educational recognition. By itself, then, the act of watching "The 
Ascent of Man" or "The Age of Uncertainty" confers nothing on its 
viewers except the deepest enlightenment; and unfortunately that buys 
very little on the Academic market! The paradox of the matter is 
that, had Professor Galbraith given "The Age of Uncertainty" at his 
token-giving Alma Mater, Harvard, the students who ventured to his 
lectures would have no doubt obtained the same deep enlightenments 
plus - if they satisfied course requirements - some educational tokens 
for their trouble. 
Teachers, then, can be employed in both token and non-token giving 
institutions. It is with the teachers in the former institutions, 
however, that this section will be primarily concerned. It has 
already been noted (see 5.7) how the institutionalization of knowledge 
has tended to make disciplinary communities very qualification conscious, 
The * token dispensing' teachers, who are 'employed* by a disciplinary 
community, are therefore expected to possess the token they are 
responsible for awarding. In fact, their disciplinary training is 
generally expected to be one institutional stage in front of the 
students they are teaching (see 5.6). Credentials signal at what 
level a teacher is permitted to teach. However, his capacity to do 
so - more than his legal right to do so - rests on something more than 
the credentials he has managed to collect. For, as was also noted ^ 
5.6, the actual ability and authority to teach are not logical exten-
sions of the formal authority to do so. Paper qualifications are not 
necessarily a measure of teacher effectiveness. Of course, some 
measure of expertise in the discipline is expected of the teacher. 
But that expertise is really only the substantive backcloth of what is 
the principal métier of the teacher: namely the ways of conveying 
that expertise. The teacher is not only an authority on some subject, 
but also on the methods of teaching it as well (Peters, 1970, p.252). 
And this embraces not only a 'feeling' for the rhetoric of communi-
cating knowledge, but also an understanding of the psychological and 
social nature of the student cognisers to whom he does his teaching. 
For acumen in these things is a necessary element of the process of 
converting C^ knowledge into terms that students can readily assimilate. 
The teacher's art, then, is very much a matter of rendering the 
'consonances' at the C part of the triad audible to the maximum number n 
of students. The teacher's plane of interest on the triad is the 
'b-dyad'. 
The teacher's disciplinary competence comes from his 'long march' 
along the continuum. The multiplicity of skills involved in the art of 
teaching (Symes, 1977) come from another quarter altogether. To accom-
modate that quarter, the continuum really needs inserting into it what, 
in the jargon of the computer programmer, would be called a 'branch'. 
For, as was indicated ^ 5.6, the student cogniser does not always 
have to reach the quaternary sector in order to secure a place in the 
disciplinary continuum. For instance, if he desires to teach in the 
primary sector of the continuum, that 'march' can reasonably conclude 
at the end of secondary education. His disciplinary training need 
not go any further. But before he can actually teach 'primary', 
the student cogniser will have to go through a period of pedagogic 
training. Thus, the cogniser's route back to the primary 
sector - as a fully credentialized teacher (t^C^) - is diverted 
through an institution specifically in the business of training 
teachers. 
So far, it has been indicated only that a disciplinary community 
is longitudinally organized. Its members, it could be surmised, 
perhaps only relate upwards and downwards on the continuum. For 
nothing has been said of possible 'side-ways* relationships. There 
might b e , for instance, in addition to the overall longitudinal 
community, some latitudinally organized institutions within that 
community designed to consolidate and perhaps elaborate 'side-ways* 
relationships. Institutions of teacher education, for instance, are 
a case in point. They are a 'branch' off the main programme of the 
continuum. They only relate indirectly to the movement of personnel 
and knowledge up and down the continuum. In fact the education of 
teachers, and the institutions which carry it out, could be regarded 
as 'meta-communities'. Their principal orbit of interest and 
responsibility centres on the pedagogic ways of distributing a know-
ledge that they themselves, as institutions, do not engage in. Rather, 
Svengali-like, they leave the presumption of that role to the teachers 
they train. In the meanwhile, it is hoped that the training received 
will leave the student-teacher cogniser better prepared and equipped 
to serve his role on the continuum. For if, as Green (1971, p.4) 
suggests, that role consists of three major types of activity, the 
logical, the strategic and the institutional, then the training and 
education most student-teachers receive embraces specialities designed 
to offer understanding on these activities. The curriculum theory he 
will study, for instance, will encapsulate ways of presenting knowledge 
more effectively. It will embrace Green's 'logic' of teaching. 
On the other hand, the sort of techniques of motivation and persuasion 
urged by the educational psychologist will fall within the province of 
the strategies of teaching. The point is that the meta-community has 
itself proliferated a plethora of specialities designed to make the 
distribution of knowledge more scientific and efficacious. The 
'b-dyad' has almost become a continuum (if not a cognised) in its own 
right. But it is a 'continuum* which exerts most of its influence on 
the continuum, as a whole, in latitudinal rather than longitudinal 
directions. That is, the province of most teacher education is 
exclusively directed at either the primary or secondary sectors of the 
continuum. 
Then, of course, within the 'family* of practising teachers -
working directly on the continuum - there are further latitudinal 
concentrations of interest. Most teachers, for example, form them-
selves into disciplinary associations whose function is to promulgate 
new developments of pedagogic technique in their particular disciplines 
Thus within the overall horizontal bureaucracy of the knowledge 
community there are also minor vertical bureaucracies - of the teacher 
education type - which have a particular and specific function to play 
in a limited domain of the continuum. 
Teachers are trained basically to l e a m the gamut of 'rhetorics' 
that can be used to convert knowledge into terms which student 
cognisers can assimilate and understand. Whilst dexterity of 
exposition might be uppermost amongst those rhetorics, it is not 
always the most effective way of securing that assimilation and under-
standing. Indeed, as Green (1971, p.8) points out, in the more 
elementary sectors of education the teacher is often more successful 
if he foregoes logical exposition altogether and adopts a more 
strategically based teaching. Particularly where the primary school 
teacher (tĵ Ĉ ) is concerned, ability to motivate and interest the 
child counts for much more than eloquence - which will frequently be 
lost on the child anyway. Hence, as was noted ̂  5.7, the accent of 
the primary school teacher's training is usually upon method rather 
than matter. Not that the rhetoric of persuasion need be absent or 
any less evident in teachers domiciled in other parts of the continuum. 
It might be less "strategic" and less childish in its appeal, but part 
of the lure of all good teaching is, as Peters (1970, p.259) has pointed 
out, that it gives to its recipients the impression of having the 
mysteries and secrets of some epistemological cult revealed to them. 
Nine-tenths of motivation involves surrounding knowledge with an "aura". 
That is one way to effect excitement and enthusiasm for it. 
The quasi-religiosity of Peters* metaphor tends to disguise, yet 
emphasise what the real business of the educator is: epistemological 
evangelism. For though the seeds of a personal disposition to a 
particular form of knowledge might have been sown in a cogniser's early 
infancy (see 6.3), the teacher, to use a Froebelian metaphor, still 
assumes a very active role in nurturing that seed into bloom and 
flower. Besides, the Max Plancks of this world, who need no 
convincing about their true epistemological avocation in life, are 
hardly the norm in the educational arena. So it remains very much the 
responsibility of the teacher to proselytise his students to his 
epistemological way of thinking. Indeed, it has been held that the 
mark of the gifted educator is that he can transform a modicum of 
disinclination towards a discipline into a lasting enthusiasm (Peters, 
1970, p.39). The measure of a teacher's ability, then is not tested 
in preaching to the epistemologically converted, but in turning the 
eyes of the apostates. In fact, the old argument of whether it is 
more apposite pedagogically to derive the etymology of education from 
educare or educere can be stood on its head. There is as much 
'seduction' in the enterprise of education as 'drawing* or 'leading 
out*. Thus if appositeness is being sought, it might be equally as 
appropriate to call teachers *seducators' as educators! 
Given that knowledge does not generate enthusiasm unless it is 
rhetorically dressed up, a pointed critique of education might be that 
if it takes that much trouble to get people interested in knowledge, 
why bother? That critique is often answered - as it was in 5.2 -
normatively, by imputing to knowledge all sorts of beneficial psycho-
logical and cultural repercussions. It is said, for instance, that 
since knowledge represents a celebration of rationality and since 
rationality improves the existential calibre of human beings, all 
ought to be exposed to the manifestations of knowledge. Education 
represents the baptism of that exposure. It is supposed to lay the 
foundations for a lifelong appreciation of knowledge for its own sake, 
rather than any utilitarian ends it might be partially instrumental 
in realising. However, it does not seem that teachers - and 
presumably many of them would subscribe to this liberal defence of 
education - are particularly successful at encouraging a reverence for 
knowledge for its own sake. Many students at universities - which 
after all, as an institution, represents the apogee of liberal 
education - tend to regard the learning they receive there in purely 
'journeyman' terms (Miller, 1970, p.63). They regard it as an invest-
ment for their occupational rather than cultural future. 
Perhaps some of this ambivalence stems from the nature of 
education itself. For if the student cogniser consciously rejects 
the liberal defence of a university education, and if he himself has 
no intention of joining a 'knowledge community*, then he has effectually 
excluded himself from two of the primary justifications for having 
institutions like universities. For, as has been noted previously 
(see 5.2), education functions ambidexterously. On the one hand, it 
serves to introduce each generation of a society to what the poet W.B. 
Yeats aptly described as the "monuments of imaging intellect". That 
is the liberal ideal of education. And on the other, it is instru-
mental in perpetuating both itself and the knowledge communities for 
which it acts as an *emplo)nnent agency* . Whether the one end is 
interlaced in the other, or is subsumed under it, is quite irrelevant, 
for it is more a matter of convenience that education, in educating 
people in general, can train some of their number to become bona fide 
members of knowledge communities. The two functions, at least until 
the tertiary sector of the continuum, live in co-existence with one 
another. What was made clear, however, by the systems treatment of 
disciplinary communities (see 5.7 and 5.8), was that such communities 
need to recruit to their ranks a minimum number of student cognisers to 
carry out certain roles and necessary functions within the community. 
If it is unable to, the community will soon degenerate into 'entropy* 
and eventual desuetude. As a matter of functional priority, then, the 
training function of education assumes for knowledge communities far 
more importance than its educating function. 
The teacher's role of 'seducator*, then, operates on two mutually 
inclusive planes. Firstly, he must cultivate amongst all his 
students, a more than transient enthusiasm for the knowledge over 
which he is curator; and then, amongst the most enthusiastic of those 
students, a desire to develop and use that enthusiasm in a knowledge 
community. The teacher makes a speciality of luring people into the 
kingdom of lore. In that way he helps to sustain the 'genealogy' of 
a discipline. But as well as being the agent of disciplinary conser-
vation, the teacher is also, paradoxically, finally responsible for 
generating disciplinary change (Peters, 1970, p.261). Unless a 
discipline is to stagnate and the springs of 'content' development in 
it are to dry up, the students the teacher trains must be more than 
passive recipients of the knowledge delivered to them. Unless the 
respect for knowledge they develop is also fringed with a legitimate 
and appropriate disrespect that goes beyond accepting the validity of 
all knowledge as absolute, teachers would only be instrumental in 
perpetuating the epistemological status quo. Teachers, in order to 
facilitate the growth of knowledge, then, must ensure that amongst 
some of their students the spirit to preserve knowledge is also fired 
with the desire to change some of it. 
But some students are more capable of doing this than others. 
Thus it is another function of teachers that they partake in the 
process of allocating intellectual resources (Wilson, 1962, p.20). 
Much of that allocation, of course, is decided meritocratically (see 
also 5.8 and 6.1). For disciplinary communities are organised very 
much about a hierarchy of talent. They conform in fact to that 
ideal form of society that Plato envisaged in The Republic, with the 
intellectual "gold" clinging to the top of it, ringing most of the 
changes of knowledge, and the "brass" and "iron", at the bottom, doing 
much of the most menial and pedestrian work in the community. 
Construed in such terms, one of the teacher's jobs, then, is to 
overlord the 'metallurgy' of student cognisers, and to see that their 
intellectual 'ore' gets to that part of the disciplinary system where 
it can be most effectively utilized. In this respect, teachers are 
very much academic talent scouts, or as Merton (1960, p.308) aptly 
characterizes them, intellectual "truffle dogs" ever trying to snuffle 
out the possible excellence in cognisers. That feel for talent which 
teachers might presume to have is not the only barometer that enables 
them to spot the intellectual 'gold*. Aside from controlling the 
"formal avenues" into the stocks of knowledge, the public examination 
has, since the Nineteenth Century, also tried to play the "truffle 
dog" - although not always with conspicuous success. The matricu-
lation examinations, for instance, which occur at the node of 
transition (see 5.6) from the secondary to the tertiary sectors of the 
continuum, do not have an impressive record for predicting academic 
success at university (Miller, 1970, p.100). There is evidence, 
particularly from England, that the intense coaching which goes on for 
'A* levels often has a "brain wash effect" on students, which secures 
them matriculation all right, but yet ill prepares them for university. 
Not that the final examinations at university are any better at picking 
the "truffles". The best possible of undergraduate degrees is not 
always a good barometer of the capacity to do research. Many a good 
scientist only gained a 'second* - Francis Crick was one - or even a 
'fourth'! Formal academic attainment, as measured in examinations, 
then, is often not the crystal ball it is intended to be (Miller, 1970, 
p.135). 
Of much more significance perhaps are the ramifications that flow 
on from the inter-cogniser rapports which prevail between a teacher 
and his student. It is of note, for instance, that in passing along 
the continuum the nature of this rapport becomes increasingly 
personalized and more one-to-one. In the jargon of administrators. 
the teacher/student ratio is reduced. Thus, graduate students in the 
quaternary sector, theoretically, have the most profound (if profundity 
is measurable in quantitative terms) rapport, and the primary student, 
the least. The justification for this of course is that the quaternary 
student, who in the process of having the 'power* of the discipline 
devolved to him, needs much more contact with his teachers if he is to 
import into his sensitivity those je ne sais quoi aspects of a 
discipline (see 5.4) that can only be acquired in a close student/ 
teacher relationship. Not that graduate students themselves report 
that such associations are enormously fruitful. On the contrary, they 
find the inter-cogniser rapport that occurs between their peers rather 
than their professors of much more epistemological significance to 
their research and professional development (Berelson, 1960, p.105). 
Of course, this is not always the case. Some teachers are notable 
for the way they are able to evoke excellence in others, and father a 
whole generation of considerable cogniser talents. Descartes' 
teacher^ Father Mersenne, was one. Many Seventeenth Century thinkers 
acknowledged their gratitude to Mersenne as a catalyst of intellectual 
challenge and as "a clearing house of Seventeenth Century science". 
Pascal said of him, for instance that "il a donne l'occasion de 
plusiers belles découvertes qu (sic) peut-etre n'auroient jamaise este 
faites d'il n'y eust excite les scavans" (Merton, 1960, p.317). It 
is as though such teachers are able to fulfil their own research 
ambitions through the work of their students; and, so to speak, 
fulfil their epistemological dreams vicariously. Then there are the 
teachers who leave a kind of intellectual inheritance, on which 
several generations of cognisers seem to capitalize. T.H. Huxley is 
accredited with being one such teacher. The departments of psychology 
and biochemistry he founded at Cambridge nurtured a whole generation of 
influential English psychologists and biochemists (Crowther, 1968, 
p.134). And at the same university, John Newport Langley appeared to 
have much the same impact on experimental biology and physiology. 
Sometimes it can happen too that a university can suddenly become the 
'centre of the universe* as far as disciplinary developments are 
concerned. This happened at the Georgia Augusta University in 
Gottingen. In the 1920*s, because of the remarkable constellation of 
teachers and students it was able to attract, it became a centre of 
restless intellectual activity in physics. It was not that any one 
teacher or teachers dominated Gottingen, but that students and teachers 
"became comrades into the interior of matter" (Jungk, 1964, p.28) which 
seemed to catalyse this activity. For out of that collaboration came 
a whole generation of cognisers whose names are virtually eponymous 
with nuclear physics. For Oppenheimer, Heisenberg, Dirac, Fermi, 
Pauling ... were all students at Gottingen sometime during the 1920's. 
* * * * * 
The teacher, it has been said, administers the transmission of 
knowledge and acts as a talent scout for the disciplinary community. 
His role also includes making himself redundant to the student. 
Advancement along the continuum should be marked by the progressive 
release of the student from dependence on his teachers. Education is 
the means by which a disciplinary community transfers its power and 
epistemological values to successive generations of cognisers. It is 
the vehicle by which the genetics of the discipline are conveyed from 
the 'parents' to the 'children' in a disciplinary community. And in 
that process of transfer, the teacher is the principal messenger 
carrying the 'genetic code'. But although one goal of teaching and 
education is to replicate the discipline and the bureaucratic structure 
which supports it, that replication is only the means to securing the 
more epistemological end of producing new knowledge. And the 
realization of that end requires a rather different role cogniser from 
the ones hitherto examined. It is a role whose main plane of interest 
is centred on the 'c-* rather than the *b-dyad*. 
6.5 RESEARCH COGNISER (rC^) 
The nutrient of a disciplinary community is new knowledge. In 
terms of a very crude metaphor, sections 6.3 and 6.4 have been 
concerned with how that nutrient is 'dished up* and 'eaten*, and by 
whom. For they described the roles that are associated with the 
distribution and assimilation of knowledge. In that sense, the 
student's and teacher's roles are both roles that are contingent, in 
the first place, upon the existence of some knowledge to distribute 
and assimilate. Without that, there would be no need for teachers or 
students. Thus, within a disciplinary community, the most antecedent 
of all roles is that associated with gathering the epistemological 
'nutrient' which all the other role-cognisers in the community, so to 
speak, survive off! Teachers and students alike live in symbiosis 
with the harvesters of knowledge in a disciplinary community. It is 
to their role that their employment in the community is ultimately 
indebted. 
The triteness of this observation demands that the import of the 
Humean ethic (see 5.1) be made more encompassing. For not only can 
it be said that there is 'no knowledge without knowers', but, 
reversing the dependency condition, it is equally true to say that 
without knowledge there would be no knowers. Certainly the community 
of a discipline, as it is being described here, and the roles it would 
appear to spawn, comes from the existence of knowledge, and the need 
to differentiate responsibilities in terms of its management. A 
discipline, then, is born at the frontier of knowledge, and as it 
matures and develops it gradually works its way down the continuum 
(see also 6.10). As it does so, it accrues a community of cognisers 
whose responsibilities are focused on the distribution of the 
discipline's knowledge and the training of other cognisers to appre-
ciate and eventually acquire that knowledge. But without its 
'frontiersmen*, a discipline is nothing.* It is the role, then, of 
research cogniser (rC^) which this section will principally consider. 
In 6.4, it was suggested that whilst a knowledge community overall 
is longitudinally organised along the phases of the continuum, within 
certain of its phases there is also a good deal of latitudinal 
* This might seem like a contradiction of an earlier and very forth-
right assertion. After all, when a discipline was being likened 
to an 'open system' (see 5.7), it was argued that one of the 
features which contributed to its systemicness was that in order 
to maintain itself in homeostasis, it required a continuous 'input' 
of cognisers. Not only were they required to manage the 'through-
put' mechanisms, but also 'content' output from the discipline was 
also somewhat dependent on them. As far as new disciplines are 
concerned, this could well leave the argument in a 'chicken or egg' 
dilemma: what came first, cogniser or content output? But from 
the point of view of their 'history', disciplines do not appear to 
have immediate and spontaneous autonomy. They do not, overnight, 
become independent systems. For they usually originate from 
beneath the panoply of another discipline, and their first practi-
tioners are usually role-hybrid disciplinarians: that is, their 
first interest might have been applied rather than pure, or they 
might have been trained initially in a discipline altogether 
different from the one they helped to establish (Hagstorm, 1965, 
p.215). Thus, Louis Pasteur was by training an oenologist, and his 
pioneer work in bacteriology was a later offshoot from it; Freud 
began as a physician, but was struck by the possibility that 
scientific principles could be applied to the study of the mind. 
organization as well. This was first noted in connection with those 
aspects of the propaedeutic phase that are associated with the education 
and preparation of teacher cognisers. It was indicated that the 
problems of pedagogic apprenticeship were rather specialized, and of a 
rather different emphasis from that encountered in the normal apprentice-
ship of cognisers. It was therefore quite natural that institutions 
should evolve to deal with the problems of teacher education, and that 
these institutions should be situated off the 'mainstream' of the 
disciplinary continuum. A similar latitudinal elaboration of the 
knowledge community exists in the 'metapaedeutic sector* of the 
continuum. It will be recalled from section 5.6, that the meta-
paedeutic sector is largely populated by cognisers who, having 
survived the exacting tests of disciplinary initiation, have secured a 
'licence' to harvest knowledge for themselves. The metapaedeutic 
sector, then, is very much the domain of the 'frontiersmen' in know-
ledge. It is where the 'research cogniser' practises his earned and 
credentialized right to seek out and promulgate new knowledge. He is 
therefore the major protagonist in the metapaedeutic sector; and it 
is his principal activity - the production of knowledge - which forms 
the fulcrum around which all the other tasks and responsibilities of 
the metapaedeutic community are balanced and organized. For the 
research cogniser needs that community, and the services its members 
are able to perform, in order to have his ideas criticized and his 
routine modes of thinking revamped. A "Robinson Crusoe" researcher, 
as Agassi (1975, p.209) has indicated, would be anathema to the devel-
opment of knowledge. Thus, within disciplinary communities are to be 
found a whole array of specialized roles and institutions designed to 
'process and handle' the knowledge that the research cogniser produces. 
They are his 'Man Fridays'. And they form part of the latitudinal 
organization of the metapaedeutic sector. They include such things 
as the professional societies to which research cognisers are virtually 
obliged to belong; the conferences which they attend to promote public 
discussion of their research findings; and the various specialized 
journals in which they publish those findings (Kuhn, 1974c.p.462; 
Toulmin, 1972, p.27). Moreover, although it has not been drawn as 
such, there exists in the metapaedeutic sector a kind of continuum 
along which, by dint of recognition, a research cogniser can make it 
to the 'top' of the disciplinary community. For just as in the 
propaedeutic sector of the continuum, equivalent 'tokens' are awarded 
to those cognisers who, in the opinion of the community at large, have 
made the most significant contribution to the knowledge of a discipline. 
Instead of certificates and letters after their names, the cognisers 
in the metapaedeutic community quest after things like the Nobel Prize, 
or the prestige that accrues from being admitted to L'Academie 
française or the Royal Society. These are always the ultimate 
accolades for the cogniser.* 
It was indicated in a previous Chapter (see 5.5), that the 
principal mecca of cultural advance is the university. It is there 
that most of the new discoveries in knowledge are made, and there that 
most, but not all, of the members of the metapaedeutic knowledge 
community are located. However, not every knowledge advance is made 
* Although they do not always signify much prestige as far as 
immortality is concerned. Take, for instance, the membership of 
L'Academie française; whilst its membership had admittedly always, 
during its history, been restricted to forty, it has managed to 
exclude from its ranks such notable French worthies as Descartes, 
Molière, Rousseau, Diderot, Saint Simon, Flaubert, Proust, to name 
but a few (Merton, 1960, p.323). 
in a university; nor is it the only institute to sponsor the liveli-
hood of the research cogniser. This is particularly true of those 
cognisers specialising in right-hand knowledge. Outside the academic 
institute, such cognisers have the choice of working in a government 
establishment or industry (Sklair, 1973, p.74). In fact, in purely 
quantitative terms, the patronage that the academy once gave to 
science has declined markedly. Government and industry have taken 
over, and are in fact the biggest employers of scientists. In the 
United Kingdom, for instance, something like 28% of all scientists are 
employed in industry alone (Cotgrove and Box, 1970, p.l). But whilst 
both government and industry have been havens of research, they are 
havens of a research that has a rather different character from that 
to be found in the academy. For one thing, the matter of answerability 
tends to guide government and industry funded and sponsored research 
much more than it does in the university. In this sense, the 
researcher in the university had a comparatively free 'epistemological* 
hand! Unlike his colleagues in industry, his can be a research not 
particularly obliged to satisfy utility or profit margins. His quest 
for knowledge does not have to have the market place in mind to justify 
it. For the industrial scientist, those things are all important. 
The disinterested progress of knowledge is of no concern to him. He 
is more interested in patents than publications, and of pleasing his 
board of directors than the community of science at large. It is a 
matter, then, of different research workplaces promoting a different 
kind of science (Sklair, 1973, p.127). 
By contrast, the workplace of the academy tends to promote the 
kind of research that is done for its own sake, without any extrinsic 
motive guiding it. The academy tends to worship the 'god Episteme' 
rather than Mammon! This is, of course, an attitude that is wholly 
commensurate with the ideals of education anyway; and one that, 
although students often volunteer a disclamation of (see 6.4), they are 
somewhat affected by. For upon graduating and entering the less 
idealistic avenues of industry, the student usually has to be 
re-enculturated to appreciate its particular ends and demands (Cotgrove 
and Box, 1970, pp.8-9). The university has to be purged from his 
system. He cannot afford, for instance, to transfer the notion that 
knowledge should be purified of utility to industry, for industry's 
existence fairly obviously depends on the exploitation of a contrary 
homily altogether. Yet students often do. 
It is only in the university, then, that the research cogniser can 
pursue his own research, and remain uncompromised by one extra-
epistemological goal or other. But on whatever pretext, it does seem 
that the preferred milieu of the brightest and most talented students 
who 'come off' the continuum is the university. This is because the 
tradition still persists that industry is usually the province of the 
intellectually second rate. The real intellectual aristocrats, the 
gold of the community, remain in the universities, preferring not to 
have to 'dirty their minds' on applied knowledge. A magical quality 
would appear to inhabit 'pure knowledge' which makes it so much more 
enchanting and appealing to the best intellects that they can easily 
justify turning their gaze from the sometimes very material persuasions 
of a job in industry (Sklair, 1973, pp.82-83; Cotgrove ̂  Box, 1970, 
p.165). Indeed, such are the virtues imputed to 'pure' knowledge that 
the consequent stigma attendant upon applied knowledge often overflows 
into the knowledge community itself. Theoretical physicists, who do 
their physics largely 'on paper' and 'in their heads' are usually 
considered to be a higher species of science 'animal' than the experi-
mental physicist who works directly with the things of the empirical 
world. And even within the community of theoretical physicists there 
is a precedence that places in a scale of value the "phenomenologist" 
above the "intermediaries", and the "intermediaries" above the 
"abstractionists" (Gaston, 1973, p.30). 
Whilst the context of knowledge gathering is not exclusively the 
university's, it is the only context which, at least in principle, does 
not intimidate the researcher into satisfying goals other than the 
purely epistemological.* It is also true that it is only in the 
university and academic setting that epistemological values are upheld 
with any earnestness and rigour (Sklair, 1973, p.169). But then the 
'industrial' cogniser's values are basically more orientated towards 
the market place than the discipline. Profitability and utility are 
more likely to determine his epistemological ideology than communalism 
and disinterestedness. Whilst the industrial cogniser, then, belongs 
to a community dedicated to the pursuit of knowledge that is allied 
in some ways to a bona fide disciplinary community, its axiological 
structure and system of values differentiate it from that community. 
The community of industrial cognisers must be regarded, therefore, as 
a tributary off the major knowledge community. It still makes 
epistemological gains, but in the pursuit of 'monetizing' those gains, 
it imposes on its cognisers a set of ordinances strange to the research 
cogniser 'brought up' in the orthodox knowledge community: hence the 
* Intimidation, for instance, is likely to occur in the attempt to 
obtain funds for a proposed research project. For in obtaining 
those funds, there is often a concomitant obligation to ensure 
that that research has some utility for, or is within the parameters 
of interest of, the funding agency. 
need for him to be 're-enculturated*. 
In whatever region of the knowledge enterprise the research 
cogniser is located, he remains loyal to the task of wresting know-
ledge from the 'world' he experiences. That is the objective to 
which he is committed, or else he is not technically a research 
cogniser. It is an objective which, in terms of the triad, has 
already been expressed (see 4.11) as the desire to cement a rational 
and empirically demonstrable nexus between the triad's cognised (C^) 
and cognition (C^) radicals. The knowledge 'gained from experience' 
serves to substitute substance for the "airy nothingness" that would 
otherwise persist between C and C,. Not that that nexus is entirely 
n d 
vacuous. 
If, for example, a relatively broad view of knowledge is taken, 
and it is held that, no matter how primitive and epistemologically 
coarse, all attempts to explain the 'workings' of the cognised are 
scientific - and thereby attempts to bridge the heuristic gap between 
C and C- - then the cogniser has always had available to him a 
n d 
repository of knowledge to help him explain the nature of his surrounds. 
Even the sometimes outlandish misconstructions that metaphysics has 
sometimes placed upon the cognised can be counted as confreres in 
that pursuit. It's just that occasionally those confreres have been 
shown to misinform the cogniser; and what was taken to be a wholly 
compatible marriage between C^ and C^ was in fact a divorce! 
Initially a cogniser is contracted to understand the world in terms 
of the knowledge which is available to him. He is very much, in his 
visions of the cognised, the victim of his epistemological inheritance. 
And at times this inheritance can occasionally split the cogniser's 
vision between the truths of empiricism and the dogma of metaphysics. 
The latter, and its advocates, can sometimes object to the findings of 
the former and often, as in the case of Galileo, for instance, result 
in at least its temporary suppression. Thus, scientific disciplines, 
particularly when 'getting off the ground*, usually have to struggle 
out of an embryo of metaphysics, which is frequently their epistemo-
logical 'backcloth*. It has been said, for instance, that the 
Copernican view of a heliocentric solar system was "inspired by a 
neo-Platonic worship of the light of (a) Sun who had to occupy the 
'centre* because of his nobility" (Popper, 1969, p.257). All that 
astronomy did was to corroborate the consonance that was already in a 
pre-scientific cosmology. It is more common, however, for that back-
cloth to mislead notions about what reality is really like. Properly 
construed it should yield, in such cases, a programme of what Lakatos 
(1974, p.132) has called "negative heuristic"; that is, it should 
indicate a course of research not to take, because it would only lead 
to specious conclusions. However, this is often not the case. It 
happened, for instance, when geology began to emerge as an autonomous 
discipline. Before the geological propositions of Sir Charles Lyell, 
the discipline tended to suffer - obviously to its empirical disadvan-
tage - from the desire to make its findings compatible with the 
chronology of the Bible (Gillispie, 1960, p.297). It was as though 
the ultimate arbiter of geological fact was not the fossils and the 
rocks in the Earth, but the Book of Genesis. 
This intermixing of the metaphysical with the scientific, 
particularly in the primitive stages of a discipline's history, high-
lights the thoroughly evolutionary character of knowledge. It points 
to the possibility that there are 'dinosaurs' in knowledge which the 
seemingly greater 'brain power' of science will eventually render 
extinct. It also suggests, as Comte (1970) and others (Toulmin, 1972, 
p.135) have indicated, that knowledge is largely the story of periodic 
supersession. And while the dramaticness of this supersession is most 
marked at the turnover from metaphysics to science, the narrative that 
science itself recounts about reality is not without its regular 
retelling! There are times when science too 'gets it all wrong' and 
has to be corrected. For there is just as much 'dinosaur' thinking in 
it as any other epistemological mode. 
In 4.11 it was shown how this phenomenon of knowledge obsolescence 
could be accommodated on the triad. The periodic 'break up' of the 
marriage between the C^ and the C^ radicals and their subsequent recon-
ciliation, it was suggested, amounted to the triad pendulating between 
a condition of 'consonance' and 'dissonance'. It was also noted ^ 
4.11 that the advance and progress of knowledge is brought on by the 
modulation of dissonance: therefore it is that modulation which remains 
the constant preoccupation of research cognisers. There is, however, 
a qualification that must be added to this ascription of the research 
cogniser's role. It is, that what is often one cogniser's consonance 
is another's dissonance. This has to be an acknowledged possibility 
because, whilst the great virtue of knowledge is its consensual appeal, 
it does not always agitate one singular phalanx of cognisers who are 
totally and unequivocally in its favour. Inevitably there are 
dissenters who are not always convinced that the marriage between C^ 
and C is as compatible and 'blissful' as some of its apologists make d 
out. Amongst Nineteenth Century geologists, Lyell was one such 
dissenter. His views on the evolution of the Earth's structure, for 
instance, were entirely dissonant with those of establishment geology. 
Whereas its representatives, like Adam Sedgwick and Roderick Murchison, 
were ever trying to prove geology consonant with the Bible, Lyell set 
about debunking their "diluvialist" mentality by showing that the 
geological facts were utterly discordant with the preachings of the 
Bible. In fact, by bowdlerizing geology of the Bible, Lyell put 
geology on a thoroughly scientific footing. 
The research cogniser*s attitude to cognition, and the nexus 
which prevails between it and the cognised, can in fact take one of 
three positions. Basically all three positions involve coining to 
terms with a level of epistemological dissonance. However, it is the 
way that that dissonance is modulated, and the gravity of the ramifi-
cations that flow on from it, which ultimately determine the 
characteristic features of these three positions. The first is that 
style of modulation which can be looked upon as an extension of the 
"coherence theory of truth". It accepts a certain state of 
epistemological affairs *as given* and then seeks out the sort of 
evidence and knowledge that will corroborate the 'given* and supply 
further justification for following it as an epistemological *mentor'. 
For as a mentor, it is considered *beyond suspicion*. All modulation 
does, then, is confirm the basic accord of already established 
cognition. It is just that there are certain *gaps* in our under-
standing of the cognised which the application of the cognition would 
fill. Those gaps constitute dissonance, the filling of them consonance 
Not that the concept of this epistemological procedure is at all novel, 
only the names for it are different. Kuhn (1973), for example, draws 
attention to it when he talks about "normal science" and pursuing a 
paradigm to the limits of its empirical expressiveness, whilst Klima 
(1974, p.110) would see the procedure as harvesting the seeds of a 
paradigm's "consistency*'. Normal science seeks to populate fhe 
vacuity of ignorance between C^ and C^ with knowledge that is already 
somewhat in accordance with a dominating epistemological mentor. 
Even though their research was grossly misguided, this was what 
Buckland and Sedgwick tried to do in perverting the course of 
geological history to suit the genealogy of the Earth given in the 
Bible. Biblical genealogy was the paradigm, and geological knowledge 
had to be made consonant and consistent with its teachings. 
The second style of modulation is in fact a 'de-modulation*. It 
is a style which is employed when it is found that certain epistemo-
logical anomalies exist which are beyond the accommodating power of 
the paradigm. Findings in the cognised are simply not consistent 
with the 'teachings* of the paradigm. De-modulation, then, serves to 
unveil previously unsuspected 'dissonances' between C^ and C^. It 
perceives discord where previously only harmony was thought to prevail. 
It thus serves to challenge the "intellectual authority" of some 
received paradigm (Toulmin, 1974, p.40). It indicates areas that, 
where knowledge was taken to be, there is in fact none; and proves 
that taking one particular course of heuristic is to commit epistemo-
logical heresy; for taking it only serves to exacerbate, not 
accelerate, the progress of knowledge. A typical example of this is 
the shadow that Newtonian mechanics and their application cast over 
the gradual understanding of the 'make up' of the Solar System. 
Whilst, for instance, Leverrier, in 1859, had been able to predict the 
existence of the planet Neptune using those mechanics - as a way of 
accounting for the perturbations in the orbit of Uranus - when the 
same mechanics were applied to Mercury (similarly perturbated) they 
did not prove nearly as efficacious (Hanson, 1962). In fact they 
led to the prediction that between Mercury and the Sun there existed 
another planet, Vulcan, which a number of astronomers even claimed the 
percipience to observe. And it was not until the experimental 
evidence had accumulated to explode the theory of Vulcan that 
astronomers finally stopped 'seeing* the "fictional planet". Its 
disappearance as an aberration, however, did no more than make the 
problem of Mercury's perturbation more difficult to solve; and the 
obsession with making whatever solution was pondered absolutely 
consonant with the laws of Newtonian mechanics led to even wilder 
postulates than that of postulating the existence of the planet Vulcan. 
For instance, an asteroid belt was proposed. But yet again the 
experimental evidence did not live up to the expectations of the 
proposal. And with so many seemingly credible postulates being 'shot 
out of the sky', it began to look as though the universe was not always 
a slave to Newton. And as some research cognisers began to look 
askance at its epistemological virtues, de-modulation of the Newtonian 
paradigm set in. The infinite generalizability of its consonance 
became a less powerful object of defence, as it proved to be guilty of 
dissonance in certain quarters of the cognised. But it is just this 
kind of discovery, that a knowledge is not quite so knowledgeable about 
the cognised as it was once thought to be, that is a prelude to the 
third style of modulation. 
Laconically expressed, that style amounts to a modulation of 
de-modulation; or introducing a consonance to where previously there 
had only been dissonance. It also amounts to rebridging the heuristic 
gap that that de-modulation opened up. It results in a new kind of 
knowledge being used to cross the abyss of ignorance. It is one that 
derives its effectiveness from its capacity to accommodate those 
anomalies that de-modulation unveiled. It has the power, then, to 
reconcile the two partners - cognition and cognised - in the 
epistemological marriage, which dissonance temporarily split asunder. 
The new knowledge does so by counselling the cognised into submitting 
itself to a completely novel set of laws. For a disciplinary 
community, this often represents a "revolutionary" turn of events which 
requires that cognisers adopt a correlative 'change of mind* about what 
they took to be the nature of reality (Kuhn, 1973). This happened in 
geology when Lyell insisted that if geology was to mature as a science, 
it had to divorce itself from theology. But more than just offering 
a manifesto of geology's desired independence, Lyell offered convincing 
proof why that independence was at all possible; for he showed "that 
existing forces, given time enough, account for the observable state 
of man's "habitat" (Gillispie, 1960, p.299). Sedgwick's deus ex 
machina was unnecessary. And such a proposal proved not only to be 
an enormous purgative for the Earth sciences, but the life sciences as 
well. It is arguable, for example, that Darwin's Theory of Evolution 
is as much a product of Lyell's Principles of Geology, as it is of his 
observations on the Galapagos Islands. 
This third style of modulation, then, always has the profoundest 
of ramifications on the development of a discipline or disciplines; 
for not only does the disciplinary coup d'etat initiated by this 
modulation overthrow the current centres of epistemological power in a 
community (Weingart, 1974, p.65), it also serves to launch, after the 
unheavals of revolution have settled, a new era of "normal science". 
Only this time round, that science has a new mentor as its guide. 
If the first style of modulation, then, indicates that there is 
nothing wrong with a knowledge, that it is quite normal, and the 
second points out that that is not so, that there are abnormalities 
inherent in it, then the third represents a cure and a return to 
epistemological normality. In effect, each style of modulation may 
be regarded as participating in what could be called the 'dialectic 
of knowledge gathering*. After all, '1* could be said to correspond 
to a thesis, '2' an antithesis and '3' a synthesis. But of more 
immediate use here is that it is possible to extend this analysis of 
'modulative' styles to accommodate a typology of research cognisers 
themselves. 
The research behaviour of cognisers, then, can be typed into 
three kinds. The vast majority of research cognisers, for instance, 
employ style one modulation. They "bow to the magisterial authority" 
of a paradigm, take a suitable problem seemingly answerable within its 
orbit, and simply "puzzle solve" (Kuhn, 1974a,p.4; Toulmin, 1974, 
p.40). Leverrier's research, as has been seen, displays all the 
traits of this kind of modulation. He bowed to the "magisterial 
authority" of Newton's celestial mechanics, and from them was able to 
postulate why Uranus was perturbated. Such research, and Leverrier's 
is typical of it, can be regarded as consonance hunting. It serves 
to reinforce the validity of the paradigm and supply further evidence 
for believing in its explanatory power. It is a style of research 
that is conservative rather than iconoclastic, and for which a great 
deal of the initial "puzzle solving" has been done by the paradigm. 
Without Newton, Leverrier would, for example, have got nowhere. He 
was, therefore, only building on what the architect Newton had planned 
Style one modulators are paradigm 'addicts'. Their research 
depends on the availability of a paradigm, otherwise the epistemo-
logical problems they confront would prove invincible. Because of 
its parasitic nature, 'consonance hunting' is really a lesser species 
of research. It is the activity of the hoi polloi in the research 
community; it represents the work of 'follow the leader* kinds of 
researchers (Mills, 1973, p.117). It is the research of those who 
exploit rather than formulate paradigms and who are footnotes to the 
big names in a disciplinary community. 
Not that a discipline can afford to disparage the work of its 
drones and lumpenproleteriat. After all it is they who do all the 
routine epistemological work upon which major discoveries are 
frequently contingent (Cole a ^ Cole, 1973, pp.216-217). For it is 
often in the very pedestrian elaboration of a paradigm that the sort 
of anomaly is unveiled which subsequently leads to a paradigm's down-
fall. Leverrier's work is an example of this. Hanson's apt 
description of it as the "zenith and nadir of Newtonian mechanics" 
(1962, p.359) is very revealing. For it was the pedestrian 
application of Newtonian mechanics to Uranus that gave further mandate 
to the continued efficacy of their explanatory power. Yet on 
logically extending their application to Mercury the consonance 
hunters proved to be out of their depth. The behaviour of Mercury 
was really quite dissonant and beyond the explanatory power of 
Newtonian mechanics. It needed quite another paradigm to explain it. 
Yet the drones relentlessly pursued the problem of Mercury in Newtonian 
terms and ended up only collecting evidence that was to indict, not 
prove, the viability of Newton in every astronomical circumstance. 
Working out the 'thesis', then, leads eventually to an 'anti-
thesis' and the emergence of a second type of research cogniser. He 
is the sort who specializes in 'de-modulation' and in discovering 
dissonances in a paradigm. He is interested in the aetiology of the 
abnormalities in a paradigm, although rarely brings off a cure for them. 
Style two modulators, then, are usually afoot when an epistemological 
revolution is in the offing. They are the 'guerillas' in a 
disciplinary community who. fire the 'initial shots' in a concerted 
campaign to overthrow a paradigm. They thrive in an atmosphere of 
discord and dissonance, as they work towards a satisfactory replace-
ment of that paradigm. And just as in a political revolution, a 
number of rival 'cadres' - each with its own particular revisionist 
strategy - are often competing with one another to gain legitimate 
epistemological 'power' before the other. 
As Watson (1968, pp.15-18)recounts it, this was certainly true of 
the story of the discovery of DNA's structure. Three main 'cadres' 
were located around the world: at Caltec in California, King's College 
in London, and at the Cavendish Laboratory in Cambridge; and all three 
were periodically to renuncíate each others' attempt to decipher the 
"secret of life". There was, for instance, a major split between 
Cambridge and London over whether DNA exhibited a helical structure or 
not. Pauling's apparently "unorthodox chemistry" at Caltec had 
indicated that it did. Franklin, at King's, however, was obdurate in 
her conviction that her X-ray pictures of DNA indicated a different 
structure altogether. Cambridge, meanwhile, tended to side with 
Caltec, much to the chagrin of Franklin (Watson, 1968, pp.164-171). 
It had good reason to suppose that the King's group had simply 
misconstrued their pictures, not realising that what they counted as 
evidence for an antihelical DNA was engendered by "minor distortions 
needed to pack regular helices into a crystalline lattice" (Watson, 
1968, p.166). 
Not only do style two modulators tend to be antithetical to the 
current understanding of a phenomenon, they are also often antithetical 
amongst themselves. Cadres fighting the same epistemological enemy, 
ignorance, frequently 'draw blood' from one another over the proper 
ways of defeating him. Yet it is these minor skirmishes, in which, 
overnight, would-be consonances are turned into dissonances, that 
provide the series of little leaps which eventually lead to the one 
giant and certain saltation into truth. And that is where the style 
three modulator enters the scenario of knowledge gathering. 
In disciplinary communities, it takes one man to make an epistemo-
logical revolution, but another five hundred to make it possible. 
Epistemological revolutionaries are not loners in the turrets of 
cerebration; they require the results of the researches of other 
cognisers to effect the closing of the heuristic gap in their field. 
It was Watson and Crick in Cambridge who finally brought off the DNA 
coup, but without Messrs. Pauling, Wilkins, W.H. and W.L. Bragg, and 
Rosalind Franklin and the 'phage' group who preceded them all, there 
would have been no revolution. Knowledge, then, always builds on the 
shoulders of the immediate past, but it is the revolutionaries who 
ultimately put knowledge head and shoulders above the past. For at 
the apex of every disciplinary community there are a few - often very 
few - research cognisers who are the originators of new paradigms. 
They are the architects of revolution in a discipline (Cole and Cole, 
1973, p.40); they are its superlunaries who, in rendering a long 
standing dissonance consonant, move a discipline massively onward and 
often down previously unenvisaged paths. Newton was of course one 
such superlunary, possibly the most super of them all.* 
* Judged in terms of the number of 'revolutions' he set in motion, 
Newton's contributions to the advancement of knowledge are simply 
staggering. In one particularly fecund phase of creativity, he 
produced the binomial theorem, differential calculculus, the theory 
of colours, integral calculus and the law of gravity (Gillispie, 
1960, p.119). 
Superliinaries are of course not just peculiar to physics. Most 
disciplines in fact have some figure or figures who are hallowed above 
all the rest, basically because after their contributions the discipline 
was never quite the same again. It is a matter of their consonance, 
having once been sounded, echoing through the minds and thoughts of 
many generations of cognisers. In this respect, what Newton is to 
physics, Lyell is to geology, Darwin to biology, Marx to sociology, 
Plato to philosophy, and so on. But all these "stars" are only a few 
amongst a whole constellation of minor luminaries, from whose insights 
their's are, in some measure, compounded (Cole and Cole, 1973,pp.216-217) 
And it is very often only because the "stars" have had the singular 
prescience to see a sudden and very often quite elementary illumination 
on an epistemological problem, that they are 'giant' rather than 'dwarf 
stars in a disciplinary community. In a 'there, but for the grace of 
God, go I' mood, T.H. Huxley, for instance, is reported to have said 
of Darwin's theory of adaptation, "How extremely stupid not to have 
thought of that" (Gillispie, 1960, p.302). But simple or not, it is 
such insights that make for the highest reputations in a disciplinary 
community, and that, as will be argued in the next section, for those 
who want to reach the apex of the community, is all important. 
6.6 OF HIGH REPUTE AND THE RESEARCH COGNISER 
Only the zealous romantic would argue that the cogniser's desire 
to smother ignorance with a capsule of knowledge comes out of an 
utterly altruistic wish to add to the stock of man's epistemological 
awareness, and nothing else. True, there might be an ingredient of 
that in it, but generally research cognisers, as Roe (1953, p.59) 
reported in her study of scientists, are frequently "doing what they 
most want to do anyway". They have been lucky in the sense that 
their intellectual talent has turned out to be suitable for the niche 
in life that would give them greatest satisfaction. Moreover, if 
that can be at all construed as satisfying a slightly selfish desire, 
there is the added fact that research cognisers also have the autonomy 
to pursue an area of epistemological investigation for which they have 
some strong sympathy and enthusiasm. Within their overall job, then, 
research cognisers have a great deal of free choice about what sorts 
of jobs they take on. They might, for instance, choose to pursue an 
enthusiasm that developed in childhood, as Lord Rayleigh did when he 
turned a precocious interest in photography into researches into wave 
motion and optics; or then again it might be a much more * apocalyptic* 
experience, as was the case with Charles Wilson, the inventor of the 
Cloud Chamber. It is said that his lifelong and resolute desire to 
understand atmospheric electricity and other nephologic effects stemmed 
from the occasion when he witnessed a spectacular thunderstorm on the 
summit of Ben Nevis (Crowther, 1968)! Crick, on the other hand, who 
was an apostate from the world of physics, got into molecular biology 
via Schroedinger's What is life?. Its suggestion that physics and 
chemistry could be applied to disentangling the genetic message was 
enough to cement Crick's belief that life could be explained 
mechanistically without resort to vitalist or quasi religious 
explanations. Ever after, he became committed to producing a 
"chemical-physics of biology" (Olby, 1972, pp.231-233). 
If the research cogniser is at all motivated by the desire to climb 
epistemological 'mountains* because, so to speak, they are not there, 
then the choice of mountains is often a very personal decision, rooted 
in some seminal event in the cogniser*s life. But these personal and 
selfish motives can sometimes be subsumed under a more basic institu-
tional imperative, which affects all research cognisers in a knowledge 
community, and that is the need to establish a reputation. After all, 
if, as was suggested earlier (see 6.5), the metapaedeutic phase is 
also conceived of as a kind of continuum within which a hierarchy of 
members and institutions prevails, then there must be some means by 
which hierarchical ascension is achieved. That ascension in fact is 
achieved not, as in the propaedeutic parts of the continuum, with 
'tokens* and certificates,* but with this very thing called * reputation* 
So how is that achieved in a knowledge community? 
As far as a knowledge community is concerned, research, publica-
tion and reputation are a veritable menage a trois. The fact that 
these three things do form a convenient marriage is to a community's 
advantage, for it would not function nearly as well if they did not. 
This can best be seen if the nature of that marriage is spelt out in 
propositional terms: 
(i) Content output is the ultimate goal of knowledge systems 
(see 5.7); 
(ii) Output which is not published is research that is "still-
born" (Wilson, 1964, p.197). It is a fruitless exercise 
to do research without the intention to publish. 
* The research cogniser is usually as fully 'certified* as he can 
be, otherwise he would not have been admitted into the metapaedeutic 
phase (see 6.3). In fact it is perhaps not quite true to say that 
the cogniser ceases acquiring * tokens*, rather that those tokens 
take on a rather different form. Vide, the way auctorial citation 
and number of publications is regarded in the research community, 
has all the hallmarks, so to speak, of the 'tokenism* encountered 
in the previous phase of the continuum. 
(iii) Connnimication is the lifeblood of a discipline (Cole and Cole, 
1973, p.116). It begets further research (Herbst, 1973). 
(iv) Reputation and recognition in a disciplinary community is 
secured by having one's research taken notice of. That in 
turn is a function of publication, which can be regarded as 
an attention seeking act (Wilson, 1964, p.195; Hagstorm, 1965). 
(v) Reputation is what a cogniser requires to ascend the hierarchy 
of a disciplinary community. 
In short, research means knowledge, knowledge means publication, 
publication means reputation, and reputation means ascension. Thus 
if the research cogniser wants ascension - as some do - then he is 
obligated to do that research which a knowledge system needs to 
continue perpetuating itself and thereby justify its continued 
existence. It is almost as if the 'publish pr perish' ethic, which is 
often used to incite cognisers into knowledge production, also defines 
the survival chances of the disciplinary system itself: unless there 
are publications within it, it w i l l perish. 
For the research cogniser, reputation is a kind of payment for 
contributing significant epistemological results. It is what he gets 
in return for making a knowledge "gift" to a disciplinary community 
(Hagstorm, 1965, pp.12-13). But there are reputations and reputations, 
and of whatever variety, neither follows from the mere appearance in 
print. Of course that is important because it helps, more than 
anything else, a cogniser to circulate his name in public, and to make 
him visible in the "invisible college". Publication, then, gives the 
cogniser an audition in the cosmopolitan, not just local, arena of 
knowledge. It allows him to deliver his epistemological 'message' to 
the maximum audience possible. 
Auditions, however, do not make reputations, indeed they can 
occasionally wreck them (see, for example, Koestler, 1973). Equally, 
it is a mistake to link reputation with the number oi said appearances 
in print a cogniser has made. One small paper can often do more for 
a reputation than numerous big ones of trivial epistemological worth. 
Nine hundred words in Nature, for instance, was enough to make Watson's 
and Crick's names. What this means very simply is that, as far as 
knowledge is concerned, quality and quantity are not commensurate. 
Reputation goes beyond the annals of prolificness. It is not, then, 
how many papers or words a cogniser has written that ultimately 
laureates his reputation, but rather the quality of the research and 
the epistemological ramifications it has for the discipline that counts. 
Reputation is computated qualitatively not quantitatively (Hagstorm, 
1965, p.168). The cogniser therefore who makes the most qualitative 
additions to knowledge has the most prestige. Inevitably, this shifts 
the question of reputation to questions about the kinds of 'qualitative 
additions' which lead to the making or boosting of a reputation. It 
is at this juncture, then, that the 'styles of modulation' discussed ^ 
6.5 are able to prove enlightening. For it was noted there that, when 
attempting to make a contribution to the corpus of knowledge, the 
research cogniser can employ one of three strategies. Firstly, there 
is that most conservative and least adventurous of approaches which is 
simply to 'harmonize' with a proven-effective paradigm and gather 
knowledge which is consonant with it. It involves making heavier the 
weight of evidence in favour of a paradigm. Secondly, there is that 
approach which adopts a more doubting air and unveils dissonances in 
the paradigm which cannot otherwise be accounted for, and, therefore, 
which demand that the paradigm be replaced. Lastly there is that 
research approach which achieves what the second intended to do, but 
never quite managed, and that is to secure a replacement for the 
falsified paradigm. Of these three strategies, the first, because it 
is only reinforcing and expanding the import of an already accepted 
paradigm, is unlikely to have massive ramifications for the discipline. 
It is likely to leave things as they were before. Therefore its 
practitioners will not have their reputation much enhanced by doing it. 
It will be the modulation mode of the 'potboilers' in a research 
community. The second, on the other hand, is rather more risk 
orientated, and the research cogniser practising it either stands to 
gain or lose a great deal more in the way of reputation. He works in 
the penumbra of a possible epistemological revolution, and whilst he 
might not participate directly in its realization, the fact that some 
of his research helped to fire it into existence usually results in 
his prestige being raised. Certainly the fact that Rosalind Franklin 
and Maurice Wilkins were involved in the 'battle' to decode DNA 
undoubtedly led to their reputations being raised. They have been 
thought of as much protagonists in the narrative of DNA's decoding as 
Watson and Crick. If not quite the agents provocateurs who made the 
DNA revolution possible, they were certainly in there as major 
conspirators, who, had 'fate decreed otherwise', might have 'seen' the 
double helix of DNA first! 
But what is interesting is that with a possible mammoth boost in 
reputation at stake, an atmosphere of de-modulation and epistemological 
dissonance of the style three kind prompts a productivity of research 
unknown in conditions of straightforward consonance and normal science 
(Blume ai^ Sinclair, 1974, pp.231-232). For if one thinks in terms of 
the half-life of a reputation, then that of style one modulators is 
likely to be the shortest lived, that of style three the longest. 
It is the makers of disciplinary revolutions, those who sew up long 
standing and important gaps in our understanding of the cognised, upon 
whom most laurels and honours are thrown. It is they who occupy the 
Mount Olympus positions of a disciplinary community; it is they who 
have the positions of most prestige in the community. 
Thus, if a research cogniser wishes to ascend the rungs of the 
metapaedeutic hierarchy - as quickly as possible - he would do well to 
suspend any of the personal motivations, mentioned earlier, that might 
dictate an area of research interest, and concentrate on one which will 
boost his reputation in the shortest possible time (Klima, 1974, p.114), 
That research, it has been argued in this section, will, of necessity, 
be of the style three kind. But before any reputation will be at all 
forthcoming, the research cogniser will have to encounter, and often 
respond to the suasions and sometimes censures of, a fourth type of 
cogniser, the evaluator cogniser. 
6.7 EVALUATOR COGNISER (eC^) 
Knowledge is the 'life blood' of a discipline, and its principal 
'donor* is the research cogniser. But not all the 'blood' a cogniser 
gives to a disciplinary community is necessarily of uniform quality. 
Therefore, before it can be used in 'transfusion', it must rigorously be 
tested and analysed. The 'sanguinometer' of a disciplinary community, 
who carries out that testing, is the evaluator cogniser (eC^). 
All knowledge is on probation until its validity is attested, so 
to speak, by those 'in the know'! It always requires their 'seal of 
approval' if it is ever to leave the laboratory or the study where it 
was conceived. Thus part of the role of the research cogniser 
involves drawing public attention to his knowledge gains. The act of 
this promulgation, as was indicated ̂  6.6, is as much an extension of 
the epistemological enterprise as the actual fabrication of knowledge; 
for a knowledge which does not attempt to engage the interest of a 
disciplinary community is still-born. Secrecy is an ethic foreign to 
disciplinary communities, for it contradicts a fundamental premise of 
knowledge, that it is a communally inspired and determined act. 
Nowhere is this more evident than in the act of knowledge evaluation. 
Scientific knowledge is not knowledge (as art is often these days) 
because its maker says so. In fact, part of the function of a 
disciplinary community, and the evaluations it exacts, is to purge 
from its members the possibility of purely egotistical knowledge acts. 
To ensure that they are not egotistical acts and to carry out this 
purge, each discipline, as was noted i^ 3.3, possesses publicly 
accredited criteria. These criteria, however, are not only designed 
to ensure objectivity in knowledge, but also to ensure that any 
consonance claims inherent in the knowledge do not contravene the 
normal standards of epistemological authenticity contained within the 
discipline. It has been noted also (see 5.6), that the research 
cogniser, in any case, during his long period of apprenticeship, would 
have assimilated these standards and criteria. One of the tacit 
obligations, after all, that accrue to a cogniser, on being admitted 
to a disciplinary community, is that he contracts himself to observe 
the values and standards which prevail in it. But whilst in theory 
every cogniser is sworn to a kind of Hippocratic oath of knowledge, 
not all of them are as 'honest' in their dealings with knowledge as 
their oath proclaims them to be. Knowledge is not without its 
occasional Tom Keatings, who will forge data in order to realise the 
knowledge they want. It is therefore to protect the disciplinary 
community from the would-be epistemological counterfeiter that it 
applies rigorous standards to the knowledge claims of a research 
cogniser. Therefore on its journey to epistemological establishment, 
all C^ knowledge will pass through the 'hands* of a number of 
evaluator cognisers, who will subject it to the shibboleths of validity, 
and make sure they can hear 'harmony* where the research cogniser 
claims he can. 
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The evaluator cogniser can be regarded as the 'lawyer* in a 
disciplinary community, and the context in which he works as the 'law 
court* of knowledge. By virtue of suitable experience and the calibre 
of his expertise, the evaluator cogniser is charged with the responsi-
bility of defending the validity of new knowledge or, where necessary, 
prosecuting its indefensibility by arraigning its inconsistencies and 
weaknesses. But, all in all, it is the "jurisdiction of rationality" 
- and it does, of course, vary very much from discipline to 
discipline - which is the ultimate judge in the case of epistemological 
litigation (Toulmin, 1972, p.95). 
In a sense, directly a research cogniser courts an audience for 
his 'knowledge' he encounters an evaluator cogniser of one sort or 
another. Initially, for instance, that audience is likely to consist 
of those colleagues and quaternary students he encounters in the milieu 
of the university or research establishment in which he works or with 
whom he is in communication. They are usually the first guinea pigs 
of a new knowledge. This was certainly the case with the discovery 
of the structure of DNA. The 'dress rehearsal' of the Nature article 
occurred around the Cavendish Laboratory and at King's College, London; 
for Watson and Crick initially took their postulates about the 
structures of DNA to Lawrence Bragg and John Kendrew of Cavendish, and 
then to Maurice Wilkins at King's (Watson, 1968, pp.207-209). Bragg, 
at first, was not thoroughly convinced, and lest, through a specious 
claim, Watson and Crick should bring some disrepute to Cavendish, he 
rigorously checked that the organic chemistry of their DNA was at 
least credible. That was Bragg's metier, and the principal area over 
which he could exercise jurisdiction and offer 'legal advice'. Wilkins, 
on the other hand, who was always much closer to the scene of the DNA 
'battle' - indeed, as has been seen, he was one of the 'combat troops' 
involved - than Bragg, could offer a judgment about the plausibility 
of the structure itself. "Maurice needed but a minute's look at the 
(DNA) model to like it" (Watson, 1968, p.209) and then he went away to 
compare the experimental evidence with the diffraction patterns 
predicted by the model. They proved to be in accord. 
The first front of epistemological approval, then, is "inter-
personal" (Hagstorm, 1965, p.29), and occurs either within the circle 
of a cogniser's immediate confreres, as happened with DNA, or in the 
forums of a professional academic society. It represents a prelim-
inary evaluation of new knowledge which aims to make - prior to its 
release on the open market of a discipline - the consonance of the 
knowledge involved as concinnate as possible. It is, then, a kind of 
epistemological equivalent of vernissage, when research cognisers 
'touch up' their new knowledge before seeking a more public eye for it 
Interpersonal approval is often, then, the first prelude to 
publication. A 'rejection slip' from that first of all evaluative 
quarters will presumably - but not always - send the research cogniser 
back to the epistemological drawing board to redesign his knowledge. 
Success, however, in the local milieu of evaluation, 'will persuade 
the cogniser to seek a more cosmopolitan, and sometimes more practised 
and critical eye, for his knowledge. The passport to the more 
cosmopolitan centres of knowledge is the journal.* A passport into 
the pages of the journal, however, is not a fait accompli. For like 
everything else in a disciplinary community, journal appearance is 
largely a matter of meritocratic selection. It is also penned in by 
the same sorts of standards and values which constrain every other 
epistemological move in the community. Journals, for instance, have 
their own 'quality control' bureaucracies that check the intellectual 
integrity of the 'knowledge' submitted to them for publication. The 
* Perhaps this is less true of the social sciences. In them, the 
principal media for marketing new knowledge still tends to be the 
book. In the more right-handed disciplines, however, the book is 
generally only the vessel for passe knowledge (Crane, 1972, p.116), 
whilst in the arts, it is only in literature, that the ''biblio-form' 
is a medium for attaining public visibility. For in painting, it 
is the exhibition, and in music, the concert, that serve to promul-
gate new knowledge (however, compare 4.6). 
research cogniser, then, who wants to be published, has to appear in 
yet another law court of knowledge, and that is the one presided over 
by the 'referees' of a journal. For it is they who act as the 
journal's 'quality control' agents, and who 'check out' the knowledge 
for faults and defects, and who finally decide whether the knowledge 
is worth publishing or not (Hagstorm, 1965, pp.26-27). And if they 
do not reject it outright, the referees will often make suggestions 
whose incorporation would serve to make the 'knowledge' acceptable to 
the journal concerned (Ravetz, 1973, pp.255-256). The risk of promul-
gation is, then, accompanied by the risk of distortion. 
The journal is the umbilical cord between a local and cosmopolitan 
appreciation of knowledge. If the cogniser and his knowledge are not 
to remain hermetically sealed from the potential public, the cogniser 
needs access to that umbilical cord. Yet the referees of journals, 
and the judgments they can exercise, can often deny that access and 
prevent a knowledge issuing forth to the general disciplinary public 
at large. The evaluator cogniser, then, when he manifests himself as 
a journal editor or referee, can exert a good deal of influence over 
the circulation of knowledge. He can be regarded as one of the 
"gatekeepers" of knowledge, who has the power to screen that informa-
tion which is permitted to circulate widely amongst the members of a 
disciplinary community (Crane, 1970, p.489). 
When that screening is done under the declared auspices of 
objectivity, and it involves 'winnowing' the good epistemological 
'grain' from the ' c h a f f , it would appear to be a wholly reasonable 
and desirable service. After all, cognisers have enough trouble 
keeping up with the good 'grains' of knowledge, without also having to 
labour over the ' c h a f f . Screening, however, is not always as 
meticulously objective as the theories of disciplinary behaviour often 
pronounce. Non-epistemological factors, for instance, can often 
intrude upon the "gatekeeper's" work and upset what should be a wholly 
disinterested appreciation of the knowledge submitted to him. Very 
often, for instance, it is not so much the knowledge that counts, but 
where it comes from and who it is by. Papers which emanatfe from 
prestigous institutes of learning are likely to have a headstart over 
those that do not. Yale is automatically taken to be a better *stud* 
for knowledge than Boise State, and therefore its research cognisers 
are likely to get preferential treatment by editors of journals and 
their referees. A cogniser*s publication chances are further 
preferred if, in addition to being 'stabled* in a traditionally good 
'stud* of knowledge, he also has a well established reputation. 
Evaluator cognisers are less likely to find 'fault' with knowledge 
that is 'out' of someone who is 'known' than by someone who is yet to 
establish a respected 'pedigree' of knowledge. It seems it is harder 
to break into print than to keep going; for the more a research 
cogniser publishes, the easier it becomes to publish (Jevons, 1973, 
P.A2). 
Then there are the more human preferrals that come through the 
cogniser having fraternal links with the editor, or being part of the 
same 'old boy' academic network to which he belongs. It seems editors 
look more favourably upon the work of those whom they personally 
'know', than those they do not. Of course all sorts of strategies 
have been devised to prevent such academic nepotism, and to rid 
knowledge evaluation completely of the "halo effects" that stem from 
a cogniser's institutional and personal affiliations (Crane, 1970, 
p.489). But it seems the use of anonyms and other devices to conceal 
authorship rarely work: editors are usually so au fait with the work 
of their confreres that they can see through any disguise of it. It 
seems, then, that the jurisdiction of rationality can occasionally be 
swayed by that prejudice. Accordingly, knowledge does not always get 
the fair trial it deserves. Contra Toulmin and Merton, it is not 
unknown for the law courts of knowledge to find a 'knowledge' guilty 
of all sorts of epistemological misdemeanours, before being given any 
trial whatsoever. The spirit of an open-minded debate that usually 
characterizes epistemological litigation can be suspended altogether, 
and the knowledge involved censured completely without being given a 
chance to defend itself and prove its innocence. The "Vellikovsky 
affair" is an instance of this. What was interesting about it, was 
not that Worlds in collision managed to contravene all the canons of 
astronomical plausibility, but that the scientists, in receiving it, 
should contravene, almost to a pathological degree, all the Mertonian 
norms that are supposed to prevail in scientific debate (Mulkay, 1969, 
p.126; Polanyi, 1967, p.74). The community of orthodox astronomy did 
its best to silence Vellikovsky altogether and would not allow him to 
champion his views in any of the orthodox forums of astronomical 
debate. Indeed, such was the scientific community's hostility to 
Vellikovsky that they even prevailed upon his publisher, Macmillan -
normally a publisher of thoroughly respectable academic texts - to 
give up their rights to Worlds in collision. "They passed them on to 
Doubleday who felt less vulnerable to the hostility of scientific 
opinion"(Polanyi, 1967, p.74). 
Given the notorious fickleness of evaluation perhaps the only 
real judge a cogniser can have any confidence in is the one Ravetz 
(1973, p.275) has pointed to, and that is "posterity". For a 
knowledge which, at present, might be eschewed as a piece of epistemo-
logica! quackery, might, sometime during its "future career", be 
construed as having profound ramifications for a discipline. It took 
biologists, for instance, thirty-four years to discover the significance 
of Mendel's work. They did not become appropriately *wise* until long 
after Mendel's experiments had been completed, written up and published. 
It was as though Mendel's famous paper, "Experiments in plant 
hybridization", went straight into 'suspended animation', instead of 
public approval (Gillispie, 1960, pp.329-337). But though Mendel's 
contemporaries were at a loss to understand the full significance of 
his experiments, the experiments were not finally lost to humanity; 
for his experiments were preserved in a form which could be brought out 
of 'suspended animation' and rediscovered. That form was the 
scientific paper. Had Mendel preserved his experiments in his head, 
instead of on paper, they would have passed on with him, and the Hugo 
de Vries' and Carl Correns' of this world - who rediscovered his work -
would have been none the wiser. Posterity, then, can only judge 
'knowledge' if it exists in a form that allows it to be judged; and it 
is to expedite the possibility of retrospective judgment and to allow 
knowledge to be disseminated in perpetuity that, in the disciplinary 
communities, things like the book and the paper have, as Popper has 
pointed out (see 4.3), as much "ontologica!" autonomy as the cognisers 
themselves. For, to some extent, they represent the life insurance 
policy of knowledge; for whilst some contemporary generation of 
evaluator cognisers might try to prevent the promulgation of a knowledge, 
if it exists in some literary form - if only as an unpublished 
manuscript - its survival is guaranteed. 
Thus, it is possible to add one further qualification to the 
Humean ethic (see 5.1): not only is there no knowledge without 
knowers, equally there is no knowledge without recordings of it. When 
a research cogniser makes a *gift* of knowledge to a disciplinary 
community he must therefore *wrap' it in some disseminative paper 
which will endure in case the gift (as Mendel's was not) is not 
immediately opened! Knowledge might initially be 'all in the mind', 
but unless it becomes, at some stage, narration, that is all it will 
remain, a figment of the mind. Research cognisers in fact have a 
variety of narrative forms available to them to disseminate their 
knowledge. But it has been suggested in this section that access to 
those forms is restricted and controlled; access is not the sine qua 
non of a research cogniser having some knowledge 'to market'. However, 
to get any access whatsoever to the 'market places' of knowledge, the 
research cogniser must first make his knowledge 'marketable' and to do 
that he must don another cogniser role altogether. 
6.8 DISSEMINATOR COGNISER (dC^) 
A cogniser's research is never fully done until it is written up 
and published. As much an extension of the research act, then, is the 
act of its dissemination. The one is incomplete without the other. 
In every research cogniser, then, dwells a disseminator. He is the 
publicist in the cogniser, wanting to get out. He is responsible for 
spreading the cogniser's name. For unlike most other social systems, 
that of knowledge and disciplines is engineered not by 'face to face' 
contacts, but by 'page to face' contacts. The cogniser has to write 
rather than speak his way into the metapaedeutic part of the 
disciplinary community. His entrance there must be made by written 
rather than vocal exposition. It is a matter of socialization 
occurring by publication (Storer, 1966, p.131). 
It has already been noted (see 6.6) how this imperative to 
disseminate works to the advantage of disciplinary systems. On a very 
trite level, for instance, the written expression of knowledge 
represents a convenient and manageable form of making a 'prosthesis' 
of what a cogniser has in his mind. As a publication, that mind can, 
quite literally, be read! Then there is the fact that the progress 
of knowledge marches on antecedence, both immediate and remote. New 
knowledge does not develop parthenogenetically; it is very much the 
progeny of its 'forebears'. It is created out of a congress with 
knowledge of near consanguinity. The fertility of knowledge, then, is 
increased if the research cogniser has the dernier cri developments in 
his discipline available to him. The pressure to publish and 
disseminate is partly a function of the need to accelerate the 
accretion of new knowledge. Not that that pressure has to be applied 
too strongly, for it is in the interest of the research cogniser to 
publish. It was noted ^ 6 . 6 , that a cogniser's standing in a 
disciplinary community is enhanced if it can be seen that he has made 
significant and original contributions to the development of knowledge. 
Publication, then, is a way of gazetting those contributions and of 
advertising to the 'world' whose "intellectual property" a particular 
piece of knowledge first belonged to (Price, 1963, p.69).* It is a 
way for the cogniser to raise his particular flag over the piece of 
epistemological territory he has discovered. 
* Since reputations are at stake, "priority claims" to having discovered 
a knowledge first are often an issue of considerable contention in 
disciplinary communities. The issue is made all the more exigent 
In the sense that his role is, in the main, 'distributive*, the 
disseminator cogniser (dC^) shares something in common with the teacher 
(see 6.4). Like him, it is within the measure of the disseminator 
cogniser*s expertise to bring a knowledge to the attention of others. 
However, that expertise goes well beyond mere attention seeking. The 
disseminator cogniser, if his knowledge is to *get through* to those 
less au fait with it than himself, must be able to articulate his 
knowledge in terms which will enable it not only to be appreciated, but 
assimilated and understood as well. He must be able to broadcast 
echoes of the consonance he himself can hear in a knowledge, and 
convince others that the echo is real, not illusory. The disseminator, 
then, is very much a rhetorician of knowledge, who, like the teacher 
cogniser, addresses his power of rhetoric to the problem of converting 
C knowledge into terms that will allow other cognisers to master it. 
n 
He, again like the teacher, lives his life out on the *b--dyad* of the 
triad. 
Whilst the roles of distribution that the disseminator and the 
teacher engage in are similar in definition, they are not in method. 
There is also some difference in the audiences to which they respec-
tively address themselves, and also in the manner in which that address 
because identical knowledge discoveries are often made by cognisers 
working independently of one another. The history of science is 
full of such instances. And as if conscious of the phenomenon, 
scientists have gone to all sorts of convoluted lengths to certify 
their priority claims. As late as the Nineteenth Century it was 
not uncommon practise to report knowledge discoveries anagrammatically 
Hooke did this with his 'hypothesis of springynesse*. In the race to 
priority, science has also seen fairly close finishes. Weiner and 
Bouligend reached the same mathematical theory almost simultaneously, 
but Weiner managed *'to get off a short note for publication" (thus 
officially staking his priority) one day after Bouligand deposited 
the same theory in a sealed envelope at the academy (Merton, 1970, 
p.75). 
is done. One way of differentiating the disseminator* s from the 
teacher's role, then, is to consider these respective audiences, and 
the modes by which the two types of distributor cogniser make contact 
with them. A teacher's audience, for instance, is predominantly made 
up of student cognisers, or those of diminished expertise in a 
discipline. And his role mainly focuses on upgrading that expertise. 
Of course the disseminator is also doing this in that he is making a 
disciplinary community aware of the knowledge that they lack and he 
possesses. However, the degree of intellectual discrepancy between 
his audience and that of the teacher is usually considerably less. For 
the most part, the disseminator cogniser is normally addressing his 
cognition (C ) - initially anyway - to other cognisers of near n 
equivalent expertise; his is an audience primarily of equals. 
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In the matter of method of knowledge distribution, the two roles are 
even more dissimilar. The teacher, for example, usually has his 
audience directly in 'front of him', and his method of dissemination, 
in that context, is in the main of an expositional kind. The line of 
communication between tC and sC is direct and of the face to face kind r r 
Knowledge is conveyed by word of mouth, and in circumstances which 
allow students to have dialogues with their teacher. That is not a 
situation which the disseminator enjoys; for one thing he can only 
see his audience through the 'eyes* of the printed page. The dC^ to 
rC^ 'rapport* is not direct, but mediated. The lines of communication 
between them are not those the disseminator chooses 'to speak', but 
write. In short, whereas the teacher cogniser converts his knowledge 
into pedagogy, the disseminator converts his into prose. In fact the 
use of the possessive is very apposite, for it underlines yet another 
difference between the disseminator and the teacher. For in a very 
real sense, the knowledge the disseminator cogniser is interested in 
distributing often belongs to him. The act of disseminating new 
knowledge, as was noted earlier, is a way of confirming the property 
rights a research cogniser has over it. The same cannot be said of 
the teacher's 'disseminative' act. It is not property claiming, for 
the knowledge the teacher distributes is rarely his own, but somebody 
else's. He makes a speciality of declaiming other people's claims to 
knowledge. 
It could be construed from the argument thus far that all new 
knowledge is promulgated on the page, all old knowledge in the class-
room, and there is no distribution that goes on between them: in other 
words, that there is no middle man between the research disseminator 
and the teacher disseminator. This in fact is not the case. There 
is an intermediary breed of disseminator; and he is the one who, like 
the research/disseminator cogniser, 'writes' rather than 'talks' his 
knowledge, but who does not (and here he is like the teacher) have any 
property rights over the knowledge he declaims. Instead he makes a 
speciality of the 'disposing' of other cognisers' intellectual property. 
and of extending its circulation beyond the bounds of the metapaedeutic 
community. He serves to make an epistemologica! vernacular - which 
everyone can understand - of highly esoteric and specialised research. 
By so doing, he serves to bring the frontier of the discipline within 
the reach and understanding of the knowledge community at large. 
Disciplinary communities would appear, then, to support two types 
of disseminator cogniser. The first - who will be known as the 
primary disseminator "" ̂ ^ that type of cogniser whose sole and 
most prior interest is in communicating his cognition to other 
researchers. The second, the secondary disseminator (d^C^), sees it 
as his obligation to distribute knowledge to a much broader community 
of cognisers than just researchers. In short, whereas the one 
is interested principally in the latitudinal distribution of knowledge 
in the metapaedeutic section of the continuum, the other seeks 
its longitudinal distribution over all parts of the continuum. 
6.9 PRIMARY DISSEMINATION, OR COMPLETING THE RESEARCH ACT 
That it is useful to demarcate two types of disseminator becomes 
more apparent when the particular exigencies of primary dissemination 
are considered in detail; for the entailments of primary dissemination 
force upon the researcher a set of obligations that, if not totally 
dissimilar from those that fall to the secondary disseminator, are 
certainly more emphasized. Firstly, there is the obligation to 
publish anyway. That would appear to be an absolutely inescapable 
qualification for having the epithet 'researcher* applied to one. The 
researcher who does not, or does not intend to, publish is really a 
travesty of a researcher.* Not that it is an obligation that most 
researchers are keen quickly to satisfy. Perhaps because it is that 
they come to dissemination - unless they are frustrated Hemingways -
by obligation, rather than by choice, that many research cognisers find 
the task of writing up their knowledge to be an "irksome chore" that is 
often "excruciatingly distasteful". It is something they are prone to 
postpone rather than do immediately (Hagstorm, 1965, p.16; Lowenthal 
and Was on, 1977, p.781). And it is often said that it takes the 
romance completely out of doing research. 
Be that as it may, it is a necessary obligation of research and 
one moreover that is trammelled within the walls of its own particular 
etiquette. Dissemination, it seems, like everything else in a 
disciplinary community, is a thoroughly 'rule bound* activity. That 
it is so stems from two instrumental facts (both noted previously) that 
(a) the birth of new knowledge has its genetic roots in the 
knowledge which has preceded it, and 
(b) that other cognisers have certain 'property rights' over 
this knowledge which have to be acknowledged when it is, 
so to speak, trespassed upon. 
New knowledge is never a 'straight-off-the-top-of-the-head' 
phenomenon. It comes as much out of the heads of the other cognisers 
as it does the individual research cogniser. It is the result of 
compound rather than singular cerebration; it adds to an "accretion 
of learning" that already exists (Price, 1963, p.65). A great deal 
of the dissemination "chore", then, is given over to recapitulation of 
* Sklair (1973, p . 159) has raised this issue in connection with 
scientists. Since a goodly number of them never publish, and 
since publication is the sine qua non of being a scientist, do 
they have any right to the name 'scientist'? 
this "accretion", it involves mapping out the genealogy from which a 
new piece of knowledge is descended. This is in fact a relatively 
new obligation, for it is only since the 1850*s when the modem research 
paper was bom, that cognisers have been expected to accompany their 
'cognition* with a 'fully documented* family tree of its ancestry. 
For this purpose, what has been called the "etiquette of citation" 
(Ravetz, 1973, p.257) has been developed. It fulfils two functions: 
firstly, it names the knowledge from which the new has developed and 
secondly, it indicates whose 'property' that knowledge is. Citation, 
then, is a kind of epistemological way of paying 'rent'. It provides 
"an 'income* to the owner of the property which is used by showing that 
his work was fruitful" (Ravetz, 1973, p.257), and avoids the possibility 
of * trespassers * being prosecuted for entering under their name 
knowledge which is not rightfully their*s.* 
Step two in the dissemination process involves getting the "irksome 
chore" into print. Not that that is necessarily a sequitur of the chore 
alone (see 6.7). In fact, the dividend of publication is quite 
difficult to achieve, and presumably gets more so as the number of 
cognisers in a field increases. But, in fact, whilst this number has 
tended to increase, the productivity of scientist cognisers has tended 
to remain much the same. According to Lotka*s law - an attempt to 
achieve some crude measure of scientific productivity - the number in 
2 a community who produce *n* papers varies as 1/n . Thus, there are 
* Not that the system is entirely watertight: trespassing still goes 
on. Again the story of DNA is illustrative. Bragg, in a paper 
dealing with the "shape of the haemoglobin molecule" was accused -
whilst the paper was still in manuscript - by Francis Crick of 
colonising, unacknowledged, an idea that he had propounded most 
forcefully in the Cavendish Laboratory months earlier (Watson, 1968. 
p.57). 
many scientists who produce only one paper, one quarter as many who 
produce two, one-ninth as many who produce three, and so on. Only one 
scientist in a thousand publishes as many as a hundred papers in his 
lifetime (Jevons, 1973, p.41; Ziman,- 1976, pp.104-105). 
Of course there are certain strategies the disseminator cogniser 
can employ to improve his chances of publication. The most important 
of these is to submit his paper to a journal whose editorial philosophy 
regularly spans, not only the substantive content of the knowledge 
being disseminated, but also its broad epistemological character. For 
it is within the pages of the learned journal, above all biblio-forms, 
that the stepping stones of knowledge advances are principally set out. 
This has not always been the case, and still is not in some disciplines 
(see 6.7). Before the advent of the journal - in the Seventeenth 
Century - the book was the principal vehicle of knowledge distribution, 
and still remains so in the more diffuse and discursive left-hand 
disciplines. But for the more methodologically compact, scientific 
disciplines the virtue of prolixity that the book could provide, proved 
somewhat of an obstacle in the dissemination of scientific knowledge. 
Books suffered badly from the "iniquity of overcharge" which made any 
number of them - which there were in the Seventeenth Century -
impossible to digest and assimilate (Price, 1963, pp.62-63). So they 
were superseded, in the sciences at least, by journals which had 
'papers* in them instead of chapters, and many authors instead of the 
one. 
Aside from encouraging a more laconic style of dissemination, the 
journal has also helped to effect the 'factionalization* of disciplinary 
communities. It has helped to promote a differentiation which is 
brought on by the need to serve the interests of cognisers of limited 
areas of epistemologica! focus (Hagstorm, 1965, p.210). The hallmark 
of an emergent discipline, then, tends to be "the establishment of a 
specialized journal catering to the scholarly needs of its exponents" 
(Ziman, 1968, p.105). Not only does the journal promote "solidarity 
and sodality" and cement fellowship amongst the members of the new 
discipline, it also means that the discipline has it own 'broadcasting 
house* in which to disseminate the knowledge which is particular to 
itself. Journals also help to create divisions and 'outlets* for 
sectarian interests within autonomous disciplines themselves. Thus 
whilst of course there still remain the broad based journals, whose 
appeal is to the whole of a disciplinary community, and which treat of 
issues of general concern to the discipline, below them there have 
tended to proliferate a host of journals of more discrete and pointed 
epistemologica! orientation. That orientation can be determined by 
a common interest in a particular facet of the cognised. The 
efflorescence of DNA as a cognised field of interest, together with all 
the ancillary issues its structure has evoked, assuredly helped to 
promote into existence a Journal of Molecular Biology. On the other 
hand, a specialized journal might be brought forth because it serves 
the interest of those analyzing the cognised by a particular technique 
or form of instrumentation. Spectroscopers, for instance, have a 
journal to themselves, as do linguistic analysts. Then there are the 
journals whose editorial persuasions mark them out to prefer the 
speculative and the theoretical, rather than the empirical and experi-
mental. Often their preferred methodological domain is pointed out 
in the title of the journal, as in The Journal of Experimental 
Psychology. 
The effect of this factionalization means the disseminator at 
least knows the journals which would or would not supply him with a 
favourable review of his knowledge. After all, a biological journal 
which publishes pre-eminently theoretical papers will presumably be 
less inclined to admit a thoroughly experimental paper into its pages, 
and vice versa (Hagstorm, 1965, p.246). This equally applies to the 
readership of the journal. Theoreticians will be attracted to 
theoretical journals, experimentalists to experimental ones. 
Factionalization of this kind in fact turns out to be quite a convenient 
rationalization of what is a perennial problem in disciplinary 
communities, that is, keeping up with the sheer quantities of knowledge 
that are around. For instance. Price (1963, p.72) estimates that a 
cogniser could not keep up with his colleagues and their knowledge 
output, if their number exceeded more than a few hundred. It would 
be impossible to assimilate the work of ten thousand! When a 
discipline becomes that populated, emigration tends to follow. 
Cognisers tend to leave, regroup and create a new discipline that 
expresses a new core of epistemological interest, and so on. 
It was the inconvenience (nay, impossibility) of bulk handling 
of knowledge contained in books that caused the journal. It is the 
time that a journal takes to reproduce and circulate that is likely to 
render the journal extinct in the Twentieth Century. The time lag 
between producing a manuscript and its appearing in print is no longer 
short enough for the progress of knowledge! Thus, the journal, 
instead of disseminating knowledge, has increasingly come to harbour 
knowledge that everyone who is likely to derive most cognitive benefit 
from it knows before-hand anyway. They either saw it in manuscript 
or heard it in casual conversation, months before it appeared in print. 
For in fields like high energy physics, the informal channels of 
communicating knowledge - like conversation and the phenomenon of the 
'preprint' - have come to assume much more importance than the formal 
ones (Gaston, 1973, p.131).* In fact, in some fields - again, high 
energy physics is notable in this regard - the letter has, to some 
extent, come to supplant the paper. Indeed, a journal, the Physical 
Review of Letters, has been produced specifically to contain this 
epistolary form of disseminating new knowledge. There are of course 
some dangers in these newer forms of high speed communication. Aside 
from a certain loss of printing quality, there are the more serious 
defects of a tendency to flout scholarly standards and citatory 
obligations (Ziman, 1976, p.108). 
6.10 SECONDARY DISSEMINATION AND CONTENT DESCENT 
The problem that confronts the secondary disseminator ^^ 
that of getting new knowledge into the 'hands of everybody'; and that 
involves translating the knowledge, circulating amongst the members of 
the metapaedeutic community, into terms which can be circulated in the 
various sectors of the propaedeutic continuum. But before he can even 
consider how to expedite that translation, he must first decide what to 
translate; and that, given the horrendous quantities of knowledge in 
circulation, is by no means an easy decision to make. Even someone 
having the most catholic appreciation of knowledge would find it 
* The access to a 'pre-print' of Linus Pauling's - via his son who was 
at the Cavendish laboratory - latest thoughts on the structure of 
DNA (which proved to be grossly erroneous) was said to have put 
Watson and Crick anything up to six weeks ahead of their Caltec 
colleagues. It would take that time to get the Proceedings of the 
National Academy into print, after which the elementary mistakes in 
Pauling's work would have been spotted immediately (Watson, 1968, 
p.162). 
difficult to appreciate much more than a minute fraction of it, such is 
the magnitude of its proportions. And those proportions are really 
quite staggering. For instance, the number of learned journals and 
periodicals in circulation - and these, it has been argued, are the 
acknowledged repositories of new knowledge - is over the fifty thousand 
mark, and that is exluding those journals written in the Slavic, Arabic, 
Oriental and African languages; and that does not account for the 
quantities of knowledge matter therein! In the 1970*s the average 
number of scientific documents published yearly is over two million, 
and conservative forecasts estimate that it will have reached eight 
million by 1985 (Bell, 1977, pp.21-22)! And that is not even 
considering books which are still, in some disciplines (see 6.9), a 
disseminative force in the promulgation of new knowledge. In fact it 
would appear that the literature of the disciplines is doubling itself 
in ever shortening periods of time. Physics, for example, now takes 
eight years to double its literature, sociology three (Crane, 1972,p.90)! 
The knowledge output of a discipline, then, is indisputably 
considerable. However, the bulk of that output is not really necessary 
to breed further developments in knowledge. Since it is not, the 
majority of disseminated knowledge is "almost at birth embedded in the 
sedimentary deposits of the academy, and will never be looked at again" 
(Herbst, 1973, p.71). Its dissemination is virtually synonymous with 
it being placed straight into 'suspended dissemination*. The problem 
of the secondary disseminator mainly focuses on deciding which of 
that knowledge should be resuscitated and placed into greater circula-
tion. This is not merely a problem of eclecticism, but rather one of 
deciding upon what, in the enormous bulk of knowledge, further develop-
ments in the discipline are eneluctably dependent. After all, the 
secondary disseminator really wants to pass on down the ranks of the 
disciplinary continuum that knowledge and those paradigms which the 
current community of researchers considers vital to the formation of new 
cognition from the cognised. Unless he does so, he is likely to cause 
an epistemological rupture between the workings of the metapaedeutic 
and propaedeutic phases of the continuum, where the former becomes so 
far in advance of the latter it is unable to catch up. What the 
disseminator cogniser endeavours to do is to effect an epistemological 
connection - one based on the latest developments in knowledge - between 
these two phases of the continuum. 
Secondary disseminators are the facilitators of * content descent* 
along the continuum. They are like teachers in this respect, although, 
unlike them, they have no measure of control over 'personnel ascent*. 
However, both roles are structurally complementary in that they both 
involve carrying out reduction of some kind; e.g. teachers selecting 
personnel and disseminators selecting knowledge. In fact it is possible 
schematically to summarise the complementary nature of their roles using 
a kind of 'dovetailed gyre'; 
Figure 6.5 
- THE DOVETAILED GYRE -
PRIMARY PHASE 
Student 
Cogniser 
Input 
C^ input 
Knowledge 
descent (C ) 
r 
QUATERNARY PHASE 
rC 
ascent (C^) 
PROPAEDEUTIC CONTINUUM 
Research 
Cogniser and 
Knowledge 
Outputs 
C^ output 
What Figure 6.5 shows is that the distribution of new knowledge occurs 
most where the number of cognisers is least, and least where the 
number of cognisers is most; namely in the quaternary and primary 
sectors of the continuum respectively. But what it fails to show is 
how the reduction of C output is achieved. The question remains: n 
what determines which knowledge travels all the way to the tip of the 
*gyre*, and which remains where it is born, at the base of the *gyre*? 
Reduction begins with evaluation. For not all the 'knowledge' 
that is brought into existence goes into circulation even in the 
metapaedeutic sector. More knowledge is launched than ever gets into 
print (see 6.9). The fact that it does not get into print is largely 
a function of the evaluator cogniser's censuring (see 6.8), which is 
aimed principally at separating false from valid knowledge claims. 
But even after this first dissemination and evaluation - which 
determines what gets into print and what does not - there is still 
plenty of cognition around for the secondary disseminator to select 
from. 
That selection is made somewhat easier because the pace of know-
ledge development, particularly in the sciences, serves to render 
redundant much of the C knowledge that is put into circulation in the n 
metapaedeutic community. It has been calculated, for instance, that 
the "half-life" of most papers in physics is as short as two and a half 
years (Cotgrove and Box, 1970, p.l). Since they quickly become 
redundant to the progress of knowledge, little point would be served in 
propagating such papers beyond the research sector. Knowledge like 
this, then, which is of only passing interest to the community, selects 
itself out of any dissemination dilemmas. That means that a great 
deal of the knowledge which arises from the practice of "normal 
science" or style one modulation, never gets transmitted beyond 
primary dissemination; for it is such knowledge that has the 
shortest half life. Not that any knowledge has *eternal life*; it 
is always permanently under the threat of overthrow or revision. It 
is a matter, then, of how short that half-life is. The pace of 
progress in knowledge is such that inevitably a great deal of the 
knowledge disseminated at any one time soon becomes outmoded. In 
engineering, for instance, it has been calculated that 60% of that 
knowledge disseminated to engineering students in 1955 was redundant 
by 1970 (Waddington, 1977, p.36). But although that forms a 
considerable percentage of engineering knowledge, it is by no means 
all of it. Presumably there is, at the heart of engineering, as there 
tends to be in other disciplines, a cell of relatively immutable know-
ledge that does not radically change through a cogniser*s career. 
There.will be some knowledge in a discipline that has a longer half-
life than two and a half years, and that does not become redundant 
within fifteen years of its initial dissemination. Newton's *laws of 
gravity', for instance, were in no sense absolute; three and a half 
centuries were taken to bring them into serious doubt and yet no 
contemporary physicist could reasonably pursue his science without 
having them in his repertoire. But knowledge like that of Newton is 
in a thoroughly different epistemological category from that which 
emerges out of style one modulation. Style three modulation, and the 
paradigms it generates, usually offers a totally new perspective on the 
cognised, quite unlike anything which came before, and as a result of 
this it has the potential to explain many aspects of the cognised. 
These are definitely not the sorts of paradigms which can be exhausted 
by one generation of cognisers. For these reasons, then, there would 
be some point in disseminating such knowledge well beyond the 
boundaries of the research community. How far is another matter. 
As a gauge of what knowledge should be disseminated first, fairly 
obviously that which has the most durable ramifications for a 
disciplinary community needs first to be 'tramlined* into communal 
awareness. And that knowledge is generally that associated with 
style three rather than style one modulation. It is the stuff, to 
use Kuhnian terms, of "revolutionary" rather than "normal" science. 
Thus, it can be said that in content descent it is the latter which 
is likely, during disseminative selection, to be attenuated first, 
and the former which is likely to travel furthest down the continuum. 
For a cogniser whose chief role is to act as the envoy of new 
knowledge, the secondary disseminator is not looked upon with much 
respect in a disciplinary community. It certainly does not improve 
or elevate a cogniser*s status in a disciplinary community to engage 
exclusively in secondary dissemination. In fact, it sometimes can 
have the opposite effect (Hagstorm, 1965, p.34; Jevons, 1973, p.83). 
There is a generally held disdain for the writers of text books - the 
chief media of secondary dissemination. It is considered that such 
dissemination is really an extension of teaching, and that a total 
commitment to it rather than research is tantamount to a cogniser 
prostituting himself. He should be gathering knowledge for himself, 
not making a gathering of other peoples* gatherings! 
The 'dovetailed gyre' (Figure 6.5) would indicate that content 
dissemination flows from the tertiary institute downwards, and this is, 
in the main, true (Musgrave, 1973, p.48). But it is not true to say 
that content descent only occurs in 'token giving' educational 
institutions (see 6,4). Indeed, it occasionally happens that 
disseminative media well outside of education are often far ahead of 
it in the promulgation of new knowledge. Outside of the circles of 
professional philosophy in Cambridge and Oxford, for instance, it was 
the BBC Third Programme which was the principal agent of exposition for 
positivism and linguistic philosophy (Quinton, 1976, p.495). Not that 
education could ever hope to be in simultaniety with the dernier cri of 
disciplinary development. It seems that it is inevitably "half a 
generation behind", and that its textbooks, particularly in the 
sciences, should be out of date within five years (Belth, 1966, p.26; 
Musgrave, 1973, p.19). But at least dissemination and content descent 
are healthier now than they were in previous centuries. After all 
education was once, not half a generation behind the advances of know-
ledge, but two centuries! Physics is a case in point. Before the 
Cavendish Laboratory was opened in 1867, physics was an absolutely 
unthinkable discipline to have in the school curriculum (Richmond, 
1971, p.24). 
English literature was similarly frowned upon. The fine arts, 
on the other hand, had to overcome an ingrained stigma which saw things 
like painting, particularly for boys, as an essentially effeminate 
activity. This hampered its educational development, such that it 
took, from the beginning of the century, something like thirty years 
for art to establish itself as an accepted school subject. It then 
took another twenty five years or so, for art education to register and 
incorporate the pedagogic systems of abstract painting and of design 
that were developed at the Bauhaus in the 1930*s (Carline, 1968, p.263) 
The content descent of knowledge into the arena of education, then, is 
never contemporaneous with the latest development in knowledge. There 
is always a time lag, which might be short or long, depending on the 
discipline involved. But what seems less a matter of contention is 
that knowledge which the professor is today struggling to make 
intellectual headway with is frequently that which in a decade will be 
the diet of every undergraduate; and a decade after that of every 
high school student. The intellectual difficulties of today are 
frequently the simplicities of tomorrow (Riesman, 1958, p.53). 
6.11 ADMINISTRATOR COGNISER (aC^) 
The cogniser types thus far identified have all been directly 
connected with knowledge in some way or other. That has always been 
the major focus of their interest, and therefore it has been possible 
to more or less describe each cogniser's role in terms of its 
'diffraction' about what are the principal foci of interest it is 
possible to have with regard to knowledge, i.e. in its reception, 
evaluation and creation. The administrator cogniser*s role is much 
less to do with any of these things, and much more to do with organizing 
the cognisers who are doing them. He is concerned with managing the 
social rather than epistemological body of a discipline; and with 
seeing that the members of that social body are carrying out their 
roles as effectively and efficiently as possible; and if they are not, 
with ways of ameliorating that carrying out. The administrator 
cogniser, then, assumes the role of a true bureaucrat in the bureau-
cracy of knowledge. He is responsible for the institutional 
organization of disciplinary communities and, in particular, its 
"visible colleges". 
Since knowledge has been bureaucratized at all levels and in all 
c o m e r s of the continuum, the administrator cogniser is almost as 
ubiquitous as knowledge itself. Certainly, wherever there are 
'colleges' visible there are always administrator cognisers on hand to 
organize them. And this is as much true of the primary sectors as it 
is of the quaternary sectors of the continuum. Even the gathering of 
knowledge itself is administered; although its administration requires 
that the cogniser involved be much more of an entrepreneur than a 
straight bureaucrat. That is because research often requires 
sponsorship and finance in order to be a viable proposition. There-
fore its merits and worth have to be promoted and advertised to those 
with access to largesse. And it is the administrator cogniser who 
often carries out that promotion. He is the man, then, who gets the 
research cogniser "the job, the trip, the research grant". The 
administrator cogniser is a member of the 'executive branch' of know-
ledge; he is, so to speak, one of the managing directors of the 
knowledge industry. And like all those in management, he spends a 
great deal of his time serving on committees and in discussion with 
his colleagues; and instead of writing papers he writes memoranda 
(Mills, 1973, p.117). 
Not that administrator cognisers are wholly strangers to the 
various epistemological arenas that they manage. Quite often they 
themselves are defectors from those various arenas. Sometimes indeed 
they use administration as an escape route for not participating in 
actual research (Mills, 1973, p.117). The committee sometimes is a 
preferred place of work to the laboratory or library; and cognisers 
would rather write memoranda than research papers. Often it is 
because their capacity to do the latter has somewhat lost momentum. 
This is very much the case with a research cogniser who springs to 
eminence very early. The loss of research men to administration is, 
for instance, particularly heavy in physics - a discipline renowned for 
its cognisers completing most of their significant and original research 
at a comparatively early age (Roe, 1953, p.45). They, of course, might 
not become pure bureaucrats; they might, for instance, conduct their 
research vicariously through overseeing and managing the research of 
younger men in their field. They, for instance, might become 
directors of prestigous research laboratories or councils. This has 
been the fate of Francis Crick who, whilst he still retains an interest 
in molecular biology, is mainly engaged, these days, in entrepreneurial 
work (Olby, 1972, p.268). He is co-director of the Cell Biology 
Division of the Medical Research Council Laboratory with thirty three 
research graduates under him. 
6.12 POLYMORPHOUS COGNISER 
Cognisers rarely play just the one role in a disciplinary community, 
To call a researcher a researcher and nothing else is really a misnomer, 
for a true statement of his role would have included all the other 
activities he engages in, and which are often quite supplementary to his 
role of researcher! It has already been noted (see 6.10) how the 
research act is only completed when it is disseminated. Therefore all 
research cognisers are accompanied by a doppelganger of a disseminator, 
who sees to it that what epistemologically goes on inside a research 
cogniser's head eventually gets a public viewing. The researcher's 
role, then, is complemented by that of a disseminator. He is a drC^, 
and not just a rC^. 
The plurality of these roles, however, can be extended even 
further. Few researchers, for example, can claim to be entirely free 
from the obligation to teach. Mixed in with their research, they 
generally have a few research students to supervise or undergraduates 
to teach (Storer, 1966, p.115). A researcher, then, is not just a 
drC^, but an at^^^drC^!* Nor are researchers alone in being polymorphous 
Even those lower down the continuum can be affected by a range of 
epistemological responsibilities and roles. It is not unusual, for 
instance, for post-graduate students to be baptized into the ways of 
academic life by being given some undergraduate teaching to do. The 
post-graduate student, then, often is not just an s^C^, but an s^t^C^ 
as well. Then again, teachers from lower down the disciplinary 
continuum are quite often engaged in studying for higher or even first 
degrees, in which case they are supplementing their t̂^ or t^ work with 
s„ or s, studies. 3 4 
But whilst it is possible and proper to assign a variety of 
different roles to the cogniser, inevitably one role assumes dominance 
over all the rest. Take the role of the researcher who divides his 
time between teaching and research: the former, which might form a 
considerable part of a cogniser*s responsibility, will not serve to 
elevate the cogniser*s status in the disciplinary community at large. 
It will only secure for him a local, not a cosmopolitan, reputation. 
And the only way a cogniser can secure that is to practise research 
and have it disseminated as print, rather than lectures (Wilson, 1964, 
p.188). Therefore, whilst a research cogniser might engage in a host 
* This expression symbolises the fact that the cogniser is at various 
times an administrator (a), a teacher of tertiary and quaternary 
students (t̂ ^̂ )̂ > a disseminator (d) and a researcher (r). 
of activities apart from just research, if he wants to 'make it' in 
the disciplinary community, the only one which really counts is 
research. A truer expression of his role, then, would have to 
indicate that, whilst a researcher teaches, administrates and 
disseminates, all these activities are really subservient to that most 
prior of his responsibilities, namely research. It is a matter of 
'd' and 'a' being less than 'r', or t^^^ad rC^. In the same 
way, the post-graduate student's teaching takes second place to the 
more overall objective of securing a higher degree: On the 
other hand, for the secondary teacher, further study most of the time 
is only directed at enlightening and improving his capacity as a 
teacher. Study is ultimately subservient to teaching: s ^ < t 2 C ^ . 
6.13 SOME MISCELLANEOUS COGNISERS, AND CONCLUSIONS 
Polymorphous or otherwise, it would be possible, no doubt, to go 
on further identifying cogniser roles. However, in identifying them 
it then becomes a matter of deciding whether the role is fully 
'autonomous' or not; for undoubtedly some of the roles that can be 
identified are subsumable beneath others. The role of 'amateur' 
cogniser is a case in point. It is his status - non-professional -
in the community, and not the epistemological features of his role, 
that ultimately differentiates him from other cognisers. After all, 
if the case of the ethno-linguist, Benjamin Whorf, is considered, he 
was undoubtedly a research cogniser of enormous significance to the 
understanding of language, yet he did not serve in any university what-
soever. He was not employed directly by a knowledge community. 
Instead he chose to work his life out as a fire protection inspector 
(Chase, 1972, p.4). But the status of amateur did not alter the 
calibre of his research work. It was regarded as being as significant 
as anything that came out of an orthodox arena of knowledge advance, 
like a university. 
Perhaps a more autonomous type of cogniser is that one associated 
with the various technical services which a disciplinary community 
calls upon to service its needs. The role of the technician in the 
so-called "Big Science" is a particularly vital one, given that a 
great deal of experimental work is carried out using sophisticated 
forms of instrumentation. A thorough understanding of the whims and 
caprices of a particular instrument is called for if the rogue 
experimental result is to be differentiated from the genuine one. But 
"Big Science" often requires more than just technicians for it to be 
successful. High energy physics is a case in point. Its success 
depends as much on the work of technologists and engineers as it does 
the researcher per se. Indeed, high energy physics has even spawned 
its own technology, "accelerator design", to cope with the whims and 
caprices of cyclotrons (Ziman, 1976, p.223). 
Then there are the various technical services associated with the 
processes of dissemination. The compilation of indexes and abstracts 
analysing periodical literature is of vital necessity to the quick 
distribution of knowledge. Research could not function adequately 
and efficiently unless such services were available. Disciplinary 
communities, then, need their bibliographer cognisers. 
But both these roles are essentially subsumable. They exist, not 
for themselves, but to serve the needs of the research cogniser. They 
function not as autonomous cognisers, but with the ends of research in 
mind. Without the research cogniser, they would be redundant. 
What all this points to is a theme which was developed ^ 5.9: 
that disciplinary communities require, to function properly and 
effectively, a certain number of essential roles. This Chapter has 
tried to delineate those roles and describe the responsibilities which 
accrue to those who possess them. There has also been an attempt to 
illustrate the nature of these responsibilities in terms of the 
epistemological triad. In a sense, then, Chapter Six has been a 
synthesis of the ideas and propositions in Chapter Three, and developed 
in Chapters Four and Five; and in a sense too, this Chapter completes 
what the study set out to do: namely to analyse the relationship 
between the epistemological and sociological dimensions of knowledge. 
It only remains therefore to summarize the findings of this study, to 
indicate the questions raised by it, and to suggest further areas of 
research which emerge from it. That is the task of the final chapter. 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This is my letter to the World 
That never wrote to Me -
The simple News that Nature told -
With tender Majesty 
Her message is committed 
To hands I cannot see -
(Emily Dickinson) 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The primary objective of this chapter will be to show that, 
although the study has now reached its conclusion and its final words, 
it is by no means the final word on those matters of knowledge it 
elected to examine. The chapter will be concerned with showing how 
the study opens more doors to other areas of investigation than it 
actually shuts and it will indicate that the study, far from being a 
terminus, is a terminus ad quo. 
But to return, for a moment, to the point of embarkation of this 
study. It will be recalled that that embarkation was sited in an area 
of the knowledge phenomenon that was called *epistemological 
sensitivity'. Several examples were cited of how it happens that 
knowledge can modify the way the world is perceived and generally alert 
the mind to aspects of reality normally close to the threshold of 
sensitivity. Understanding the mechanics of how it is knowledge flows 
onto and influences the way the world is regarded, and how it is that 
epistemological sensitivity develops, thus became the initial objectives 
of this study. They were the 'destinations* which this study set out 
to reach, and which, hopefully, within the preceding pages, have indeed 
been reached. Before, then, suggesting what sort of areas of investi-
gation remain to be examined if the features of epistemological 
sensitivity and its acquisition are to be fully understood, it will be 
useful to summarize the itinerary this study has taken to discover more 
about epistemological sensitivity and the disciplinary systems in which 
its acquisition occurs; and to point out what sort of discoveries and 
findings were made on that itinerary. 
7.2 THE 'JOURNEY' TO EPISTEMOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY 
In many respects, it could be said that the 'journey' to 
explaining epistemological sensitivity has taken two major routes. 
There was firstly that essentially epistemological 'route', and that 
involved explaining what a sensitivity due to knowledge really amounts 
to in terms of reality and the dispositions of the mind. Then there 
was the more sociological 'route', which entailed describing how it is 
within the context of a disciplinary community epistemological 
sensitivity is acquired; and once acquired, to what sort of purposes 
and ends within that community is that sensitivity employed. In the 
sense that these two distinct, though not necessarily antithetical 
'routes' are observable in this study, it could be said that its 
overall character is socio-epistemological in tenor. 
Apropos the epistemological 'strain' in that character: having 
recorded a number of examples which showed that it was possible for 
perception, after experiencing a 'milieu' of knowledge, to become 
aware of new aspects in and facets to the milieu of reality, the first 
parts of this study were primarily concerned with finding a way to 
represent this infusion of knowledge into perception. That infusion, 
which is really the prelude to development of epistemological sensi-
tivity, it was noted, represents the marriage of three components: 
knowledge, reality and mind or what have been called, respectively, in 
this study, cognition, the cogniser and the cognised. But before 
actually describing that marriage, and the possible relationships 
which could ensue from it, all the 'parties' to the marriage were 
first examined and described in some detail. It was found, amongst 
other things, for instance, that it was possible to develop a 
threefold 'taxonomy' of the cognised, in which it became feasible to 
classify all the various and diverse 'species' of reality under three 
main generic headings: the sub-organic, the organic and the supra-
organic cognised. These, so to speak, formed the divisions of 
reality to which the cogniser's attention could be potentially drawn. 
But it was also noted, when the 'nature' of the cogniser came to be 
characterized, that that 'attention' too had features which bore on 
the phenomenon of knowledge and the development of epistemological 
sensitivity. Considered prime amongst these features was the fact 
that in order to have a satisfactory experience of the cognised, the 
cogniser must in some way reduce the bulk of sensation that his senses 
have the potential to register. It was noted, that integrating 
experience and making templets of the possible progress of reality, 
supplied a way of forestalling the consequences of sensory 'overcharge' 
It was additionally noted, however, that it is possible, particularly 
when man has become so good at it, to take such stimulus reduction 
to an extreme whereby it then becomes necessary, if his perceptual 
faculties are not to suffer and become lethargic, for man to seek out 
new areas of sensory stimulation. And it was argued that it is 
from this strategy to compensate for under stimulation, that knowledge, 
or cognition, eventually springs. In this connection, it was said 
that, whilst knowledge sometimes seemingly does its best to conceal 
its sensory origins, it is really no more than an extension of 
perception. As such, it displays many of the features of the latter. 
Knowledge was thus considered to be one further attempt to integrate 
and reduce experience to more manageable proportions. It was 
suggested that it was just one more realization of that power to 
coalesce, that cognisers would seem to possess and are constantly 
preoccupied with applying. Knowledge, however, takes a multiplicity 
of forms, some of which succeed better than others at making integ-
rations and templets of the cognised. It was to show this, and the 
fact that the various forms of knowledge tend to form rather different 
alliances with the cognised, that a 'spectrum of knowledge' was drawn 
up. The spectrum tried to show that the complete range of knowledge 
can be located on a continuum that extends from those varieties of 
knowledge which form a demonstrable and testable nexus between them-
selves and the cognised, and those which do not. 
Once having thus detailed the character of the parties to the 
marriage between reality, mind and knowledge, the study then proceeded 
to try and find some way of representing that marriage. A useful 
analogue, it was discovered, could be found in those models of meaning 
that linguists have suggested operate between a name, its sense and 
the thing to which it refers (Ullman, 1970, p.57). It was argued 
that the relationship between cognition, the cognised and the cogniser 
is directly analogous, and could be represented schematically on the 
same equilateral triangle that is frequently used to represent the 
process of meaning. It was this analogue between meaning and the 
epistemological enterprise, then, which formed the basis of what was 
subsequently referred to as the 'knowledge triad'. 
The basic advantage of the triad, it was found, was its capacity 
to illustrate a number of facets of the epistemological enterprise in 
a relatively simple and succinct way. For instance, as well as being 
able to picture the basic structural elements of knowledge, the triad 
also made it possible to abstract some of the probable relationships 
that might occur in the epistemological enterprise, and the kinds of 
epistemological issue that might be subsequently given forth by those 
relationships. It was shown, for instance, that certain 'chromatic* 
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divisions on the spectrum of knowledge could be explained in terms of 
the suppression of certain relationships that might occur between 
particular radicals of the triad. But the most important facility of 
the triad in this regard proved to be its capacity to explain the 
progress of knowledge, particularly scientific knowledge. This was 
achieved by seeing the progress of knowledge as largely a matter of 
the modulation of dissonance, or augmentation of consonance between 
the cognition and cognised radicals of the triad. Modulation, it was 
suggested, amounted to bridging that heuristic gap which is prone to 
open up when a previously established consonance between the cognition 
and cognised radicals of the triad is shown to be false or illusory. 
However, it is not always the case that epistemological modulation is 
concerned with reinforcing the conjunction between C^ and C^. Some-
times, as is often the case with the arts, the focus of the modulation 
centres not so much on refining the content of C^, as on the methods 
for generating that content. But whether the dissonance involved owes 
its origins to a failure of method or content, its resolution, it was 
argued, always serves to alleviate psychological tension and discomfort 
in the cogniser. Removal of that tension and discomfort, in fact, 
acts as a motivation for cogniser activity. Yet whilst 'tension 
reduction' might serve to catalyse the search for knowledge, the 
cogniser, in order to carry out that reduction, must first sense 
tension in the triad. The capacity to do so, it was argued, in fact 
is very much dependent on the kinds of knowledge and theories that 
infuse a cogniser's vision of the world. Unless they are there, and 
in the right sort of variety and proportion, the cogniser will not even 
spot a possible dissonance between C^ and C^, let alone have the 
capacity to modulate it ! 
Concerned to explain how it was a cogniser came to identify 
'dissonances', it was at this juncture that the study changed direction, 
and instead of pursuing what had been pre-eminently an epistemological 
route, took one which was increasingly sociological in character. It 
had been noted, for instance, that the perception of epistemological 
dissonance was only open to those of an appropriate epistemological 
background. It required a particular mental training to do so, a 
training designed to supply the cogniser with the capacity, not only to 
identify dissonance, but also the methods to modulate it. And that 
training initially comes about in the essentially social context of 
institutionalized education; for it was argued that one of the primary 
functions of education is the socialization of cognisers into 
disciplinary communities. Education is the principal vendor, then, of 
an epistemological sensitivity appropriate to the need of resolving 
dissonances. But whilst it is principally through the agency of 
education that an epistemological sensitivity comes eventually to be 
'bought*, its buying is by no means a quick or an easy transaction. 
In fact, that transaction usually takes place over a considerable period 
of time, and it also passes through a number of distinct phases. It 
was in an effort to plot these phases that the 'disciplinary continuum' 
was put together. 
What that continuum attempted to show was the kind of institutional 
network that has tended to evolve in education in order to control 
admittance into disciplinary communities. For, whilst all people now 
have the franchise to some form of institutionalized education, the 
right to 'obtain' the most developed forms of epistemological sensiti-
vity tends to fall only to a few, carefully chosen and selected 
individuals. The continuum, in this respect, is an ability filter. 
For the vast majority who enter the 'gates* of education, and embark 
on the march along the 'disciplinary continuum' do not reach its end. 
They go to join instead the large world outside the knowledge industry, 
possessing, according to the phase along the disciplinary continuum 
they finally reached, only a partially developed epistemological 
sensitivity. But even those who, so to speak, 'stay the journey' and 
get to the point of being admitted into the 'metapaedeutic' parts of 
the continuum, few of them - even though they might possess the 
appropriate degree of epistemological sensitivity - ever actually end 
up modulating knowledge dissonances. It can be said, then, that the 
disciplinary continuum tends to overproduce well in excess of the 
numbers of cognisers actually required to advance certified knowledge. 
It was in order to explain why this surplus of cogniser 'manpower' 
was in fact necessary to the functioning of knowledge industries, that 
systems principles were introduced and the whole fabric of the know-
ledge industry treated as though it were an 'open system'. For if a 
disciplinary community is to survive, and that means in systems terms 
the staving off of entropy formation, it was argued that such 
communities need more sorts of cognisers to populate them than mere 
dissonance modulators. Disciplinary communities do not survive on 
the epistemological fruits of their frontiersmen. For one thing, in 
order for such communities to acquire such frontiersmen - who will have 
the appropriate capacity to modulate dissonance and advance the frontiers 
of certified knowledge - those frontiersmen must first pass along the 
disciplinary continuum. They must first be, it has been noted, 
initiated into the public form of knowledge that is a discipline. But 
that initiation, it was noted, is not a private affair. There are few 
self taught men occupying positions of real responsibility in 
disciplinary communities. Most would only get to such positions by 
passing along those channels that have been designated for the purpose 
in education. For the initiation into disciplinary communities largely 
occurs in the public arena of education, and is conducted by teachers 
who, by virtue of their superior and publicly accredited skills in a 
discipline, are charged with the responsibility of training student 
cognisers in its epistemological ways. It is through their teachers, 
then, that students come to inherit what it was noted were both the 
explicit and tacit aspects of a discipline's tradition. Without 
teachers to pass on what was called a discipline's 'DNA', that 
tradition might get ruptured and perhaps something of its essence 
irrevocably lost. 
Thus, the propaedeutic phases of the continuum, and the teacher 
cognisers who manage them, are as much a part of the fabric of the open 
system that is the knowledge industry as anything else in it. Indeed, 
they could be said to be amongst its most vital parts, for unless a 
disciplinary system secures for itself sufficient input of student 
cognisers to take over the roles currently occupied by an older 
generation of cognisers, the system will not find itself perpetuated. 
Its bureaucratic structure will collapse; it will degenerate into 
entropy. The knowledge industry, then, needs something like a 
disciplinary continuum to protect its continued existence and to 
maintain its homeostasis. Thus it was discovered that in order to 
maintain this homeostasis some of the cogniser input, who managed to 
reach the beginnings of the metapaedeutic phases of the continuum, are 
in fact fed back down that continuum, to manage and teach in some of 
its earlier phases. They, as it were, descend the continuum to take 
- 35A -
charge of the personnel ascent of student cognisers. 
Disciplinary communities, however, in order to sustain themselves, 
require more than just teacher cognisers. If such communities were 
populated solely with teachers, nothing more than the institutional 
status quo would end up being conserved and perpetuated. In fact 
disciplinary communities, and the institutions that are contained 
within them, are no more than a means to an end, that 'end* being the 
advance of certified knowledge. If that advance ceases, it was argued, 
the raison d*etre of a discipline evaporates, and the social structure 
needed to support its continued existence eventually becomes redundant. 
No new cognition, then, means that no new cognisers will be needed for 
the disciplinary community. 
The personnel services needed to produce new knowledge turn out to 
be as much a bureaucracy as that serving to educate and train cognisers. 
For the metapaedeutic phase - where the advancement of knowledge occurs -
tends to be rife with institutions and different types of cognisers, 
whose roles are various and diverse. It was discovered, for instance, 
that in addition to the 'research cogniser' who actually modulates 
dissonances, there are, in the metapaedeutic community, cognisers whose 
task it is to check the calibre and authenticity of a proposed 
modulation. Such cognisers, who were called 'evaluators', are, as it 
were, the agents of quality control in the disciplinary community. 
They serve to ensure the maintenance of epistemological standards; 
they make sure that the 'bridge' proposed to cross a heuristic gap will 
not collapse under the strain of criticism or empirical test. 
Then there are those cognisers whose role it is to disseminate the 
new knowledge gathered at the frontiers of research. They, as it were, 
broadcast to the disciplinary community at large the new epistemological 
'consonances' circulating in the metapaedeutic phase; they facilitate 
the descent of new knowledge to the earlier phases of the disciplinary 
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continuum. 
The second and sociological half of this study, then, was mainly 
concerned with identifying those roles that are essential to the 
functioning of a disciplinary system. The identification of the roles 
of researcher, teacher, disseminator and so on, thus was equivalent to 
developing a 'role typology' of a disciplinary community. It was a 
classification of the cogniser's possible roles, and it shared 
similarities with the earlier attempts to classify the cognised and 
cognition. But as if in order to vindicate the existence of the 
'knowledge triad', which the first half of the study was pre-eminently 
concerned with developing, some attempt was then made to relate this 
role typology to the structure of the knowledge triad, but in its 
amended form as a tetrad. By doing so, it became possible, for 
instance, to show that the teacher's role is essentially concerned 
with facilitating the passage of C^ knowledge along the 'b-dyad' to 
student cognisers; the researcher's with bridging any heuristic gap 
that might exist between C^ knowledge and the cognised; the 
evaluator's with testing the epistemological strength of that bridge, 
and so on. Having made those connections between the typology and 
the triad, a sjmthesis was achieved between the epistemological and 
sociological parts of the study, and the study was brought to a close. 
* * * * * 
In essence, this study has produced a number of what Black (1966, 
p.222) would call "analogue models" of various facets of the epistemo-
logical enterprise. Such models, according to Black, attempt to 
reproduce as faithfully as possible the structure of the originals on 
which they model themselves, and the webs of relationships which 
prevail there. The operative word here is 'faithfully', for one of 
the hazards of model building is that in scaling down (or up) an 
original, small details and nuances that would not have a massive 
distorting effect on the overall form of the model, tend to be over-
looked or omitted. Models, then, in the desire to encompass so much, 
inevitably are forced to leave out a great deal. There is a tendency 
for models thus to become but cartoons of the real. Some of the 
suggestions, then, for further research will be centred on fleshing out 
the knowledge triad, the disciplinary continuum, and the role typology, 
and showing that indeed there is likeness in these 'cartoons* of the 
knowledge enterprise. 
The other danger inherent in model building is the tendency to 
confer an absolute status on models that are built. It is not within 
the model's province to question the integrity and merit of the system 
being described and reproduced. Models only portray what is, not 
what ought to or could be; they are descriptive rather than evaluative 
devices. Yet plainly, where education is concerned, the principal 
finding of this study - that education is mainly subservient to the 
knowledge ideal in order to satisfy the personnel needs of disciplinary 
communities - could be a matter of debate and contention. Before 
examining, then, the sort of research that might be done to corroborate 
the thesis that education is but a 'service industry' to the 
disciplinary community, it might be worth asking the broad philosophical 
question, as to whether that 'thesis' is a wrong one for education to 
follow; and that schools perhaps ought to attempt other things than 
the realization of the knowledge ideal. 
7.3 EDUCATION AND THE PASSAGE TO KNOWLEDGE 
It is a regular homily in philosophy that an 'ought* cannot be 
derived from an 'is*, yet, it could be argued, this is precisely what 
has happened in education. For what, since the Nineteenth Century 
anyway, has evolved as a functional obligation of education - the need 
to satisfy the personnel requirements of disciplinary communities - is 
now frequently justified on the normative grounds that epistemological 
experience is good for human beings in general, irrespective of whether 
they eventually join disciplinary communities or not. An 'ought' 
justification, then, has tended to be used to justify what has become 
an 'is' situation, and that, on the surface at least, could be 
construed as being a questionable principle on which to base schooling 
and the contents of the curriculum. But questionable or not, it is 
this principle which this section will consider. 
Education might be a passage to knowledge, but it is only in the 
last three decades or so that all three layers of the disciplinary 
continuum have become hierarchically integrated (Dore, 1976, p.20). 
Each of those layers now contributes in some way to the eventual 
initiation of cognisers into the public forms of knowledge. Not that 
all educationalists find a rather premature orientation to the knowledge 
ideal to be undesirable. Indeed, some of them, in their philosophies, 
have made a virtual cult of the knowledge ideal. Followers of the 
'liberal education' tradition, in particular, as has been noted in this 
study, would see a schooling that idolises knowledge as not only 
desirable, but unavoidable if schools are not to engage in something 
that is a travesty of education. A school which does not engage its 
students, it is said, in the serious and systematic study of the 
intellectual, imaginative and cultural inheritance is technically not 
educating (Oakeshott, 1975, pp.21-22; Wilson, 1977, p. 13; Wamock, 
1977, p.19). Thus it is that most school curricula have tended to 
pay homage to that inheritance, although more often than not for 
functional rather than overtly normative reasons. For the average 
school curriculum draws its contents from representative areas of the 
knowledge spectrum, and most students, whatever their intellectual 
ability or range of interests, tend to experience something of a Cook's 
tour of man's intellectual achievements. Of course, this is all very 
convenient and desirable for those students destined to climb to the 
top of the educational ladder, but, as the more radically disposed 
educationalists have tended to ask, if the vast majority of students 
never get beyond the bottom rung of that ladder, and thereby only get 
a cursory glimpse of man's intellectual achievements, might not those 
students benefit from areas of human experience not normally labelled 
"cultural inheritance"? Perhaps if the curriculum changed its current 
centre of gravity and drew more from the practical affairs of life - the 
'ultra-violet' parts of the spectrum - schooling might do a great deal 
more good for a great many more. It could be that the very 
hierarchical integration which has served to knit together the various 
institutions of schooling, and concatenate into some logical order the 
process of learning, has paradoxically served to sabotage the possibility 
of an all-round education. After all, it is that integration which has 
served to introduce into the disciplinary continuum that great distemper 
to fair and just educational practice, the qualification. Securing it 
has tended to make the passage to knowledge, not so much a journey of 
inspiring enlightenment and awakening reverence for the cultural 
inheritance, but merely a matter of passing the next examination. 
Education, as a result, has tended to become mere qualification earning 
(Dore, 1976, p.ix). The disciplinary continuum, and the "filtering 
devices" that exist there to differentiate student ability, in this 
sense, serve to debase, not support, a normative justification for 
education. 
There are a number of questions, then, that need to be raised in 
connection with education's apparent allegiance to the knowledge ideal. 
Firstly, ought there to be that allegiance anyway? After all, it only 
seems to be philosophical hearsay, not empirical fact, that existential 
benefits accrue from experiencing knowledge and the cultural inheritance. 
Man, it could turn out, is equally able and competent at existence 
without them. There might be many other domains of human endeavour 
from which the vast majority of mankind could benefit apart from what 
is included on the knowledge spectrum. But even if there are not, and 
it can conclusively be proved that knowledge holds the key to the health 
of the human condition, need the initiation into the public forms take 
place in its current format? 
If it is held that the appreciation of the cultural inheritance, 
and the forms of knowledge it embraces, is desirable then it has been 
a conclusion of this study that that appreciation can not spontaneously 
be acquired. An individual only comes to take possession of that 
appreciation after a protracted period of epistemological training and 
exposure to knowledge. At present, education supplies the context in 
which that protracted training occurs. The format, however, in which 
that training tends to be conducted, has tended to evolve by accident 
rather than by design. There might, then, be logically sound and 
empirically advantageous ways of arranging that training. For 
instance, one of the findings of this study is that the sciences are 
more likely to be compatible with the intellectual proclivities of 
young children, whereas the arts seem to have much more appeal during 
adolescence. This would perhaps suggest that more emphasis should be 
given to the sciences in the primary phases of the continuum, and more 
to the arts during the second. 
Then there is the question of whether 'personnel ascent* on the 
continuum need occur exactly in the phases that appear to 
have evolved. If that continuum is regarded, as it has been in this 
study, as the preliminary intellectual route a student cogniser must 
follow if he is eventually to secure a place in a disciplinary community, 
could there not be other routes for gaining that admission? Does the 
training of cognisers necessarily have to follow consecutively the 
stages of the continuum, or can there be some interruption, as is often 
proposed between secondary and tertiary phases for instance, in that 
progress? Might it not be better, as Dorè (1976, p.143) has proposed, 
if the "entry port" to a disciplinary community, along with the 
professions in general, commenced, not at 22, but at the age of 15 or 
16? At that early age, the would-be cogniser would start his training 
as a research assistant or a secretary to a university department, and 
continue his knowledge training concurrently, so to speak, "in-career". 
But the only way to measure the efficacy of such proposals, or whether 
genuine and practical alternatives to the current modes of disciplinary 
apprenticeship are indeed needed, is to discover how successful these 
modes are. However, such discoveries are a matter of empirical 
assessment, and belong properly to the category of 'is' rather than 
'ought' questions about disciplinary initiation and apprenticeship. 
7.4 THE PASSAGE TO KNOWLEDGE: SOME POSSIBLE AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH 
Whilst much of what has been said in this study has been abstracted 
from what would appear to be the empirical facts about knowledge, the 
models which have been produced from that abstraction really need now to 
be inductively corroborated. This section will suggest areas in which 
that inductive corroboration would appear to be most needed, or 
desirable, because it might yield further important understandings 
about the character of the epistemological enterprise. 
Firstly, there is no reason to suppose that the general principles 
of enculturation and their effects are necessarily exclusive to the 
arena of man's epistemological activities. Presumably, any cultural, 
social and technological activity that is worthwhile perpetuating and 
that is subject to innovation as it passes from generation to generation, 
will follow analogous practices to those of replication and modification 
encountered in knowledge communities. There is a possibility, then, 
that the model of the discipline could be extrapolated to other areas of 
human activity. 
Secondly, an effect of exploring the specialized sensitivity that 
arises out of pursuing particular avocations might be that the nature 
of a knowledge outlook and epistemological sensitivity might itself be 
better understood. For whilst epistemological sensitivity has been 
very much the keynote of this study, as a disposition it has only been 
rather broadly defined. If epistemological sensitivity, with its own 
set of conceptual and perceptual biases, is one of the principal 
cumulative products of education, then plainly anything which more 
specifically describes how a sensitivity to knowledge is engendered and 
developed will have profound repercussions on the nature and practise 
of education. 
Thirdly, a related question is, what happens to epistemological 
sensitivity when dissonance is uncovered? It has been argued that 
psychological feelings of discomfort are registered which do not finally 
vanish until consonance is restored. That would be an area that the 
autobiographies of scientists and artists might yield support for in 
plenty. For if epistemological problems are a source of anxiety and 
tension, then it would be expected that cognisers who have encountered 
such tension and anxiety would describe it as such. In fact, the use 
of autobiographies, as well as the types of longitudinal study that 
Getzels and Csikszentmihalyi (1976) engaged in, might yield considerably 
more understanding about the results and processes of disciplinary 
apprenticeship than perhaps has been hitherto available. It has been 
said in this study, for instance, that the *inter-cogniser* rapport 
which occurs between a teacher and a student is a fairly necessary 
feature in the 'institutional* replication of a discipline, yet little 
is actually known about what happens in this perhaps most key process 
of learning. Autobiographies of prominent scientists, artists and 
philosophers might supply certain insights about what it is that happens 
between a student and his teachers. Perhaps such research might 
indicate what qualities in a teacher ultimately proselytize students to 
their discipline and their epistemological ways of thinking. Perhaps 
it might be discovered that that proselytization is often a compounding 
of a number of factors, of which the teacher's influence is but one. 
There are several questions about the composition of the knowledge 
spectrum that also need further exploration and clarification. There 
are, for instance, the wholly speculative questions about whether, with 
the emergence of science, the spectrum has ceased evolving; and 
whether, should epistemologica! positivism reign supreme, all the 
other and older forms of knowledge will become accommodated in the 
domain of science? Or will the divisions in the spectrum of knowledge 
continue to remain much as they are now, and instead of aping the 
sciences, seek out their own autonomous methodologies? Or could it 
be that the epistemologica! possibilities of positivism have reached 
their limit, and that further understanding about man and the universe 
will increasingly be speculative and philosophical in character? 
Instead of knowledge continuing to move towards the right, it could be 
that knowledge will once again begin to exhibit the features of left-
hand knowledge. 
Then further questions should be raised about the fundamental 
differences between the arts and the sciences. The chronology of 
scientific revolutions by now have been well documented, yet if 
revolutions in the arts, as has been asserted in this study, are mainly 
of a methodological kind, their chronology has not been equivalently 
documented. The forces generating method dissonance, and the accep-
tance of the subsequent modulation were only superficially examined in 
this study; yet if the structure of artistic revolutions, as being 
based on the principle of method dissonance, is to be understood, then 
a history of modal changes in the arts could perhaps be drawn up. 
Could it b e , too, that changes in the other non-scientifically based 
disciplines, like philosophy, are also modally based? Certainly the 
changeover from the 'idealism* that a Nineteenth Century philosopher 
like Bradley practised to the 'linguistic analysis', which became the 
virtual emblem of Anglo-Saxon philosophy in the first half of the 
Twentieth Century, could be regarded as a modal change. For after 
that change, instead of the pure speculation of idealism, philosophers 
engaged in an examination of the words that were used for that 
speculation. They altered, as it were, their method of approach to 
philosophical problems. 
The systems treatment of a disciplinary community raises certain 
quantitative questions about the minimum (or maximum) number of 
cognisers such communities need to function properly and thereby 
achieve a personnel homeostasis. It was noted in this study how, for 
instance, when a discipline becomes too large and its interest becomes 
too broad in compass, it tends to proliferate sub-disciplines. It 
might be worth ascertaining, then, the minimum number of cognisers 
(and of what type and variety) that are required to found and make such 
a sub-discipline a viable proposition. 
Questions of a quantitative kind might also be asked about the 
various role cognisers. It should be possible to quantify the time 
spent in fulfilling each role, as that pertains, for example, to a 
polymorphous cogniser. Is it the case with the polymorphous cogniser 
that one role predominates over all the rest? Does, as has been 
suggested in the study, the cogniser in the metapaedeutic sector, do 
most of his most significant research when comparatively young, and 
then for the remainder of his career turn to administration or teaching 
as the principal focus of his interests? His role as a research 
cogniser tends to fade into the background with the coming of age. 
But if this is true, as it seems to be, with physicists and mathema-
ticians, is it equally true of philosophers and literary critics? Or 
do their capacities as researchers and contributors to knowledge flower 
comparatively late in life? Certainly, this was the case with Kant, 
who did not publish anything until he was 59! If the 'publish or 
perish ethic' had prevailed at the University of Konisberg in the 
Eighteenth Century, then the world would possibly not now have the 
Critique of pure reason! Equally, there is the related question as 
to whether disciplinary connnunities need to be as highly populated with 
cognisers to secure highly significant epistemological results. There 
is some evidence to suggest - cited ̂  Chapter Six - that really high 
calibre contributions to knowledge would appear to come from a fixed 
and finite number of cognisers in each generation. The greater 
number doing research only seem to add to the bulk of relatively 
mediocre knowledge, not to that which is revolutionary. It could be 
argued, then, that the numbers working in the knowledge industry could 
be severely cut back, and the advancement of knowledge would not suffer 
unduly. Yet mankind's per capita involvement in the knowledge 
industry continues to rise faster than the population (Price, 1963, p.16). 
It has recently been calculated that the number whose professional 
activity is predominantly mental (professors, research scientists, men 
of letters and artists) has reached, in the most progressive countries, 
in the order of 10% of the active population (Fourastie, 1976, p.2). 
It could be, then, with more manpower 'investment* in the knowledge 
industry, that the law of diminishing returns might commence to prevail, 
and the growth of knowledge might, comparatively speaking, contract 
rather than grow. Or it could be, since communication would appear to 
be the life blood of any discipline, that the sheer quantity of 
knowledge being produced might inhibit communication and the sort of 
disciplinary cross fertilization from which new knowledge is generated. 
It has been noted how the proliferation of new sub-disciplines is often 
a way of combatting this hazard. But the hazard of this 
'sub-disciplinization' is the increased concentration on very small 
areas of specialization, often at the expense of having a general 
purview of reality. The areas of theoretical coverage that a know-
ledge encompasses could become smaller and smaller, and less and less 
general, as the number of sub-disciplines increases. The knowledge 
explosion could have, as one of its shock effects, an implosion of 
disciplinary interest, which might make it more difficult for a Newton 
or an Einstein, in the future, to emerge on the scenario of knowledge. 
Another problem needing further examination is the matter of 
'content descent*. It was said that the school science curriculum -
and the same is probably true of other areas of knowledge - is usually 
about a generation behind the latest developments in scientific 
knowledge. But what was not examined is how it is that the content 
of the curriculum is brought up to date and modernized. It has been 
said that there is a group of cognisers in each disciplinary community 
called 'disseminators*, who, as it were, promulgate the newest develop-
ments in knowledge: but, given the bulk of new knowledge, it is worth 
asking what sort of criteria they use to carry out that selection. 
And how, once that selection has been made, does that knowledge 
eventually end up in the teacher's 'hands'? The dynamics of 'content 
descent' are not well understood, and perhaps need to be, lest, as has 
tended to happen in literature, the forces and powers responsible for 
curriculum change, are subject to pressure and lobby by publishing 
houses keen to see their poets and novelists on the literature 
curricula of universities (Kostelanetz, 1974). It might not be, then, 
the disinterestedness and objectivity of knowledge that determines what 
is promoted as desirable new knowledge worth learning, but simply the 
self interest of organizations like publishers, who are more often 
interested in selling their books rather than the knowledge contained 
within them. It has been noted, for instance, how the publishers. 
Penguin, who once aimed their Pelican books at the general reader, now 
have a conscious policy of aiming the 'Pelican* at students "in the 
polytechnics and the universities" (Dore, 1976, p.32). The course 
text is a thoroughly lucrative market for publishers, probably only 
outranked in its profit potential by the popular best seller. The 
trouble with publishers is that they have a tendency to promote the 
popularizers in a particular discipline. This often has a malevolent 
effect on parasitic disciplines, for example education, which tend to 
draw on parent disciplines like anthropology and psychology for many of 
their insights. Whilst in the field of professional anthropology the 
work of Kluckholn, Mead and Benedict tends not to be trusted and 
respected, in education it is the work of these popularizers that is 
cited most frequently. The work of the purely scholarly anthropologist, 
which is often more subtle and profound than that of the popularizers, 
is often overlooked or eschewed. Because it is rarely given the same 
attention by publishers, it rarely becomes essential reading for the 
educationalist interested in the anthropological dimensions of teaching 
and learning (Spindler, 1955). 
7.5 AND IN CONCLUSION 
It is difficult to do full justice to a problem like knowledge, 
more so when it is realized that, as a problem, knowledge had 
preoccupied some of the best minds in the pantheon of Western culture, 
over two thousand years. This study has not tried to understand what 
knowledge is in the most general and fundamental sense - in the sense, 
for instance, in which Socrates asked Theaetetus to define knowledge 
(Plato, 1973b). Rather it has attempted to understand the nature of 
knowledge in its most substantive form, as that form manifests itself 
in education, in epistemological sensitivity and in the disciplinary 
community. This study, then, has not allowed itself to be diverted 
by the problem of the Skeptics or Pyrrhon, and worried about whether 
man can ever have knowledge about anything at all. It has accepted 
that knowledge is something of a fait accompli, and in doing so, has 
come to examine how that knowledge becomes an accomplished fact. That 
has always been the major focus of interest in this study. It is only 
to be hoped that in pursuing that interest, the insights into knowledge 
that have been gained are not 'stillborn*, but evoke further interest 
and possible research into the areas that have been suggested in the 
concluding chapter of the study. 
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SEMIOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY 
Of all areas of understanding that could have inspired the 
'knowledge triad', it is that of language, in particular semiology, 
which is principally responsible, not only for the form the triad takes, 
but also the vocabulary that has been used to identify its components. 
It is no accident, then, that the elements of the triad have been 
named 'cogniser', 'cognised* and 'cognition'; for anyone familiar with 
the 'sign talk' of Saussurean linguistics will immediately recognize 
the inflexional homology that these terms bear with "signifier" and 
"signified" - the two major components of a "significance" system. 
Not that the homology extends completely to the concepts inherent in 
these two sets of terms. Whilst, for example, there is a degree of 
parallelism - although not total - between cognised and signified, 
a signifier is by no means a cogniser in a semantic rather than an 
epistemological costume. The difference between the terms is one of 
focus rather than straightforward contradistinction. For in the 
knowledge triad the cogniser takes on the dimension of a human persona; 
and whilst it is possible to extrapolate this persona from the nature 
of a signifier , in strict Saussurean terms signifier refers to that 
"sound-image" part of a sign which conveys meaning. Signifier embraces 
the possible morphological and phonetic elements of a sign vehicle. 
It is the "plane of expression" as opposed to the "plane of content", 
or meaning in a sign. Saussure in fact uses the term signified to 
encapsulate the features associated with the latter (Barthes, 1967, 
pp.39-42; Saussure, 1966, pp.66-67). 
As far as the semiology of Saussure is concerned, it is only the 
"signifier" aspects of his terminology which have been inspirational. 
The "signified" concepts associated with that terminology are seemingly 
less appropriate to the knowledge triad than the evident "signifier" 
homologies would indicate. Not that the realms of semiology and 
epistemology are that distant from one another that it would be 
entirely inconceivable that an analogue for knowledge might be found in 
meaning. It is just that Saussure, in this regard, is not so apposite 
as the partial *take over* of his terms would impute. 
The possible propinquities between language and knowledge, however, 
have not escaped the notice of all semiologists. There have been 
attempts, for instance, to show that the compass of knowledge and the 
expressive range of language are, in some respects, collateral. The 
range of possibilities inherent in language can be seen as reflecting 
a basic antimony in epistemological discourse in general. For instance, 
if the compass of that antimony can be located between poetic and 
scientific types of discourse, then language too reflects that 
epistemological antimony. It is the option of language, then, that 
it yields to the possibility of being objective and emotive at one and 
the same time; and that poetic is the obverse of scientific discourse 
(Richards, 1970, p.31). It is a matter of the former capitalizing on 
everything that is absolutely anathema to the latter; of scientific 
discourse, for instance, purging itself of all the connotative and 
"polysémie" effects that are the *aura* of ordinary language (Guiraud, 
1975, pp.56-57). What is bane for science is boon for poetry. 
In fact, it is possible to go beyond the basic Richardian antimony 
and find all sorts of possible specialization in linguistic discourse. 
Morris (1946,pp.124-126)did this when he tried classifying the compass 
of epistemological discourse in terms of its "mode/use" dominance. He 
posited that there are four possible signifying modes: designative. 
appraisive, prescriptive and formative, which can be put to four 
possible epistemologica! usages: informative, valuative, incitive or 
systemic. On this basis, Richards* poetic and scientific discourses 
become appraisive/valuative and designative/informative discourses 
respectively. In fact Morris' "mode/use" classification offers the 
possibility of sixteen major types of discourse within the spectrum of 
knowledge (see 4.6). 
But above all it is the semiological models of meaning that have 
most propinquity to the knowledge triad. Perhaps this is not so 
surprising because, after all, knowledge and language can both be 
regarded as templets of the world around which notions are drawn and 
explanations conceived. They both operate within a sphere in which an 
agent of consciousness tries to make a partnership between knowledge 
or language and the world which exists beyond the corporeal limits of 
the agent. The process of semiosis, for instance, has been described 
as a "co-operation of three subjects ... a sign, its objects, and its 
interpretant" (Peirce, 1934, p.484). Meaning is a triangular relation-
ship, a fact which Ogden and Richards (1936, p.10) in their famous 
representation of the process of meaning took to be quite literally 
true: 
THOUGHT OR REFERENCE 
CORRECT / \ ADEQUATE 
symbolises a / \ refer to other 
causal relation / \ connectedness 
SYMBOL REFERENT 
Stands for 
imputed relation 
TRUE 
This not only looks like the knowledge triad, but, with one or two 
elementary modifications, can in fact be regarded as an analogue of it. 
Those modifications mainly centre around the ambiguity of Ogden*s and 
Richards' terminology. In fact, exceedingly vexed by that terminology, 
Ullman was encouraged to simplify it altogether by suggesting that what 
Ogden and Richards meant by thought, symbol and referent were "sense", 
"name" and "thing" respectively (Ullman, 1970, p.57); or simpler still, 
Peirce*s terms: a sign, its objects,and its referents. And these 
three things of course correspond to what in the knowledge triad have 
been called cognition, cognised and cogniser. 
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- APPENDIX II -
GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
Because it has been felt useful to devise a relatively independent 
nomenclature to designate some of the models and concepts used in this 
study, a glossary of the commoner terms used in that nomenclature 
follows. In particular, a glossary recommends itself because many of 
the terms used are what Scheffler (1962, p.13) would call "inventive 
stipulative": that is, they are different from conventional usage or 
are consciously invented neologisms that seem to suit the semantic need 
at hand. 
It is to be hoped, then, that this glossary will help to overcome 
the problem that a reviewer encountered in reading a recent book on 
semiology: it was so crammed full of "inventive stipulatives" that he 
found himself unable to remember from one page to the next the difference 
between parole and langue, and the difference between difference and 
differance! In such circumstances, a glossary might have acted, as it 
is intended to do here, as an aide-memoire. 
GLOSSARY 
COGNISED (C.) - refers to that to which all knowledge and experience d 
is addressed. It is the 'object* in the knowing process, 
and can either take a sub-organic, organic or supra-organic 
form (see 4.2). 
COGNISER (C^) - is the agent of consciousness in the epistemological 
enterprise. It is he who has the capacity to translate his 
experience of the cognised into knowledge (see A.3). 
- 3 75 -
COGNITION (C ) - results from the translation of experience into 
n 
epistemological terms. It can be taken as knowledge about 
the cognised (see 4.4). 
CONSONANCE - is the condition of epistemological harmony between 
cognition and cognised, which exists when the former appears 
accurately to translate the latter into knowledge terms 
(see 4.11). 
DISCIPLINARY CONTINUUM - is an attempt to represent the stages and 
procedures a cogniser normally must pass through in order to 
gain admittance into a disciplinary community. It is an 
attempt to tell the 'life-history* of a cogniser (see 5.6). 
DISSONANCE - erupts when the translation of cognised into cognition 
is not as accurate as was supposed. In fact, it proves to 
be erroneous (see 4.11). 
EPISTEMOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY - is the compounded outlook, drawn from 
knowledge, that a cogniser has on the cognised (see 1.1). 
KNOWLEDGE SPECTRUM - encapsulates the range of knowledge modes that 
have evolved to describe and investigate the various phenomena 
in the cognised (see 4.6). 
KNOWLEDGE TRIAD - is formed from the three basic elements - cognised, 
cogniser and cognition - that have been identified as forming 
the principal elements in all epistemological enterprises. 
The model indicates the possible interactions that are 
permissible between these three elements (see 4.9). Note that 
the knowledge tetrad is that amended form of the triad which 
has been used to accommodate the social dimension of knowledge 
(see 6.2). 
METAPAEDEUTIC PHASE - represents the final part of the continuum in 
which knowledge and research are produced (see 5.6). 
MODULATION - is that epistemological action which renders a 
dissonance consonant (see 4.11). 
PRE-PAEDEUTIC PHASE - is that phase in a cogniser's 'life history' 
which occurs before he embarks on the disciplinary continuum, 
It is the cognitive state of pre-epistemological awareness 
(see 5.6). 
PROPAEDEUTIC PHASE - can be regarded as that phase of the continuum 
during which a cogniser*s initiation into the public forms 
of knowledge occurs. It is a phase during which epistemo-
logical sensitivity develops. (see 5.6). 
ROLE TYPOLOGY OF COGNISERS - represents an attempt to classify 
cognisers according to the role they hold within a 
disciplinary community (see 6.3 et seq.). 
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